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Telecoms industry is a highly specialised industry and there is a general consensus 
that it requires a specially designed regulatory system. Besides the many 
technology-oriented regulations, this regulatory system not only integrates many 
economic theories and concepts taken from competition law, but also features several 
measures designed ad hoc to deal with the character of the industry, such as a natural 
monopoly, bottlenecks and a public service. A major category of these regulatory 
measures is forced access mechanisms. "Forced access" in this thesis refers to the 
forcing open of certain property – mostly telecoms networks and relevant facilities – 
to be accessed by others, especially other competitors in the market. While these 
mechanisms do indeed promote competition in the telecoms market and benefit the 
public, they also limit the fundamental rights of telecoms companies – mostly 
incumbents – as legal persons, especially concerning their property rights and 
freedom to conduct a business, and it does not need emphasising further that the 
protection of fundamental rights is a general principle in the European Union and a 
constitutional value in modern democratic states. This thesis aims to take three 
distinct telecoms forced access mechanisms (interconnection, local loop unbundling 
and separation), with different regulatory intensities, as examples to discuss the 
possible fundamental rights derogation issues of two targeted jurisdictions – the 
European Union and Taiwan. There are some substantial reasons for this comparative 
study. On the one hand, many of the regulatory concepts of the telecoms regulatory 
framework in the European Union, together with those in the United States, have been 
adopted by Taiwan; on the other hand, the protection of fundamental rights in the 
European Union is inspired by the constitutional traditions common to Member States, 
and the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) plays an important role, while the 
Taiwanese Constitution and the constitutionality reviews system derive from Germany 
(continental law) and the United States (common law). The reasoning of Taiwanese 
constitutional review does not therefore just reflect the fundamental rights protection 
system but also introduces the constitutionality review system of the United States as 
a reference. 
 
This thesis starts with an introduction to telecoms forced access mechanisms in the 
European Union and Taiwan, with a special focus on three selected forced access 
mechanisms. Then, fundamental rights protection system under the two jurisdictions 
will be discussed, followed by an in-depth discussion of the concepts of property 
rights and freedom to conduct a business. This thesis goes on to analyse how to 
 ii 
appraise the three telecoms forced access mechanisms in relation to the fundamental 
rights protection system and to discuss the reasonableness of such an analysis. The 
final part of the thesis will, by reviewing the legal frameworks of the two jurisdictions, 
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3G: The third generation of developments in wireless technology, especially mobile 
communications. 
4G: The fourth generation of developments in wireless technology, especially mobile 
communications. 
ADSL: Asymmetric digital subscriber line. 
BEREC: Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications. 
BT: British Telecom. 
CATV: Cable television. 
CFR: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
CHT: ChungHwa Telecom. 
DGT: Directorate General of Telecommunications of Taiwan. 
ECHR: European Convention on Human Rights. 
ECtHR: European Court of Human Right. 
EOI: Equivalence of input.  
EOO: Equivalence of output. 
ERG: The European Regulators Group. 
EU: The European Union. 
FCC: Federal Communications Commission of the United States. 
FTC: Fair Trade Commission of Taiwan. 
Fundamental rights: May include fundamental rights and freedoms where applicable.  
GIO: Government Information Office of Taiwan. 
IBC: Infrastructure-based competition. 
IRG: The Independent Regulators Group. 
LTE: Long-Term Evolution, a standard for wireless communication. 
MOTC: Ministry of Transportation and Communications of Taiwan. 
MVNO: Mobile virtual network operator. 
NCC: National Communications Commission. 
NGN: Next Generation Networks. 
NRA: National Regulatory Authority. 
Ofcom: The communications regulator in the UK. 
ONP: Open network provision. 
POI: Point of interconnection. 
SBC: Service-based competition.  
SMP: Significant market power. 
 x 
TEC: Treaty establishing the European Community. 
TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
Telco: Telecommunications companies or telecommunications operators. 
Telecoms: Telecommunications. 
TEU: Treaty on European Union. 
VAN: Value-added network.  
VDSL: Very-high-speed digital subscriber line. 
VOIP: Voice over IP. 
WTO: World Trade Organisation.
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Chapter I Introduction 
 
1. Background of the Research 
Telecoms regulation is unique due to its many specific characteristics of the telecoms 
industry. First, it has a public-service nature, and in most countries telecoms services 
evolved from the liberalisation of the public telecoms department.1 Secondly, it has to 
engage with innovative developments in telecommunications ("telecoms") 
technologies. Thirdly, the telecoms industry is usually regarded as a natural 
monopoly;2 therefore, in addition to being a form of sector-specific regulation, many 
important concepts and ideas developed in the field of competition law are applied in 
telecoms regulations.3     
 
Among these regulations, one kind of regulation, or mechanism, is forced access to 
telecoms networks. The term "forced access" is defined differently by agencies and 
individuals. This thesis adopts the broadest definition, which is considered to be 
obligatory access to a telecommunications company's ("telco") physical or virtual 
networks by other telcos. The main reason for such forced access is the natural 
monopoly found in the telecoms market, and this mechanism serves to eliminate or 
reduce competition difficulties caused by the advantages of owning key network 
                                                 
1 The only exception is the United States, where telecoms services were first provided by private 
persons. 
2 See for example: Posner, R. A. (1999). Natural monopoly and its regulation, Cato Institute; 
Depoorter, B. W. (1999). "Regulation of natural monopoly." Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Part 
V-Regulation of contracts. For an opposing opinion, see: Thierer, A. D. (1994). "Unnatural monopoly: 
critical moments in the development of the Bell system monopoly", Cato J. 14: 267. 
3 For a discussion of the relationship between competition law and sector-specific legislation, 
especially in the European Union, see European Commission (1998). "Notice on the application of the 
competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector.", available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=OJ:C:1998:265:TOC (accessed Apr 2016). 
 
 2 
facilities.4    
 
It is easy to imagine that the owners of networks – in most cases the incumbent telco – 
are subject to certain restrictions on the use of their networks by such obligations. As 
these networks are their property, exercising their right to property will be limited; at 
the same time, forced access to their networks means that their freedom to use such 
networks, and to negotiate their use, an important component of the freedom to 
conduct a business, will be limited as well.5 However, these forced-access 
mechanisms, as a form of sector-specific regulation, despite possible interference with 
or restriction on the fundamental rights and freedoms of telcos, are seldom challenged 
on the basis of their legality or constitutionality. This is because of the adherence to 
the principle of the separation of powers, and judicial respect for the decisions made 
by legislative and administrative departments. This is especially true in the field of 
sector-specific regulations or regulations about expert areas, to which telecoms forced 
access mechanisms belong.6 
 
The judicial departments' seeming reluctance to exercise their power raises a question. 
As discussed later in this thesis, different telecoms forced access mechanisms may 
entail different levels of interference in fundamental rights and freedoms. The 
reluctance to conduct a review implies that this interference is legitimate or 
constitutional, an assumption which is not legitimate or constitutional in itself under 
the idea of separate powers. To be specific, the questions that should be asked here are: 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion of the meaning and functions of telecoms forced-access mechanism see 
Chapters Two and Three. 
5 The meaning and scope of the right to property and freedom to conduct a business will be discussed 
in relevant chapters, such as Chapters Six to Nine. 
6 See discussions in Chapters Ten and Eleven. 
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is it legitimate or appropriate to adopt a deferential approach when reviewing the 
legality of telecoms forced access mechanisms that severely interfere with or restrict 
fundamental rights and freedoms? And is it legitimate or appropriate to review the 
legality of telecoms forced access mechanisms that severely interfere with or restrict 
fundamental rights and freedoms in accordance with the same criteria employed when 
measures do not constitute such severe interference or restrictions? With regard to 
these questions, this thesis examines the legality and constitutionality of the three 
most commonly used telecoms forced access mechanisms – interconnection, 
local-loop unbundling and separation.7 It does so with reference to the constitutional 
and legal frameworks of the European Union and Taiwan, and focuses on two 
fundamental rights and freedoms that are most vulnerable to the implementation of 
telecoms forced access mechanisms: the right to property and the freedom to conduct 
a business. 
 
2. Research Questions 
According to the discussion above, this thesis proposes the following research 
questions. 
(1) How does the judicial review system work in the European Union and Taiwan, i.e. 
how is the legality or constitutionality of legislative or administrative regulatory 
measures reviewed by the court in these two jurisdictions? 
 
(2) To what kind of judicial review are telecoms forced access mechanisms subject in 
the two targeted jurisdictions, i.e. what are the criteria for judicial review of these 
mechanisms? Why? 
                                                 





(3) Should the criteria for judicial review of telecoms forced access mechanism be 
distinguished, for example, by the intensity of the interference with fundamental 
rights and freedoms? In other words, should different telecoms forced access 
mechanisms be subject to different intensities of judicial review? 
  
(4) Are the current judicial review criteria for telecoms forced access mechanisms in 
the European Union and Taiwan reasonable? Why? And if not, how should they be 
improved or adjusted? 
 
3. Methodology 
The basic logic for this thesis is a two stage legal Syllogism. To be specific, in the first 
stage: 
Major premise: What are the different criteria (A, B,…Z) for review of 
constitutionality and legality of different regulatory measures (a, b,…z), if there are 
more than one criterion?  
Minor premise: Telecoms forced access mechanisms are a type of (a) regulatory 
measure. 
Conclusion: Criterium A should be applied to review the constitutionality and legality 
of telecoms forced access mechanisms. 
 
In the second stage: 
Major premise: Criterion A 
Minor premise: Telecoms forced access mechanisms 
Conclusion: Applying criterion A to examine the constitutionality and legality of 
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telecoms forced access mechanism. 
 
To give a better idea about telecoms forced access mechanism, and why the 
constitutionality and legality of telecoms forced access mechanisms is important, this 
thesis will discuss these telecoms forced access mechanism in the earlier chapters (see 
below (5)). 
 
The methodology used in this thesis is primarily a literature review, with a 
supplementary methodology of empirical study. As for the European Union, the 
materials studied in this thesis include the case law of the European Court of Justice 
and European General Court, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, European Union legal instruments such as regulations, directives and 
recommendations. Although the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is 
not a European Union legal instrument, and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) is not a European Union court, because of the importance of the ECHR in 
the protection of fundamental rights in the European Union, the connection made by 
the Treaty of Lisbon,8 and the mass of detailed case law, for the purpose of this study, 
they will also be included in the discussion. 
 
As for Taiwan, the research materials include the Official Interpretations of the 
Constitution made by Grand Justices, legal instruments of telecoms regulation and 
scholarly discussions. 
 
4. Contributions to the Field 
                                                 
8 See discussions in Chapter Four. 
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Fundamental or human rights issues which arise in sector-specific areas never draw 
significant scholarly attention. Ameye (2004)9 and Andreangeli (2012)10 have 
discussed the relationship between competition law and human rights, but focused on 
human right issues in the competition proceedings in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 
such as the right to a fair trial and to an effect remedy. Naser (2009)11 also discussed 
the relationship between freedom of speech and trademarks. But these studies fell 
short of the discussions about the constitutionality and legality of economic rights 
such as the right to property and freedom to conduct a business. 
 
This thesis chooses the European Union and Taiwan for comparative models for the 
following reasons: 
a. First, the European Union's telecoms regulatory framework is one regime that 
Taiwan has favoured as a source for regulatory approaches in recent years. 
However, Taiwan also adopts many regulatory ideas from the United States.12 It is 
interesting to see how the regulatory ideas from these two jurisdictions integrate 
and interact with each other in a third jurisdiction, i.e., will a approach that is 
compromised with the considerations of those in the European Union or the 
United States be more reasonable than its precedents? 
b. Despite the different situations of telecoms markets, such as the development of 
telecoms technologies within Member States, the European Union is a 
supranational organization that aims to achieve a single market (internal market), 
                                                 
9 Ameye, E. M. (2004). "The Interplay between Human rights and competition law in the EU." 
European Competition Law Review 25(6): 332-341. 
10 Andreangeli, A. (2012). "Competition law and human rights: striking a balance between business 
freedom and regulatory intervention." The Global Limits of Competition Law, ed. Ioannis Lianos and D. 
Daniel Sokol: 22-36. 
11 Naser, M. A. (2009). "Trademarks and Freedom of Expression." IIC-International Review of 
Intellectual Property and competition Law 40 (2): 188-205. 
12 See discussion in Chapter Three. 
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and the European legal system – including the telecoms regulatory framework – 
features with doctrines of supremacy and direct effect. Taiwan, on the other hand, 
is a unitary country, and the adoption of regulatory measures only needs to 
consider the appropriation of the said measure within Taiwan. It is interesting to 
examine the different effects and applicability of legislation and its 
constitutionality and legality in these two jurisdictions. 
c. The third point concerns the judicial review of the legality and constitutionality of 
regulatory measures. Taiwan has traditionally adopted constitutional and legal 
theories from Continental European countries, such as Germany, but in recent 
years, the constitutional review system in the United States was also introduced in 
Taiwan.13 On the other hand, constitutional theories in Germany are also a major 
source from which the European Union has derived its general principles.14 It is 
interesting to see how the judicial review system in Taiwan, with modifications 
according to US law, can serve as a reference of theories for the legality review 
system in the European Union. 
 
5. Outline of the Thesis 
According to the research questions specified above, the structure of this thesis is set 
out as follows: 
 
This first chapter is an introduction to the thesis. It explains the background to the 
research, specifies the research questions and outlines the structure of the thesis. 
 
To examine the legality and constitutionality of telecoms forced access mechanisms, it 
                                                 
13 See discussion in Chapter Five. 
14 See discussions in Chapters Four, Six and Eight. 
 
 8 
is essential to have a clear understanding of these mechanisms, and how these 
mechanisms are situated in the entire telecoms regulatory framework. Therefore, 
Chapters Two and Three begin with a brief introduction to the telecoms regulatory 
frameworks in the European Union and Taiwan; the discussion goes on to introduce 
the concept and the content of the three forced access mechanisms targeted, and 
finally how these mechanisms are implemented in the European Union and Taiwan. 
 
Before an in-depth discussion of the fundamental rights and freedoms targeted, it is 
essential to have a brief explanation of how these rights and freedoms are protected in 
the European Union and Taiwan. Therefore, Chapters Four and Five paint a brief 
picture of how fundamental rights protection regimes evolved in these two 
jurisdictions, and of the constitutional and legal instruments, and institutional designs 
that grant protection to these fundamental rights. 
 
The next chapters – Chapters Six to Nine – discuss the two fundamental rights 
targeted by this thesis, i.e. the right to property and the freedom to conduct a business, 
in the European Union and Taiwan, respectively. In the European Union, this involves 
the protection granted in the provisions of the Union Treaties, including the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) and the case law of the European 
Courts. As specified above, due to their importance to the European Union, the 
provisions in the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR will also be discussed. In 
Taiwan, discussion focuses on the Official Interpretations of the Constitution made by 
Grand Justices, and the content of the said rights and freedoms supplemented by 




Analyses of the legality and constitutionality of telecoms forced access mechanisms in 
the European Union and Taiwan are conducted in Chapters Ten and Eleven, 
respectively, based on the findings in previous chapters. To be specific, these two 
chapters discuss the judicial review criteria for telecoms forced access mechanisms, 
whether these criteria are reasonable, and finally the application of these criteria to 
examine the legality and constitutionality of the three targeted telecoms forced access 
mechanisms in the two jurisdictions. 
 
The final chapter draws conclusions from the results in the two analytical chapters and 
the findings of all the previous chapters, and reflects on the research questions 
proposed in this thesis. 
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Chapter II  
Telecoms Forced Access Mechanisms 
 in the European Union 
 
Preface 
This thesis discusses the legitimacy and constitutionality of telecoms forced-access 
mechanisms, i.e. whether these mechanisms excessively restrict the fundamental 
rights of telcos. It is therefore important to understand the meaning and content of 
telecoms forced-access mechanisms, and how these mechanisms are implemented, in 
order to determine whether and how they interfere with telcos' fundamental rights, 
especially economic rights, such as the right to property and the freedom to conduct a 
business, discussed further in Chapters Six to Nine. 
 
First, this chapter discusses telecoms forced-access mechanisms in the European 
Union. As telecoms forced-access mechanisms are a form of telecoms regulatory 
measure, to understand how these mechanisms originated and function, it is important 
to have an overall understanding of the telecoms regulatory framework. The first 
section (1) of this chapter is therefore of an introductory nature and gives a brief 
overview of the telecoms regulatory framework in the European Union, including 
regulatory authorities and the historical evolution of the European telecoms regulatory 
framework. 
 
The second section (2) explains the various forced-access mechanisms that are 
recognized under the European telecoms regulatory framework, from a systematic 
perspective. Better to understand forced-access mechanisms, this section starts with a 
brief introduction to the structure of telecoms networks (2.1), which is common to and 
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thus will be referred to in the discussions of telecoms forced-access mechanisms in 
Taiwan. Since the Union proposed its common policy on telecoms in the late 1980s, 
there have been several reforms and amendments to the European telecoms regulatory 
framework. One of the most important of these reforms, especially for the purposes of 
this thesis, is probably the introduction of the 2002 Telecoms Package. This chapter 
will therefore take the 2002 Telecoms Package as a watershed moment and discuss 
telecoms forced-access mechanisms in section 2.2 and then in section 2.3 the 2002 
Telecoms Package. Of course, each of these frameworks includes an extensive range 
of regulatory measures, and many of them are directly or indirectly related to 
telecoms forced-access mechanisms. However, a discussion of the overall telecoms 
regulatory framework is beyond the remit of this thesis, and thus this section will 
focus only on telecoms forced-access mechanisms, most notably interconnection, 
local-loop unbundling and separation. Other regulatory mechanisms that are related to 
forced-access mechanisms will be discussed where appropriate, but not emphasized. 
 
Legal theories and disputes about telecoms forced access will be discussed in the last 
section (3) of this chapter. The discussion will start with the legal rationale for forced 
access, most notably the essential facilities doctrine, and proceed to the pros and cons 
of the aforementioned telecoms forced-access mechanisms. As this thesis aims to 
investigate the legitimacy and constitutionality of telecoms forced-access mechanisms, 
this section has no intention to conduct an in-depth discussion about the economic 
effects of these mechanisms, i.e. how effectively these mechanisms achieve their 
objectives; however, an overall look at their impact will serve to inform the discussion 




As discussed in Chapter One, both "electronic communications" and 
"telecommunications" are terms that have been used in the European telecoms 
regulatory framework, e.g. by the European Commission in its legal documents. 
While the concepts indicated by these two terms may not perfectly align, such small 
differences are not relevant to the discussion here. These two terms will therefore be 
used interchangeably in this chapter, especially when legal documents are cited. 
Likewise, the terms "operator(s)" and "undertaking(s)" will also be used 
interchangeably in the discussion when referring to telco(s). 
 
1. The European Telecoms Regulatory Framework 
1.1 Regulatory Authority 
a. Independent Regulators Group 
While the European Commission proposed a single-market scheme and several 
relevant Directives for the Community in the late 1980s, the responsibilities for 
policy-making and implementing telecoms regulations were first laid on the national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs) of Member States. It was not until the late 1990s with 
the strengthening of the European Union that cries for a more centralised regulatory 
body began to be heard. 
 
The first move, however, was actually more about seeking the unification of 
regulatory mechanisms, instead of establishing a Union regulator. The Independent 
Regulators Group (IRG) was established in 1997 and comprised a group of European 
NRAs whose members shared experiences and points of views on important issues 
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relating to the regulation and development of the European telecoms market at the 
beginning of its liberalisation.1 
b. European Regulators Group 
IRG's successor, the European Regulators Group (ERG) for electronic 
communications networks and services, was set up by the European Commission as 
an advisory group to the Commission when the 2002 Telecoms Package came into 
force. The ERG's mission was to provide a suitable mechanism to encourage 
cooperation and coordination between NRAs and the Commission so as to promote 
the development of an internal market for electronic communications networks and 
services, and seek consistent application of the provisions set out in the Directives of 
the new regulatory framework in all Member States.2 
 
c. Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) 
In the drafting of the 2009 Telecoms Package (see 2.3), the European Commission 
proposed a more powerful regulator, the European Telecoms Market Authority, by 
replacing the ERG and overriding the NRAs. It was proposed that the Authority be 
able to issue opinions and recommendations to the Commission, concerning spectrum 
issues, market analyses not completed on time by national regulators, and the possible 
imposition of remedies such as price controls, accounting separation or functional 
separation. The Commission would have to take the utmost account of these opinions 
and recommendations, but would not be bound by them. 
This proposal, however, was later not included in the 2009 Telecoms Package; instead, 
                                                 




the ERG was transformed into the Body of European Regulators for Electronic 
Communications (BEREC), with an enhanced role in the new regulatory framework. 
BEREC commenced its activities in 2010 and comprises a Board of Regulators made 
up of: the heads of NRAs, the Commission, the EFTA States (Switzerland, Norway, 
Iceland and Liechtenstein) and European Union candidate countries participate as 
observers to the Board of Regulators. BEREC’s mission is to contribute to the 
development and better functioning of an internal market for electronic 
communications networks and services by aiming to ensure consistent application of 
the European Union regulatory framework and to promote an effective internal market 
in the telecoms sector.3 It also assists the Commission and NRAs in implementing the 
European Union regulatory framework for electronic communications. It provides 
advice on request and on its own initiative to the European institutions and 
complements at European level the regulatory tasks performed at national level by the 
NRAs. 
The NRAs and the Commission have to take utmost account of any opinions, 
recommendations, guidelines, advice or regulatory best practice adopted by BEREC. 
In particular, BEREC is requested to: 
(a) develop and disseminate regulatory best practices among NRAs, such as common 
approaches, methodologies or guidelines on the implementation of the European 
Union regulatory framework; 
(b) on request, provide assistance to NRAs on regulatory issues; 
(c) deliver opinions on the draft decisions, recommendations and guidelines of the 
Commission as specified in the regulatory framework; and 
                                                 
3 See: BEREC (2015). "What is BEREC?" available at: 
http://berec.europa.eu/eng/about_berec/what_is_berec/ (accessed April 2016). 
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(d) issue reports and provide advice, upon a reasoned request from the Commission or 
on its own initiative, and deliver opinions to the European Parliament and Council, 
when needed, on any matter within its remit; on request, assist the European 
Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the NRAs in relations, discussions 
and exchanges of views with third parties, and assist the Commission and NRAs 
in the dissemination of regulatory best practices to third parties.4 
d. European Commission and NRAs 
Despite the IRG evolving into the current BEREC in the European Union, these 
groups or bodies were not really regulating the telecoms sector, but rather acting more 
in an advisory or reference capacity, and in fact they can hardly be called regulatory 
bodies or authorities. This raises the question of what makes a body qualify as a 
regulatory authority, especially within the scope of European Union law. 
 
Drawing from the ideas of EU Member States and other jurisdictions, a regulatory 
authority should be responsible for designing policies and mapping out the 
development of the industry, proposing regulations to achieve those policies goals, 
and at the same time supervising the implementation of such policies and regulations 
or even implementing them itself. In this regard, there are two types of regulatory 
authorities for the telecoms sector in the European Union, the Commission and NRAs. 
 
1.2 Development of the Telecoms Regulatory Framework in the European Union 
The history of EU telecoms regulation essentially began in 1987, when the European 
Commission appeared to be an "early mover" in the design of an initial regulatory 




framework established by various Community legislative initiatives.5 The framework 
set out in the Commission’s first Green Paper,,6 and a later White Paper7 and 
Directive,8 proposed to open up national European Union markets to telecoms 
equipment and services. Together with the idea of the creation of a single market in 
telecoms services, they paved the way for a common policy on telecoms, which was 
developed later in the 1990s. The common policy on telecoms was established around 
four axes: the creation of a single market for telecoms equipment and services; the 
liberalisation of telecoms services; technological development of the sector with the 
assistance of European research; and balanced development in the regions of the 
Union by means of trans-European telecoms networks.9 
 
The European Commission did not pause in its efforts to pursue a better telecoms 
regulatory framework. In 1990, the European Commission published it first Open 
Network Provision (ONP) Framework Directive,10 the purpose of which was to 
harmonize the conditions for open and efficient access to and use of public telecoms 
networks. Such conditions must: be based on objective criteria; be transparent and 
appropriately published; guarantee equality of access; and be non-discriminatory in 
accordance with Community legislation.11 Restrictions on access can be justified by 
                                                 
5 Tsatsou, P. (2010). "European Union Regulations on Telecommunications: The Role of Subsidiarity 
and Mediation." First Monday 16(1).  
6 Towards a Dynamic European economy, Green Paper on the Development of a Common Market for 
Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM (87) 290, 1987. 
7 Towards a competitive Community-wide telecommunications market in 1992. Implementing the 
Green Paper on the development of the Common Market for telecommunications services and 
equipment. State of discussions and proposals by the Commission. COM (88) 48 1988. 
8 Commission Directive 88/301/EEC on competition in the markets for telecommunications terminal 
equipment, 1988, OJ L 131/73. 
9 See: Nicholas, M. (1999). Industrial and Enterprise Policies. In Access to European Union, law, 
economics, policies.  
10 Council Directive 90/387/EEC on the Establishment of an Internal Market for Telecommunications 
Services through the Implementation of Open Network Provision, 1990 OJ L 192/1 (hereinafter the 
ONP Framework Directive). 
11 Ibid, Article 3(1). 
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key requirements, such as the security of network operations and so forth.12 The 
framework provided in this Directive, its later amendments and other related 
Directives is sometimes called the ONP framework.13  
 
Later, in 1997, the European Commission published its "Green Paper on the 
convergence of the telecoms, media and information technology sectors and the 
implications for regulation – Towards an approach for the information society".14 The 
Green Paper was followed by consultation on reforms to the regulation of 
infrastructure and associated services which would be proposed as part of the 1999 
communications review, and on actions concerning content services which would be 
covered either by adjustments to existing legislation in due course or by the 
introduction of new measures as appropriate.15 
 
Later, in 1999, the European Commission also published a Communications Review, 
"Towards a new framework for electronic communications infrastructure and 
associated services".16 The Report provided an overview of European Union 
regulation of telecoms and also proposed a new framework for communications 
infrastructure and associated services. 
                                                 
12 Council Directive 90/387/EEC on the Establishment of an Internal Market for Telecommunications 
Services through the Implementation of Open Network Provision, 1990 OJ L 192/1, as amended by 
Directive 97/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 6 October 1997, amending 
Council Directives 90/387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the purpose of the adoption of a competitive 
environment in telecommunications, 1997, OJ L 295/23, Article 3(2). 
13 See: https://www.irg.eu/ (accessed April 2016). 
14 Commission of the European Communities, Towards an Approach for the Information Society: 
Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology 
Sectors and the Implications for Regulation by the Commission of the European Council, COM (97) 
623 Final (not published in the Official Journal). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Commission Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions Towards a new framework for Electronic 





The liberalisation in 1998 and the 1999 Communications Review resulted in the 2002 
Telecoms package. With this package, the European Commission attempted to 
overcome the historic national fragmentation and diversity of European telecoms and 
information markets, which were seen as considerable barriers to "Europe" or 
"Europeanisation."17 
 
2. Telecoms Forced Access Mechanisms in the European Telecoms Regulatory 
Framework  
2.1 Telecoms Forced Access in the 2002 Telecoms Package 
2.1.1 Structure of the 2002 Telecoms Package 
There are two main new concepts in the 2002 Telecoms Package. The first is that to 
establish a unified regulatory framework in response to the trend towards convergence, 
the European Commission introduced the idea of "electronic communications" to 
replace "telecommunications". As stated in recital (5) of the Framework Directive: 
"The convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology 
sectors means all transmission networks and services should be covered by a single 
regulatory framework."18 The second concept is that besides maintaining ex ante 
regulation of markets with telcos with significant market power (SMP), it adopts ex 
post regulation of markets without SMP in order to coordinate with the European 
competition regulatory framework.19 
 
                                                 
17 Tsatsou, P. (2010). "European Union Regulations on Telecommunications: The Role of Subsidiarity 
and Mediation." First Monday 16 (1).  
18 Recital (5) in the preamble to the Framework Directive, supra n 12. 
19 Ibid, Recital (25).  
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The 2002 Telecom Package includes five Directives, and they are:20 
--Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services (the "Framework Directive"); 
--Directive on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services 
(the "Authorisation Directive");21 
--Directive on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks 
and associated facilities (the "Access Directive");22 
--Directive on the universal service (the "Universal Service Directive");23 
--Directive 97/66/EC on the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy 
in the telecommunications sector (the "Telecommunications Data Protection 
Directive").24 
 
The Telecommunications Data Protection Directive, although according to the 
Framework Directive included as part of the 2002 Telecoms Package,25 actually came 
into force in 1997. It was, however, replaced by the Directive on privacy and 
electronic communications (Data Protection Directive)26 later than the above 
                                                 
20 See for reference, European Union (2015) "Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications", 
available at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/legislative_framework/l24216a_en.htm(ac
cessed April 2016). 
21 Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Authorisation of 
Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2002 OJ L 108/21 (hereinafter Authorisation 
Directive). 
22 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Access to, and 
Interconnection of, Electronic Communications Networks and Associated Facilities, 2002 OJ L 108/7 
(hereinafter Access Directive). 
23 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on universal service and Users' 
Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2002 OJ L 108/51 (hereinafter 
Universal Service Directive).  
24 Directive 1997/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning the Processing of 
Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 1998 OJ L 24/1 
(hereinafter Telecommunications Data Protection Directive). 
25 Recital (5) in the preamble to the Framework Directive. 
26 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning the Processing of 
Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 OJ L 
201/37 (hereinafter Data Protection Directive). 
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Directives in 2002. This new Directive, together with the Directive on competition in 
the markets for electronic communications networks and services27 (which also came 
into force later in 2002) can be deemed to be included in the broad meaning of the 
2002 Telecoms Package. 
 
Thus, as per the reforms, combinations and updates of the previous Directives and 
Regulations, especially in the 1998 Telecoms Package, the subsequent relationship 
between the 1998 Telecoms Package and 2002 Telecoms Package can be illustrated as 
shown in the chart below: 
 
1998 Telecoms Package 2002 Telecoms Package 
ONP Framework Directive 
(90/387/EEC, 97/51/EC) 
Framework Directive  
(2002/21/EC)  
Licensing Directive (97/13/EC)  
 
GSM Directive (87/372/EEC)  
 
ERMES Directive (90/544/EC)  
 
DECT Directive (91/287/EEC)  
 
Satellite-PCS Decision (710/97/EC)  
 
Authorisation Directive  
(2002/20/EC)  
                                                 
27 Directive 2002/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Competition in the Markets 
for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2002 OJ L 249/21.  
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UMTS Decision (128/1999/EC)  
 
European Emergency Number Decision  
(91/396/EEC)  
 
International Access Code Decision  
(92/264/EEC)  
ONP Leased Lines Directive  
(92/44/EEC, 97/51/EC)  
 
TV Standards Directive (95/47/EC)  
 
Interconnection Directive (97/33/EC)  
Access Directive  
(2002/19/EC)  
Voice Telephony Directive (98/10/EC)  Universal Service Directive 
(2002/22/EC)  
Telecommunications Data Protection  
Directive (97/66/EC)  
Data Protection Directive 
(2002/58/EC)  
Service Directive (90/388/EEC) 
 
Satellite Directive (94/46/EC) 
  
Cable Directive (95/51/EC)  
 
Mobile Directive (96/2/EC)  
 




Full Competition Directive (96/19/EC)  
 
Cable Ownership Directive (99/64/EC) 
 
 
2.1.2 Content of Forced Access Mechanisms in the 2002 Telecoms Package 
Despite forced access mechanisms, as the name suggests, being mostly stipulated in 
the Access Directive, many of the missions carried out by the Framework Directive, 
such as market definition and the identification of SMP, are crucial in deciding the 
obligations of telcos. Hence, this subsection will begin with a discussion about these 
aspects of the Framework Directive. 
 
a. Framework Directive 
The Framework Directive is probably the leading Directive of the 2002 Telecoms 
Package, and many important terms that were commonly used in the Package were 
defined in this Directive. Amongst these, one of the main missions of the Framework 
Directive is to redefine the scope of telecoms, with consideration given to 
convergence. The idea of telecoms is thus expanded, to cover "electronic 
communications networks", and as defined in the Framework Directive, electronic 
communications networks refer to the transmission systems and, where applicable, 
switching or routing equipment and other resources, including network elements 
which are not active, which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, radio, optical or 
other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit and 
packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable 
systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, 
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networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, 
irrespective of the type of information conveyed.28 
 
At the same time, "electronic communications services", according to the same 
Article above, refer to services normally provided for remuneration which consist 
wholly or mainly of the conveyance of signals on electronic communications 
networks, including telecoms services and transmission services in networks used for 
broadcasting, but excluding services providing, or exercising editorial control over, 
content transmitted using electronic communications networks and services; it does 
not include "information society services", as defined in Article 1 of Directive 
98/34/EC, which do not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on 
electronic communications networks.29 
 
After defining electronic communications services and networks, the European 
Commission reconsidered the relationship between electronic communications 
regulation and general competition law in order to achieve effective competition 
within the electronic communications market. In this regard, the European 
Commission made two decisions with regard to regulation of the electronic 
communications market in the Framework Directive. First, the European Commission 
asserted that there was still a need, but only under the circumstance when there is no 
effective competition--i.e. in markets where there are one or more telcos with SMP, 
and where national and Community competition law remedies are not sufficient to 
address the problem--that ex ante legal measures be maintained.30 
                                                 
28 Article 2 (a) Framework Directive, supra n 12. 
29 Ibid, Article 2 (c). 




The other decision of the European Commission was to reconsider the definition of 
SMP as it found that the original definition of SMP was unsuited to an increasingly 
complex and dynamic market, and therefore decided to introduce a new definition for 
SMP. Before the entry into force of the Framework Directive, the definition of SMP 
referred to telcos with a market share over 25%, as suggested by the Open Network 
Provision (ONP) Directive.31 The European Commission sought to co-ordinate that 
with the general competition regulatory framework and therefore adapted the concept 
of "dominant position" as defined in the case law of European Courts.32 As stated in 
Article 14 (2) of the Framework Directive, an undertaking shall be deemed to have 
significant market power if, either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a 
position equivalent to dominance, a position of economic strength affording it the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and 
ultimately consumers. 
 
In this regard, the European Commission further published a Recommendation on 
Relevant Product and Service Markets in 2003.33 In this Recommendation, the 
European Commission considered the necessity for ex ante regulation and defined the 
market as per the requirements of Article 15(1) of the Framework Directive. It 
identified that there were still SMP in seven retail markets (markets for services or 
                                                 
31 Directive 1997/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Interconnection in 
Telecommunications with regard to Ensuring Universal Service and Interoperability through 
Application of the Principles of Open Network Provision, 1997 OJ L 199/ 32. Directive as amended by 
Directive 1998/61/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 1997/33/EC 
with Regard to Operator Number Portability and Carrier Pre-selection, 1998 OJ L 268/ 37. 
32 Recital (25) in the preamble to the Framework Directive, supra n 12.  
33 Recommendation 2003/311/EC of the European Commission on Relevant Product and Service 
Markets within the Electronic Communications Sector Susceptible to ex ante Regulation in Accordance 
with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common Regulatory 
Framework for Electronic Communication Networks and Services, 2003 OJ L 114/45(hereinafter 
Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service Markets I). 
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products provided to end users) and 11 wholesale markets (markets for inputs which 
are necessary for telcos to provide services and products to end users) that are subject 
to ex ante regulation. The European Commission’s considerations are:34  
--Whether there are high and non-transitory structural, legal or regulatory entry 
barriers present in the market. 
--Whether the market has a structure which does not lend itself to effective 
competition within the relevant time horizon. 
--Whether the application of competition law alone would adequately address the 
market failure(s). 
 
Only if the answers to all these three questions were negative would that justify ex 
ante regulation. The European Commission therefore identified that the following 
markets are subject to ex ante regulation: 
 





Access to the public telephone 
network at a fixed location for 
residential customers   
 
Access to the public telephone 
network at a fixed location for 
non-residential customers 
 
Publicly available local and/or 
Call origination on the public 
telephone network provided at a 
fixed location.  
 
Call termination on individual 
public telephone networks 
provided at a fixed location  
 
Transit services in the fixed public 
                                                 
34 Ibid, Recital (9).  
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Wholesale unbundled access 
(including shared access) to 
metallic loops and sub-loops for 
the purpose of providing 







services provided at a fixed 
location for residential 
customers  
 
Publicly available local and/or 
national telephone services 
provided at a fixed location 




services provided at a fixed 
location for non-residential 
customers 
 
Broadband  Wholesale broadband access  





leased lines  
 
Wholesale trunk segments of 
leased lines  
Mobile 
Networks 
 Access and call origination on 
public mobile telephone networks  
 
Voice call termination on 
individual mobile networks 
  
The wholesale national market for 
international roaming on public 




 Broadcasting transmission services 
to deliver broadcast content to end 
users 
(Chart 2.1 Markets subject to ex ante regulation in Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service 
Markets I35) 
 
Another feature of the Framework Directive that is of special importance to this thesis 
is the stipulation of co-location and facility sharing.36 The European Commission 
considered that facility sharing could be of benefit for town planning, public health or 
environmental reasons,37 and thus NRAs should encourage the sharing of facilities or 
                                                 
35 Chart cited from: Kao, K.-s. and P. Liu. (2005). "The Research of 2003 European Communications 
Law." Socioeconomic Law and Institution Review : 329. 
36 It covers inter alia: physical co-location and duct, building, mast, antenna or antenna system sharing. 
See: Recital (23) in the preamble to the Framework Directive, supra n 12.  
37 Ibid, Recital (22).  
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property where an undertaking provides electronic communications networks via the 
said facilities or property. Such sharing becomes an obligation in the case where 
undertakings are deprived of access to viable alternatives because of the need to 
protect the environment, public health, public security or to meet town and country 
planning objectives; thus, the NRAs may impose the sharing of facilities or property 
(including physical co-location) on an undertaking operating an electronic 
communications network or take measures to facilitate the coordination of public 
works after public consultation.38 
 
b. Access Directive 
The aim of the Access Directive is to establish a framework to encourage competition 
by stimulating the development of communications services and networks, and also to 
ensure that any bottlenecks in the market do not constrain the emergence of 
innovative services that could benefit users.39 
 
The term "access", in the Access Directive, refers to the making available of facilities 
and/or services to another undertaking, under defined conditions, on either an 
exclusive or a non-exclusive basis, for the purpose of providing electronic 
communications services. It covers areas including: access to network elements and 
associated facilities, which may involve the connection of equipment, by fixed or 
non-fixed means (in particular this includes access to the local loop and to facilities 
and services necessary to provide services over the local loop); access to physical 
infrastructure, including buildings, ducts and masts; access to relevant software 
                                                 
38 Ibid, Article 12.  
39 See: European Union. (2015) "Access to Electronic Communications Networks", available at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/legislative_framework/l24108i_en.htm.(ac
cessed April 2016). 
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systems including operational support systems; access to number translation or 
systems offering equivalent functionality; access to fixed and mobile networks, in 
particular for roaming; access to conditional access systems for digital television 
services; and access to virtual network services.40 
 
One of the main types of access is interconnection. Interconnection means the 
physical and logical linking of public communications networks used by the same or a 
different undertaking in order to allow the users of one undertaking to communicate 
with users of the same or another undertaking, or to access services provided by 
another undertaking.41  
 
Interconnection is an essential mechanism in the electronic communications market, 
especially when there is SMP present in the market. New undertakings, as late market 
entrants, have to interconnect with the networks of the dominant or incumbent 
undertakings to share the network effect,42 and thus can compete in the market. On 
the other hand, to protect their vested interests and market dominance, dominant or 
incumbent undertakings tend to refuse interconnection, or use exclusive technologies 
to interfere with the procedure of interconnection. In this regard, interconnection 
obligations are usually imposed by NRAs in order to promote competition in the 
electronic communications market. The Access Directive therefore suggested that, in 
an open and competitive market where there are no large differences in negotiating 
power between undertakings, there should be no restrictions that prevent undertakings 
                                                 
40 Article 2 (a) Access Directive, supra n22.  
41 Ibid, Article 2 (b). 
42 The network effect refers to the effect that one user of goods or services has on the value of that 
product to other people. When a network effect is present, the value of a product or service is 
dependent on the number of others using it. See: Shapiro, C. and H. R. Varian (2013). Information 
Rules: a Strategic Guide to the Network Economy, Harvard Business Press. 
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from negotiating access and interconnection arrangements between themselves, and 
undertakings which receive requests for access or interconnection should in principle 
conclude such agreements on a commercial basis, and negotiate in good faith.43 The 
Access Directive therefore asserted that, in principle, an undertaking without SMP 
status should negotiate interconnection but not other access to physical facilities, and 
only the undertaking with SMP bears an extensive access obligation.44 
 
Another important concept of access is unbundling, most notably unbundled access to 
the local loop (local-loop unbundling, LLU). Unbundling means the breakup of the 
whole package of network into elements, via which undertakings can interconnect 
with the networks of other undertakings, especially those of the incumbent 
undertakings, using their own network elements. Local loop, on the other hand, means 
the physical twisted metallic pair circuit connecting the network termination point at 
the subscriber's premises to the main distribution frame or equivalent facility in the 
fixed public telephone network.45 As shown in the figure below, the local loop 
includes three main sections: the first section is from the main distribution frame (A) 
in the local exchange room to the distribution point (B) at the street corner; the second 
section is from the distribution point to the main distribution frame in the end user's 
premise building (C, usually in the basement); and the third section is the vertical 
network from the main distribution frame in the end user’s premise building to end 
user’s device (D). 
 
                                                 
43 Recital (6) in the preamble to the Access Directive, supra n 22.  
44 See for examples: Articles 5 (1), 6 (3) and 8(2) Access Directive, supra n 22. 
45 Recital (3) in the preamble to Council Regulation 2887/2000/EC on Unbundled Access to the Local 




(Figure 2.1 The structure of local loop. 
 
The key feature of this mechanism is that new entrants will not have to be able to 
afford the immense cost of investment in building its own local loop, which is 
arguably the most difficult network to deploy, and will not need to pay for network 
elements or facilities which are not necessary for the supply of its services, yet still be 
able to interconnect with existing networks to share the network effect.46 Therefore, 
competition in the local loop may become effective only if competitors are able to 
have access to existing networks rather than being obliged to build their own.47 
 
Before the Access Directive, one of the main legal measures concerning local-loop 
unbundling was the Regulation on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop48 
(hereinafter local-loop unbundling Regulation), which aims to address the problem of 
the lack of competition on the local network where incumbent telcos continue to 
                                                 
46 Ibid, Recital (7). 
47 See for reference: Buigues, P.-A. (2001). "European Policy on Local Loop Unbundling: Competition 
Law Background and Problems of Implementation". CPR Conference 2001. 
48 LLU Regulation, Supra n 45. 
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dominate the market for voice telephony services and high-speed Internet access.49 It 
complements the regulatory framework for telecoms, in particular Directives 
1997/33/EC and 1998/10/EC. The new regulatory framework for electronic 
communications should include appropriate provisions to replace this Regulation. 
 
The local-loop unbundling Regulation gives explanations to different types of 
unbundled access to the local loop: 
a. "unbundled access to the local loop" means full unbundled access to the local loop 
and shared access to the local loop; it does not entail a change in ownership of the 
local loop;50 
b. "full unbundled access to the local loop" means the provision to a beneficiary of 
access to the local loop or local sub-loop of the notified telcos authorising the use of 
the full frequency spectrum of the twisted metallic pair;51 
c. "shared access to the local loop" means the provision to a beneficiary of access to 
the local loop or local sub-loop of the notified telcos, authorising the use of the 
non-voice band frequency spectrum of the twisted metallic pair; the local loop 
continues to be used by the notified telcos to provide the telephone service to the 
public;52 
d. "collocation" means the provision of physical space and technical facilities 
necessary reasonably to accommodate and connect the relevant equipment of a 
beneficiary, as mentioned in Section B of the Annex.53 
                                                 
49 See: European Union (2005) "Unbundled Access to the Local Loop", available at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/internet/l24108j_en.htm (accessed April 
2016). 
50 Article 2(e) LLU Regulation, Supra n 45. 
51 Ibid, Article 2(f). 
52 Ibid, Article 2(g). 




The regulatory ideas about local-loop unbundling in the Regulation on Unbundled 
Access to the Local Loop are basically contained in the Access Directive with its 
consideration of SMP status. As stated above, the presence of SMP status or not may 
incur different obligations. Articles 9 to 13 of the Access Directive have enumerated a 
series of obligations for NRAs to adopt. These obligations are summarised in Chart 
2.2 below: 
 
 SMP Non-SMP 
Obligations 
 
Obligations of access and interconnection, 
such as: 
 
Obligation of transparency54 
 
Obligation of non-discrimination55  
 
Obligation of accounting separation56 
 
Obligations to grant access to, and use of, 




                                                 
54 Article 9 Access Directive, supra n 22. 
55 Ibid, Article 10. 
56 Ibid, Article 11.  
57 Ibid, Article 11. These obligations include:  
1. A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8, impose 
obligations on operators to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, specific network 
elements and associated facilities, inter alia in situations where the national regulatory authority 
considers that denial of access or unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would 




(Chart 2.2 Different Obligations between SMP and non-SMP in Access directive) 
 
c. Directive on Competition in Markets for Electronic Communications Networks 
and Services 
Another notable Directive in the 2002 Telecoms Package of special importance to 
this thesis is the Directive on Competition in Markets for Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services.58 In this Directive, the Commission 
abolished the exclusive and special rights of electronic communications networks 
and services, by asserting that: 
(a) Member States shall not grant or maintain in force exclusive or special rights 
for the establishment and/or the provision of electronic communications 
networks, or for the provision of publicly available electronic communications 
                                                                                                                                            
Operators may be required inter alia: 
(a) to give third parties access to specified network elements and/or facilities, including unbundled 
access to the local loop; 
(b) to negotiate in good faith with undertakings requesting access; 
(c) not to withdraw access to facilities already granted; 
(d) to provide specified services on a wholesale basis for resale by third parties; 
(e) to grant open access to technical interfaces, protocols or other key technologies that are 
indispensable for the interoperability of services or virtual network services; 
(f) to provide co-location or other forms of facility sharing, including duct, building or mast sharing; 
(g) to provide specified services needed to ensure interoperability of end-to-end services to users, 
including facilities for intelligent network services or roaming on mobile networks; 
(h) to provide access to operational support systems or similar software systems necessary to ensure 
fair competition in the provision of services; 
(i) to interconnect networks or network facilities. National regulatory authorities may attach to those 
obligations conditions covering fairness, reasonableness and timeliness. 
 
2. When national regulatory authorities are considering whether to impose the obligations referred to in 
paragraph 1, and in particular when assessing whether such obligations would be proportionate to the 
objectives set out in Article 8 of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), they shall take account 
in particular of the following factors: 
(a) the technical and economic viability of using or installing competing facilities, in light of the rate of 
market development, taking into account the nature and type of interconnection and access involved; 
(b) the feasibility of providing the access proposed, in relation to the capacity available; 
(c) the initial investment by the facility owner, bearing in mind the risks involved in making the 
investment; 
(d) the need to safeguard competition in the long term; 
(e) where appropriate, any relevant intellectual property rights; 
(f) the provision of pan-European services. 
58 Directive 2002/77/EC of the European Commission on Competition in the Markets for Electronic 




(b) Member States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that any 
undertaking is entitled to provide electronic communications services or to 
establish, extend or provide electronic communications networks.60 
(c) Member States shall ensure that no restrictions are imposed or maintained on 
the provision of electronic communications services over electronic 
communications networks established by the providers of electronic 
communications services, over infrastructures provided by third parties, or by 
means of sharing networks, other facilities or sites without prejudice to the 
provisions of Directives 2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC and 
2002/22/EC.61 
 
2.2 Telecoms Forced Access in Post-2002 Telecoms Framework Era and the 2009 
Telecoms Reform Package 
From 2007 onwards, the European Commission started to review the telecoms 
framework created by the 2002 Telecoms Package from various perspectives. One of 
the features involves reviewing the scope of ex ante regulation. The second version of 
the Commission Recommendation on relevant product and service markets62 was 
proposed in 2007, whereby the range of markets that have ex ante regulations for 
SMP that should be applied was vastly reduced (see Chart 2.3 below). The 
                                                 
59 Ibid, Article 2(1). 
60 Ibid, Article 2(2). 
61 Article 2(3) Directive on Competition in Markets for Electronic Communications Networks and 
Services, Supra n 58. 
62 Recommendation 2007/879/EC of the European Commission on Relevant Product and Service 
Markets within the Electronic Communications Sector Susceptible to ex ante Regulation in Accordance 
with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common Regulatory 
Framework for Electronic Communication Networks and Services, 2007 OJ L 344/65(hereinafter 
Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service Markets II).  
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Recommendation also proposed the creation of a new pan-European regulator which 
could identify SMP in pan-European services. 
 
Retail Market Wholesale Market 
Access to the public telephone 
network at a fixed location for 
residential and non-residential 
customers  
Call origination on the public telephone network 
provided at a fixed location  
Call termination on individual public telephone 
networks provided at a fixed location  
Wholesale (physical) network infrastructure 
access, including sharing or fully unbundled 
access at a fixed location 
Wholesale broadband access  
Wholesale terminating segments of leased lines  
Voice call termination on individual mobile 
networks  
(Chart 2.3 Markets subject to ex ante regulation in Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service 
Markets II63) 
 
Also in 2007, the European Commission proposed a draft of a new telecoms package 
as it acknowledged that the vision to create a single European telecoms market still 
had a long way to go.64 This reform had four objectives in total: more competition, 
better regulation, strengthening of the internal market and consumer protection.65 The 
European Parliament and Council of Ministers agreed on reform to the 2002 Telecoms 
Regulations in November 2009, and the so-called 2009 Telecoms Package came into 
force in December of the same year. The 2009 Telecoms Package aims to "complete 
the internal market for electronic communications" and to push all national regulators 
towards stronger market competition through lifting regulation in markets where 
competition operates well,66 and it introduced two new Directives, namely the Better 
                                                 
63 Chart cited from Kao, K.-s. and L. Poli (2005). "The Research of 2003 European Communications 
Law." Socioeconomic Law and Institution Review : 335. 
64 See: Tsatsou (2010) supra n 5. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Recital (3) in the preamble to the Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services, 2002/19/EC on Access to, and Interconnection of, Electronic 
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Regulation Directive67 and the Citizen’s Rights Directive,68 to amend existing 
Directives. It also created the Body of European Regulators for Electronic 
Communications (BEREC) to promote cooperation between NRAs, aiming to ensure 
consistent application of the European Union regulatory framework to electronic 
communications. 
 
The 2009 Telecoms Package includes five Directives:69 
(1) the Framework Directive, which is based on the original Framework Directive and 
the new Better Regulation Directive; 
(2) the Access Directive, which is based on the original Access Directive and the 
Better Regulation Directive; 
(3) the Authorisation Directive, which is based on the original Authorisation Direction 
and the Better Regulation Directive; 
(4) the Universal Service Directive, which is based on the original Universal Service 
Directive and the Citizen’s Rights Directive; 
(5) the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, which is based on the 
Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, the Data Retention 
Directive70 and the Citizen's Rights Directive; 
                                                                                                                                            
Communications Networks and Associated Facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the Authorisation of 
Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2009 OJ L 337/37 (hereinafter Better Regulation 
Directive). 
67 Ibid. 
68 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and 
services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of 
privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation 
between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, 2009 OJ L 
337/11 (hereinafter Citizen’s Rights Directive). 
69 European Commission, (2015) Telecoms Rules, available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/telecom-rules (accessed April 2016). 
70 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Retention of Data 
Generated or Processed in Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic 




and two Regulations: 
(1) the Regulation establishing BEREC and the Office;71 
(2) the Regulation on roaming on Public Mobile Communications Networks.72 
 
Of special interest to this thesis, one of the most important features of the 2009 
Telecoms Package was the introduction of functional separation into the European 
Telecoms Regulatory Framework.73 Functional separation refers to the separation of 
networks and facilities (especially access networks) of a telco (especially the 
incumbent telco) into an independent department; while such departments are still 
under the same ownership, the separated telco has imposed upon it a series of strict 
obligations, such as non-discriminatory treatment of other telcos and the telco's other 
departments, an independent accounting system and the establishing of "Chinese 
wall"74 of personnel and information between the separated department and other 
departments.75 
 
To understand functional separation, it is important first to discuss the meaning of 
separation. Under economic theories, telecoms separation can be construed and 
practiced in two aspects (or two steps).76 As to which assets are to be "cut" from the 
                                                                                                                                            
2002/58/EC, 2006 OJ L 105/54. 
71 Council Regulation 1211/2009/EC establishing the Body of the European Regulators for Electronic 
Communications (BEREC) and the Office, OJ L 337/1 (hereinafter BEREC Regulation). 
72 Council Regulation 531/2012/EC on Roaming on Public Mobile Communications networks within 
the Union, 2012, OJ L 172/10. 
73 Article 13(a) Access Directive as amended by Better Regulation Directive, supra n 66. 
74 In company law, a Chinese wall is an information barrier implemented within a company to prevent 
exchanges of information that could cause conflicts of interests. See: Greifender, E. and J. Bar Ilan 
(2008). The History of Information Security: A Comprehensive Handbook: 630. 
75 Ruhle, E.-O. and M. E. W. Reichl (2002). "Functional Separation: A new panacea in telecoms 
regulation?" Journal, OJ L 108: 24.24; Curien, N. "Functional Separation: Pros and Cons, available at: 
http://www.arcep.fr/uploads/tx_gspublication/lettre55-eng.pdf (accessed April 2016). 
76 Cave, M. E. (2006). "Six degrees of separation operational separation as a remedy in European 
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incumbent, there are three methods of separation: retail, network (non-access), and 
network (access).  
 
(Chart 2.4 The first category of separation models.) 
 
As to the behaviours of the separated components, there are six schemes, or categories, 
of separation, between basic accounting separation and ultimate ownership separation 
(see Chart 5). It should be noted, first, that there is a mixture of terms for categories 
between (2) and (6). For example, the separation model of the incumbent British 
Telecom (BT) in the United Kingdom has been called both operational separation77 
and functional separation.78 Second, in real practice, the categories into which 
separation falls into are sometimes difficult to define by judging the obligations 
imposed and the undertakings of the separated telcos, as these complex obligations are 
reflections of the actual needs of regulation.79 It is therefore more sensible to focus on 
the content of the regulatory measure imposed instead of the terminology used when 
discussing functional/operational separation.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
telecommunications regulation." Communications & Strategies(64): 89. 
77 Ibid, 98. 
78 BEREC Guidance on Functional Separation - Annex I, Functional Separation in Practice: European 
Union experiences: 2, available at: http://berec.europa.eu/files/documents/bor_10_44Rev1b.pdf  
(accessed April 2016).   
79 See, for example, BT’s undertakings, available at:  




(Chart 2.5 Vertical separation models.80)   
 
The 2009 Telecoms Package was not the first time that the concept of separation was 
introduced into the European telecoms regulatory framework. A minor model of 
separation, accounting separation, was included in the Access Directive in the 2002 
Telecoms Package and imposed an obligation for accounting separation on SMPs with 
regard to their interconnection and access activities, especially concerning the 
transparency of their wholesale and internal transfer prices, in order to meet the 
requirement for non-discrimination and to prevent unfair cross-subsidy.81 However, 
accounting separation functions mainly on the price aspect, and this can hardly tackle 
other discriminatory behaviour such as restrictions on the provision of wholesale 
products to competitors. The Commission therefore introduced more drastic 
functional separation to ensure the provision of fully equivalent access products (this 
may constitute either equivalence of input (EOI) or equivalence of output (EOO82) to 
all downstream telcos, including the telco's own vertically integrated downstream 
divisions.83  
 
                                                 
80 Source of Chart 4 and Chart 5: Cave, M. E. (2006). "Six degrees of separation operational separation 
as a remedy in European telecommunications regulation." Communications & Strategies 64: 93-94. 
81 Article 11 Access Directive, supra n 22. 
82 See: ITU, "ICT Regulation Toolkit--Functional Separation.", available at:  




As suggested by the ERG, functional separation allows for the targeted separation of 
those enduring bottlenecks which are difficult for rival telcos to replicate 
commercially, but which provide vital inputs to a range of downstream products and 
services provided by both the vertically-integrated telco and its competitors. By 
creating a separate business unit with business incentives based on the performance of 
that unit (rather than the performance of the vertically-integrated telco as a whole), it 
is more likely that the business unit will deliver the services that its customers want.84 
 
For functional separation to be effective, however, it requires a number of key 
elements in order to ensure that sufficient incentives are in place for the designated 
telco to provide equal access to vital upstream inputs (while also ensuring greater 
transparency of activities, so that the whole market can have confidence in the 
effectiveness of the associated measures). 
(a) In order to prevent the employees running these bottleneck assets having the 
motivation and ability to favour the telco's own downstream affiliates, to the 
detriment of competitors, a functional separation remedy would require – as a 
minimum – that the same products and services that are provided to the telco's 
own downstream affiliates be provided equally to alternative providers, using the 
same ordering and handling processes.85 
(b) The new separate business unit established to deliver these products and services 
must be responsible for the management of assets under its administration, staff, 
operational support systems (OSS) and Management Information Systems.86 
(c) There will need to be governance arrangements to ensure the independence of the 
                                                 
84 See: ERG (2007) ERG Opinion on Functional Separation, available at: 
http://www.localret.cat/revistesinews/broadband/num25/docs/num4.pdf (accessed Dec 2014).  
85 Ibid: 2. 
86 Ibid: 3. 
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staff employed by the separate business unit.87 
 
Functional separation should be considered an extreme measure and only applied 
where regular regulatory measures have failed to achieve effective competition.88 As 
stated in the Better Regulation Directive, where NRAs conclude that appropriate 
obligations imposed under Articles 9 to 13 of the Access Directive have failed to 
achieve effective competition and that there are important and persisting competition 
problems and/or market failures identified in relation to the wholesale provision of 
access to certain products and markets, they may, as an exceptional measure,89 
impose an obligation on vertically-integrated undertakings to place activities related 
to the wholesale provision of relevant access products in an independently operating 
business entity.  
 
3. Theories and Disputes Regarding Telecoms Forced Access Mechanisms 
3.1 The Application of an Essential Facility Doctrine in the European Union 
From the above analysis, we can conclude that all telecoms forced-access mechanisms 
aim to tackle the same competition problem – the incumbent's huge network 
advantages from its long-term monopoly, without access to which it is difficult for 
new entrants to compete in the market. Based on these characteristics, the essential 
facility doctrine must be taken into consideration when dealing with this competition 
problem. 
 
The essential facility, or bottleneck, doctrine, is generally considered to originate in 
                                                 
87 Ibid: 3. 
88 See for reference: Better Regulation Directive, supra note 66, Article 2 (10); see also: Kelly, T. and 




United States case law.90 As determined in one of the earliest cases with regard to 
telecoms regulation, MCI Communications v AT&T,91 an essential facility is 
described as involving: 
a. control of an essential facility by a monopolist; 
b. a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; 
c. denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and 
d. the feasibility of providing the facility.92 
 
At the same time, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) also defines an essential 
facility as a public telecom transport network or service that  
a. is exclusively or predominantly provided by a single or a limited number of 
suppliers; and 
b. cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted in order to provide a 
service.93  
 
In the European Union, the concept of essential facilities was explicitly introduced by 
Commission decisions relating to access to harbour facilities.94 Later, the 
Commission took an extensive range of decisions where recourse was made to the 
essential facilities doctrine, with or without expressly referring to it. These decisions 
                                                 
90 It should be noted, however, that the essential facility doctrine has never been officially recognised 
by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
91 MCI Communications Corp. v AT&T. (708 F.2d1081, 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 
(1983)). 
92 Ibid, at 1132–33. 
93 WTO, "Telecommunications Services: Reference Paper.", available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.htm (accessed April 2016).  
94 Examples see: Commission Decision No. 94/19/EC (Sea Containers), 1994 OJ L 15/8, and 
Commission Decision No.94/119/EC (Rødby), OJ L 55/52. 
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can be classified into four categories:95 (a) harbours;96 (b) airports;97 (c) rail 
infrastructure;98 and(d) intellectual property.99 
 
The concept of the essential facilities doctrine has also been adopted by the Court of 
Justice, despite the term often not being explicitly expressed. In the early years, in 
Commercial Solvents case, the Court of Justice stated that a refusal to supply raw 
material to a competitor in a downstream market was an abuse of a dominant 
position.100 However, it was not until Magill that the Court of Justice found that, in 
"exceptional circumstances", third parties should be granted access to goods or 
services where the following conditions are met. By refusing to grant access, the 
right-holder: 
a. reserves for himself a secondary market (downstream market) and thus excludes 
all possible competition; 
b. renders impossible the emergence of a new product sought after in the market; and 
c. any objective justification should be absent.101 
 
In Oscar Bronner, the Court of Justice further proposed, beyond the conditions in 
Magill, that two extra conditions should be satisfied:  
                                                 
95 See: Hatzopoulos, V. (2006). "The European Union Essential Facilities Doctrine.".  
96 Example decisions see: Sea Containers and Rødby, supra n 92. 
97 Example decisions see: Commission Decision No 92/213/EEC (British Midland/Aer Lingus), OJ L 
96/34; Commission Decision No 98/190/EC (FAG-Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG), OJ L 72/30. 
98 Example decisions see: Commission Decision No 94/663/ΕC (Night Services) OJ L 259/20; 
Commission Decision No 94/894/EC (Eurotunnel), OJ L 354/66. 
99 Example decisions see: Commission Decision COMP/C-3.37.792 (Magill) OJ L 78/43.  
100 Joined Cases C-6/73 and C-7/73, ICI and Commercial Solvents v Commission [1974] E.C.R. 223. 
However, it should be noted that the Court of Justice handled this issue with care, and indicated that a 
practice which prima facie appears to be abusive may not be so in the case that it is objectively 
justifiable, for example when discriminative practices are justified on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health. See: Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE v Pliroforissis [1991] 
E.C.R. I- 2925. 
101 Joined Cases C-241 and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission [1995] E.C.R. I-743. 
 
 46 
a. a refusal to deal is likely to eliminate all competition from the relevant market, on 
the part of the requesting party; and 
b. the facility is indispensable to carrying on that person's business, inasmuch as 
there is no actual or potential substitute in existence.102  
 
In the later IMS case103 the Court of Justice upheld the assessment in Oscar Bronner 
about the definition of "essential" that it should not be economically viable for a firm 
of comparable size to the right-holder to produce a similar facility and, despite 
accepting the Advocate General’s opinion that regulation should balance the rights of 
the dominant firm with the need to ensure free competition in a derivative market, the 
Court of Justice reiterated that all the criteria of the "exceptional circumstances", as 
stated in Magill, must be fulfilled in order for a compulsory license to by granted. 
Again, in Microsoft,104 the Court of First Instance upheld the test in Magill and IMS, 
with a minor modification of the "new product" requirement to that the refusal limited 
technical development to the detriment of consumers,105 although the Court, by 
reference to the Commission’s reasoning in its decision, decided that this criterion 
should be widened to include all refusals that resulted in the limitation of technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers.106   
 
Besides the harsh conditions for applying the essential facilities doctrine in Court of 
Justice case law, the doctrine itself has drawn much criticism. It has been pointed out 
that the doctrine does not have a coherent rationale.107 Areeda and Hovenkamp (2000) 
                                                 
102 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner v Mediaprint Zeinungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag [1998] E.C.R. I-779. 
103 Case C-481/01 P, NDC v IMS [2002] E.C.R. I-3401. 
104 Case T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission [2007] E.C.R. II-3601.   
105 Ibid, para. 665. 
106 Ibid, 647-649. 
107 See, for examples: Marquardt, P. D. and M. Leddy (2003). "The Essential Facilities Doctrine and 
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state that applying the essential facilities doctrine discourages firms from developing 
their own alternative inputs, and "[r]equiring a firm to share its monopoly with its 
competitors, as the essential facilities doctrine does, can be inconsistent with the 
fundamental, pro-competitive goals of the antitrust laws. "108 Motta (2004) also 
questions the effects of the doctrine, saying "… mandating access, or compulsory 
licensing, to the monopolized facility might dissuade the monopolist, the rival or both 
in investing in beneficial facilities in the future. From the monopolist's perspective, 
once it believes that its rivals will free-ride on its efforts, it will lose the incentive to 
innovate and invest, as it will not be rewarded for its risks and efforts. On the other 
hand, the rival will not be motivated to invest because he can be fairly sure that he 
will be granted access to the monopolist’s facility. Consequently, the result is losses in 
efficiencies, and those most harmed in such a situation are the consumers."109  
 
The application of the essential facilities doctrine in the telecoms sector is especially 
questionable due to the market’s innovative nature. As Sullivan & Grimes (2006) 
point out, "[c]ompelling a monopolist to grant competitors access to a facility that the 
monopolist has … collides with … commonplace propositions … that innovation 
should be encouraged and rewarded",110 and in an innovative market such forced 
mechanisms are normally not welfare-enhancing.111 
                                                                                                                                            
Intellectual Property Rights: A Response to Pitofsky, Patterson, and Hooks." Antitrust Law Journal: 
847-873.; Lipsky Jr, A. B. and J. G. Sidak (1999). "Essential facilities." Stanford Law Review: 
1187-1248. 
108 Areeda, O.E. and H. J. Hovenkamp, (2000). "Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and 
Their Application.". 
109 Motta, M. (2004). Competition policy: theory and practice, Cambridge University Press. 
110 Sullivan, L. A. and W. S. Grimes (2006). The law of antitrust: an integrated handbook, West 
Academic. 
111 Kezsbom, A. and A. V. Goldman (1996). "No Shortcut to Antitrust Analysis: The Twisted Journey 
of the Essential Facilities Doctrine." Colum. Bus. L. Rev.: 1.; Gilbert, R. J. and C. Shapiro (1996). "An 
economic analysis of unilateral refusals to license intellectual property." Proceedings of the National 




3.2 Disputes in the Telecoms Market in the European Union 
Amongst the three main telecoms forced-access mechanisms in the European Union, 
there are apparently more disputes about the application of local-loop unbundling and 
separation than interconnection. This is not only because of the ubiquitous service 
nature of interconnection, but also because of the interpretation of the aforementioned 
essential facilities doctrine. 
 
As discussed above, the Court of Justice generally adopts a strict stance when 
applying the essential facilities doctrine, as some of the conditions that it has 
established, such as the refusal to deal, were likely to eliminate all competition from 
relevant markets, and the fact of a disputed facility being indispensable to carrying on 
a person's business, inasmuch as there is no actual or potential substitute in existence, 
is difficult to establish. Furthermore, this last condition, according to the Court of 
Justice, will only be fulfilled if:  
a. there are no plausible alternatives to the facility, even of an inferior quality; and 
b. the impossibility of duplicating the facility is objective, due to "technical, legal or 
economic obstacles", and not to the limited capacities (e.g. inadequate output) of 
the specific competitor requiring access.112 
 
The Commission, on the other hand, has a relatively loose approach to the essential 
facilities doctrine, especially in the telecoms sector. As set out in the Commission’s 
Notice on the application of competition rules to access agreements in the 
                                                 
112 Oscar Bronner, supra n 102, para. 43. 
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telecommunications sector – framework, relevant markets and principles113 – when 
determining whether access should be ordered under competition rules, the 
Commission intends to consider whether the dominant telco has not fulfilled its duty 
not to discriminate, or the following essential facility test conditions are met: 
a. access to the facility in question is generally essential in order for telcos to 
compete in that related market; 
b. there is sufficient capacity available to provide access; 
c. the facility owner fails to satisfy the demand for an existing service or product 
market, blocks the emergence of a potential new service or product, or impedes 
competition for an existing or potential service or product market; 
d. the telco seeking access is prepared to pay a reasonable and non-discriminatory 
price and will otherwise in all respects accept non-discriminatory access terms and 
conditions; and 
e. there is no objective justification for refusing to provide access. 
 
One of the most notable counter-arguments to applying the essential facilities doctrine 
in the European telecoms sector rests on whether the disputed networks are essential, 
e.g. if there are alternative access networks so that the refusal of access to the said 
networks should not be regarded as the exclusion of all possible competition. This 
question should be deemed crucial in today’s trend towards convergence in the 
telecoms sector, as there are cable services, electricity lines (power lines) and even the 
latest developed Long-Term Evolution (LTE) services. 
                                                 
113 See: European Commission, "Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access 
Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector – Framework, Relevant Markets and Principles, 
available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31998Y0822(01)&from=EN 




Besides, some of the criticisms of the "general" essential facilities doctrine can also be 
made about application of the said doctrine in the telecoms sector, or more precisely, 
local-loop unbundling or separation. Chris Doyle (2000), for example, raises the point 
about the difficulties in getting a clear economic evaluation of the benefits and costs 
of mandated local-loop unbundling, as he observes that there appears to be no reason 
to support mandated local-loop unbundling in densely populated urban areas, as 
competition among infrastructure providers is emerging. He further concludes that, 
"[w]hile policy makers have championed ULL [the author used "unbundled local 
loop" instead of "local-loop unbundling"] as a way to promote competition at the local 
level in telecom, applying mandated ULL across the whole of a country may be 
inappropriate and socially damaging."114 
 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of telecoms forced access in the European Union. 
It starts with an introduction to the European telecoms regulatory framework, to the 
meaning of telecom forced access mechanisms, and how these mechanisms are 
situated in this regulatory framework, including the changes to forced access 
obligations with the introduction of new Telecoms Packages; lastly, it examined 
theoretical and factual disputes concerning telecoms forced access mechanisms in the 
European Union. 
 
There are several observations that can be made on the discussions in this chapter. 
First, one of the biggest changes brought by the new 2009 Telecoms Package was 
                                                 
114 Doyle, C. (2000). "Local loop unbundling and regulatory risk." J. Network Ind. 1: 33. 
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greatly reduce the markets that are subject to ex ante regulation. This change is 
regarded as in line with the global trend away from sector-specific regulation to 
competition regulation. While it is unknown how much further this trend will evolve 
in the future, this gradually lighter-touch regulatory idea suggests that the need for 
intense regulation of the telecoms market is reducing, and this will play an important 
role when reviewing the legitimacy of telecoms forced access mechanisms. 
 
This trend, however, is in contrast to the introduction of functional separation, which 
is a relatively strong regulatory measure. The reason why the European Union 
introduced a regulatory measure that is in such contradiction to its loosening of the 
regulatory framework is unknown, but probably due to politics within Member States, 
As suggested by Keegan (2011), this might be due to the fact that when there was a 
dispute about the functional separation implemented in the United Kingdom, the 
United Kingdom then took this proposal to the European Union.115 
 
The essential facilities doctrine, as discussed in the last section of the chapter, serves 
as an important rationale for telecoms forced access mechanisms. However, the 
implementation of this doctrine, according to the Court of Justice, requires a strict 
assessment of "essential", and the results of incautious implementation may have 
drawbacks in the form of economic and social welfare damage, such as reducing the 
incentive to invest in new and better technologies. These will be examined later, in 
Chapter Ten.
                                                 






Chapter III  





Like Chapter Two, to understand whether telecoms forced access mechanisms 
constitute an unconstitutional restriction on the fundamental rights of telcos under 
Taiwan’s constitutional and legal framework, it is important to understand the 
meaning and content of telecoms forced access mechanisms and how these 
mechanisms are implemented in Taiwan. This chapter thus comprises three sections: 
the first is an introduction to the telecoms regulatory framework in Taiwan, which 
starts with an introduction to the regulatory authority (section 1.1). As the telecoms 
market in Taiwan has many unique features, and much of it was gradually added to 
the regulatory design over the years,1 the next part of the section is a brief 
introduction to the historical development of telecoms regulations in Taiwan (section 
1.2). Because Taiwan’s telecoms regulations did not have major, fundamental 
amendments such as the introduction of the new Telecoms Package in the European 
Union, but had several modifications over the years instead, the second part of this 
section gives an overall view of telecoms regulation in Taiwan from a scholarly 
perspective (section 1.3). According to Taiwanese scholarly discussions, telecoms 
regulations can be categorised into four groups: (market) entry regulations; structural 
(asymmetric) regulations; behavioural regulations; and competition law regulations.2 
For the purposes of this chapter, the emphasis of this section will be on structural and 
behavioural regulations, as most forced access regulations fall into these two 
                                                 
1 Y.L.Liu, Ed. (2004). Telecommunications. SunYei Publishing: 170. 





The second section is a discussion of telecoms forced access mechanisms in Taiwan. 
As per the discussion and limitations set out in previous chapters, this section will 
focus on the three targeted telecoms forced access mechanisms--i.e. interconnection, 
local-loop unbundling and separation--that are stipulated in Taiwanese telecoms 
regulations, such as in the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among 
Telecommunications Enterprises.3 It should also be noted that as there are no active 
laws or administrative orders regulating separation, this section will include 
discussion of a draft bill to amend the Telecommunications Act.4 
 
Finally, as the review of the constitutionality of a regulatory measure involves a 
synthetic consideration and a weighing of all the interests and possible harms (see 
Chapters Seven, Nine and Eleven), the final section 3 examines the current situation 
of the Taiwanese telecoms market and some notable disputes between telcos, 
concerning telecoms forced access, that are occurring in the market, especially 
between the incumbent and competing telcos, to analyse what interests are at stake 
and potential harms resulting from implementing telecoms forced access mechanisms 
in Taiwan. 
 
It should be noted that as this chapter focuses on the regulatory framework in Taiwan, 
the materials cited are mostly in Chinese. As such, it will not be further specified 
individually that the terms and content are translations from Chinese but they will be 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that customarily, the statutes and regulations in Taiwan do not specify their 
amended date in their names; therefore, when an act or regulation is mentioned, it refers to the latest 
version or amendment. 
4 Article 25 of draft amendment bill of Telecommunications Act. 
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categorised as such in the Bibliography. 
 
1. Telecoms Regulatory Framework in Taiwan 
1.1 Regulatory Authorities 
a. Sector Regulator: National Communications Commission 
The telecommunications sector regulatory authority in Taiwan is the National 
Communications Commission (NCC). There are several laws and regulations 
regulating communications affairs, such as the Telecommunications Act, Radio and 
Television Act, Cable Radio and Television Act and Satellite Broadcasting Act; and 
the power to regulate communications affairs belonged to the Ministry of 
Transportation and Communications (MOTC), the Government Information Office 
(GIO) and the Directorate General of Telecommunications (DGT), respectively, 
according to their nature. Although this multi-authorities pattern was applied in 
Taiwan for decades, such arrangements ran the risk of lower efficiency and ambiguity 
in responsibilities. There are two noteworthy issues: first, the GIO served as a 
government spokesperson regarding the supervision of broadcasting and the 
propaganda of the Taiwanese government to international society, diluting each of 
these roles that it played. Second, with the DGT being an institute under the MOTC, 
the communications affairs operated and supervised by these two bodies led to 
confusion over the organisation in charge and, much more importantly, a conflict of 
interests. 
 
This ambiguous situation changed greatly with the movement towards reorganisation 
of government and the requirements of joining the World Trade Organisation 
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(WTO),5 and hence the creating of a single united regulator in the 
telecommunications sector. Thus in 2002, a new regulator, the NCC, was established 
to imitate the design of the FCC in the United States. With the later enactment of the 
Fundamental Communications Act and the National Communications Commission 
Organization Act, the NCC was reaffirmed as the single regulatory authority in the 
telecommunications sector by design.6 
 
b. Competition Regulator: Fair Trade Commission 
The national authority for unfair competition, the Fair Trade Commission (FTC), also 
plays a role in telecoms regulation with regard to the anti-competitive behaviour of 
telecoms companies via the application of the Fair Trade Act. At the same time, 
because of the character of regulatory policies in the telecoms sector, the ideas of 
competition law have also been integrated into some provisions in sector regulations, 
e.g., the asymmetrical regulation on SMP in Type I telecommunications operators in 
Article 26-1 of the Telecommunications Act, such that the SMPs (termed as DMP, 
dominant market player) bear the obligation not to: obstruct a request for 
interconnection; refuse to release the calculation methods of its interconnection fees; 
or improperly determine or change the tariffs of telecoms services.7 
                                                 
5 See: TWDRWP (2005). Transparency Discipline for Domestic Regulation in the Transparency 
Discipline for Domestic Regulation in the Telecommunications Sector. 
6 It should be noted that in Article 3 Telecommunications Act, the regulatory authority of the 
telecommunications sector remains unamended and is still the MOTC. However, there is no doubt that 
the NCC has replaced the MOTC (DGT) as the regulatory authority, as stated in Article 2 of The 
National Communications Commission Organisation Act: "Effective on the NCC inception date, the 
competent government agency and pertinent communications laws and regulations, including the 
Telecommunications Act, the Radio and Television Act, the Cable Radio and Television Act, and the 
Satellite Broadcasting Act, that once had fallen under the purview of the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communications, the Government's Information Office, Executive Yuan, and the Directorate General 
of Telecommunications, Ministry of Transportation and Communications, shall fall under the purview 
of the NCC. The same also applies to those stipulated by other pertinent laws and regulations that 
concern the competent responsibilities of the NCC." 
7 Article 26-1Telecommunications Act reads: 




The responsibilities borne by the NCC and FTC sometimes overlap, despite the 
different roles played and tasks undertaken by the two regulatory authorities. For 
example, both regulators are competent in dealing with telecoms mergers. The FTC 
has also issued an "Explanation of the Fair Trade Commission's Regulations of 
Telecommunications Operators",8 which explains the relationship between 
competition law and telecoms regulations and, of special importance to this thesis, the 
application of an essential facilities doctrine to local loops. This will be further 
explored later in this chapter (1.3.2). 
 
1.2 Historical Development of Telecom Regulation in Taiwan 
Telecoms services in Taiwan, as in most other countries, were first offered by the 
government. With the global trend towards liberalisation, Taiwan also took steps to 
liberalise and open up the telecommunications market. Telecoms regulation evolved 
                                                                                                                                            
following conducts: 
1. to obstruct, directly or indirectly, the request of interconnection of networks proposed by other Type 
I telecommunications enterprises with its proprietary techniques; 
2. to refuse to release to other Type I telecommunications enterprises the calculation methods of its 
interconnection fees and other relevant materials; 
3. to improperly determine, maintain, or change its tariffs or methods of offering telecommunications 
services; 
4. to reject the request of leasing network component by other Type I telecommunications enterprises 
without due cause; 
5. to reject the request of leasing circuits by other telecommunications enterprises or users without due 
cause; 
6. to reject the request of negotiation or testing by other telecommunications enterprises or users 
without due cause; 
7. to reject the request of co-location negotiation by other telecommunications enterprises without due 
cause; 
8. to discriminate against other telecommunications enterprises or users without due cause; or 
9. to abuse its DMP status, or to engage in other unfair competition acts. 
The aforementioned DMP shall be identified by the DGT. 
 
8 FTC "Explanation of the Fair Trade Commission's Regulations of Telecommunications Operators", 
available at: http://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/main/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=211&docid=275 (accessed 
April 2016 ). 
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with the liberalisation process, and can be divided into the following three stages:9 
 
1.2.1 Initial liberalisation in the Monopoly Era 
The first stage of liberalisation began in 1987 with the opening up of end users' 
devices (home telephone sets). The DGT was then not the only source of telephone 
sets anymore, and end users could get and use telephone sets from private sellers as 
long as these telephone sets were approved by the DGT. Other important progress in 
this stage was the opening up of electronic circuits and value-added network (VAN) 
services. 
 
1.2.2 The Opening up of Mobile Communications Services 
The second stage began in 1989, as the DGT opened up several more telecoms 
services, amongst which primitive mobile communications services were the most 
important. The reason why these services were opened up earlier was because they 
only involved opening up the spectrum, not the installation of network infrastructure. 
With the opening of said services, the mobile phone market developed very rapidly. In 
2002, the penetration rate for mobiles in Taiwan reached 108% which had been 
reported as the highest rate in the world at the time.10 Also in this stage, the DGT 
started to categorise telecommunications operators into Type I and Type II 
telecommunications operators, and differentiated its regulatory approaches. 
 
1.2.3 Opening up of the Fixed Network and Full Liberalisation 
                                                 
9 For these historical developments, see: Liu, K.-C. and J.-j. Shih (2001). Revolutional Regulation, 
Social Science Research Centre, Academic Sinica; Jen, T.-Y. (2001). A Study on the Regulation for the 
Telecommunications Industry, Shay & Partners; Y.L.Liu, Ed. (2004). Telecommunications. SunYei 
Publishing. 
10 TNIC (2002). "Report of Internet Population", available at: 
http://www.myhome.net.tw/2002_09/articl/articl_0102.htm (accessed April 2016 ).  
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With the fundamentals established in the second stage and the opening up of more 
telecoms services, such as the leasing of international submarine cables, the 
Taiwanese telecoms market was developing prosperously. To promote the 
development of broadband networks, the DGT further opened up fixed network 
services in 2000, which might be one of the most important steps in the third stage of 
liberalisation. With the later opening up of services such as Voice over IP (VOIP),11 
third-generation (3G) mobile services and mobile virtual network operators 
(MVNOs),12 all telecoms services were opened and the Taiwanese telecoms market 
could be said to be entirely liberalised. In this stage, the NCC also replaced the DGT 
as the independent regulator of the telecoms sector. 
 
1.3 Current Telecoms Regulatory Framework---A Scholarly Perspective 
1.3.1 Telecoms Sector Regulations 
It should be noted first that in the Telecommunications Act, telcos, terms as 
telecommunications, are classified into two categories: Type I telecommunications 
and Type II telecommunications. "Type I telecommunications" means an enterprise 
that installs telecommunications line facilities and equipment in order to provide 
telecommunications services,13 and "Type II telecommunications" means 
telecommunications other than Type I telecommunications.14 The regulations for 
different intensities and obligations imposed are often designed according to the 
                                                 
11 VOIP refers to the telecommunications technology that delivers voice communications and 
multimedia packets over Internet Protocol (IP) networks such as the Internet, see: Goode, B. (2002). 
Voice over internet protocol (VoIP):13; Yeung, J. (2015). Voice Over Internet Protocol - A Practical 
Guide for the Non-telephone Engineer. 
12 MVNO refers to a wireless communications service operator that does not own wireless network 
infrastructure to provide services to its customers, see for reference: Korhonen, J. (2003). Introduction 
to 3G mobile communications, Artech House: 300. 
13 Here, telecommunications line facilities and equipment refer to network transmission facilities 
connecting sending and receiving terminals, switching facilities installed to be integrated with network 




different nature of the two types of telecommunications. 
 
According to the consensus of Taiwanese scholars, telecommunications sector 
regulations can be classified into the following three categories:15 
 
1.3.1.1 Entry Regulations 
a. Limitation on the Organisation of Telecommunications 
A Type I telecommunications operator shall be a company limited by shares 
incorporated pursuant to Company Law.16 There is no limitation on the organization 
of Type II telecommunications operators. 
 
b. Limitation on Foreign Capital 
A limitation on foreign capital in the early development of privatisation of 
telecommunications sector has been adopted by many countries, including Taiwan, in 
order to ensure steady development of the national telecommunications industry. 
 
However, with the convergence of telecommunications technologies and the need for 
new products and services, the limitations were loosened as the introduction of 
foreign capital also brings in new technologies and better management. This situation 
was further enhanced by the eagerness to join the WTO and the requirement to lift 
restrictions on foreign capital. Nowadays, the limitation on foreign capital is 49% for 
direct shareholdings and 60% for direct and indirect shareholdings combined, an 
                                                 
15 See: Li, C.-J. (2007). The Research on the Regulatory Classification of Telecommunications 
Enterprises under the Telecommunications Act: Take Internet Telephony Service as Example, TungHwa 
University School of Law: 131-132. 
16 Article 12 (2) Telecommunications Act. 
 
 61 
increase from the original 20% for direct and indirect shareholdings combined.17 
 
c. Special Licenses and Permissions 
There are different designs and requirements for company establishment and 
registration in Taiwan according to the nature of the company,18 and as the operation 
of Type I telecommunications operators involves scarce resources, such as the 
spectrum and the use of land, the establishment of said telecommunications operator 
has to have permission from the national regulator. At the same time, the types of 
business, their scopes and timeframes and the overall quantity of Type I 
telecommunications operators should also follow special orders and regulations. On 
the other hand, the regulations on Type II telecommunications operators are not as 
strict and are not very different from those for companies in other industries. 
 
d. Limitation on Overall Capital 
The current limitation on overall capital mainly focuses on Type I 
telecommunications operators: they should be financially competent to install 
telecommunications facilities.19 
 
1.3.1.2 Structural Regulations 
"Structural regulations" refers to regulations aiming to adjust the structure of the 
industry, especially the competition status of markets within the industry. The most 
important and typical structural regulations in the telecoms industry are asymmetric 
                                                 
17 Article 12(3) Telecommunications Act. 
18 Article 17 Company Law. 
19 For examples, see: Article 8(1) Regulations for the Administration of Fixed Network 
Telecommunications Businesses, Article 13 Regulations for the Administration of Mobile 
Communications Businesses, Article 4 Regulations for the Administration of Third Generation 
Mobile Communications Businesses. 
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regulations. As in most countries, telecoms markets were once a monopoly with a 
single (incumbent) operator, giving the incumbent the edge in competition after 
markets were opened up. In order to introduce competition into this once monopolised 
industry and achieve the proposed policy goals,20 regulators usually impose stronger 
obligations or a heavier burden on one or some of the market participants, especially 
the incumbent or companies with significant market power (SMP). 
 
There are two main types of asymmetric regulations in the telecoms sector. The first 
concerns the regulations applied to the relationship between telcos and consumers, 
such as tariff regulations. The second type is found in the regulations on the 
relationship between telcos, such as the obligations of interconnection.21 The reason 
for asymmetric regulation of interconnection is because of the imbalance of economic 
power between the incumbent and new entrants, especially during the early process of 
privatisation, as the incumbent inherits and controls most of the resources (such as 
existing networks and customers) and deploying networks is difficult (especially for 
networks in a city). It is therefore essential to apply asymmetric regulation in order to 
protect new entrants and facilitate their competence to compete.22 
 
One of the most noteworthy asymmetric regulation provisions in Taiwanese telecoms 
regulation is Article 26-1, which elaborates the prohibition on nine kinds of abuse of 
                                                 
20 Shyr, H. S. H. (2009). Legal Analysis of the Opening of Local Loops in Taiwan--The Switching of the 
Legal Framework of Communication Convergence toward Competition, Angle Publish: p.193.  
21 Liu, Y.-F. C. C.-J. (2000). "Asymmetric Regulation in the Telecommunications Industry." 
Socioeconomic Law and Institution Review 26: 64.  
22 It has been commented that the application of asymmetric regulations, like the infant industry 
argument in economics theory, will not be justified unless it satisfies the following conditions: (1) when 
the prescribed protection period is over, the original asymmetric regulations should be removed, or 
consumers cannot enjoy the benefits of competition; (2) when a new market player survives the 
competition, the positive effects this brings to the competition market should surpass the social costs 
during the protection period; (3) the protection period should be set in advance and include the 
provision that all protective approaches will be ended when the protection period ends. Ibid.:70-71. 
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Type I telecommunications SMP. Eight of these nine behaviours are related to 
interconnection affairs, such as the prices of and requests for interconnection or 
co-location (termed as collocation in Taiwan telecoms regulation) . It has been said 
that this article is a typical or prima facie asymmetric regulation and can be called a 
"competition provision within sector (regulation)."23  
 
Asymmetric regulation is regarded as an effective regulatory method in the telecoms 
sector and has been ubiquitously adopted; however, an important (especially in the 
early stages of this thesis) question to ask is: where should we draw the line on 
asymmetric regulation? This leads to a second and more straightforward question 
concerning the aims of integrating competition law mechanisms into sector regulation. 
If we think that the answer to the second question is to create an environment for new 
entrants so that they are more capable of competing, resulting in more choices in the 
market with regard to products and services instead of depressing SMP, the scope of 
asymmetric regulation should, understandably, be limited to the encouragement of 
competition in terms of efficiency and innovation. In other words, excessive 
asymmetric regulation mechanisms, such as rates and arrangements for 
interconnection that lavishly favour new entrants, may greatly diminish their incentive 
to develop or deploy their own infrastructures.24 
 
1.3.1.3 Behavioural Regulations 
Here, we enumerate several important regulatory mechanisms that are classified by 
Taiwanese scholars as behavioural regulation: 
 
                                                 
23 Shyr (2009), supra n 20: 133-134. 




In telecoms, interconnection means the physical or functional linking of one or more 
telecoms networks in order to let the users of each network be able to communicate 
with each other, or let the users of a network use the services offered by other 
networks.25 The principle of interconnection is the basis for setting up the 
technological interface and commercial arrangements.26 
 
b. Tariff Control 
Tariff control means a regulatory policy that allows the regulator to control the tariffs 
that telcos apply to their end customers. Tariff control is an important regulatory 
mechanism, especially during the early stage of telecoms privatisation, as it has a 
twofold function: first, it enables telcos to operate and develop steadily by ensuring a 
sufficient rate of return to cover their operation costs; second, it prevents exorbitant 
telecoms prices as public utilities can be used at a fair rate. Despite the Taiwanese 
telecoms market having been liberalised and developing rapidly, there still exist some 
conditions or entry barriers, such as the number of telco licences, which tend to lead 
to an oligopoly (see the above discussion on Special Licenses and Permissions in 
section 1.3.1.1). To prevent anti-competitive practices in an oligopoly, such as cartel 
pricing (concerted pricing), it is necessary to retain a certain amount of tariff control.27 
 
Before telecoms services were privatised, the mechanism for tariff control was 
rate-of-return regulation. In other words, the telecoms department (DGT) was allowed 
to set tariffs to achieve a certain range of rate of return in order to keep profits at a 
                                                 
25 Jen (2001), supra n 9:76.  
26 MOTC (1997). White Paper on the Liberalisation of Telecommunications Policies:17.  
27 Huang (2010), supra n 2:107. 
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reasonable level.28 When the telecoms market was later privatised, however, defects 
in the rate-of-return regulations emerged, as they did not allow the margin of profit to 
exceed a proposed range and might reduce the incentive for telcos to enhance their 
efficiency and lower costs.29 In many countries, telecoms regulators have adopted 
price-cap regulations to replace rate-of-return regulations.30 Price-cap regulations 
adjust the tariffs charged by telcos according to a price-cap index that reflects the 
overall rate of inflation in the country and are usually presented as "CPI – X", with 
CPI being the consumer price index and X the adjusting index. Price-cap regulation 
was also included in the 1999 amendment to the Taiwanese Telecommunications Act. 
 
c. Universal Service 
An issue in the privatisation of the telecoms market was how to maintain the universal 
service. Universal service means maintaining a certain degree of telecoms services 
throughout the country, especially in areas where the free market function fails, e.g. 
deploying telecoms infrastructure in remote rural areas where the return on investment 
cannot meet the costs of deployment. Since the telecoms market has been privatised, 
telcos, in pursuit of profit, usually pay more attention to more profitable services and 
areas, and neglect uneconomic services and areas (creaming). However, citizens in 
these areas should retain at least a basic level of telecoms services in order to engage 
in daily economic life. Therefore, regulators usually impose a universal service 
                                                 
28 It has been commented that the rate of return regulations adopted by the DGT were very strict, as the 
upper limit was very low but the lower limit very high. See Wang, W.-Y. (2000). "Transformation of the 
Concept of Public Utilities Regulations and competition – A Case Study of Telecommunications and 
Electricity." National Taiwan University Law Review 4:138.  
29 Another issue is that, at this rate, asset values have to be considered when calculating tariffs. 
Therefore, when telecommunications operators’ assets values are being revalued, tariffs will have to be 
adjusted as well. See: Huang (2010), supra n 2: 107.  
30 See: OECD (1995), Price Caps for Telecommunications—Policies and Experiences, available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/1909801.pdf (accessed April 2016). 
 
 66 
obligation on telcos.31 Universal service is one of the most vivid characteristics of 
modern telecoms services as public utilities. 
 
1.3.2 Competition Law Regulations 
As stated in the early part of this chapter, the NCC is the regulator for the telecoms 
sector and regulates telecoms affairs by applying sector regulations, such as the 
Fundamental Communications Act and the Telecommunications Act. On the other 
hand, the FTC is the regulator for general anti-competitive behaviour and emphasises 
the economic dimension. As made clear in the FTC's "Explanation of the Fair Trade 
Commission’s Regulations of Telecommunications Operators": "[t]he current 
Telecommunications Act also has several regulations for certain competition 
behaviours of telecommunications operators. Compared to the Fair Trade Act, the 
Telecommunications Act implements sector-specific regulations and emphasizes 
ex-ante regulation. In other words, it lowers the chances of anti-competitive behaviour 
via such mechanisms as tariff control, interconnection, equal access and accounting 
separation. On the other hand, the Fair Trade Act plays the role of a general 
competition law and emphasises ex-post regulation. It prevents and deters 
anti-competitive behaviours via the investigation and punishment of enterprises that 
violate the Fair Trade Act".32 In its explanation, the FTC further specifies several 
anti-competitive behaviours of telcos that it aims to target. These include: predatory 
pricing; vertical price squeezing; cross-subsidies; abuse of essential facilities; 
improper special and differential treatment; improper long-term contracts; and 
                                                 
31 One of the common approaches is where regulator charges all the telecoms companies in the market 
a certain amount of money to establish a telecoms universal services fund and forces certain companies 
(usually the incumbent) to ensure their physical deployment.  
32 See Article 3 FTC "Explanation of the Fair Trade Commission's Regulations of Telecommunications 
Operators", supra n 8.  
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limitations on transfers. 
 
Despite these two regulators being responsible for different matters, sometimes their 
duties overlap, as when two telcos merge. The relationship between the functioning of 
the NCC and the FTC is similar to that between the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 
the United States. However, the two regulators may sometimes have different or even 
conflicting views. Many of these cases occur because of the ex ante or ex post stances 
that the two regulators adopt. For example, in the case of essential facilities, the FTC 
does not specify which facilities or devices are essential but will make a judgement 
when a case is brought before the FTC.33 On the other hand, the NCC can specify 
certain facilities or devices and apply different regulations, such as deciding that 
local-loop unbundling is an essential facility (termed alternatively a "bottleneck 
facility") in the fixed-line market in 2006,34 as per the provision in Regulations for 
Administration on Fixed Network Telecommunications Business: "During the 
construction of network infrastructure facilities for its fixed telecommunication 
network, where the bottleneck facilities in the telecommunications network cannot be 
self-constructed or substituted for by other available technologies within a reasonable 
period of time, an operator or an applicant who has received the approval for 
establishment may request for sharing of network infrastructure facilities with 
operators of fixed network telecommunications business who have the possession of 
bottleneck facilities".35  
 
                                                 
33 See for reference, ibid. 
34 NCC (2006). Metalic Local Loop as Bottleneck Facility. 
35 Article 37(1) Regulations for Administration on Fixed Network Telecommunications Business.  
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2. Telecoms Forced Access Mechanisms in Taiwan 
2.1 Introduction 
In this subsection, the regulations for the three main kinds of telecoms forced access 
mechanisms in Taiwan will be discussed: interconnection, local-loop unbundling 
(local-loop access) and separation. It should first be noted that, in some scholarly 
discussions, local-loop unbundling is classified as a type of interconnection.36 
However, as the Taiwanese regulators follow different paths to deal with these two 
mechanisms, they will be discussed separately in this chapter. 
 
Except for accounting separation , there have not been active laws or regulations for 
separation in the telecommunications sector. However, the idea of separation, 
especially functional separation, has been introduced to Taiwan and it has been 
discussed whether it should be included in law (see discussion in 2.4, below). As 
expectations are that this thesis will serve not just as the basis for the present but also 
future scholarly discussions, this chapter will include separation in the discussion of 
the forced access mechanism, especially the proposed provision of draft amendments. 
 
2.2 Interconnection 
2.2.1 Meaning and Limitations 
Interconnection means the connection of two or more network systems so that the 
users of those systems can communicate with each other. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, telcos can be classified as Type I and Type II. Interconnections are necessary 
between Type I operators and are arguably necessary between telecommunications 
                                                 
36 For examples, see: Chuang, Y.-F. and C.-J. Liu (1998). "Network Interconnection and the 
Development of the Telecommunications Industry." Socioeconomic Law and Institution Review 21; 
Chou, Y. (2001). The Third Revolution in Telecommunications Regulations. Policy Analysis: Theory 
and Practice. Shih-Hsin University Department of Administration: p.3; Liu (2004) supra n 1: 203. 
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operators that are not all Type I telecommunications operators, i.e. between Type I 
and Type II operators, and between Type II operators inter se (henceforth non-Type I 
telecommunications operators or non-Type I interconnection). DGT, the Taiwanese 
regulator, and the succeeding NCC hold the same opinion and distinguish the 
regulations for interconnection depending upon these two kinds of operators. Simply 
put, only Type I telecommunications operators have an obligation to interconnect with 
each other, while non-Type I telecommunications operators do not have such an 
obligation.37 
 
As Type I and non-Type I interconnections are basically different--i.e. Type I 
interconnections emphasise the physical connections between two networks while 
non-Type I interconnections refer to the arrangements for IP transmission--the 
regulatory principles for these two kinds of interconnection also differ. A comparison 
of the regulatory principles for Type I and non-Type I telecommunications operators 
and interconnection is shown in the chart below: 
 
 Type I 
Telecommunications 
Non-Type I  
Telecommunications 
Licensing Special and limited  
 
Fully open and no restrictions 
Regulations Strong and asymmetric  Less strict 
Interconnection Legally obliged  Voluntary interconnection by 
negotiation 
                                                 













Per-call based, time- and 
class-sensitive 
Three different ways: 
1. Mutually waived 
2.  Consumer mode 




Per-call based, time- and 
class-sensitive 
Monthly flat rate 
(Chart 3.1 The interconnection obligations of Type I and Type II telcos38) 
 
There is no doubt that non-Type I interconnections play an important role in the 
telecoms industry, and there are no fewer disputes surrounding it than Type I 
interconnections, most notably concerning interconnection fees, especially in 
Taiwan.39 However, this thesis focuses mainly on physical forced access to telecoms 
networks; disputes about non-Type I interconnections will be discussed where 
appropriate, but not emphasised, as discussions about non-Type I interconnections go 
well beyond the scope of this thesis. 
                                                 
38 Lien, Y.-N. (2009). "Analyses of Regulations and Techniques of IP Interconnection", available at 
http://www.cs.nccu.edu.tw/~lien/Pub/c80ip.pdf (accessed April 2016). 
39 It should be noted here that the NCC has a regulatory philosophy whereby telecommunications 
operators that have operated Type I telecommunications businesses should be regulated and abide by 
Type I regulations (which are generally considered stricter), even when they are offering Type II 
(non-network related) products or services. According to Mei-Hwui Chui, head of the legal department 
of CHT, the NCC asserted that this regulatory philosophy is not just customary but came from an 
administrative order that it published. However, the said order could never be found (and therefore was 
never able to be challenged in judicial review) (Chui, personal communication). The application of the 
said regulatory philosophy, however, is not just arbitrary but impairs the principle of the rule of law, as 
it lacks a legal source, and also nullifies the legislative designs distinguishing Type I and Type II 





In the history of telecoms liberalisation, different countries adopted different stances 
toward the regulation of interconnection, i.e. some countries have made 
interconnection a legal obligation, while others respect the negotiations between 
telcos and so regulators do not intervene until negotiations fail.40 However, it should 
be noted that even if agreement has been reached in the negotiation of interconnection 
arrangements, as the competition situation in the market is ever-changing, it is 
essential for interconnecting telcos to have updated arrangements and regulatory 
frameworks should be adjusted accordingly.41 
 
Currently, only Type I telecommunications operators have an interconnection 
obligation. The principal provision of this obligation in Taiwan is Article 16(1) of the 
Telecommunications Act, which states:  
"Requests for network interconnection between or among Type I telecommunications 
enterprises shall not be rejected, unless the law specifies otherwise." 
This provision was the result of an amendment in 1999 as the terminology used in the 
original version was not clear. In an explanation of the said amendment, the term 
"interconnection" is identified as a "network connection between Type I 
telecommunications operators in order to enable subscribers to communicate with 
subscribers to other telecommunications operators or to access services provided by 
                                                 
40 See Huang (2010), supra n 2:133. 
41 It may be questioned whether interconnection agreements should be regarded as cartels. In this 
regard, the FTC points out in its Explanations of the Fair Trade Commission’s regulations on 
Telecommunications Operators that since interconnection agreements benefit customers who can use 
telecommunications services and this will promote competition, therefore, generally they will not be 
regarded as cartels. However, were interconnecting parties purposely to set excessively high 
interconnection charges in order to restrict the competition between tariffs, this might be regarded as an 
illegal cartel.  
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other telecommunications". However, if there are technical infeasibilities inherent in 
the said interconnection or where such interconnection will affect the safety of 
telecoms facilities, the requested telco should have the right to reject the said 
interconnection with the approval of the regulator.42 
 
The idea that requests for interconnection shall not be rejected in principle was 
reaffirmed in later published administrative orders, Regulations Governing Network 
Interconnection among Type I Telecommunications Operators43 and Regulations for 
the Administration of Fixed Network Telecommunications Business.44 
 
In the same Article, the Telecommunications Act announces principles for 
interconnection arrangements, as it states:  
"The arrangement of network interconnection mentioned in the preceding paragraph 
shall follow the principles of transparency, reasonableness, non-discrimination, 
network unbundling and cost-based pricing. The DGT shall designate the 
telecommunications enterprises to which the said principles shall apply."45 
 
With technological developments and international trends, e.g. Taiwan joined the 
WTO and had to abide by the WTO's Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, the 
scope of interconnection is not limited to Type I telecommunications operators. The 
                                                 
42 See: Article 4 of the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications 
Enterprises.  
43 As stated in Article 4(1) of the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Type I 
Telecommunications Companies: "Among Type I telecommunication enterprises, when one enterprise 
demands network interconnection with another enterprise, the other party is not allowed to refuse". 
44 As stated in Article 43(1) of the Regulations for Administration of the Fixed Network 
Telecommunications Business: "By and between any two operators, when one requests network 
interconnection with another, except as otherwise provided by the laws and regulations, the other 
cannot refuse". 
45 See: Article 16(2) of the Telecommunications Act. It should again be noted that to rely on the "DGT" 
is legislative negligence as the regulatory authority should be the NCC instead. 
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said Article 16 of the Telecommunications Act was therefore amended in 2002 to open 
a gateway to interconnection between Type I and Type II telecommunications 
operators and to give a legal basis for a more detailed administrative order.46 
Accordingly, the aforementioned Regulations Governing Network Interconnection 
among Type I Telecommunications Operators was amended and became the 
Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications 
Enterprises, and this enlarged the scope of interconnection to interconnection between 
Type I and Type II telecommunications operators as well. 
 
2.2.3 Current Framework of Interconnection 
The early legislators of the Telecommunications Act and the DGT held the belief that, 
as the telecoms market had just been liberalised and there was one dominant player in 
the market which owned most of the resources, the market could not be expected to 
function fully without due regulation. In the case of interconnection, a failure to retain 
a suitable interconnection mechanism would lead to delays or poor quality in 
communications. It would also lead to excessively high costs for new entrants and low 
efficiency for the incumbent. Therefore, it was essential to maintain a workable legal 
framework for interconnection. The current regulator NCC holds the same opinion 
and has included such ideas in the law, and this is the reason why interconnection 
under the Taiwanese telecoms regulatory framework does not rely entirely rely on 
commercial negotiations but sometimes are legal obligations, and in some cases the 
                                                 
46 As stated in Article 16 (VII) of the Telecommunications Act: "Type I telecommunications 
enterprises shall not reject a request for network interconnection by Type II telecommunication 
enterprises without due cause, unless the law specifies otherwise. The preceding paragraphs 3 and 6 
shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to an agreement for network interconnection." 
Article 16 (VII) further states that the DGT shall enact rules with respect to network interconnection, 
tariff calculation, negotiation, mandatory terms within interconnection agreements, arbitration 
procedures and matters requiring compliance related thereto, between or among Type I 
telecommunications enterprises and other telecommunications enterprises. 
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regulator can intervene. 
 
The current legal framework of interconnection can be analysed as follows: 
 
2.2.3.1 Arrangements for Interconnection 
a. The arrangements for network interconnection mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph shall follow the principles of transparency, reasonableness, 
non-discrimination, network unbundling and cost-based pricing.47 This idea is 
reaffirmed in the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among 
Telecommunications Enterprises, which state that when a Type I telecommunications 
operator provides a network interconnection service, the price, quality and other 
interconnection conditions shall meet the principles of being just, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory.48 
 
b. Network interconnection among Type I telecommunications enterprises shall be 
economically, technically and administratively efficient.49 
 
c. The point of interconnection (POI) is the connecting point where the connecting 
telco's networks and facilities are installed into the connected telco's properties; thus, 
it involves issues of co-location. From the perspective of the interconnecting telco, the 
arrangements for interconnection affect their network status and the quality of 
interconnection,50 and this is especially true when new market entrants interconnect 
                                                 
47 Article 16 (2) Telecommunication Act. 
48 Article 6(1) Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications 
Enterprises. 
49 Article 5 Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications Enterprises. 
50 Wang, Z.-N. and W. Lin (1998). "A General discussion of Current Telecommunications 
Interconnection and Its Future Development." Chunghwa Telecom Technical Quarterly 2:121. 
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with the incumbent. Therefore, the settings and locations of POI should be established 
through negotiations51 and should be set up wherever technically feasible.52 When 
there is evaluation of technical feasibility, only the security or reliability of telecoms 
networks, not space, location and economic factors, should be considered.53 
 
2.2.3.2 Interconnection Charges 
Another important issue regarding interconnection is the distribution of 
interconnection charges. There are many fees and charges in the interconnection 
process, and most of these fees are generally borne by the party that requires 
interconnection. This results in a costs increase for the other party unless the law 
specifies otherwise.54 Amongst these fees, access charges55 and transit charges56 are 
usually the ones most disputed, as they are usually the largest costs for new entrants 
and one of the most important income sources for the incumbent.57 It is especially 
true in Taiwan, as interconnection charges are where the regulator applies a lighter 
approach to interconnection matter. Access charges are paid by the party to which the 
                                                 
51 Article 7(1) Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications 
Enterprises. From the perspective of an effective network, the way in which new entrants interconnect 
with the incumbent will affect their network status and quality of interconnection; therefore, the best 
location for a POI should be decided by negotiation. For the incumbent, concerns about the location 
should be mainly decided in terms of efficiency and maintenance; for new entrants, the main 
considerations are lowering the cost of interconnection and the distance from their own exchange. See: 
ibid: 126. 
52 Article 7(2) of the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications 
Enterprises. 
53 Article 7(4) of the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications 
Enterprises. 
54 Article 13(2) iii of the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications 
Enterprises. 
55 An access charge refers to the cost calculated on the basis of the duration of network 
communications using network interconnection, see Article 13(1) Regulations Governing Network 
Interconnection among Telecommunications Enterprises. 
56 A transit charge refers to the charge paid to the other Type I telecommunications enterprise, through 
whose network the communication between networks of two Type I telecommunications enterprises 
will run for the networks of two enterprises which are only partly or not fully interconnected. Ibid.  




tariff applies; nevertheless, a specific agreement will follow if there is any negotiation 
of the connection charge by the interconnecting enterprises, while transit charges are 
paid by the party that seeks the switching, and this shall be determined by negotiation 
if there is no reason for the switching.58 
 
2.3 Local Loop Unbundling 
The local loop refers to the local loop network element which is defined as a 
transmission facility between a distribution frame (or its equivalent) in the 
incumbent's LEC central office and a loop demarcation point at an end-user 
customer's premises, including the wire inside owned by the incumbent LEC,59 or 
simply put, the physical link or circuit that connects an end user's premises to the 
telecoms network. 
 
As the local loop stretches into the premises of end users (subscribers), it is sometimes 
called a subscriber's line; at the same time, as the local loop constitutes the final 
section of the telecoms networks from an operator perspective, it is also sometimes 
called "the last mile". The local loop, amongst other sections of telecoms networks, is 
considered to be the most difficult section to install, and it is impractical for the new 
entrants to build their own local loops, especially in the early stage of liberalisation. 
Several reasons are given for such difficulties, and it can be concluded that since end 
users already have an existing and functioning network for them to connect and use 
telecoms services, they tend to avoid the inconvenience of letting another telco enter 
or even damage their premises to install another network which seems unnecessary to 
                                                 
58 Article 13(2) i and ii of the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among 
Telecommunications Enterprises. 
59 See the definition in U.S. federal regulations for telecommunications 47 C.F.R. §51.319(a) or the 





It has been widely commented that the telecoms industry constitutes a natural 
monopoly, as despite the market being liberalised, it is difficult for new entrants to 
compete with the incumbent that owns networks that were installed when telecoms 
services were still offered by the government.60 
 
In many countries, the essential facilities or bottleneck doctrine has been adopted to 
deal with issues concerning the opening up of telecoms networks. The idea of an 
essential facilities doctrine was first seen in The United States v Terminal Railroad 
Association,61 and it has gradually developed its content over the years.62 
 
Despite it being arguable whether the essential facilities doctrine has general 
application to the opening up of the telecoms networks, because of the special nature 
of the local loop there is little debate about the said doctrine being used to deal with 
issues about the opening of local loops. 
 
In the current Taiwanese telecoms regulatory framework, local-loop unbundling can 
be seen as a two-stage process. The first stage is where local loops and neighbouring 
infrastructures are forced to grant access. As stated in Article 31 of the 
Telecommunications Act: 
"When a Type I telecommunications enterprise engages in the construction of 
infrastructure for the lines and pipes of its fixed networks, it may request co-location 
                                                 
60 Chuang & Chorng (1998) supra n 34: 58; Liu (2005) supra n 1; Liu, K.-C. (2009). Initial Discussion 
of the Interconnection Regulatory Revolution. White Paper of Interconnection Policy. 
61 The United States v Terminal Railroad Association, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
62 See discussions in Chapter Two (3.1). 
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for its lines and pipes with the facilities at the bottleneck of telecommunications 
networks with the owners of such facilities for a charge. 
With respect to a request to use the infrastructure described in the preceding 
paragraph, the party being so requested shall not reject such a request without due 
cause." 
 
At the same time, Article 37 of the Regulations for the Administration of Fixed 
Network Telecommunications Business also states: 
"During the construction of network infrastructure facilities for its fixed 
telecommunications network, where the bottleneck facilities in the 
telecommunications network cannot be self-constructed or substituted for by other 
available technologies within a reasonable period of time, an operator or an applicant 
who has received approval for the establishment may request sharing of the network 
infrastructure facilities with the operators of a fixed network telecommunications 
business who have possession of bottleneck facilities. 
A request for the sharing of network infrastructure facilities pursuant to the preceding 
paragraph shall not be rejected by such other operator without due reason." 
 
Since the NCC declared local loops to be bottleneck facilities in 2006, a telco that 
owns a local loop (the incumbent) has the obligation to open up the said network to 
access by other telcos.63 
 
The second stage of local loop unbundling (LLU) is to allow the circuits or networks 
                                                 
63 It should be noted that the facilities identified as bottleneck facilities only include 
telecommunications rooms, ducts and the vertical and horizon cables in buildings and do not 
included the circuit between the buildings and the exchange room. See supra n 33. 
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of the local loop to be accessed, which takes the form of the said circuits or networks 
being separated into network elements. A telco that requests access can lease or 
purchase only those combinations or amounts of those elements that they consider 
economically feasible. The requesting telco therefore does not have to pay for 
network elements and thus can reduce its costs to offer services. LLU is therefore 
considered an important regulatory mechanism to lower entry barriers. 
 
The unbundling of networks is not only seen in local loop regulations. As 
aforementioned, the arrangements for network interconnection shall follow the 
principles of transparency, reasonableness, non-discrimination, network unbundling 
and cost-based pricing.64 However, this provision is just a proclamation of policy 
principles for interconnection negotiations between telcos. On the other hand, it is a 
legal obligation for a company with SMP in a fixed network market to unbundle local 
loops for access by other telcos.65 The idea to separate local-loop unbundling from 
general interconnection somehow also reflects on the tariffs of those companies 
granting forced access, as stated in Article 18(2) of the Regulations Governing 
Networks Interconnection among Telecommunications Enterprises: 
 
"The tariff of unbundled network elements leased by other Type I 
telecommunications enterprises, unless otherwise provided for by laws or 
regulations, shall be determined by negotiations between both parties, provided 
that the tariff for network bottleneck facilities shall be charged on a cost basis." 
 
                                                 
64 Article 16(2) Telecommunications Act. 




It should be noted that, technically, there can be four types of local-loop unbundling, 




(Figure 3.1 Different Local Loop Unbundling Arrangements) 
 
Amongst these local-loop unbundling arrangements, full unbundling, line-sharing and 
sub-loop unbundling should be deemed a physical co-location66, and bitstream 
unbundling should be deemed a virtual co-location.67 Unlike those in the United 
States,68 the local-loop unbundling provisions in Taiwan do not explicitly limit 
physical co-location as a principle, and this is similar to the situation in the European 
                                                 
66 Physical co-location refers to the incumbent sparing some space in its exchange room for new 
entrants to install the equipment necessary for interconnection. With regard to the management of 
personnel and the costs of such co-locations, these should be decided by negotiation. See: Wang & Lin 
(1998) supra n 49: 130. 
67 Virtual co-location refers to the co-location model whereby new entrants offer equipment to be 
installed into the incumbent's exchange room and let the incumbent operate such equipment. See: Ibid: 
131.  
68 As 47 U.S.C.§251(c)(6) refers to, "The duty to provide, on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, for physical collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection 
or access to unbundled network elements at the premises of the local exchange carrier, except that the 
carrier may provide for virtual collocation if the local exchange carrier demonstrates to the State 







In this thesis, "separation" is defined as the individualisation of business, operation or 
department of a telco. As discussed in the previous chapter, in scholarly analysis, there 
are different gradations of separation models, from fundamental accounting separation 
to the most extreme ownership separation. Amongst these separation models, 
accounting separation is not really a forced-access mechanism that this thesis aims to 
target, but rather a behavioural practice imposed by the regulator. Therefore, this 
chapter will only focus on other forms of separation, most notably functional 
separation and ownership separation. 
 
Amongst the different separation models, the most discussed and widely adopted is 
functional separation. Functional separation refers to individualisation of the 
incumbent’s access network department into an independent division. This newly 
established business unit is obliged to maintain strict equivalence between all its 
customers, i.e. the original telco and its competitors that wish to connect to the 
network. At the same time, many supplementary measures have to be applied to the 
new business unit, such as creating a Chinese wall70 between the said business and 
other business offered by the incumbent, and the independence of budgets, personnel 
and supervising board, to ensure non-discrimination for all customers.71  
 
Structural separation is a next-step mechanism when functional separation fails to 
                                                 
69 See Chapter Two (2.1.2). 
70 See Chapter Two (2.2) 
71 Ibid  
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maintain non-discrimination. Structural separation means making a newly-created 
business unit into a subsidiary, in order to make the relationship between this business 
unit independent of the incumbent, and the relationship between this business unit and 
the incumbent's other divisions entirely transparent.72 As a next step or perhaps last 
resort there is ownership separation, which means ownership of the said subsidiary 
has to be transferred to other shareholders. 
 
The Taiwanese regulator NCC is never shy of seeking innovative regulatory 
mechanisms from other jurisdictions. Since 2003, disputes between the incumbent 
ChungHwa Telecom (CHT) and new entrants, especially about interconnection 
charges, have gradually emerged, and these soon became difficult and ever-repeating 
tasks for the NCC to handle.73 The case of BT or British Telecom's functional 
separation in 2005 and the later amendment of the 2009 telecoms package in the 
European Union inspired a new direction for telecoms regulation in Taiwan and cries 
to introduce separation into the Taiwanese telecoms regulatory framework have been 
heard.74 
 
The NCC has since started to integrate functional separation into a draft amendment 
to the Telecommunications Act. In 2010, an amended Article 22 of the 
Telecommunications Act was proposed, which states: 
"To promote the substantial effective competition in the fixed network market, if a 
relevant effective competition cannot be achieved within a certain period of time after 
                                                 
72 In this regard, the BT Openreach separation model should be classified as structural separation. 
However, this categorisation is sometimes confusing as discussed in Chapter Two. Thesis will follow 
general practice and refer to it as functional separation where appropriate. 
73 See discussions in (3.2). 
74 For the 2009 Telecoms Package in the European Union, see discussion in Chapter Two (2.2). 
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the amendment of this Act, the regulator may impose necessary measures such as the 
structural or functional separation of the dominant operator in the fixed-line market. 
The dominant operator cannot evade or reject such obligations. 
 
The certain period of time, the assessment of relevant effective competition, the 
methods of implementing structural or functional separation and the obligations of the 
dominant operator in the first paragraph should be decided by the regulator." 
(provisional translation by author) 
 
This proposed provision was later incorporated into the Article 25 of the draft 
Telecommunications bill in 2011. The amendment that includes this article is still 
under consideration by Executive Yuan and has not yet been introduced to Congress. 
 
3. Current Situation and Disputes in the Taiwanese Telecoms Market 
As this thesis analyses the legality and constitutionality of telecoms forced access 
mechanisms, which involves the assessments and balancing the benefits gained and 
harms caused by the implementing of these mechanisms, it is important to have a brief 
understanding of the current situation in Taiwanese telecoms market, so that the 
benefits and harms caused by telecoms forced access mechanisms can be correctly 
assessed. Therefore, in this section we will discuss the current situation and disputes 
in the Taiwanese telecoms market. As this thesis aims to discuss forced access to 
telecoms networks, this section will emphasise the situation and issues in the 
fixed-line network market. 
 
3.1 Current Situation in the Taiwanese Telecoms Market 
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The market for fixed network services was opened up in 2000. As aforementioned, the 
then regulator, DGT, set strict conditions for granting licences to new fixed-network 
service providers. These include each new entrant requiring a minimum capital of 40 
billion new Taiwanese dollars (NTD) (around £800 million), to build a million local 
loops within six years,75 and to make sensible proposals for a promising and 
innovative business operation plans (such as the installation of fibre-optic networks). 
In order to meet these conditions, three new entrants, Asia Pacific Telecom, Taiwan 
Fixed Network and New Century Infocom, raised a total of NTD 200 billion dollars 
(£4 billion),76 amongst which Taiwan Fixed Network alone raised NTD 92.2 billion 
dollars (£1.84 billion). The three new entrants also promised they would soon have 
their fibre-optic networks installed. 
 
The three new entrants have different strategies and lay different emphases on 
different fixed network products and services. The fixed network market in Taiwan 
can be further categorised into three sub-markets: local-call market, long-distance call 
market and international call market.77 Because of the high capital threshold of NTD 
40 billion dollars, the three new entrants were naturally eager to redeem their 
investments. It is understandable that the new entrants' operations put much emphasis 
                                                 
75 Article 22 Regulations for the Administration of Fixed Network Telecommunications Business. 
76 At the same time, the capital of the incumbent CHT was NTD 96.4 billion (around £1.93 billion). 
Data from: ChungHwa Telecom (2001). "ChungHwa Telecom Annual Report", available at: 
http://www.cht.com.tw/ir/upload/content/CHT90_annual_report.pdf. (accessed April 2016); 
Taiwanmobile (2001). "Annual Report", available at: 
http://corp.taiwanmobile.com/files/investor-relations/financial/2001AR_all_c.pdf (April 2016). 
77 Because of the massive investment in and long pay-back period of fixed networks, to increase the 
incentive for long-term investment, the regulator, DGT, has allowed the fixed-network operator to 
operate a long-distance call and international call business. In other words, the fixed network license 
issued in 2000 was actually a complex license. The DGT and MOTC have also promised that the 
long-distance call and international call business will not be opened to other operators in order to 
prevent a "cream-skimming" effect and lead to a competition failure in the market. However, such 
promises have had to be changed, as they were regarded as violations of WTO entrance obligations. 
See: Hsieh, H.-C. and P.-H. Tsai "Directorate General of Telecommunications' Response to Issues about 
Opening Fixed Networks." Communications 70: 31-32. 
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on the far more profitable long-distance and international call markets and ignored the 
local-call market.78 In other words, although the new entrants somehow built their 
own backbone networks, they were reluctant to deploy their own local loops because 
it was are much more difficult and costly to do so. 
 
Similar to the situation in other countries, local loops are difficult to deploy in Taiwan 
for several reasons. First, as consumers already have existing local loops that are 
workable (ready to offer or already offering services), they are reluctant to let another 
telco install a duplicate network into their premises. Second, as aforementioned, local 
loops include the sections stretching from the local exchange room to end users' 
premises or, simply put, along the streets. To deploy networks in these sections may 
face some major regulatory and factual difficulties: local regulations for infrastructure 
deployment and the interference to local livelihoods and traffic. This is especially true 
in highly populated areas. Thus, local loops are sometimes described as being a 
"natural monopoly" or "bottlenecks".79 
 
As already mentioned, when first obtaining their operations licences, the three new 
entrants did not really focus on the deployment of their own networks, but rather on 
                                                 
78 Amongst all the businesses of fixed network operators, the investment in local calls is immense and 
the return is relatively small. Take CHT for example, during 2014 and 2015, the investment in local 
calls constitutes about 60-70% of all its network investments, see: ChungHwa Telecom. (2001). 
"ChungHwa Telecom Annual Report", available at: 
http://www.cht.com.tw/ir/upload/content/CHT90_annual_report.pdf, (accessed April 2016). As the 
Telecommunications Act prohibits cross-subsidies, and the tariffs for local calls may not be adjusted 
easily, the operation strategy of new entrants is to focus on more profitable long-distance calls, 
international calls and broadband services. At the same time, new integrated telecommunications 
operators also invest much more in mobile services than fixed network services. For example, Far 
EasTone's (see below) investment in fixed networks during the same time frame above only ranged 
from 11–30% of its investment in mobile services. See: EasTone, F. (2014). "FETNET Annual Report", 
available at: https://www.fetnet.net/cs/Satellite/Corporate/coAnnualReport (accessed April 2016). 
79 See: Correa, L. (2003). "Natural or unnatural monopolies in UK telecommunications?" University of 
London Economics Working Paper(501); Buigues, P. A. and P. Rey (2004). The economics of antitrust 
and regulation in telecommunications, Edward Elgar: 58. 
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redeeming the cost of acquiring the licences. One such redeeming practice was the 
sale of pre-empted certifications of stock, which is illegal under the Taiwanese 
Securities and Exchange Act. However, it was widely reported that many 
congressmen were involved in the purchase and resale of the said certifications.80 
Whether or not the redemption was helpful to the deployment of telecoms networks, it 
was not necessarily negative for the development of the Taiwanese telecoms industry; 
however, starting a fixed network telecoms company seemed to be a gateway for 
some owners among the three new entrants to fill their own pockets. Soon after the 
licences were granted, those owners were found to have committed financial crimes 
and asset-stripped the companies. This included the sum of NTD 17.1 billion dollars 
(£342 million) of assets of the major shareholder of Taiwan Fixed Network, Pacific 
Electric Wire and Cable Co., which were stripped by its owner Jack Sun, which led to 
a later transfer of ownership of Taiwan Fixed Network to Fubon Group, while the sum 
of NTD 27.2 billion dollars (£544 million) of assets of Asia Pacific Telecom were 
stripped by its owner You-theng Wang.81 
 
With the transfers of ownership and further mergers, the telecoms market in Taiwan 
has gradually formed into a balance à trois, with CHT, the former incumbent, being 
slightly larger than the other two, Taiwan Mobile Fixed Network and Far EasTone 
Telecom, amongst which Taiwan Mobile merged with Taiwan Fixed Network in 2007, 
                                                 
80 See: China Times Express (2000 April) "Congressmen Sell Certifications, Swimming in Bank Notes 
and Votes", China Times Express; United Daily News (2007 January). "Pacific's Certification Incident 
Was a Common Glitch of Both (Political) Parties" United Daily News. It has been commented as the 
"Worst Scam in Congress History" by congressman Wen-Zhong Li. It has been reported that the values 
of the certifications that were resold by Congress alone was around 5 to 8 billion (£100 m. to 160 m.), 
see: United Daily News (2007), ibid. Many of these certifications, with face value of 10 (£0.20) were 
acquired by congressmen with values as low as 3 (£0.06) and have a finale resale value of 24 (£0.48), 
see: China Times Express (2000), ibid. 
81 Epochnews (2014 November). "Pacific Electric Wire and Cable Stripped to Hollow" Epochnews, 
available at: http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/tag/亞太電信.2.html (accessed April 2016). 
 
 87 
and Far EasTone was originally a major shareholder of New Century Infocom. CHT, 
Taiwan Mobile and Far EasTone are generally called the three leading lights of the 
Taiwanese telecoms markets. Asia Pacific Telecom, the only other fixed network 
operator, does not have comparable scale in either the fixed-network, mobile or other 
service markets. 
 
Despite the transfers of ownership and the expansion of business, the new entrants 
were still reluctant to invest in fixed network deployments. Not only did the goal of 
installing one million local loops for each new operator within six years fail to be 
reached, but their penetration rate of local loops remained low.82 The then newly 
established regulator, NCC, was keen to tackle this issue. One of the mechanisms that 
the NCC adopted was to try to increase the profits from local calls in order to create 
an incentive for the new entrants to invest in the deployment of local loops, by 
changing the tariff-charging mode.83 In the beginning of the opening up of the mobile 
market, in order to make it profitable for the new mobile operators, no matter whether 
calls were made from mobile to home or vice versa, the tariffs were priced and 
charged by the mobile operators, and the only home phone or local call operator at the 
time was CHT, which only charged the mobile operators transit fees. Since the mobile 
market matured (see section 1.2.2: The Opening up of Mobile Communications 
Services), the NCC planned to reverse the situation and adopt a caller-end pricing 
mode in order to encourage the relatively weak competition in the fixed-network 
                                                 
82 To this day, the combined penetration rate of local loops for the new entrants is still less than 1% of 
that of the incumbent CHT. The low penetration rate for network construction has resulted in 
sardonicism and suggestions that these new entrants were "fake telcos", see: China Times Forum (2002 
January). "Private Telcos, Fake Telcos". Commercial Times, available at: 
http://www.ctwu.org.tw/short/gif/user.htm (accessed April 2016). 




market. This mechanism was, however, predictably opposed by Taiwan Mobile and 
Far EasTone, as they had larger shares in mobile markets, and relatively much smaller 
shares in the fixed network market, and their concern was that their profits from the 
mobile market would flow to the fixed network monopoly CHT.84 
 
If the new entrants ever cared about the fixed network business, it was because they 
were expecting to deploy their own new technology fibre-optic networks. Therefore, 
in 1996 when CHT was transformed from a public department to a company and the 
government was deciding on the arrangements for the then copper-based local loops, 
the new entrants showed very little interest. It has been reported that it was proposed 
that a new network company should be established to operate the said networks, and 
the operation of the said company and the maintenance costs of networks should be 
shared by all the fixed network operators.85 Such a proposal was rejected by the new 
entrants, as they were concerned that the costs would be very high. Eventually, the 
privatised CHT had to follow its largest shareholder – a government order – and 
purchase all the local loops from the government at a price of NTD 300 billion dollars 
(£6 billion).86  
 
The three new entrants' dismissive attitudes to local loops changed with the rise of the 
Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Loop (ADSL), a technology that can use existing 
copper-based local loops to transmit higher speed Internet services. ADSL (and the 
                                                 
84 The caller-end pricing mode was eventually adopted in 2011; however, the NCC has imposed an 
"interim fee" that the fixed network operators have to pay to the mobile operators to this day. This 
interim fee is generally considered to cover the profits lost by the mobile operators because of the 
adoption of a caller-end pricing mode. However, just like many of the NCC's policies, the imposition of 
such an interim fee is without legal foundation and arbitrary. 
85 In this regard, such a design is actually similar to separation arrangements. 
86 For a detailed report, see: Ettoday News (2012 July). CHT: "No Other Telco was Deploying New 




later VDSL, Very High Bit-Rate DSL) uses Frequency-Division Multiplexing (FDM) 
technology and can utilise frequencies that are not used by voice transmissions to 
offer broader bandwidth for Internet usage. Before the prevalence of fibre optics, 
ADSL was very competitive, and thus made the local copper loops that once seemed 
obsolete very sought after. However, the new entrants still hesitated to deploy their 
own local loops,87 and even to lease local loops from the incumbent.88 In 2005, the 
three new entrants began to lobby and try to influence the government to force the 
CHT to open up its local loops or, more specifically, to have the local loops declared 
"bottlenecks" by either the FTC or NCC, so that they could lease the local loops at a 
cost-based rate.89 Eventually, the NCC did declare local loops "bottlenecks" at the 
end of 2006 (see section 1.3.2: Competition Law Regulations). 
 
The declaring of local loops to be bottlenecks did not really stop the disputes between 
CHT and its competitors, as the new entrants turned their attention to the actual cost 
of local loops. The new entrants claimed that CHT's costs for operating local loops 
were minimal, if any, as most local loops were deployed when telecoms services were 
provided by the State, while CHT argued that, as the copper-based local loop 
networks were deployed decades ago, the costs for maintenance and replacements 
were significant. The reasons for such parallel arguments were not just because both 
parties only stressed their advantageous arguments and ignored the others, but to an 
extent because the low-intensity accounting separation that was at the time imposed 
                                                 
87 According to NCC, before the local loops were declared bottlenecks, the total number of local loops 
of the three new entrants was less than 100 subscribers. See: NCC (2006) "Consultation Paper on 
Declaring Local Loops to be Bottleneck Facilities." 
88 After the CHT opened up the leasing of local loops to new entrants in June 2004 and until the NCC 
planned to declare local loops to be bottlenecks, there were only 220 such applications, see NCC's 
consultation paper in supra n 86. 




on the incumbent CHT was not able to reveal all the relevant costs of the incumbent.90 
With lobbying and the introduction of functional separation into the "Telecoms 
Package" in the European Union,91 calls for more drastic approaches, such as 
different separation models to promote competition in the fixed network market, have 
arisen. 
 
3.2 Disputes Related to Forced Access in the Taiwanese Telecoms Market 
As discussed in the previous section, there have been several major disputes 
concerning forced-access practices in the Taiwanese telecoms market. These disputes 
are actually related to each other, as local-loop unbundling can be regarded as a 
special type of interconnection, and the proposed separation models are mainly aimed 
at tackling the dilemma in local-loop access. 
 
In this section, two topics will be discussed: the pros and cons of local-loop 
unbundling and those of functional separation. As aforementioned, at the very 
beginning, this thesis does not aim to apply economic theories to analyse telecoms 
policies, but rather to consider possible fundamental rights infringements that 
occurred during the application of the telecoms forced access mechanism; therefore, 
the scope of the discussion here will be limited to offering relevant background 
information about a discussion of further fundamental infringements. Especially as 
most of the regulatory concepts for applying such forced mechanisms have been 
discussed in this chapter, this section will therefore focus on the counter-arguments in 
order to provide information to assess and consider constitutionality tests, because a 
                                                 
90 See: Ni, T.-C. (2010). "The Policy Consideration of Splitting the Incumbent’s Fixed line Network: 
The Case of BT’s Functional Separation." National Chung cheng University Law Journal. 
91 See the discussion in Chapter Two (2.2). 
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key element of assessing the legality and constitutionality is the balancing between 
the benefits and harms (see Chapter Eleven). 
 
3.2.1 Local Loop Unbundling 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the sharing of facilities in local-loop unbundling 
can lower the uncertainty of market entry, and at the same time constrain the 
incumbent from abusing its competitive advantage. However, there are some 
questions over the application of local-loop unbundling. 
 
a. Costs of Regulation 
Not only are the costs of local-loop unbundling regulation very high (especially for 
the discovery of the actual costs of local loops, as discussed above), but the risks of 
erroneous regulation are high as well. With such high regulatory costs, whether the 
local-loop unbundling approach can be executed by the relatively inexperienced 
Taiwanese regulator may be an issue.92 
 
b. Not necessarily beneficial to NGN 
The essence of local-loop unbundling policy is not whether competitors can share 
facilities, but how to share the facilities and at what cost. When considering the 
deployment of newer technologies, such as Next Generation Networks (NGN), such 
costs will play an important role in market players’ decisions, i.e. such costs involve 
build-or-buy decisions in economic theories. Simply put, where the local-loop 
unbundling is applied, and new entrants find the cost of leasing local loops is lower 
than deploying NGN, they will not have sufficient incentive to deploy their own NGN. 
                                                 




At the same time, local-loop unbundling may also cause a chilling effect from the 
regulations. Even if there is no dispute about the costs of local-loop unbundling, for 
the incumbent all that it can have in return is the fees calculated from the costs of a 
successful set of local loops. Were it to fail in an NGN investment (such as fibre-optic 
networks), such loss will not be shared by the new entrants. Another aspect is that the 
message given out by local-loop unbundling policy to potential NGN investors is that 
the more successful the first movers in the market, the likelier it will be that their 
facilities will be declared to be bottlenecks.93 All these factors may restrain the 
incumbent's, and even other operators', incentives to invest in NGN.94 
 
c. The Intentions of New Entrants 
As discussed in section 2.3 of this chapter, the Regulations for the Administration of 
Fixed Network Telecommunications Business have adopted the concepts of 
contemporary essential facilities (bottlenecks) theory and enumerate the conditions for 
bottleneck facilities as ones which "cannot be self-constructed" or "cannot be 
substituted for by other available technologies" within a reasonable period of time. 
The telecoms market in Taiwan, or more specifically the new entrants' deployment of 
their own networks, as discussed earlier in this section, seems to be decided more by 
their inclination instead of actual difficulties. This situation leads to the question of 
                                                 
93 Hausman, J. and J. G. Sidak (1999). "A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling 
of Telecommunications Networks." Yale Law Journal 109 (3): 417-505. 
94 This issue also involves disputes over service-based competition (SBC) and infrastructure-based 
competition (IBC). Simply put, in the early stages of telecommunications market privatisation, to 
facilitate market entry and promote competition in the market, SBC is simpler and more efficient, and it 
can avoid unnecessary investment in duplicate facilities. However, with the development of 
telecommunications technologies, SBC cannot encourage investment in more advanced technologies. 
Therefore, it has been commented that IBC is the future for countries with highly developed 
telecommunications industries. See: OVUM (2006). "Regulation in Asian markets – Which Approach 
is Right?", cited from NCC, "Accumulated opinions for declaring local loops as bottleneck facilities", 




whether it is justifiable to apply a local-loop unbundling policy. 
 
d. Non-Substitutability 
Non-substitutability is another questionable issue related to the justification of 
local-loop unbundling, as there are in fact several technologies that can substitute for 
traditional copper networks. From the global perspective of broadband development, 
when time local-loop unbundling was applied in Taiwan in 2006, DSL (copper-based 
networks) had a share of 66%, while that of cable modems was 24% and FTTx (a 
different type of fibre-optic network) was 9%. Nowadays, the share of DSL has fallen 
to 59% and cable modems to 19%, while FTTx has grown to 22%.95 Despite 
copper-based broadband services maintaining the highest share, such a lead is not 
absolute and keeps falling. In other words, technologies such as cable modems and 
fibre optics can be regarded as substitutes for copper networks. 
 
The substitutability of copper networks has significance in the Taiwanese telecoms 
market, as fibre-optic networks and cable-modem broadband services are becoming 
relatively strong. The cable modem is a technology that transmits broadband services 
via a cable TV (CATV) network and is considered one of the most mature broadband 
technologies.96 As CATV networks stretch into users’ premises to offer services just 
like traditional copper local loops, they can serve well as substitutes for the latter, as 
whenever a CATV service is subscribed to, the network that provides CATV services 
can also be used to offer broadband services. In 2014, the total number of 
                                                 
95 PointTopic (2014). "World Broadband Statistics Q1 2013", available at: 
http://point-topic.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Point-Topic-Global-Broadband-Statistics-Q1-2013.
pdf. (accessed April 2016). 




subscriptions to CATV in Taiwan included 4.99 million households and had a 
penetration rate of 59.9%.97 It is noteworthy that in 2009, one of the leading lights in 
the Taiwanese telecoms market, Taiwan Mobile, merged with the CATV operator 
KPBO, acquired its 1.1 million subscribers and used the co-operation between CATV 
operators to constitute a so-called "Mega Net" to offer telecoms services, together 
with another fixed network operator, Asia Pacific Telecom. 
 
Fibre optic networks are another way to substitute for copper-based local loops, but in 
reality this is a more complicated issue. Since 2007, the incumbent, CHT, has 
activated a NTD 60 billion dollars (£1.2 billion) five-year "Optic Generation Project" 
and started to replace its copper local loops with fibre optics. Today, fibre-optic based 
broadband in Taiwan is regarded as one of the best performers around the world, with 
a penetration rate of 37%,98 within which CHT alone has more than 3 million 
household subscriptions.99 Despite all the fibre-optic local loops having been 
deployed after CHT was fully privatised, and the local loops that were declared 
bottlenecks being copper-based networks, the new entrants still argue that all local 
loops constitute bottlenecks and should be opened up. In fact, with the high market 
share of CHT in fibre-optic local loops, the incumbent has difficulties in persuading 
the NCC that fibre optics can substitute for copper-based local loops. 
 
There are some possible substitutions for copper-based local loops. One possible 
                                                 
97 See: NCC (2014). "Statistics of Cable Subscriptions." 
http://www.ncc.gov.tw/chinese/files/14081/1979_32567_140813_1.xls (accessed April 2016). 
98 See: FTTH Council Europe (2014). "Fibre broadband flourishes as Switzerland joins the league of 
FTTH leaders" available at: 
http://www.ftthcouncilmena.org/documents/PressReleases/2014/PR2014_EU_Ranking_Stockholm_Fe
b2014.pdf (accessed April 2016).   
99 See: CHT (2015). "CHT Operation Report" available at: 
http://www.cht.com.tw/aboutus/related/ope-condition-0.html (accessed April 2016).  
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substitution is power-line communications (PLC). As the name suggests, it uses 
existing electric power lines to provide Internet services. As power lines stretch into 
end-users’ premises, such technology can be regarded as having great potential to 
substitute for the current copper local loops. Furthermore, with the convergence of 
technologies, different services can now be provided and operated on different 
platforms and devices. For example, smartphones or other handheld devices are now 
able to deliver Internet services. In this regard, if we do not restrict the traditional 
market definition, third-generation (3G) and fourth-generation (4G, such as 
Long-Term Evolution technology, LTE) mobile phone services can be seen as strong 
substitutes for fixed-network Internet services to premises. 
 
3.2.2 Functional Separation 
As a vertically integrated telco, the incumbent in the telecoms market may take 
advantage of its market power to engage in unfair competition by discriminating 
between the incumbent’s own retail departments and other operators. Functional 
separation and other separation models aim to increase the transparency between the 
network department and other departments in the incumbent telecoms company and 
eliminate the said discrimination. If functional separation – separating the network 
department into an independent unit – fails to achieve the goal, more drastic structural 
separation and ownership separation may be adopted as a last resort to complete the 
mission. 
 
However, separation exhibits some drawbacks, and here we take functional separation 
as an example: 
a. The actual costs of functional separation are much higher than other mechanisms, 
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such as accounting separation. Such costs include the restructuring of the 
company, the expense of duplicating engineering personnel and extra expenses 
incurred due to the lack of current integrating effects. These costs may eventually 
lead to increases in the costs of network access for all operators. 
 
b. Functional separation cannot react to the rapidly developing telecoms market and 
new technologies. As the telecoms market is developing vigorously, the 
regulations should be reviewed and amended at regular intervals,100 and this is 
apparently in conflict with functional separation which has long-term effects. 
 
c. The experience of separation in the energy industry cannot be entirely applied to 
the telecoms industry. The movement to adopt separation in the gas and electricity 
industries began in the early 2000s and has been taken as a reference point for 
applying separation in the telecoms industry. However, the situation in the 
telecoms industry is rather different, e.g. some parts of the networks will have to 
be replicated during the process of accessing telecoms networks; at the same time, 
how to decide on which point of a network should be a realm of separation may 
well be an issue that was not seen in the energy industry. 
 
d. The intentions of all the operators for their future investments in separated 
networks are unknown. 
 
e. The regulations to eliminate discrimination may lead to the incumbent’s 
                                                 
100 For example, the European Commission suggested that the functioning of Directives should be 
reviewed periodically on a first occasion not later than three years after the date of application, see 
Article 25 Framework Directive. 
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unwillingness to provide quality products and services. 
 
f. Separation cannot substitute for other regulatory mechanisms. The experiences of 
countries that have applied functional separation (such as the United Kingdom) 
show that even if functional separation is applied, others matters such as tariffs 
and quality of service should still be regulated. On the other hand, it is not 
impossible to impose some of major obligations and concepts under functional 
separation, such as the separation of information between network and retail 




This chapter gave an overview of telecoms forced access in Taiwan. It started with an 
introduction to the Taiwanese telecoms regulatory framework, to the meaning of 
telecom forced access mechanisms, and how these mechanisms are implemented in 
Taiwan. With this regulatory background established, the last section of this chapter, 
which discussed the current situation and disputes in the Taiwanese telecoms market, 
provided important information to be used in the analysis engaged in later in this 
thesis. Simply put, while Taiwan adopts several regulatory approaches from the 
United States, such as the categorisation of Type I and Type II telcos, it also adopt 
many of those from the European Union, such as the proposed functional separation. 
However, the telecoms market in Taiwan is unique for the following reasons: despite 
being a small island country (which makes it relatively easier to deploy new 
networks), it has relatively advanced telecoms technology, and a high penetration rate 
for broadband Internet services provided via traditional telecoms networks, but also a 
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high penetration rate for cable services. These special characteristics, together with 
the regulator's (NCC) not just legal but usually factual partiality towards competing 
telcos, make the Taiwanese telecoms market unique, or at least quite different from 
those in other jurisdictions, such as the European Union. Such a complex regulatory 
framework design, including the combination of elements of those in the United 
States and the European Union, the somehow dictatorial attitude of the regulator, and 
the many special characteristics in the telecoms market will play important roles in the 




Chapter IV   





After identifying the "facts", i.e. what telecoms forced access mechanisms are, and 
how they are implemented in the two jurisdictions targeted, the following four 
chapters (Chapters Four to Seven) seek the "norms", i.e., the standards by which the 
legality or constitutionality of these telecoms forced access mechanisms should be 
reviewed. These two chapters, Chapters Four and Five, are of a general nature, they 
discuss the overall fundamental rights protection regimes in the two targeted 
jurisdictions, the European Union and Taiwan. These general discussions are 
important to the later analyses of this thesis, for they include: (a) the reasons why 
fundamental rights are protected in these jurisdictions; (b) identifying the sources of 
law and the relationships between them; (c) identifying the reviewing bodies (courts) 
and their different inclinations; and thus observations can be made, on (d) how 
fundamental rights protection regimes have evolved over time to make an estimation 
of future development.  
 
As such, this chapter, regarding the fundamental rights protection regime in the 
European Union, is structured as follows: it starts with a discussion of the history and 
development of fundamental rights protection (1), including the situation in earlier 
years (1.1), and how fundamental rights began to draw attention in European Union 
law (1.2) (1.3) and other European Union or non-European Union legal instruments 
began to protect fundamental rights (1.4). The second section (2) discusses the current 
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fundamental rights protection regimes in the European Union. It first identifies the 
sources of law (2.1) and the nature (2.2), scope and limitations (2.3) of fundamental 
rights, and then goes on to examine how fundamental rights are protected under 
different legal instruments, and especially the relationship between these instruments 
(2.4) (2.5). 
 
1. History and Developments of Fundamental Rights Protection in the European 
Union 
1.1 Early Years 
Article 2 TEU proclaims that the Union is founded on the values of respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
but the protection of fundamental rights was not integrated into the European Union 
(European Union) at least on the Community law level until later. During its first 
years, the focus of the European Economic Community (EEC) was on creating a 
common market and the efforts for integration were largely of an economic nature 
only. The original EEC Treaty did not mention the protection of human rights as an 
objective of the Community. There were many discussions regarding this, but it is 
generally believed that the European institutions held the belief that economic 
integration could not lead to violations of human rights, and where human rights 
issues really happened, they would be dealt with by the Council of Europe.1 Thus the 
then EEC together with OEEC (the antecedent of the OECD) focused only on the 
economic restoration of the Europe after the World War II.  
 
1.2 Introduction of Fundamental Rights into Court of Justice Case Law 
                                                 
1 See: Douglas-Scott, S. (2002). Constitutional law of the European Union, Pearson education: 432. 
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It was not until the late '60s that the EEC began formally to recognize fundamental 
rights as a part of the great European integration project. The first move was made by 
the European Court of Justice (Court of Justice).2 The earliest attempts to introduce 
fundamental rights into Court of Justice case law, however, were not successful. 
Fundamental rights issues were first brought to the Court of Justice in Stork,3 in 
which the Court held it was only required to ensure that the law (in this case, the 
decisions made by the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community 
[ECSC]4) was observed in the interpretation and the application of the Community 
Treaties, and could not normally rule on provisions of national law. Thus, the Court of 
Justice refused to annul the decisions due to their incompatibility with the German 
Basic Law (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland), the Constitution of the 
then West Germany. Again in Geitling,5 the Court of Justice held it could not examine 
whether the national constitution and laws had been respected, and that Community 
law "does not contain any general principle, express or otherwise, guaranteeing the 
maintenance of vested rights." In Sgarlata,6 the Court of Justice held that being 
express provisions of the Treaties, regulations made by the Commission cannot be 
overridden by the fundamental rights in the Italian Constitution.  
 
The consensus is that it was in Stauder7and Solange I8 that the Court of Justice first 
held that it had jurisdiction to rule on human rights matters. As the Court of Justice 
                                                 
2 Lenaerts, K. (2011). European Union Law: 826. 
3 Case C-1/58 Stork v High Authority [1958] E.C.R. 17. 
4 The ECSC was joined by two other similar communities in 1957, the European Economic 
Community and European Atomic Energy Community. In 1967 all its institutions were merged with 
that of the European Economic Community (EEC), but it retained its own independent legal personality. 
After the Treaty of Paris expired in 2002, all the ECSC activities and resources were absorbed by the 
European Union. 
5 Case C-13/60 Geitling v High Authority [1962] E.C.R. 423. 
6 Case C-40/64 Sgarlata v Commission [1965] E.C.R. 215. 
7 Case C-26/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] E.C.R. 419. 
8 Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr [1970] E.C.R. 1125. 
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stated in Stauder, fundamental rights are enshrined in the general principles of 
Community law.9 In Solange I, the Court of Justice held that respect for human rights 
forms an integral part of the general principles of law; the protection of such rights, 
whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, must be 
ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the Community. The 
Court further noted that the possible infringement of fundamental rights by 
Community measures can only be assessed by Community law itself but not national 
legislation. 
 
The reason why the Court of Justice changed its attitude and started to take 
fundamental rights into consideration is debated, but it is widely believed that it was 
because the Court of Justice was afraid that some Member States' constitutional courts, 
such as the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and Italian Corte costituzionale della 
Repubblica Italiana, would refuse to accord supremacy to EEC law if they found it 
inadequate to protect the fundamental rights in their constitutions.10 The Stuttgart 
court in the then West Germany, when referring to Court of Justice in Stauder, stated 
that if the Court of Justice failed to fulfil its duties of protecting fundamental rights 
that had previously been guaranteed by the German national courts, the latter would 
be compelled to reserve for themselves the power of examing the constitutionality of 
Community acts.11 Indeed, Article 79 of German Basic Law states that no amendment 
of the Constitution may diminish fundamental rights protection, and Article 24 
permits transfer of sovereignity to international organisations subjects to the rules of 
the first chapter of the Basic Law (fundamental rights protection). In the fear of losing 
                                                 
9 However, the Court of Justice used "general principles of law", rather than general principles of 
Community law in its later case law. 
10 See: Douglas-Scott (2002), supra n 1: 434. 
11 Stauder, supra n7. 
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the supremacy of EEC law12 and the possible adverse effects on the uniformity and 
efficacy of Community law, the Court decided in the Solange I that the validity of 
measures adopted by the Community can only be assessed in the light of Community 
law.13 Another reason might be because the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) had entered into force in 1953 with all the Member States of EEC being 
signatory parties. Considering the importance placed upon the protection of 
fundamental rights by the Member States, it would have been impossible for the 
Community legal order not to provide for similar protection. 
 
1.3 Later Development of Fundamental Rights in the European Union 
After Stauder and Solange I, the Court of Justice continued to incorporate 
fundamental rights into its case law, and further clarified the source of fundamental 
rights and gave clear explanations of the concepts of these rights. In Nold,14 Court of 
Justice reiterated that the inspiration for the fundamental rights protection, as part of 
the general principles of European Union law,15 came from the common 
constitutional traditions of EEC Member States and international human rights treaties 
on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories. 
 
A notable further step is that in Rutili,16 the Court of Justice started to use the ECHR 
as guideline for interpretation of the limitations set out in Community law.17 Also in 
                                                 
12 The principle of supremacy was established in Case C-6/64 Costa v Enel [1964] E.C.R. 1141 and 
later reaffirmed in many subsequent cases. 
13 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, supra n 8, para. 3. 
14 Case C-4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] E.C.R. 491. 
15 The relationship between the general principles and fundamental rights will be discussed below. 
16 Case C-36/75 Roland Rutili v Minister of the Interior [1975] E.C.R. 1219. 
17 It held that a particular provision of European Union law (in this case it is Article 48(3) EEC) was a 
“specific manifestation of the more general fundamental principles of [European Union] law which 
could be found in the ECHR”, ibid, para. 32.  
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Hauer,18 the Court of Justice looked into the ECHR for guidance in applying 
Community law, and when it could not find sufficient guidance, it turned to look into 
the constitutional principles of the Member States (Germany, Italy and Ireland). This 
approach of sourcing fundamental rights protection later gained Treaty status, as the 
Amsterdam Treaty (which entered into force in 1999) explicitly expressed that "[t]he 
Union is found on … respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule 
of law, principles which are common to the Member States".19 
 
By drawing from constitutional traditions common to the Member States and 
international human rights treaties (such as the ECHR, discussed below), over the 
years the Court of Justice (together with the Court of First Instance, CFI, now 
European General Court, EGC), have recognized numerous fundamental rights and 
general principles such as proportionality and equality before the law. Of particular 
importance for this thesis, it is worth noting that, for example, economic rights, such 
as rights to property, were considered by the Court of Justice in the above mentioned 
Hauer case. In Baustahlgewebe,20 where the applicant requested a timely judgment, 
the Court of Justice started to consider the rights to fair hearing, a right under Article 6 
ECHR. Rights to privacy were subjected to the Court of Justice’s scrutiny in X v 
Commission21 where the applicant refused to take an AIDS test for his job application, 
and freedom of expression was considered by the CFI in Connolly,22 in which the 
applicant asserted his rights to show contempt for a certain political party in his book. 
The Court of Justice also granted the applicant rights to access to certain documents 
                                                 
18 Case C-44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland Pfalz [1979] E.C.R.3740. 
19 See Article 8 (a) 1 of TEU, now Article 6(2) TEU.  
20 Case C-185/95P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] E.C.R. I-8417. 
21 Case C-404/92 X v Commission [1994] E.C.R. I-4737. 
22 Joined Case T-34/96 and T-163/96 Connolly v Commission [1999] E.C.R. IA-87, II-463. 
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on the ground of protecting the rights to information in Hautala.23  
 
1.4 The ECHR, CFR and TCE 
Here, several legal instruments that play important roles in fundamental rights 
protection will be introduced chronologically. 
 
1.4.1 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
The European Convention on Human Rights (formally, the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) is an international treaty 
to protect fundamental rights in Europe. The ECHR was drafted in 1950 by the 
Council of Europe and entered into force in 1953. The ECHR also established a court, 
namely the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in Strasbourg to oversee and 
enforce the ECHR.24 
 
The original Convention consists of three parts: the main rights and freedoms are 
contained in Section I, which consists of Articles 2 to 18. Section II (Article 19) set up 
the Commission and the Court, Sections III (Articles 20 to 37) and IV (Articles 38 to 
59) included the high-level machinery for the operation of the Commission and the 
Court, and Section V contained various concluding provisions. This structure changed 
significantly with the entry into force of Protocol 11 of the Convention, as the current 
Section II (Articles 19 to 51) sets up the Court and its rules of operation, and Section 
III contains various concluding provisions. 
 
The ECHR also has a number of protocols, and they can be divided into two main 
                                                 
23 Case C-353/99P Council v Hautala [2001] E.C.R. I-9565. 
24 See Section II (Articles 19 to 51) of the ECHR. 
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groups: those amending the framework of the Convention system, and those 
expanding the rights that can be protected. The former require unanimous ratification 
by Member States before coming into force, while the latter require a certain number 
of States to sign before coming into force. Up until today, thirteen protocols to the 
Convention have been opened for signature. 
 
1.4.2 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union enshrines several political, 
social and economic rights for European Union citizens and residents. It was drafted 
and proclaimed by the Council of the European Union (Council), the European 
Parliament (Parliament) and the European Commission (Commission) as a political 
declaration in 2000, as the conclusions of the Cologne European Council indicated 
that the ECHR, the common constitutional traditions of the Member States as well as 
the European Social Charter and the Community Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights of Workers should be the basis for the CFR. It does not formulate new rights 
within the Union's legal order but rather further solidifies the already existing 
obligation of the Union to respect fundamental rights. The CFR has sometimes been 
referred to as a "creative distillation" of rights, from different European and 
international agreements and national constitutions.25 
 
The CFR is divided into seven chapters, with the first six consisting of different 
categories of rights: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizens' Rights and 
Justice, while the last chapter deals with general provisions for the interpretation and 
application of the CFR. As mentioned above, the first six chapters cover the classical 
                                                 
25 See: Craig, P. and G. de Búrca (2015). European Union law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford 
University Press: 396.   
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rights enshrined in the ECHR, but these are further extended to include rights covered 
by the European Social Charter, the Community Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights of Workers, other international conventions to which the Union or its Member 
States are parties, and the constitutional traditions of Member States. 
 
The legal status of the CFR, however, remained unclear due to the failure to ratify the 
Constitutional Treaty, as the latter had foreseen the CFR being fully incorporated into 
the Treaties. It was not until the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009 that the CFR 
finally acquired binding force. However, it was not incorporated directly into the 
Treaties as the Constitutional Treaty had intended; rather, it was stated in Article 6(1) 
TEU that the CFR has the same legal value as the Treaties.26 
 
1.4.3 The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was a treaty aiming to create a 
consolidated constitution for the European Union. The TCE was signed in 2004 by 
representatives of the then 25 Member States and was later ratified by 18 Member 
States. However, its ratification was rejected by the French and the Dutch, and thus 
failed to become a legitimate source of law in the European Union. Had the Treaty 
have been ratified, it would have unified and replaced the existing European Union 
treaties and given legal force to the CFR. 
 
1.4.4 The Lisbon Treaty and European Union Accession to ECHR 
Compared to the Court of Justice, fundamental rights protection appeared relatively 
late at the Community Law Treaty level. The Maastricht Treaty (TEU) which came 
                                                 
26 See below discussion about the European Union accession to the ECHR (1.4.4) and the relationship 
between the CFR and the ECHR (2.5). 
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into force in 1993, was the first time that the Treaties explicitly expressed the 
protection of fundamental rights, as Article 6(2) of TEU stated: "[t]he Union shall 
respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human 
Rights and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to Member States 
as general principles of Community law". However, this provision, as mentioned 
above, did not do more than draw from the ideas existing in Court of Justice case 
law.27 
 
On the other hand, the Court of Justice, while having gone ahead of the express 
wording of the Treaties, found the latter insufficient to provide fundamental rights 
guidelines. It is therefore easy to understand that, while looking to the ECHR when 
dealing with fundamental rights issues, the Court of Justice also considered its 
relationship with the ECHR. Despite all Council of Europe Member States being 
parties to the ECHR, neither the Community was nor the Union is a party to the 
Convention. Therefore, the ECHR itself should not be regarded as a direct source of 
law in the Union. The Court of Justice was of the same opinion. In its Opinion 2/94 on 
the Accession of the Community to the ECHR,28 the Court of Justice reaffirmed the 
ECHR's special position among the international treaties, but ruled that accession to 
the ECHR was not possible, as the EC lacked competence to do that without first 
amending the European Community Treaties.29 
 
This situation changed when in December 2009 the Lisbon Treaty was ratified, which 
gave rise to a number of significant developments in the field of fundamental rights 
                                                 
27 Lenaerts (2011), supra n 2: 828. 
28 Opinion 2/94 [1996] E.C.R. I-1759. 
29 The Court of Justice particularly pointed to the EC’s lack of "general power to enact rules on human 
rights", see ibid, para. 27. 
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protection in the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty amended the TEU and the 
TEC. The TEU has kept its previous title. The TEC has been renamed the "Treaty on 
the Functioning of the Union" --TFEU. The Lisbon Treaty also introduced many 
important changes to the field of human rights law in the European Union. Above 
others, as stated in the amended Article 6 TEU, the Union recognises the rights, 
freedoms and principles set out in the CFR, which shall have the same legal value as 
the Treaties, and Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR further provides for the European 
Union to become a party to the ECHR. In other words, with the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, both the CFR and the ECHR gained the status of sources of law in the 
Union. 
 
The main arguments for the Union acceding to the ECHR are that it improves the 
external accountability of the Union. Prior to accession, individuals cannot bring 
European Union institutions before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on 
the basis of breaches of the ECHR, it can only do so if the relevant provision has been 
implemented by a Member State which is a party to the Convention.30 
 
2. Current Regime of Fundamental Rights Protection in the European Union 
2.1 Sources of Law 
As the Lisbon Treaty has now entered into force, Article 6 TEU states that the Union 
recognizes three formal sources of human rights law: the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (CFR), the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) and general principles as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States. It can be understood that the general principles 
                                                 
30 Douglas-Scott, S. (2011). "The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon." 
Human Rights Law Review 11(4): 659. 
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resulting from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States are the least 
tangible of the three, due to their unwritten nature, the diversity of constitutional 
backgrounds of Member States and the indistinct meaning of "common to". In fact, 
national constitutional provisions were rarely drawn upon in the case law of the 
European Courts.31 It is therefore questionable whether there is a need for a reference 
to the common constitutional traditions of the Member States as a source of 
fundamental rights, as the CFR is binding and the Union is about to accede to the 
ECHR.32 However, common constitutional traditions of the Member States in Article 
6(3) TEU opens up the possibility for the Court of Justice to recognize and enforce 
rights that are not present in the CFR or in the ECHR.  
 
On the other hand, the CFR and ECHR have been agreed to by all Member States,33 
so citing them may greatly simplify the debates in court. As both documents were 
drafted in broad terms, it is important to see how these fundamental rights are 
interpreted in the case law. In this sense, the ECHR plays a more important role in this 
thesis due to the amount of case law accumulated by the ECtHR when interpreting the 
ECHR. This is not just for the expediency of academic discussion, but also in 
accordance of the fact that ECtHR case law is substantively binding. As the 
Explanations34 to the CFR (issued when the CFR was drafted) state, "the meaning 
and scope of the guaranteed rights are determined not only by the text of those 
instruments, but also by the case law of the ECtHR."35 (See also the below discussion 
                                                 
31 Craig & de Búrca (2015), supra n 25: 369.   
32 In December 2014, however, the Court of Justice delivered a negative opinion on the drafted 
agreement on the accession of the European Union to the ECHR on the ground that the ECHR is 
incompatible with the founding EU treaties because it undermines the autonomy of the EU law. See: 
Opinion 2/13 [2014] OJ C 260/19.  
33 In the case of CFR, the signatories even include the Union institutes. 
34 http://www.eu2011.hu/files/bveu/documents/Explanations_to_the_CHFR.pdf (accessed Nov 2015) 
35 Explanation to Article 52 (3) by Explanation Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007) 
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about the relationship between the CFR and ECHR.) 
  
Another reason why this thesis will place more emphasize on the criteria 
developed by the ECtHR rather than those by the Court of Justice is that Court of 
Justice is relatively short and sometimes even peremptory in its analysis in 
fundamental rights cases compared to the more experienced ECtHR.36 The low 
success rate of fundamental rights claims in the Court of Justice also draws much 
criticism.37 As noted by de Witte (1999),38 the cases where the Court of Justice 
found an actual breach of fundamental rights to have been committed by the EC were 
very rare, and as a consequence the standard of protection of fundamental rights in the 
Court of Justice has been lower than that of the ECHR and even the national 
constitutional courts of the Member States. 
 
2.2 Relationship between Fundamental Rights and General Principles 
This section only gives a brief introduction to the relationship between fundamental 
rights and general principles, and this issue will be further explored later in this thesis, 
especially in Chapter Eight. As discussed above, the Court of Justice regarded 
fundamental rights as general principles of (Community) law. The CFR, however, 
makes a distinction between rights and principles. The established definition of a right 
is that an individual can rely on a right when requesting judicial review of a legislative, 
                                                                                                                                            
OJ C 303/02. Although the Explanation is not binding, Article 52(7) CFR states that the Explanations 
must be taken into account when the courts of the European Union and of the Member States interpret 
the CFR. Article 6(1) TEU also states that the CFR must be interpreted with due regard to the 
Explanations. 
36 Douglas-Scott (2002) supra n 1: 458. 
37 Ibid: 460. 
38 De Witte, B. (1999). "The past and future role of the European Court of Justice in the protection of 
human rights", in Alston P. (ed) The EU and Human Rights 877: 859. 
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executive or administrative norm before a court.39 If, instead, a provision in the CFR 
is considered to be a principle, then Article 52(5) CFR states: "[t]he provisions of this 
Charter which contain principles may be implemented by legislative and executive 
acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of 
Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their 
respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of 
such acts and in the ruling on their legality." In other words, issues purely regarding 
principles may not be brought before Courts by individuals.40 
 
2.3 General Limitations 
Although it has been suggested that at least prior to the entry into force of the CFR 
there was nothing in case law that indicated what the scope of permitted limitations 
under this provision might be,41 the Court of Justice pointed out in Wachauf that 
"[t]he fundamental rights recognized by the Court are not absolute, however, but must 
be considered in relation to their social function. Consequently, restrictions may be 
imposed on the exercise of those rights (...) provided that those restrictions in fact 
correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and do not 
constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable 
interference, impairing the very substance of those rights."42 These criteria were 
upheld in subsequent cases such as Germany v Commission43 and Bosphorus.44 
 
                                                 
39 Craig, P. (2010). The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, Oxford University Press: 216. 
In this regard, the "rights" here are similar to the concepts of German Subjektiven öffentlichen Recht.  
40 The CFR does not specify which provisions constitute principles and which constitute rights. 
However, the Explanations provide some guidance in interpreting which provisions are principles and 
which are rights. 
41 Peers, S. and A. Ward, (eds). (2004). The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: 155. 
42 Case C-5/88 Wachauf v Germany [1989] E.C.R. 2609, para. 18. 
43 Case C-62/90 Germany v Commission [1992] E.C.R. I-2575, para. 23. 
44 Case C-84/95 Bosphorus v Ireland [1996] E.C.R. I-3953, para. 60. 
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One of the key issues that should be considered concerning the balancing of 
fundamental rights and public interests or social functions is the principle of 
proportionality. As mentioned above, the Explanations provide some guidelines on the 
interpretation of the CFR. There are, at the same time, some provisions about the 
limitations of rights and freedoms, as stated in Articles 17–18 ECHR and Articles 
51–54 CFR, respectively. These limitations are subject to, amongst others, 
proportionality and the prohibition of abuse of rights. The principles of these 
limitations are as stated in Article 52(1) CFR, i.e. that any limitation must be 
"provided for by law" and must respect "the essence" of those right and freedoms. 
 
2.4 Relationship between the European Union and ECHR/ECtHR 
The relationship between the European Union and ECHR/ECtHR can be observed in 
two perspectives. The first perspective is the meaning of ECHR/ECtHR to the 
European Union. Although in Stauder and Solange I, the Court of Justice started to 
recognize the importance of fundamental rights, and even started to introduce the 
ECHR to interpret Community Law in Rutili, the ECHR was not regarded as source of 
law in the European Union. This idea was reaffirmed in Opinion 2/94. Also in 
Treuhand,45 the CFI thought that ECHR provisions did not form part of European 
Union law, despite saying that it had special significance since the ECHR forms part 
of the general principles of European Union law.46 This situation, of course, will be 
changed as and when the European Union accedes to the ECHR. However, the ECHR 
does not bring changes to the European Union legal system; as stated in Article 6(2) 
                                                 
45 Case T-99/04 Treuhand v Commission [2008] E.C.R. II-1501, para. 45. 
46 As observed in Treuhand, this view is confirmed by Article 6(3) TEU and is reaffirmed by the 
Recital (5) CFR’s Preamble, as well as Articles 52(3) and 53 CFR. Treuhand also refered to Case 
T-112/98, Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission [2001] E.C.R. II-729, para. 59f and the case law 
cited therein. See also Jones, A. and B. Sufrin (2014). EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 
Oxford University Press (UK): 103. 
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TEU, the Union's accession to the ECHR shall not affect its competence as defined in 
the Treaties. Protocol No. 8 of the Lisbon Treaty also states that the agreement 
relating to accession must "make provision for preserving the specific characteristics 
of the Union and Union law" and that accession "shall not affect the competences of 
the Union or the powers of its institutions".47 
 
The second perspective is, on the contrary, how does fundamental rights protection in 
the European Union relate to the ECHR, or, more precisely, to what extent should the 
fundamental rights protection in the European Union adopt the ECtHR's point of view? 
The ECtHR established in cases such as Bosphorus48 that the level of human rights 
protection within the European Union should be "equivalent"49 or "comparable" to 
that of the ECHR, as it indicates that the European Union Member States – bound by 
European Union law – act within the scope of the ECHR.50 The ECtHR only 
intervenes if it considers that the human rights protection has been "manifestly 
deficient".51 
 
2.5 Relationship between ECHR and CFR 
The biggest issue regarding the relationship between the ECHR and the CFR is the 
scope of the protection in these two documents. As Article 52(3) states: "In so far as 
                                                 
47 Article 1 and Article 2 in No.8 Protocol annexed to Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty 
on European Union on the accession of the Union to the European Convention on the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
48 Case Bosphorus v Ireland, (2005) App. no. 45036/98 ECHR 440. 
49 By 'equivalent' the ECtHR meant 'comparable'; see Bosphorus, ibid, paras. 155 and 165. 
50 The ECtHR made a presumption that, if the European Union provides equivalent protection, the 
European Union Member State applying European Union law, has not departed from the ECHR 
requirements; see ibid. 
51 This has been called the “Bosphorus presumption” and has been the subject of much criticism. It is 
not entirely clear whether the presumption will still hold after the Union accedes to the ECHR, as it 
could undermine the scope of judicial review of the European Union legal order by the ECtHR. See: 
Douglas-Scott (2011) supra n 30: 667 - 668. 
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this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive 
protection." Through this article the ECHR is incorporated into the CFR, and thereby 
into primary European Union law, but only to the extent that the rights in the CFR 
correspond to rights in the ECHR. The Union can provide more extensive protection 
than what is provided for in the ECHR, which means that the ECHR provides a 
minimum guarantee protection of fundamental rights in the European Union legal 
order.52 This is true also prior to the Union’s accession to the ECHR. 
 
As the rights in the ECHR are only incorporated into European Union law insofar as 
they correspond to rights in the CFR, it is important to know which rights in the 
ECHR and the CFR actually correspond to each other. The CFR does not make itself 
clear on this issue. However, the non-binding Explanations have provided helpful 
guidance in determining what rights in the CFR correspond to rights in the ECHR.53 
                                                 
52 Weiss, W. (2011). "Human Rights and European Union Antitrust Enforcement: News from Lisbon." 











As with Chapter Four, this chapter contains a general discussion of the fundamental 
rights protection regime in Taiwan. This chapter is laid out as follows: first, it 
discusses the history and development of fundamental rights protection in Taiwan (1), 
most notably how the Taiwanese constitutional system was influenced by Germany; 
the second section sets out the current fundamental rights regime in Taiwan (2), 
including the sources of law (2.1) and the system for review of constitutionality. It 
thus considers the Official Interpretations made by the Grand Justices (2.2), and 
includes a general discussion about the scope of fundamental rights protection (2.3), 
as well as addressing an important issue in the fundamental rights protection regime 
that is of special importance to this thesis—legislative discretion (2.4). This chapter 
sums up with a brief comparison between the protection of fundamental rights in 
Taiwan and the situation in the European Union (3). 
 
1. History and Developments of Fundamental Rights Protection in Taiwan 
Compared to the rocky road that it went through in the European Union, the 
development of fundamental rights protection in Taiwan has been much less 
problematic. The reason for this is because it chose to follow a precedent. At the turn 
of the 20th century, the central government of the then newly established Republic of 
China (R.O.C.) chose the German constitution1 as the main model when it proposed 
to introduce a constitutional system into the young democratic regime. The German 
                                                 
1 The German constitution then was the Constitution of the German Empire (Verfassung des Deutschen 
Reiches), also known as the Bismarck's Imperial Constitution. 
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Constitution(s) remains the most influential source for the R.O.C and the latter 
Taiwanese Constitution.2 
 
The idea of fundamental rights, or Grundrechte, did not appear right after China 
became a constitutional country. There were brief enumerations of people's rights and 
obligations in the second constitution, the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of 
China of 1912, but it was not until the enactment of the 1936 draft constitution (the so 
called "Five-Five Constitution Draft" as it was declared on 5 May 1936) that the 
fundamental rights protection enshrined in the then German Constitution3 really 
found reflection in this overseas country that had a long monarchic or rather 
dictatorial history. 
 
It should be noted, however, that when the term Grundrechte was introduced, the 
Chinese legal scholars did not make a clear distinction between this concept and 
general "rights" (權利, such as the rights under civil law) when they translated the 
terms. Such ambiguity of terminology remained for decades, and only started to 
change in the 1980s when the young Taiwanese constitutional scholars returned from 
studying in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). The literal meaning of 
the current term (基本權利) in Mandarin is however closed to the English 
"fundamental rights" than German "Grundrechte".4 
 
                                                 
2 The history of the constitution model chosing process of R.O.C. and the relationship between the 
R.O.C. and the current Taiwan is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
3 The German constitution that the Five-Five Constitution Draft mainly adopted from was the 
Constitution of the German Reich (Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs), also known as the Weimar 
Constitution. 
4 It is arguable that the term fundamental rights did not appear in English, at least in a 
generally-recognized format, before Mrs. Roosevelt, the wife of ex-president of the United States gave 
her famous The Universal Declaration of Human Rights speech in the United Nations. 
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Besides Germany, Japan is another country whose constitutional theories have had a 
deep influence on those of Taiwan. This is understandable, as Taiwan was colonized 
by Japan for 50 years (1895~1945) until the end of World War II, and has been 
influenced by Japan in all aspects. Besides, during the colonization period, Japan was 
the only destination for elite Taiwanese scholars, especially legal scholars, and 
therefore the Japanese constitutional and legal theories were introduced into Taiwan. 
It is an interesting law-adopting case, because Japan itself also adopted many acts and 
constitutional and legal theories from Germany, but has developed its own theories on 
the basis of these adopted acts and theories. 
 
In recent years, however, the constitutional theories in the United States, especially 
the rationales of the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States, have begun 
to play an important role when Taiwanese legal scholars are interpreting the 
constitution. This is due to the fact that more and more legal scholars have returned 
from studying in the United States, and many of these scholars have been appointed to 
serve as Grand Justices. It is safe to say that today US constitutional theories have 
exceeded those of Japan in influence and are now the second most influential force 
when interpreting the Taiwanese Constitution. 
 
2. Current Fundamental Rights Protection Regime in Taiwan 
Unlike the European Union, which is a supranational organisation, Taiwan is a single 
constitutional country and has not experienced the same difficulties regarding 
fundamental rights protection as the European Union. 
 
2.1 Source of Law 
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2.1.1 The Constitution 
The first source of law regarding the substantive5 fundamental rights protection in 
Taiwan is the Taiwanese Constitution (formally known as the Constitution of the 
Republic of China). The Taiwanese Constitution comprises 175 articles within its 
fourteen chapters,6 and the general fundamental rights protection provisions are 
situated in the second chapter, "Rights and Duties of the People". Since the 
Constitution came into effect in 1947, it has been amended several times by adding 
amending articles. These articles are called "The Additional Articles of the 
Constitution of the Republic of China", but most of these amendments were not about 
fundamental rights protection but about the restructure of the government. 
 
The fundamental rights protection provisions in Chapter II of the Constitution can be 
further categorized into several different kinds of rights and freedoms: rights to 
equality (Article 7), freedoms (Article 8-14), rights to property (Article 15), rights to 
political participation (Article 16 and 17), rights of being public servants (Article 18), 
rights to education (Article 21), general provisions of rights and freedoms (Article 22), 
together with Article 23 being the general provisions on the limitations of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. 
 
Besides the "traditional" fundamental rights noted above, there are some social rights 
in Chapter XIII, the "Fundamental National Policies". These rights, such as rights to 
                                                 
5 There are some other laws regarding the fundamental rights protection procedure, such as the Act of 
Ruling of the Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan (see below). 
6 These fourteen chapters are: (I) General Provisions, (II) Rights and Duties of the People, (III) The 
National Assembly, (IV) The President, (V) Administration, (VI) Legislation, (VII) Judiciary, (VIII) 
Examination, (XI) Control, (X) Power of the Central and Local Governments, (XI) 
System of Local Government, (XII) Election, Recall, Initiative and Referendum, (XIII) 
Fundamental National Policies, and (XIV) Enforcement and Amendment of the Constitution. 
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education (compulsory education), the protection of labour and the protection of 
minorities at frontier regions, are generally called "beneficiary rights" in scholarly 
discussions. However, Taiwanese constitutional scholars generally do not think that 
these rights enjoy the same status as the fundamental rights above; they are not 
Subjektive Öffentiche Recht and cannot be claimed directly from the state until the 
contents and conditions of rights have been legislated into enacted laws7. 
 
2.1.2 Official Interpretations 
The review of the constitutionality of statutes, regulations and administrative orders in 
Taiwan is monopolised by the Grand Justice of Judicial Yuan, similarly to the 
constitutional court in other countries. As Article 78 of the Constitution states: "[t]he 
Judicial Yuan shall interpret the Constitution and shall have the power to unify the 
interpretation of laws and orders." These reviews are called the Official 
Interpretations of Grand Justices (hereinafter abbreviated as Official 
Interpretation/Interpretations). So far, the Grand Justices have made 733 
Interpretations.8 
 
As Article 78 of the Constitution did not mention the effects of the Official 
Interpretations, one may reasonably speculate on their position in the Taiwanese legal 
hierarchy. According to Official Interpretation No.185, "the Judicial Yuan is vested 
with the power to interpret the Constitution, and to provide uniform interpretations 
                                                 
7 Taiwanese constitutional scholars think the provision in the Fundamental National Policies, by their 
effects, can be further allocated into four categories: Guiding Clauses (Programmsätze or 
Staatszielbestimmung), Constitutional Authorization (Verfassungsauftrag), Institutional Guarantee 
(Institutsgarantie) and Subjective Public rights (Subjektive Öffentiche Rechte). Among these, only the 
right to education (Article 160[1] of the Section 5, Education and Culture of the Chapter XIII) is a 
Subjective Public Right. The content of these provisions is beyond the scope of this thesis, but Articles 
144 and 145, limitations of the public utilities and monopolies, will be discussed in later chapters. 
8 See: http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03.asp (accessed Nov 2015). 
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with respect to statutes and ordinances. The interpretations of the Judicial Yuan shall 
be binding upon every institution and person in the country, and each institution shall 
abide by the meaning of these interpretations in handling relevant matters."9 Some 
commentators thus conclude that the Official Interpretations have constitution-level 
effects.10 This view, however, cannot avoid critiques of being circular reasoning.11  
 
2.2 Constitutionality Review by Grand Justices—The Procedure 
The Council of Grand Justices, or the Grand Justices of the Constitutional Court, is a 
council under Judicial Yuan comprised of 15 Grand Justices members who are 
charged with interpreting the Constitution. According to Act of Ruling of the Grand 
Justices of the Judicial Yuan (provisional translation), the Grand Justices rule on the 
following four kinds of cases:12 
1. Interpretation of the Constitution; 
2. Uniform Interpretation of Statutes and Regulations; 
3. Impeachment of President and Vice President of the Republic of China; and 
4. Declaring the dissolution of political parties in violation of the Constitution. 
According to the same Act, the petitions of Interpretations can be filed under the 
following circumstances: 
1. where a central or local government agency is uncertain regarding the application 
of the Constitution while exercising its powers, or, if the agency, while exercising 
                                                 
9 The official translations of Official Interpretations, until No.728, are available at: 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03.asp (accessed Nov 2015). 
10 Same opinion, see: the partial dissenting opinion to No.374 Official Interpretation by Grand Justice 
Su, J-H. In some cases, the effects of the Interpretations are even higher than the Constitution. For 
example, No.499 Official Interpretation forfeited Article 1, Section 3 (4) of the Additional Articles of 
the Constitution as the Grand Justices held this provision unconstitutional. 
11 Weng, Y.-S. (2004). The Research of the Effects of Official Interpretations. Public Law and Political 
Theories. Y.-S. Weng; Peng, F.-Z. (2008). "The Effects of Official Interpretations--the General Effects 
and its comparison with Article 31 of German Constitutional Court Act." 
12 Article 4 Act of Ruling of the Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan. 
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its powers, has disputes with another agency regarding the application of the 
Constitution, or if the agency is uncertain of the constitutionality of a particular 
law or order when applying the same;13 
2. where an individual, a juristic person, or a political party, alleges that his or its 
constitutional right has been infringed and who has exhausted all judicial remedies 
provided by law, questions the constitutionality of the law or order applied by the 
court of last resort in its final decision;14 
3. where the Members of the Legislative Yuan, in exercising their powers, are 
uncertain regarding the application of the Constitution or with regard to the 
constitutionality of a particular law when applying the same, and at least one-third 
of the total number of the Members of the Legislative Yuan have filed a petition;15 
and 
4. where any court believes that a particular law, which it is applying to a case 
pending with it, is in conflict with the Constitution.16 
 
2.3 Scope of Fundamental Rights Protection in Taiwan 
The Taiwanese Constitution was drafted in broad terms, in a similar manner to the Bill 
of Rights, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (Déclaration des droits de 
l'homme et du citoyen), and especially the fundamental rights protection provisions in 
the German Basic Law. Statements of the principles of fundamental rights protection 
are not determinative and require extensive interpretation to bring out their meaning 
in particular factual situations. The Grand Justices' main efforts are therefore in trying 
to form the contents and outer frames of these fundamental rights, and at the same 
                                                 
13 Article 5 (1) (a) of Act of Ruling of the Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan. 
14 Ibid, Article 5 (1) b. 
15 Ibid, Article 5 (1) (c). 
16 Ibid, Article 5 (2). 
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time develop the criteria of how to examine their constitutionality. 
 
As mentioned above, the fundamental rights that have been specified in the Taiwanese 
Constitution can be categorised into six main kinds of rights and freedoms.17 
However, this enumeration is not an exhaustive list, and the scope of fundamental 
rights protection can be expanded with the development of society and culture. Indeed, 
as Article 22 of the Constitution, being a general provision, states: "[a]ll other 
freedoms and rights of the people that are not detrimental to social order or public 
welfare shall be guaranteed under the Constitution." This article, which is said to have 
a "capture effect",18 not only opens the possibility of some interests being recognised 
as rights in the future, but also reaffirms the essence of being a democratic free 
country.19 
 
The idea of the general protection in Article 22 is further enhanced in Article 23, 
which states "[a]ll the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding Articles shall 
not be restricted by law except by such as may be necessary to prevent infringement 
upon the freedoms of other persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social 
order or to advance public welfare." This article, however, plays another important 
role, as it is the only article in the Constitution regarding the limitations of 
fundamental rights. Although there are some disagreements, the consensus of most 
Taiwanese constitutional scholars and commentators is that Article 23 is the 
application of the principle of proportionality in the Constitution, despite the fact that 
this principle cannot be perceived literally from the texts. The analysis and 
                                                 
17 See above discussion in p. 10. 
18 Dong, B. and J.-p. Fa (2003). New Commentary on Constitution: 87. 
19 Ibid: 89. 
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explanation of Article 23 and, more importantly, the application of the principle of 
proportionality will be further discussed in latter chapters. 
 
Besides the Official Interpretations, scholarly discussions are another source 
(although not binding) of exploring the content of the fundamental rights in the 
Taiwanese Constitution. As the Grand Justices are the exclusive interpreters of the 
Constitution, their Official Interpretations are supposed to be the only official binding 
source when searching for the meanings of the ever concise Constitution texts. 
However, the making of the Interpretations is a very conscientious procedure; the 
Council of Grand Justices is not a permanent council, and the Grand Justices only 
meet whenever a petition meets the requirements in Article 4 and 5 of the above 
mentioned Act of Ruling of the Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan. Over the years, 
the Grand Justices have only made 733 Official Interpretations, not to mention that 
some of the Interpretations were not about fundamental rights protection but the 
structure of the government. It is understandable that there have been only a few 
Official Interpretations for each of the enumerated rights. Therefore, scholarly 
discussions are, and should be, much relied on when exploring the concept, content, 
and scope of fundamental rights in Taiwan, especially those that are not covered in 
existing Official Interpretations. 
 
2.4  Constitutionality Review and its Intensity 
Traditionally, constitutionality jurisprudence in Taiwan has adopted the German 
approach, which has two emphases: normative review and substantive review. 
 
2.4.1 Normative Review 
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Normative review is conducted to assess whether the restrictions of fundamental 
rights meet the requirement of the principle of the rule of law. This requirement 
contains two further requirements: the statutory reserve and the principle of clarity.  
 
2.4.1.1 Statutory Reserve 
The first is "statutory reserve" (Gesetzesvorbehalt), i.e., whether the restrictions are 
provided for by law. The "law" here refers to the enacted laws that are passed by the 
parliament. The consensus is that this comes from Article 23 of the Constitution: "[a]ll 
the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding Articles shall not be restricted by 
law except … (emphasis added)". 
 
There are, however, theoretical disputes about whether all of the State's powers should 
meet this requirement: 
a. The Statutory Reserve of Interference: under this theory, where there is 
interference with people’s fundamental rights, such regulatory measure should be 
provided for by law; 
b. Full Statutory Reserve: under full statutory reserve theory, any and all matters 
where the State's exercises its power should be provided for by law; 
c. Theory of Substantiality (Wesentlichkeitstheorie): under the theory of 
substantiality, as long as a substantial matter is involved, the regulatory measure 
should be provided for by law. As regards what constitutes a substantial matter, 
the consensus is that it refers to a matter involving the realisation of fundamental 
rights and which is of special importance to the public interest.20 
 
                                                 
20 Wu, G. (2015). The Theories and Practices of Administrative Law: 79-114. 
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This theory is generally agreed in judicial practices and scholarly commentaries.21 
As in No.443 Official Interpretation, the Grand Justices held that: "The 
determination of which freedom or right shall be regulated by law or by rules 
authorized by the law shall depend on regulated intensity. Reasonable deviation is 
allowed considering the party to be regulated, the content of the regulation, or the 
limitations to be made on the interests or freedom. For instance, depriving people's 
lives or limiting their physical freedom shall be in compliance with the principle 
of definitiveness of crime and punishment and stipulated by law; limitations 
concerning people's other freedoms shall also be stipulated by law, in the case 
where there is authorization by the law to the administrative institutions to make 
supplemental rules, the authorization shall be specific and precise. "22 (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Similarly, in Official Interpretation No.614, the Grand Justices held that: "The 
modern principle of a constitutional state is specifically manifested by the 
principle of legal reservation under the Constitution. Not only does it regulate the 
relations between the State and the people, but it also involves the division of 
powers and authorities between the executive and legislative branches. If the 
people’s freedoms and rights are not restricted by a measure of 
Leistungsverwaltung, there should be no violation of the principle of legal 
reservation under Article 23 of the Constitution, which concerns the restriction of 
fundamental rights of the people. If, however, any significant matter is involved, 
e.g., public interests or protection of fundamental rights of the people, the 
                                                 
21 Tang, T.-C. (2014). A New Commentary on the Separation of Powers. Tien-Hung Publishing, Taipei; 
Luo, C.-H. (2004). The Parliament and Legislation, Wu-Nan Publishing, Taipei; Wu, G. (2015), ibid. 
22 Official Interpretation No. 443. It should be noted that some commentators disagree that this 
interpretation is the realization of the theory of substantiality, but is to establish a "levelised statutory". 
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competent authority, in principle, should not formulate and issue any regulation 
without express authorization of the law." (Emphasis added.) 
 
d. Functionally-legal Approach (funktionell-rechtlicher Ansatz): under this theory, 
the assignment of a national task to a legislative or administrative department 
should depend on the assessment of the suitability of the organizations, procedural 
designs and regulatory structures of the said departments. 
 
2.4.1.2 The Principle of Clarity 
This requirement refers to the idea that the phrasing in the legislative provisions 
should not be vague, but should be concrete and specific. In Taiwanese constitutional 
jurisprudence, there are three conditions proposed for this requirement: 
a. the meaning of the provisions should be understandable; 
b. the scope and objectives should be predictable to the opponents of the regulation; 
and 
c. can be confirmed in judicial review.23 
 
2.4.2 Substantive Review 
The second element is substantive review, which is used to examine whether the 
restriction upon fundamental rights is excessive. Following the traditional approach 
which was adopted from Germany, this review is generally construed as the 
application of principle of proportionality.24 In other words, the requirements of 
suitability, necessity and reasonableness of the said legislation should be assessed, 
                                                 
23 See: Nos, 432, 445,602, 617, and 636 Official Interpretations. 
24 Chen (2002) supra n 125; Liao, Y.-H. (2008). "Unpredictable or an Inherent Order? The 




while at the same time considering how intensely these requirements should be 
assessed. This so-called German "intensity of judicial control" system contains three 
categories: 
(1) in Evidence Control, the Constitutional Court (henceforth the Court) only 
reviews whether there exist apparent errors in the challenged legislation;25 
(2) in Tenability Control, the Court reviews whether the decisions made by 
legislators are reasonable or tenable; and  
(3) in Intensive Content Control, the court has to review whether the legislator’s 
assessments or predictions are highly accurate or reliable, and where there 
exist reasonable doubts about such accuracy or reliability, the challenged 
legislation should be deemed unconstitutional.26 
 
It has therefore been noted that the intensity of review is similar to the standard of 
proof for relevant government departments regarding how much effort they have to 
put in to certify that their decisions are legitimate.27 
 
It has been claimed, however, that the German approach is too abstract and cannot be 
easily applied in real cases. Therefore, in recent years, the American approach has 
been considered as more applicable,28 and has been introduced by the Grand Justices 
and scholars with American legal backgrounds. The American approach also has three 
                                                 
25 For example, a legislation made by an administrative department without statutory delegation. 
26 Hsu, T.-L. (2007). Investigation of Facts in Constitutionality Review Procedure. Law and State 
Power, Angle Publishing. 
27 Chang, Z.-W. (2008). "The Principle of Proportionality and Legislative Discretion--The Structure of 
Review Intensity from the View of Rule of Law." National Chung cheng University Law Journal(24): 
38; Tang, T.-C. (2009). "Preliminary Construction of Constitutionality Review Criteria--A Levelised 
Principle of Proportionality " The Theories and Practices of Constitution Explanation 6(2): 612-. 
28 Hsu, Y.-H. (2005). "Criteria of Constitutionality Review of Criminal Legislation." Democracy, 
Human Rights and Justice: 369-; Huang, Z. (2013). "The development of Constitutionality Review 
Criteria in Official Interpretations (1996-2011): The Adoption and Localisation of the Principle of 




(1) the Rational Relationship Test requires that the policy objective pursued 
should be a legitimate governmental interest, and there should exist a rational 
relationship between the policy objective and the measure adopted. Under 
this test, the challenged regulatory measure is basically assumed to be 
constitutional. In other words, the Court basically accept the validity of the 
decision made by legislative or administrative departments; 
(2) the Intermediate Scrutiny Test requires that the policy objectives should 
pursue an important governmental interest, and there should exist a 
substantive relationship between the policy objective and the measure 
adopted; and  
(3) the Strict Scrutiny Test requires that the policy objective should pursue a 
compelling governmental interest, and the measure adopted should be 
narrowly tailored to the policy objective.29 
 
The American approach of constitutional review is illustrated in below Chart 5.1. 
                                                 
29 For more detailed Taiwanese scholarly discussions about the intensity of constitutionality review in 
the United States, see: Lin, T.-Y. (1997). The Limitations of Freedoms of Expression and the 
Two-Track Theory. Modern States and Constitution, Angle Publishing: 248-.; Fah, Z.-B. (2003). 
"Equality in Judicial Review: A Study of the Construction of A Double Standard." Rule of Law State 
and the Freedom of Expression : 213-16; Huang, Z. (2004). "Judicial Review of Limitations to 
Constitutional Rights: A Comparative Analysis of the American Multi-dimensional Models." National 
Taiwan University Law Review 33(3): 1-103; Liao, Y.-H. (2008). "Unpredictable or an Inherent Order? 
The Constitutionality Review Criteria Proposed by Current Grand Justices " Academia Sinica Law 




Chart 5.1. The American approach to intensity of constitutional review. 
 
2.5  Special Issue: Legislative discretion 
2.5.1 Legislative Discretion and Sector-Specific Regulation 
An issue regarding the current fundamental rights protection regime in Taiwan that is 
of special importance to this thesis is the legislative discretion in sector-specific 
regulation such as telecoms regulation. The term "discretion" has many meanings in 
Taiwan’s constitutional jurisprudence. It mainly refers to the leeway in 
decision-making of administrative institutions, but is sometimes also used to refer to 
that of the legislator.30 To avoid confusion, in recent years when referring to the 
freedom exercised by the legislator in its decision-making, Taiwanese scholars usually 
specify it as legislative discretion.31 
 
Under the concept of the modern constitutional state, although the legislator should 
follow the procedures laid down in the Constitution to enact legislation, the content of 
legislation should reflect and align with public opinion and serve the needs of society, 
                                                 
30 See: Lee, C.-L. (2000). "The Basic Constituional Theory of Legislative Discretion " Taipei 
University Law Review 47: 57; Tang, T. C. (2000). A New Commentary on Separated Powers, 4-5; Li, 
C. c. (2007). "The Tension between Judicial and Legislative Powers--A Commentary Focused on the 
Restriction to Legislative Power by Constitutionality Review": 52. 
31 Su, Y.-C. (2000). "Legislative Discretion and Judicial Review." 127-128; 144-145; Li, C. c. (2007). 
"The Tension between Judicial and Legislative Powers--A Commentary Focused on the Restriction to 
Legislative Power by Constitutionality Review": 53. 
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politics, the economy and technology. The legislator is therefore entitled to choose 
different approaches as appropriate to achieve constitutional principles and 
objectives.32 In other words, the legislator enjoys some leeway, in consideration of 
the social background and public opinion, to decide whether, when and how to enact 
legislation.33 Thus, despite the establishment of a constitutional review system, it is 
important for modern constitutional states to realize the principle of constitutional 
supremacy; the judiciary should respect the decisions made by the legislator in order 
not to infringe upon such entitlement, and hence the legislator enjoys discretionary 
power in its decision-making.  
 
Having such legislative discretion is of course not to say that decisions made by the 
legislator should not be subject to judicial review – as that would catastrophically 
nullify the function of the constitutionality review system – but the consensus is that a 
lighter-handed approach should be taken in reviewing constitutional legislation 
regarding sector-specific regulations.34 This is because the intensity of judicial review 
is subject to the judicial department’s assessment of the extent to which it should 
interfere in the decision-making of other departments with consideration of the 
separation of powers, the insights of democracy, the expertise of the judicial 
department itself and public consensus over a certain issue;35 and in the case of 
sector-specific or "expert fields" regulation, the judicial department is not usually as 
expert as the legislator nor is it equipped with sufficiently adequate personnel, 
                                                 
32 Su, J.-h. (1998). "The Effects and Scope of Individual Constitutionality Review from the Point of 
Intergration Theory (Integrationslehre) " Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Theory: 29. 
33 Li, C. c. (2007). "The Tension between Judicial and Legislative Powers--A Commentary Focused on 
the Restriction to Legislative Power by Constitutionality Review": 51. 
34 See: No.315 Official Interpretation; Chen, Y. C. (1994). The Theory and Practice Studying Of 
Taiwan Regulatory Economic Law, National Chung Hsing University: 74; Lee, C.-L. (2000). "The 
Basic Constituional Theory of Legislative Discretion " Taipei University Law Review 47: 61; Tsai, W.-I. 
(2001). "Delegated Legislation in Speciality Fields--A Commentary of No.524 Official Interpretation." 
35 See concurring opinion to No.571 Official Interpretation by Grand Justice Lin, T.-Y.. 
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especially in the case of delegated legislation. In other words, it is not in a better 
position than the legislator to make such decisions, and therefore it should be 
extremely hesitant to replace legislative decisions with its own.36 
 
It should be noted that besides delegated legislation mentioned above, in many cases, 
legislation regarding sector-specific regulation is drafted by the relevant 
administrative departments.37 This is because, according to Article 58(2) of the 
Constitution, administrative departments are entitled to draft statutory bills to be 
submitted to the legislator – i.e. Parliament.38 Due to the fact that these administrative 
departments are more experienced and expert in these regulated areas, traditionally, 
unless there exist significant disputes in these drafted bills, they are usually respected 
and passed by the legislator without substantial revisions.39 
 
A quick examination of the jurisprudence on constitutionality leads to the conclusion 
that there are not many actual cases that directly discuss legislative discretion, 
especially as regards sector-specific regulation. This is partly because of the concise 
nature of Official Interpretations which do not leave much room for very detailed 
scholarly discussion,40 but mostly because the Grand Justices are cautious in making 
                                                 
36 Lee, C.-L. (2000). "The Basic Constituional Theory of Legislative Discretion " Taipei University 
Law Review 47: 62. 
37 Luo, C.-H. (2004). The Parliament and Legislation, Wu-Nan Publishing: 36. 
38 Article 58 (2) Constitution: "Statutory or budgetary bills or bills concerning martial law, amnesty, 
declaration of war, conclusion of peace or treaties, and other important affairs, all of which are to be 
submitted to the Legislative Yuan, as well as matters that are of common concern to the various 
Ministries and Commissions, shall be presented by the President and various Ministers and Chairmen 
of Commissions of the Executive Yuan to the Executive Yuan Council for decision." 
39 Functional separation is one of the examples with such significant disputes, and hence the shelving 
of the drafted bill. 
40 This concise feature is especially obvious in earlier Interpretations. For example, No.54 Official 
Interpretation briefly states: "Where a prosecutor discovers that an accuser made a malicious accusation, 
the prosecutor should initiate a suit to indict the accuser for the malicious accusation and does not need 
to make a separate non-prosecution disposition of the person falsely charged. Nevertheless, the 
prosecutor should issue a non-prosecutorial disposition when the accuser applies in the original suit.” 
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Official Interpretations and therefore cannot cover many scholarly disputes like legal 
treatises.41 In fact, while discretion in sector-specific regulation is well recognised,42 
this has not attracted much scholarly attention until recent years, and most of the 
commentaries focus on administrative discretion.43 Therefore, there has not been 
developed a manifest effort test, or its equivalent in Taiwanese constitutional 
jurisprudence, as exists in the jurisprudence of European Courts to clarify the 
boundary between legislative discretion and constitutionality review. That said, some 
principles and concepts of legislative discretion can be found in the rationales of some 
Official Interpretations, which will be discussed below. 
 
2.5.2 Official Interpretations Regarding Legislative Discretion 
a. Official Interpretation No.485 
In Official Interpretation No.485 where the Grand Justices dealt with legislation (Act 
for Rebuilding Old Quarters for Military Dependents) that grants privileges to 
incumbent residents of "Old Quarters", the Grand Justices give clear reasoning about 
their legislative discretion in this case:  
 
"The improvement of the people's welfare is one of the basic principles of the 
Constitution, which is self-evident in light of the Preamble, Article 1, the Fundamental 
National Policies in Chapter XIII and the 10th Amendment. Based on this principle, 
                                                                                                                                            
Also, before No.80 Official Interpretation, the Grand Justices did not give their reasoning together with 
the holding. 
41 One example of this feature is the quantity of the Official Interpretations. To this date (November 
2015), only 733 Official Interpretations were made. 
42 See infra note 21. 
43 See for examples: Huang, C.-C. and H.-F. Wan (1998). "The Assessment, Announcement and Appeal 
of Monopoly Undertakings." The Taiwan Law Review; Tsai, W.-I. (2001). "Delegated Legislation in 
Speciality Fields--A Commentary of No.524 Official Interpretation"; Chang, L. (2007). "The Discretion 
of Fair Trade Commission--A Commentary of 2006 No.148 and 163 Judgments of Taipei Superior 
Administrative Court "; Huang, J. (2009). "The Intensity of Judicial Control of Administrative 
Decisions in High-Technology Speciality Fields." Soochow University Law Review 21(1): 95-127. 
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the State should provide various kinds of benefits in order to guarantee the basic 
needs of people, as required by human dignity, to assist the economically 
disadvantaged and implement welfare measures such as social safety. Since the said 
benefits are related to the allocation of state resources, the legislative body has full 
authority to make decisions on issues concerning the priority of various kinds of 
benefits, purposes of enactment, the scope of beneficiaries, ways and amounts of 
provision etc. The legislative body can consider relevant factors of social policies, 
such as the necessity of benefit and public finance in the law-making process, and 
enact such policies to make a restricted allocation of welfare resources."44 
 
b. Official Interpretation No.490 
In Official Interpretation No.490 where the Grand Justices dealt with the provisions in 
the Act Of Military Service System or, more specifically, the conflict between 
religious beliefs and military service, the Grand Justices specified that regulations 
imposing military obligations are within the legislator's discretion, as they noted that: 
"[i]mportant matters regarding military service shall be specified in laws and solely 
left to the legislature's discretion with due consideration of national security and the 
needs of social development."45 
 
c. Official Interpretation No.442 
Despite not being in the holding and reasoning of Official Interpretation No.442 itself, 
in his concurring opinion, Grand Justice Lin proposed that the boundary of legislative 
discretion should be Article 23 and some substantive concepts of the Constitution, as 
he stated:  
                                                 
44 See the reasoning of Official Interpretation No.485. 




"… with regard to the right of instituting legal proceedings, the Constitution only 
stipulates the types of proceedings, such as civil proceedings or criminal 
proceedings. Administrative proceedings include election proceedings, public 
servant discipline proceedings, constitutionality reviews and the dismissal of 
unconstitutional political party proceedings. As for the design of the conditions and 
procedures for such proceedings, that is left to the legislator. Therefore, with regard 
to procedures, the levels of trials and the conditions for proceedings, the legislator 
enjoys discretionary power along with consideration of citizens’ election rights, the 
right to equity and other rights and freedoms, as well as Article 23 of the 
Constitution. Unless such developing and discretion is exercised against the 
essence of the Constitution, the decision-making of the legislator is only a matter 
of the appropriateness of legislative policy, but not constitutionality."46 
 
d. Official Interpretation No.472 
In his concurring opinion in Official Interpretation No.472, Grand Justice Su proposed 
the principle of proportionality and the principle of equity as the boundary of 
legislative discretion, as he stated:  
 
"…[a]rticle 10(5) of The Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of 
China stipulated that the State shall promote universal health insurance and 
promote research into and the development of both modern and traditional 
medicines. Under this 'constitutional delegation', the legislator is entitled to design 
and plan universal health insurance, has an obligation to do so, and has broad 
                                                 
46 See the concurring opinion to Official Interpretation No.442 by Grand Justice Lin, Y.-M.. 
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leeway in realising this 'state objective' (Staatsziel); however, its decision-making 
in such designing and planning should meet the requirements of constitutional 
freedom and equity, and it cannot exceed the framework of legislative development 
set out by the Constitution … this is because, although the principle of the welfare 
state is significantly meaningful to the interpretation of fundamental rights and 
judgment as to the boundary of fundamental rights limitations, the realisation of 
this constitutional principle cannot hinder the principles of democratic politics. 
Thus, the realisation of the State's task in achieving social justice should still rely 
on the legislator on the basis of its right of legislation development, without 
violating the principle of proportionality, the principle of equity and other 
constitutionality requirements."47 
 
3 Summary—A Comparison with the European Union 
A few observations can be made from a comparison of fundamental rights protection 
regimes in the European Union and Taiwan, and these include similarities and 
differences. For the purposes of this thesis, these differences play a crucial role in how 
the criteria for review of the legality and constitutionality of regulatory measures are 
devised. 
 
From a historical perspective, as the European Union’s predecessors were created 
mainly for economic purposes, the protection of fundamental rights was not the first 
priority and thus not included in the legal framework. However, since such cases as 
Stauder, fundamental rights began to gain recognition as constituents of the general 
principles of Community law. Over the years, the protection of fundamental rights and 
                                                 
47 See the concurring opinion to No.472 Official Interpretation by Grand Justice Su, J.-H.. 
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freedoms was strengthened and its scope enlarged by the Court of Justice and the 
General Court, and also gained Treaty status in Article 6 TEU. 
 
Taiwan (R.O.C), on the other hand, was established as a constitutional state, with a 
codified Constitution, and can be said to have seen the protection of fundamental 
rights as an important constitutional value since its earliest existence. The inclusive 
Article 22 of the Constitution plays an important role in the enlargement of the scope 
of protection, as it opens up the possibility of some interests being recognised as 
rights in the future without amending constitutional provisions or being recognised by 
an eligible institution, such as the Court of Justice in the European Union. 
 
This observation, of course, leads to discussions about another difference between 
these two jurisdictions' institutional design. The European Union is a supranational 
organisation, and therefore its legal system is distinct from that of a single State.  
The EU law is constituted of a series of Treaties and legislation, such as Regulations 
and Directives, which have direct effect or indirect effect on the national laws of 
Member States, and it is the responsibility of the Court of Justice to review the 
legality and validity in the interpretation and application of these Treaties and 
legislation.  
 
The Court of Justice has a wide range of jurisdiction, such as those specified in Article 
19 TEU and Articles 251–281 TFEU. Among these, the most relevant to this thesis is 
Article 263, which states: "The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review 
the legality of legislative acts, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the 
European Central Bank, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the 
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European Parliament and of the European Council intended to produce legal effects 
vis-à-vis third parties. It shall also review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or 
agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties." At the 
same time, it can also make preliminary rulings to interpret Treaties of the Union, and 
to validate and interpret acts of Union institutions. In addition, if a question may 
involve a conflict between national law and EU law is raised before a national court or 
tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may request a preliminary reference 
from the Court if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it 
to give judgment, and shall request such ruling if there is no judicial remedy under 
national law for the decision regarding such a question (Article 267 TFEU). As 
fundamental rights became an integral part of European Union law, when the Court of 
Justice is reviewing the validity of legislative acts or acts of Union institutions in its 
preliminary rulings, an important criterion is that whether the said legislative acts or 
acts of Union institutions compatible with fundamental rights protection. With that 
said, cases regarding fundamental rights constitute only a fraction of the case law of 
the Court of Justice.48  
 
On the other hand, the judicial system in Taiwan is similar to the domestic legal 
                                                 
48 It is difficult to know exactly how many cases have been brought before the European Courts, and 
this may be because the term "fundamental rights" itself is not used as a subject-matter category of 
European-courts statistics, such as the statistics in the Annual Report of the Court of Justice (see, for 
example, the Annual Report of the Court of Justice 2015, available at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-04/en_ecj_annual_report_2014_pr1.pdf, 
pp.95–104, accessed April 2016). Despite this difficulty, a search using "fundamental rights" as the 
subject matter in the CURIA databank gave 220 returns. This, however, should be deemed an 
underestimation, as in many cases while fundamental rights are not the subject matter, the European 
Courts still considered the fundamental rights involved. Accordingly, using "fundamental rights" as the 
keywords to search in the same databank gave over 3,900 returns. On the other hand, a search of the 
HUDOC databank of the ECtHR that deals with fundamental rights issues, using English as the 
published language, gave over 17,000 returns, as suggested by the 1959–2014 statistics in the ECtHR 
2014 Annual Report, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_Report_2014_ENG.pdf  
(accessed April 2016). Take property rights for example, amongst the 17,754 results found in the 
Annual Report, there are 2,898 cases regarding the protection of property rights. 
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system in EU Member States, especially the continental States. As for the 
constitutionality of legal acts in Taiwan, especially those relating to fundamental 
rights issues, this is monopolised by the Grand Justices, who are very economical in 
making their Official Interpretations. To this day, only 733 Official Interpretations 
have been made, with just about half of them related to fundamental rights or human 
rights,49 in contrast with the much more cases handled by the European Courts50 and 
the ECtHR.51 In fact, coincidently similar to the late arrival of fundamental rights into 
the jurisprudence of the European Courts such as Nold, while the first Official 
Interpretation was made in 1949, the Grand Justices did not really engage in in-depth 
protection of fundamental rights until the 1990s, and most earlier Official 
Interpretations dealt with the structural design of the government in the Constitution 
or literal explanation of provisions of substantive or procedural legislative acts. Even 
if some early Official Interpretations were related to fundamental rights, their 
reasoning was mostly brief and vague. In many cases, while fundamental rights were 
involved, it was usually the normative requirements that were not met, and the Grand 
Justices simply mentioned: " (the legislative act at issue) … is in violation of the 
constitutional right of the people" or "is in violation of a right guaranteed by the 
                                                 
49 Observation and calculation by the author. 
50 It is difficult to know exactly how many cases have been brought before the European Courts, and 
this may be because "fundamental rights" is not used as a subject-matter category of European Courts 
statistics, such as the statistics in the Annual Report of the Court of Justice (see, for example, the 
Annual Report of the Court of Justice 2015, available at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-04/en_ecj_annual_report_2014_pr1.pdf, 
accessed April 2016). Despite this difficulty, a search using "fundamental rights" as the subject matter 
in the CURIA databank gave 220 returns. This, however, should be deemed an underestimation, as in 
many cases while fundamental rights are not the subject matter, the European Courts still considered 
the fundamental right involved. Accordingly, using "fundamental rights" as the keywords to search in 
the same databank gave over 3,900 returns. 
51 A search in the HUDOC databank of the ECtHR that deals with fundamental rights issues, using 
English as the published language, gave over 17,000 returns, as suggested by the 1959–2014 statistics 
in the ECtHR 2014 Annual Report, available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_Report_2014_ENG.pdf (accessed April 2016). Take 
property rights for example, amongst the 17,754 results found in the Annual Report, there are 2,898 
cases regarding the protection of property rights. 
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Constitution".52 This is, however, understandable as the current Constitution came 
into force in 1949 and the functions of many roles in the government required further 
clarification, similarly the martial-law regime in Taiwan which was not lifted until 
1987. The end of the martial-law regime can be seen as being reflected in the 
strengthening of the protection of fundamental rights in Official Interpretations in two 
ways: first, the protection of fundamental rights is more accentuated by states; and 
second, more and more legal scholars returning from overseas are being selected as 
Grand Justices to introduce concepts of fundamental rights. For example, the 
protection of property rights was first seen in Official Interpretation No. 219 but not 
thoroughly discussed until No.400, and the freedom to conduct a business was not 
applied until Official Interpretation No. 404. With this changing trend, however, to 
date only about half of the Official Interpretations are related to fundamental rights. In 
addition, as mentioned in (2.2), it is very difficult to bring a case for review before the 
Grand Justices. Take a possible dispute about telecoms forced access as an example, if 
a case were brought before a general administrative court, and were the said court to 
finds a constitutionality dispute existed regarding the regulatory measure, it would 
have the competence to decide whether to stop the procedure and take the case for 
review by the Grand Justices.53 Considering the complex relationship between telcos 
and the regulator, NCC,54 where the NCC in many cases applies a carrot-and-stick 
approach to seek a balance between telcos, disputes with regard to telecom regulations 
have seldom been brought before the administrative court, let alone referred to the 
                                                 
52 For examples, in Official Interpretations Nos. 313 and 394, the Grand Justices simply emphasised 
that in case the law authorizes the promulgation of a regulation to supplement such triggering 
conditions, the contents and scope of such authorization shall be concrete and clear so that the 
regulation promulgated according to such law may be in compliance with Article 23 of the 
Constitution. 
53 Article 5 (2) of the Act of Ruling of the Grand Justices of Judicial Yuan. See also: Ibid, Article 5 (1) 
b. 
54 See the discussion about the Taiwanese telecoms market in Chapter Three (3.1). 
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Grand Justices. This is one of the main reasons why there are to date no scholarly 
comments about constitutionality reviews regarding telecoms forced access 




Legality and Constitutionality of Restrictions to Right to 




In order to examine the legality and constitutionality of telecoms forced-access 
mechanisms, it is important to identify which fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
telcos are potentially affected by these mechanisms and thus should be subject to a 
relevant constitutionality review. This chapter therefore discusses property rights, or 
the "right to property" in the European Union, and has three sections. As the 
implementation of EU telecoms forced-access mechanisms strongly relies on the 
transposition of Member States, especially via the designing of their property-right 
systems, it has been argued whether the EU has the competence to propose legislation 
that may affect the property orders of Member States. This issue, especially in relation 
to Article 345 TFEU, will be discussed in the first section (1) of this chapter. The 
second section discusses the protection of the right to property in the CFR and the 
case law of the Court of Justice (2), including an introduction (2.1), and an analysis of 
European Court case law (2.2). Although the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) is not a legal Union instrument, and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) that it established is not a Union court, because of the importance of the 
ECHR in protecting fundamental rights in the European Union’s legal system, this 
thesis will also take ECHR provisions and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR into 
account (3). 
 
1. Article 345 TFEU and Property Rights 
Union mechanisms, especially regarding limits on use and even the expropriation of 
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property that Member States are required to implement. This naturally raises 
considerations as to whether European legislation has the competence to regulate 
matters of property law within Member States, and most notably the scope of Article 
345 TFEU (formerly Article 295 TEC). 
 
Article 345 TFEU states: "The Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member 
States governing the system of property ownership." The interpretation of this article 
has prompted much debate within different European Union institutes, such as the 
Commission and the Court of Justice. Such debate includes the scope of application of 
the article, whether this article empowers the European Union or Member States to 
legislate in the field of property law, and what the "Treaties" are that this article refers 
to.1 Of special importance to this thesis, the wording of the provision seems to deny 
that the Treaties (TEU and TFEU) and even secondary EU legislation affect Member 
States' rules on property rights,2 and thus EU telecoms forced-access mechanisms, 
which, as specified in this thesis, may affect property-right rules in Member States 
and cannot be justified. 
 
The above explanation should not, however, be deemed correct. Article 345 TFEU 
should be understood as meaning that the Treaty may apply, but only if it does not 
infringe the rules governing systems of property ownership in Member States.3 As 
stated in Commission v Portugal: "[Article 345 TFEU] merely signifies that each 
                                                 
1 See for example: Pielow, J.-C. and E. Ehlers (2008). "Ownership unbundling and constitutional 
conflict: a typical German debate?" European Review of Energy Markets 2(3): 13–15; Akkermans, B. 
and E. Ramaekers (2010). "Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 EC), its meanings and interpretations." 
European Law Journal 16 (3): 292–314 and Ramaekers, E. (2013). European Union Property 
Law:101–141, Intersentia, Cambridge. 
2 Ramaekers (2013) supra n 1:114. 
3 Akkermans and Ramaekers (2010). Supra n 1: 298. 
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Member State may organise as it thinks fit the system of ownership of undertakings 
whilst at the same time respecting the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the 
Treaty."4 It has been further pointed out that this Article does not concern the content 
of rights of ownership nor the objects of right of ownership; rather, it concerns 
systems of property ownership,5 i.e. the ways in which rights of ownership can be 
held.6 Additionally, from a historical perspective, this Article only concerns the 
subjects of property relationship, namely undertakings,7 and regardless of whether 
these undertakings are state-owned or private.8 To conclude, Article 345 TFEU only 
concerns the systems of property ownership of undertakings. Undertakings, and the 
question of whether or not they are owned publicly or privately, are precluded from 
the scope of application of the Treaties, but national rules governing rights of 
ownership and objects of ownership are not precluded from the scope of application 
of the Treaties.  
 
It has been argued that Article 345 TFEU also helps to formulate the scope of property 
rights protection in the CFR, which will be discussed in the following section. As 
Peers et al. point out, to the extent that property-related decisions of the Member 
States are considered as being protected by Article 345 TFEU, the European Union 
must not interfere. This limitation may also be considered when determining the scope 
of Article 17 of the CFR.9 
 
                                                 
4 Case C-367/98, Commission v Portugal [2002] E.C.R. I-4731, para. 28. 
5 Ramaekers (2013) supra n 1: 111. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Akkermans and Ramaekers (2010). Supra n 1: 299 and Ramaekers (2013) supra n 1: 107. 
8 See Commission green papers: COM (2004) 327 final, 20, COM (2007) 529 final, 6, COM (2007) 
530 final, 6, COM (2007) 532 final, 6. 
9 Peers, S., T. Hervey, et al. (2014). The EU Charter of fundamental rights: a commentary, 
Bloomsbury Publishing: 470. 
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2. Protection of the Right to Property in the CFR and the Case Law of Court of 
Justice 
2.1 Introduction 
The CFR has gained the status of a source of law in the Union following the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty. However, even before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, 
the CFR was already used as an important reference document. Advocates General 
have referred on several occasions to the CFR in proceedings in the Court of Justice, 
as have cases decided in national courts of Member States, including those in the 
United Kingdom.10 As a result it is fair to say that, over the last decade, the CFR had 
already had an impact on EU and domestic litigation. The direct enforceability of the 
Charter after the Lisbon Treaty can be seen as the conclusion of a process of its 
gradual introduction into the EU and domestic legal orders. 
 
The protection of property rights as fundamental rights is enumerated in two main 
articles, namely Articles 17 and 52 CFR. While Article 17 directly addresses the 
protection of property rights, Article 52, and especially Article 52(1), is a general 
provision that establishes limitations to the applications of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms in the CFR and sets out criteria for the said limitations. 
 
Article 17 states: 
  "Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully 
acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the 
public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject 
to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may 
be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest. 
                                                 
10 See, for example, R (A, B, X and Y) v East Sussex County Council [2003] EWHC 167. 
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Intellectual property shall be protected." 
 
Article 52, meanwhile, states: 
  "Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if 
they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the 
Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
Rights recognised by this Charter which are based on the Community Treaties or the 
Treaty on European Union shall be exercised under the conditions and within the 
limits defined by those Treaties. 
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive 
protection." 
 
2.2 Analyses of Cases before the European Courts 
(1) The definition and scope of "possession" 
The Court of Justice has reaffirmed several times in its case law that the text on 
"possession" also includes a wide range of lawful interests, including intangible 
property. Such lawful interests should be concrete and cannot be mere expectations.11 
In other words, the term possession should refer either to "existing possessions" or 
"assets", including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she 
has at least a "legitimate expectation" of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property 
                                                 
11 Case T-256/11, Ezz v Council [2014] OJ C 204/28. 
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right. Where the proprietary interest is in the nature of a claim, it may be regarded as 
an 'asset' only where it has sufficient basis in law. For example, a mere expectation of 
acquiring property shall not be protected.12 Similarly, the Court of Justice in the 
Alliance for Natural Health13 case held that a market share cannot be claimed as a 
right to property, as such a market share only constitutes a momentary economic 
position which is exposed to the risks inherent in changing circumstances.14 It should 
be noted that, in the same case, the Court of Justice stated that an economic operator 
cannot claim an acquired right or even a legitimate expectation that an existing 
situation which is capable of being altered by measures taken by Community 
institutions within the limits of their discretion will be maintained.15 In short, the 
Court of Justice has concluded that possessions in Article 17(1) are rights "with an 
asset value creating an established legal position under the legal system, enabling the 
holder to exercise those rights autonomously and for his benefit".16 
 
With the entry into force of the CFR and the Court of Justice starting to cite it as a 
source of law, the broad meaning of possessions remains the same. A distinction made 
by the CFR, as opposed to the ECHR that will be discussed below, however, is that 
the CFR has explicitly stated that intellectual property is protected. This can be best 
illustrated, among other cases, in the recent UsedSoft case.17 In UsedSoft, despite not 
directly applying the CFR, the Court of Justice affirmed that property rights also 
apply to the sale of intangible goods, such as a copy of a computer program. However, 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, Alliance for Natural Health [2005] E.C.R. I-6451. 
14 See also: Case C-280/93, Germany v Council[1994] E.C.R. I-4973 and Case C-210/03, Swedish 
Match v Secretary of State for Health, [2004] E.C.R. I-11893. 
15 See also: Case C-52/81, Faust v Commission, [1982] E.C.R. I-3745 and Swedish Match, ibid. 
16 Case C-283/11, Sky Österreich v Österreichischer Rundfunk [2013] OJ C 269/25. 
17 Case C-128/11, UsedSoft v Oracle International [2012] OJ C 287/10. 
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as mentioned above, intangible goods that are not intellectual property shall also be 
protected. In FA Premier League,18 the Court of Justice held that although sporting 
events cannot be regarded as intellectual creations and cannot be protected by 
copyright, limitations on the rights to broadcast those events can be regarded as 
infringements of property rights.19 This view is reaffirmed by Sky Österreich,20 in 
which the Court of Justice held that exclusive broadcasting rights are indeed property 
rights. 
 
(2) Restrictions upon the Right to Property 
a. Social function of rights 
Even before the CFR was enacted, the Court of Justice had long held that property 
rights, being fundamental rights, were not absolute and were subject to certain 
restrictions. As early as Nold, the Court held that:  
 
"If rights of ownership are protected by the constitutional laws of all the Member 
States and if similar guarantees are given in respect of their right freely to choose and 
practice their trade or profession, the rights thereby guaranteed, far from constituting 
unfettered prerogatives, must be viewed in the light of the social function of the 
property and activities protected thereunder. For this reason, rights of this nature are 
protected by law subject always to limitations laid down in accordance with the public 
interest. Within the Community legal order it likewise seems legitimate that these 
rights should, if necessary, be subject to certain limits justified by the overall 
objectives pursued by the Community, on condition that the substance of these rights 
                                                 
18 Case C-403/08, Football Association Premier League v QC Leisure [2011] E.C.R. I-9083. 
19 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Case C-201/11 P, UEFA v Commission [2013] OJ C 
260/3. 
20 Sky Österreich, supra n7. 
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is left untouched."  
 
This social-function rationale is maintained in Court of Justice case law,21 sometimes 
with additional remarks about the relationship with that social function in the 
European Union. In Wachauf, the Court stated that: "The fundamental rights 
recognized by the Court are not absolute, however, but must be considered in relation 
to their social function. Consequently, restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of 
those rights, in particular in the context of a common organization of a market."22 
With the entry into force of the CFR, the idea that fundamental rights that are 
protected under the CFR are subject to social function restrictions, especially Union 
values, should remain the same, as in the opinions in N. S. v SSHD23 and 
Dominguez,24 the Advocates General stated that rights recognised by the CFR which 
are based on the Community Treaties or the Treaty on European Union shall be 
exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties. 
 
b. Provided for by law 
Property rights, like any fundamental rights, are not absolute and are subject to certain 
restrictions. However, in order to be upheld, these restrictions must satisfy certain 
conditions. In Ezz,25 the General Court established that in order for a limitation on the 
exercise of the right to property to comply with European Law, it must satisfy three 
                                                 
21 See: Case C-84/95, Bosphorus v Minister for Transport [1996] E.C.R. I-3953 and Case C-317/08, 
Alassini v Telecom Italia [2010] E.C.R. I-2213. 
22 Case C-5/88, Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] E.C.R. I-02609. See 
also: Case C-265/87, Schräder v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] E.C.R. 2237; Case C-177/90, Kühn v 
Landwirtschaftskammer Weser-Ems [1992] E.C.R. I-0035, Case C-22/94, Irish Farmers' Association 
[1997] E.C.R. I-1809. 
23 Case C-411/10, N. S. v Secretary of State [2011] E.C.R. I-13905. 
24 Case C-282/10, Maribel Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique [2012] OJ C 
73/2. 
25 Ezz, supra n 11.. 
 
 151 
conditions: the limitation must be "provided for by law", the limitation must refer to 
an objective of general interest recognised as such by the European Union, and it must 
not be excessive: it must be necessary and proportionate to the aim sought.  
 
The first condition, that the restrictions are provided for by law (Article 52 (1)),26 as 
mentioned above, is also known as "legality", "legal certainty" or the "rule of law", 
and it has been recognized as one of the general principles of the European Union 
since the 1960s.27 The legal certainty requirement has been comprehended in several 
aspects, or sub-categories, such as legitimate expectations, acquired rights, 
non-retroactivity, lack of procedural time limits and the demand for understandable 
language;28 and each of these aspects has been repeatedly ruled on by the Court of 
Justice. With regard to the doctrine (principle) of legitimate expectations, it means 
that: "those who act in good faith on the basis of law as it is or seems to be should not 
be frustrated in their expectations".29 When deciding on the legality of a changed 
regulation in Töpfer, the Court held that the protection of legitimate expectation forms 
part of the Community legal order, and any failure to comply with it is an 
infringement of the Treaty or rule of law relating to its application within the meaning 
of Article 173 EEC (now Article 263 TFEU).30  
 
The principle of acquired rights protection means that, when legislation is amended, 
unless the legislature expresses a contrary intention, the continuity of the legal system 
                                                 
26 Case C-407/08 P,Knauf Gips v Commission [2010] E.C.R. I-06375. 
27 Calmers, D., C. Hadjiemmanuil, et al. (2014). European Union Law, Text and Materials, Cambridge 
University Press. 
28 Schermers, H. G. and D. F. Waelbroeck (2001). Judicial protection in the European Union, Kluwer 
Law International.  
29 Kaczorowska, A. (2013). European Union Law, Routledge. 
30 Case C-112/77, Töpfer v Commission, [1978] E.C.R. I-1019. See also: Case C-120/86, Mulder v 
Minister van Lanbouw en Visserij [1988] E.C.R. I-2321 and Case C-212/80, Amministrazione delle 
finanze dello Stato v Salumi, [1981] E.C.R. I-2735. 
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must be ensured.31 Regarding non-retroactivity, as the Court held in Opel Austria, the 
Regulation in question should not have come into force before it had been notified 
and the Regulation published.32 In Netherlands v Commission, the Court confirmed 
the principle in the context of a lack of procedural time limits when the applicant 
argued that the financial aid Regulation challenged (ECSC Treaty, Article 35) failed 
to provide any specific period within which to exercise the alleged right.33  
 
The demand for understandable language is confirmed by the Court of Justice in 
Farrauto,34in which an Italian worker brought a suit against a German industrial 
social insurance body in Germany. In his opinion in Digital Rights Ireland, Advocate 
General Cruz Villalón also made a profound remark about the "quality of law" 
meeting the requirement of being "provided for by law", under which Union 
legislation should not be just a matter of general referral but must be sufficiently clear 
and foreseeable as to the meaning and nature of applicable measures, and must define 
with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercising of the power of interference 
when exercising rights. He further pointed out that the European Union legislature 
cannot entirely leave to Member States the task of defining guarantees capable of 
justifying that interference, but should rather fully assume its share of responsibility 
by defining at the very least the principles which must govern the definition, 
establishment, application and review of observance of those guarantees. Thus, an 
example of merely giving the description of "serious crime" in the European Union 
legislation should not be deemed adequate in light of the intensity of the 
                                                 
31 Case C-23/68, Klomp v Inspectie der belastingen [1969] E.C.R. I-0043. See also Case C-10/78, 
Belbouab v Bundesknappschaft [1978] E.C.R I-1915. 
32 Case T-115/94, Opel Austria v Council, [1997] E.C.R. II-2739. See also: Case C-98/78, Racke v 
Hauptzollamt Mainz [1979] E.C.R. I-0069, Salumi supra n 21. 
33 Case C-59/70, Netherlands v Commission [1971] E.C.R. I-0639. 





c. General interest 
The next requirement for an infringement to be legitimate is that restrictions of rights, 
while provided for by law, must meet the general or public interest. Usually 
mentioned together with the social functions of rights, this requirement has been 
repeatedly quoted in Court of Justice case law.36 This requirement, as explained by 
the Court of Justice in Dereci, means that limitations of rights must refer to an 
objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union.37 These 
objectives include those pursued under the CFSP and referred to in Article 21(2)(b) 
and (d) TEU, namely supporting democracy, the rule of law and human rights as well 
as the sustainable development of developing countries with the essential objective of 
eradicating poverty.38 
 
Compared to the ECtHR, the Court of Justice is not eager to set criteria to determine 
whether there exists a general or public interest in a case. However, when citing an 
ECtHR case, Malama, Advocate General Mischo pointed out, in his opinion in Booker 
Aquaculture, that the notion of public interest is necessarily extensive, and the 
authorities of Member States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation as, in principle, 
they are better placed to appreciate what is in the public interest.39 This opinion was 
maintained in S.P.C.M., where the Court held that the Community legislature must 
                                                 
35 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications Marine 
and Natural Resources, [2014] OJ C 175/6. 
36 For examples, see: Schräder, supra n 13 and Case C-200/96, Metronome Musik v Music Point 
Hokamp [1998] E.C.R. I-1953 and Alliance supra n4. 
37 Case C-256/11, Dereci v Bundesministerium für Inneres [2011] E.C.R. I-11315. 
38 Ezz supra n 16. 
39 Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00 Booker Aquaculture v Scottish Minsters [2003] E.C.R. I-7411. 
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also be allowed broad discretion, which may involve political, economic and social 
choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments.40 
Thus, the legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the 
measure is manifestly inappropriate having due regard to the objective which the 
competent institution is pursuing. 
 
d. Principle of proportionality  
According to Article 52(1) CFR, any limitation on property rights is also subject to 
the principle of proportionality. The idea of proportionality was first recognised in the 
Community in Article 5 TEC (now Article 5(3b) TEU), stating that: "any action by 
the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this 
Treaty". The principle of proportionality has been recognised as one of the general 
principles of European Law by the Court of Justice since the 1950s.41 It was first 
recognised by the Court of Justice in Fédéchar.42 In Solange I, the Advocate General 
provided an early formulation of the principle of proportionality, stating that: "the 
individual should not have his freedom of action limited beyond the degree necessary 
in the public interest".43 Since then, the concept of proportionality has been further 
developed. When dealing with a European Directive prohibiting the use of certain 
hormonal substances in livestock farming in the frequently quoted Fedesa, the Court 
of Justice held that by virtue of the principle of proportionality, the lawfulness of the 
said Directive depended on whether it was appropriate and necessary to achieve the 
objectives legitimately pursued by the law in question. When there is a choice 
                                                 
40 Case C-558/07, S.P.C.M. v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2009] 
E.C.R. I-5783. 
41 Damian Chalmers (2006), supra n 18. 
42 Case C-8/55, Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v High Authority [1954] E.C.R. I-245.  
43 Case C-11/70, International Handelsgesellschaft v Einfur [1970] E.C.R. I-1125. 
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between several appropriate measures, the least onerous must be adopted, and any 
disadvantage caused must not be disproportionate to the aim(s) pursued.44 Nowadays, 
it has been established that the principle of proportionality generally entails a 
three-stage test:  
(a) the measure is suitable to achieve a legitimate aim (appropriateness test), 
(b) the measure is necessary to achieve that aim or no less restrictive means are 
available (necessity test), and 
(c) the measure does not have an excessive effect on the applicant's interests 
(reasonableness). The principle of proportionality therefore requires that a 
measure is both appropriate and necessary, and as such the Court of Justice 
reviews both the legality of a measure but also, to some extent, the merits of 
legislative and administrative measures.45 
 
When the principle of proportionality is applied under the Union’s legal order, it is not 
always the weighing of fundamental rights according to the restrictive method 
discussed above, but rather a weighing of different fundamental rights and freedoms 
that are guaranteed within the European Union. In this regard, assessment of the 
possible disproportionate nature of a provision of European Union law must be 
carried out with a view to reconciling the requirements of the protection of those 
different rights and freedoms and striking a fair balance between them.46 
                                                 
44 Case, C-331/88, R v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries [1990] E.C.R. I–4023. See also: Case 
C-189/01, Jippes v Minister van Landbouw [2001] E.C.R. I-5689, Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical v 
Secretary of State for Transport, [2010] E.C.R. I-7027, and joined cases C-581/10 & C-629/10 Nelson 
& TUI Travel v Deutsche Lufthansa [2012] OJ C 399/3, and Sky Österreich, supra n 7. 
45 Craig, P. and G. de Búrca (2015). EU law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford University Press. See 
also: Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Case C-271/08, Commission v Germany [2010] E.C.R. 
I-7091. However, in some Court of Justice cases that have applied the principle of proportionality, only 
the third stage – reasonableness – has been considered. 
46 See: Sky Österreich, supra n 7 and Case C-275/06, Promusicae v Telefónica de España [2008] E.C.R. 




The principle of proportionality has been quoted many times in Court of Justice case 
law when the Court is applying the CFR. For example, in UEFA,47 when considering 
whether Union secondary legislation48 infringed the exclusive rights to broadcast a 
football event, the Court applied the principle of proportionality by weighing the said 
broadcasting rights (property rights) against the right to disseminate information and 
ensuring wider access by the public to the television coverage of events of major 
importance.49 In another case, Sky Österreich, regarding exclusive broadcasting rights, 
the Court reckoned that requiring the broadcasting rights-holder to provide short clips 
(extracts) to other broadcasters based on the costs directly incurred in providing such 
clips (e.g. providing access to the signal) might constitute an infringement of the 
rights to property and professional freedom; however, the marketing on an exclusive 
basis of events of high interest to the public is increasing and is liable to restrict 
considerably the access of the general public to information relating to those events. 
The Court also found that, despite the fact that a less restrictive measure could have 
consisted of providing compensation to holders of exclusive broadcasting rights in 
excess of costs directly incurred, this could deter or even prevent certain broadcasters 
from requesting access for the purpose of making short news reports; and therefore, 
by requiring the holders to provide the said extracts only at the level of the costs 
incurred, this might not be deemed disproportionate. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
discussion about the weighing of fundamental rights, see Chapter Ten. 
47 Case C-201/11 P, UEFA v Commission [2013] OJ C 260/3. 
48 Article 3a of Directive 89/552 as amended by Directive 97/36. 
49 In this regard, the Court of Justice has combined consideration of the general interest and 
proportionality. In fact, it is not rare for European Courts to combine observations of proportionality 
and other legitimate considerations. For example, in the aforementioned Ezz, the General Court even 
considered that restrictive measures were not disproportionate because they are by nature temporary 
and reversible and do not therefore infringe the “essential content” of the right to property.  
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(3) Fair compensation 
As will be discussed below, although not enumerated in ECHR provisions, the ECtHR 
uses compensation as an index of whether a proper balance has been struck between 
the harms caused and the benefits gained. This compensation should be paid in timely 
fashion, and whilst it may not need to be paid in full, a total lack of compensation can 
be considered justifiable only in exceptional circumstances. The CFR, however, 
explicitly states "fair" compensation paid in good time to be one of the conditions of a 
legitimate deprivation of possessions. In the aforementioned Sky Österreich, 
compensation was one of the elements in the Court of Justice'’s decision about 
determining the proportionality of the legislative measure, and the Court held that 
partial compensation, together with the merits of other rights and freedoms, 
constituted a fair balance and thus the legislative measure at issue was legitimate. 
 
(4) The essence of property rights 
The CFR has made a distinction separating it from the ECHR by explicitly stating that 
any limitation on rights and freedoms should respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms. This is actually a reaffirmation of statements in Court of Justice case law. 
As early as Nold, the Court of Justice noted that while fundamental rights may be 
subject to certain limits, the substance of such rights should be left untouched. This 
finding has been repeatedly noted in later cases, though sometimes in alternative 
terms, as for example in the aforementioned Schräder and Wachauf cases, where the 
Court held that restrictions should not infringe upon the "very substance" of the rights 
guaranteed;50 in Keller,51 where the Court of Justice was dealing with professional 
                                                 
50 See also: Case C-177/90 Kühn [1992] E.C.R. I-0035, Case C-22/94, Irish Farmers' Association 
[1997] E.C.R. I-1809, Case C-200/96, Metronome Musik [1998] E.C.R. I-1953. 
51 Case C-234/85, Staatsanwaltschaft Freiburg v Franz Keller [1986] E.C.R. I-2897. 
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freedom, the Court held that the Community restriction should not impinge on the 
"actual substance" of that freedom.  
 
After the CFR came into force, as per a requirement of the Article, the Court of 
Justice maintained the same opinion, i.e. that any limitation of fundamental rights and 
freedoms should not impair the essence of the said rights and freedoms. And in Eifert, 
the Court held that: "limitations may be imposed on the exercise of rights … as long 
as the limitations … respect the essence of those rights and freedoms".52 In ZZ, the 
Court held that "… whilst Article 52(1) of the Charter admittedly allows limitations 
on the exercise of the rights enshrined by the Charter, it nevertheless lays down that 
any limitation must in particular respect the essence of the fundamental right in 
question … ".53  
 
Whether the essence of each fundamental right, for example where property rights are 
affected, involves in-depth discussion, this depends on the content of the right at issue. 
Oddly enough, despite repeated emphasis that the essence of rights should be 
respected, the Court of Justice has rarely directly dealt with this issue, i.e. explaining 
why the Court has held that the essence of each disputed fundamental right and 
freedom has or has not been affected in cases.54 Usually, from the author’s 
observation, the Court merely describes the facts and does not really explain their 
                                                 
52 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert v Land Hessen [2010] 
E.C.R. I-11063. 
53 Case C-300/11, ZZ v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] OJ C 225/7. 
54 However, it does not mean whether the essence of certain fundamental rights and freedoms has 
never been paid attention to in European Judicial proceedings. In his opinion to Deutsches Weintor eG v 
Land Rheinland-Pfalz regarding to the freedom of labeling applicant’s alcoholic beverage (the freedom 
to conduct a business), Advocate General Mazák seemed to combine the consideration of whether the 
essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms has been affected and proportionality by raising the 
point that the prohibition only places restrictions within a clearly defined sphere on the business 
activities, and therefore the essence and actual substance of such right was not impaired. 
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relationship to the essence of the rights at issue. An example of this is Sky Österreich, 
in which the Court noted that the Union legislative provision55 that requires 
broadcasting rights holders to offer short clips of important matches to other 
broadcasters "does not prevent a business activity from being carried out as such by 
the holder of exclusive broadcasting rights" and "does not prevent the holder of those 
rights from making use of them by broadcasting the event in question itself for 
consideration or by granting that right to another broadcaster on a contractual basis for 
consideration or to any other economic operator", and therefore this does not affect 
the core content of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
 
3. Protection of the Right to Property in ECHR and ECtHR Case Law 
The protection of property rights under the ECHR is stated in Article 1 of Protocol 1 
(henceforth referred to as Article 1):  
 
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law.  
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
                                                 
55 Directive 2007/65/EC of the European Parliament and the Council amending Council Directive 
89/552/EC (OJ L 298, 17.10.1989) on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, 






The interpretation of the ECHR is mainly conducted by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), though other Council of Europe institutions may provide 
interpretative guidance. The ECtHR is a supranational court, established in 1959, 
which supervises the implementation of the ECHR.57  
 
Article1 set out the protection of property rights. However, as aforementioned, 
property rights are not absolute but are subject to reasonable limitation or interference 
from the State. It has been observed that the ECtHR has therefore developed a 
five-step test to deal with whether there are violations of Article 1:58  
Step 1: Did the applicant have property in the sense of Article 1? 
Step 2: Was there interference with the peaceful enjoyment of the property? 
Step 3: Was the interference provided for by law? 
Step 4: Did the interference pursue the general interest? 




In this step, two questions should be considered: (1) who can claim to be the victim of 
                                                 
56 It has been long debated whether economic rights such as property rights shall enjoy equal 
protection with civil or political rights, such as freedom of speech, as the latter ones traditionally are 
more vulnerable to the power of States. Upholders think that with the adoption of Protocol 1 of the 
ECHR, economic rights are not considered less important than political rights. See: Kirchner, S. and K. 
Geler-Noch (2012). "Compensation under the European Convention on Human Rights for 
Expropriations Enforced Prior to the Applicability of the Convention." Jurisprudence 19(1): 24. This 
issue will be further discussed in later chapters, especially Chapter Eight. 
57 As stated in Article 19 of the ECHR, the ECtHR was established "to ensure the observance of the 
engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols". 




interference with property, i.e. who may bring proceedings before the Convention 
bodies; and (2) what is property, i.e. what constitutes a "possession" within the 
meaning of the ECHR?  
 
Regarding the first question, everyone whose rights are violated will have an effective 
remedy before the State, as stated in Article 13 of the ECHR: "Everyone whose rights 
and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective 
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity." 
 
According to Article 1, not only natural persons but also legal persons are entitled to 
the enjoyment of property rights protection. However, shareholders generally have no 
claim based on damage to a company. The "piercing of the corporate veil" will only 
be permitted in exceptional circumstances, such as when a company is unable to make 
a claim through its organs or liquidators.59 
 
As for the second question, the concept of property under Article 1 is very broad, and 
not limited to the ownership of physical goods.60 The text in the Article is 
"possessions" in English and "biens" in French, and is deemed to include a wide range 
of lawful interests that have a pecuniary value, but not abstract concepts,61 as in civil 
                                                 
59 See: Yarrow v the United Kingdom (1983) App No. 9266/81, 30 DR 155; X v Austria (1966) App 
no.1706/62, 21 CD 34 and Agrotexim v Greece (1995) App no. 14807/89 21 EHRR 250. In Agrotexim, 
the ECtHR disputed whether a shareholder should generally be able to claim for violations of the 
property rights of a company, as disagreements between shareholders and a company’s board of 
directors or amongst shareholders are common, and such disagreements could cause difficulties in 
relation to an infringement of the company’s rights. It may also cause the risk of violating the ECHR's 
requirement that all domestic remedies be exhausted (Article 35). 
60 See: Iatridis v Greece (2000) App no. 31107/96, ECHR 1999-II 75, para. 40. 
61 The object of the property right claimed “must be adequately definable in relation to the claims 
based thereupon". See: Van Dijk, P., G. J. Hoof, et al. (1998). Theory and practice of the European 
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law legal doctrine.62 It should be noted that such interest should at least have a certain 
economic value.63 For example, the ECtHR has confirmed the following as being 
protected under Article 1: movable or immovable property, tangible or intangible 
interests, such as shares,64 patents,65 an arbitration award (as long as it is sufficiently 
established and enforceable),66 an entitlement to a pension,67 a landlord’s entitlement 
to rent,68 the running of a business,69 the right to exercise a profession or even a legal 
claim.70 However, property in relation to the Article should be restricted to that which 
already exists, or at least there being a legitimate expectation that a certain state of 
affairs will apply;71 in other words, the mere expectation of getting property is not 
protected under the Article.72 
 
As for identification of the concept of property rights, the ECtHR is not restricted by 
definitions in domestic law but has an autonomous nature.73 In other words, the 
ECtHR is not bound by the circumstance of whether a right or advantage under 
                                                                                                                                            
Convention on Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 621. 
62 Van Banning, T. R. (2002). The Human Right to Property, Intersentia nv 
63 In cases where the enjoyment of property is concerned but the economic impact is difficult to assess, 
Article 8 can come into play, see: Carss-Frisk, M. (2001). The Right to Property: a Guide to the 
Implementation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Directorate General of Human Rights Council of Europe. 
64 Bramelid & Malmström v Sweden (1982) App nos 8588/79, 8589/79, 29 DR 64 
65 Smith Kline & French Lab v Netherlands (1990) App no. 12633/87, 66 ECHR 70. 
66 Stran Greek Refineries & Stratis Andreadis v Greece (1995) App no 13427/87, 19 EHRR 293 
67 Müller v Austria (2008) App no 28034/04, ECHR 18. 
68 Mellacher v Austria (1989) App no. 10522/83, 11011/84, 11070/84, 12 EHRR 391. 
69 Bramelid supra n 11 and Van Marle v Netherland (1986) App no. 8543/79 8674/79 8675/79 8685/79, 
8 EHRR 483. 
70 Pressos Compania Naviera v Belgium (1997) App no.17849/91, 21 EHRR 301 
71 See: Pine Valley Developments v Ireland (1991) App no.12742/87, 14 EHRR 319. In this case, the 
ECtHR thought the applicant acted in reliance on permission duly recorded in a public register, and 
thus constituted a legit expectation. 
72 See: Marckx v Belgium (1979) App no. 6833/74, 2 EHRR 330 and X v Germany (1979) App no. 
8410/78, 18 DR 216. In Maarckx, the ECtHR disputed the right to acquire possessions, whether on 
intestacy or through voluntary dispositions, being protected under Article 1; in X, the ECtHR disputed 
whether fees that have not come into existence are protected under Article 1. 
73 Schutte(2004), supra n49. 
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national law is considered to be a property right.74 This flexible approach is important 
for the supranational nature of the ECtHR, as it makes it possible for the ECtHR to 
deal with the different concepts of property rights within States. However, it is still 
relevant to consider the position as a matter of domestic law.75 Apparent violations of 
domestic law are generally not protected under Article 1.76 
 
Step 2: Interference 
In the second step, the ECtHR has to consider whether there has been interference 
with property. Regarding this, the ECtHR has established a three-rule test in its case 
law.77 First, in Sporrong, the ECtHR pointed out:  
 
"That Article (Article 1) comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, which is of a 
general nature, enounces the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property; it is set out 
in the first sentence of the first paragraph. The second rule covers deprivation of 
possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; it appears in the second sentence of 
the same paragraph. The third rule recognises that the States are entitled, amongst 
other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest, by 
                                                 
74 Alkema, E., J. Loof, et al. (2000). "The Concept of Property–In Particular in the European 
Convention on Human Rights " The Right to Property–The Influence of Article 1 Protocol No. 1 ECHR 
on Several Fields of Domestic Law. 
75 See: Pressos, supra n61. It should be noted that consideration of domestic law is not restricted to the 
concept of the property, but also to the entitlement to property. In Gratzinger & Gratzingerova v Czech 
(2002) App no.39794/98, 35EHRR CD202, the applicants were originally Czech nationals but later lost 
their nationality. The ECtHR held that the applicants had not shown that they had a claim which was 
sufficiently established to be enforceable, and therefore could not argue that they had a "possession" 
within the meaning of Article 1. 
76 See: S. v the United Kingdom (1986) App no. 11716/85, 47 DR 274. In this case, the ECtHR pointed 
out that occupying a property without a legal right under domestic law is not protected under the 
Article. 
77 The ECtHR, however, has sometimes emphasised that the three rules are connected: the second and 
third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment 
of possessions and should be construed in the light of that general principle, " ...the rules are not 
'distinct' in the sense of being unconnected: the second and third rules are concerned with particular 
instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property. They must therefore be 
construed in the light of the general principle laid down in the first rule". See Mellacher supra n 15. 
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enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose; it is contained in the 
second paragraph".78 
 
It should be noted that although Article 1 deals with property rights violations by 
States, it is not restricted to property interfered with by or transferred to (see below) 
States. In other words, where States take certain measures resulting in property being 
transferred to or affected by other individuals (a private third party), this also 
constitutes interference under Article 1.79 
 
a. Deprivation of Property 
When considering whether there has been interference with property, the ECtHR will 
first examine the second rule, i.e. whether there has been deprivation of property. This 
is because the first of the three rules is of a general nature and should therefore be 
examined after the last two.  
 
As for whether there is any deprivation of property, it should be noted that 
"deprivation" here is not restricted to formal or legal expropriation or transfer of 
ownership; the ECtHR also considers whether there has been a de facto taking of 
property, i.e. the State takes measures that interfere with property rights to an extent 
that these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been 
expropriated, even though the State does not purport to have expropriated them and 
the legal title to the property formally remains with the original owner.80  
 
                                                 
78 Sporrong & Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) App no. 7151/75; 7152/75, ECHR 5. 
79 See: James v United Kingdom (1986) App no.8793/79, ECHR 2; Scollo v Italy (1996) App 
no.19133/91, 22 EHRR 514; Bramelid supra n 16. 
80 Sporrong, supra n 69.  
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Such de facto deprivation has been frequently reiterated by the ECtHR. In 
Papamichalopoulos, the ECtHR held that the loss of all ability to dispose of land, 
taken together with the failure to remedy the situation, entailed sufficiently serious 
consequences for the applicants' land de facto as to have been expropriated.81 In 
Brumarescu, the relevant property was never legally nationalised, as the 
nationalisation legislation was found to be void, but the ECtHR stated that it was 
necessary to look behind appearances and investigate the reality of the situation 
complained of, and as the applicant could not use the property, the State's behaviour 
should be deemed deprivation.82 
 
b. Control of the Use of Property 
As stated in the second paragraph of Article 1, the third rule provides that property 
rights generally should be protected, unless under certain legitimate circumstances 
whereby the State is entitled to enforce necessary laws to control the use of the said 
property. 
 
In Sporrong, the State imposed two measures, namely expropriation permits and the 
prohibition of construction on the relevant land for future development. The ECtHR 
held that although the measures had made it more difficult for the applicant to use, 
sell, donate and otherwise deal with the property, he was still entitled and able to do 
so, and therefore there was no deprivation of property. However, the prohibition on 
construction clearly amounted to control over the use of property, within the meaning 
of the second paragraph (the third rule).83 
                                                 
81 Papamichalopoulos and others v Greece (1993) App no 14556/89, ECHR 28. 
82 Brumarescu v Romania (1999) App no.28342/95, ECHR 105. 




In Scollo, the applicant claimed the return of his flat. The proceeding, however, was 
suspended by domestic legislation. The ECtHR found that the tenant's continuing to 
occupy the flat undoubtedly amounted to control over the use of possessions, and the 
second paragraph of Article 1 applied accordingly.84 A similar case is Hutten-Czapska, 
in which the applicant's house was assigned to a tenant by State legislation. The 
ECtHR held that the measures taken could not be considered a formal or de facto 
expropriation but did constitute control over the use of the property.85 
 
In Mellacher, new domestic legislation limited the rent for accommodation. The 
applicant, being a landlord, contested the lawfulness of such legislation. The ECtHR 
found that the measures taken did not amount either to formal or to de facto 
expropriation, as there was neither transfer of the applicant's property nor was he 
deprived of his right to use, let or sell it. The contested measures which deprived the 
applicant of part of his income from the property amounted to control over the use of 
the property. Accordingly, the second paragraph of Article 1 applied.86 
 
c. Violations of Peaceful Enjoyment of Property? 
The first rule, as aforementioned, is of a general nature. If State measures do not fall 
under the next two rules, the ECtHR will consider whether such a measure violates 
peaceful enjoyment of the property.87 However, even if measures fall within the ambit 
                                                 
84 Scollo, supra n 70. 
85 Hutten-Czapska v Poland (2008) App no. 35014/97, ECHR 355. 
86 Mellacher supra n 59. 
87 In Sporrong, the ECtHR held that the expropriation permits of the two measures were not 
deprivations, nor were they intended to limit or control of such property; they were therefore had to be 
considered under the first sentence of the first paragraph (i.e. the first rule). See also Broniowski v 
Poland (2005) App no.31443/96, ECHR 647, the ECtHR considered that the alleged violation could 
not be classified into a precise category, and it was appropriate to be examined under the general rule of 
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of neither the second nor the third rule, that does not mean they violate the provisions 
contained within the first rule.88 
 
In Loizidou, the applicant was denied access by the State to her own land for 16 years. 
The land was neither denied (or de facto denied) nor controlled by the State. However, 
the ECtHR noted that the denial of access over a period of 16 years had affected the 
applicant's right as a property owner, and thus constituted a violation of peaceful 
enjoyment of the property.89 
 
In Stran Greek Refineries, new domestic legislation voided a contract and its 
arbitration clauses, and a further arbitration award was denied by the State. The 
ECtHR considered the first rule and found it was impossible for the applicants to 
secure enforcement of arbitration under which the State was required to pay them 
specified sums in respect of expenditure they had incurred in seeking to fulfil their 
contractual obligations or even for them to take further action to recover the sums in 
question through the courts, and therefore concluded interference existed.90 
 
In Driza, the State enacted an act under which the former owners of property who 
were expropriated under the communist regime could claim ownership or 
compensation. This right to claim, however, became uncertain after the State enacted 
another series of acts. The ECtHR held that the continuing failure to pay the 
applicants compensation and recognise their right to ownership of property amounted 
                                                                                                                                            
peaceful enjoyment of possessions. 
88 Sporrong, supra n 69. 
89 Loizidou v Turkey (1995) App No 15318/89, ECHR 10. 
90 Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v Greece (1994)App no. 13427/87, ECHR 48. 
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to interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.91 
 
Step 3: Provided for by Law92 
This requirement is often also called "legality", "legal certainty" or the "rule of law". 
Whether or not interference is provided for by law is, in some cases, the first question 
to ask, i.e. if the interference was not lawful, it could not be compatible with Article 1, 
as the ECtHR stated in the aforementioned Iatridis: " ... whether a fair balance has 
been struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights … becomes 
relevant only once it has been established that the interference in question satisfied the 
requirement of lawfulness and was not arbitrary".93 
 
The requirement for legal certainty, although explicitly stated in the second sentence 
of the first paragraph of Article 1, is actually a principle inherent in the whole 
ECHR,94 and has a broader meaning: any State measure that limits a national's 
fundamental rights should be provided for by law, be issued and executed by an 
appropriate authority, follow a proper procedure, and not be arbitrary. For example, in 
a serious case against Bulgaria, properties owned by the applicants were nationalised 
under the communist regime. Later legislation, namely a restitution law, was enacted 
in order to return property or award compensation. The legislation was later amended 
with a renewing time limit. The ECtHR held that the authorities' failure to set clear 
                                                 
91 Driza v Albania (2007) App no. 33771/02,49 EHRR 779. 
92 In recent years, however, the ECtHR has adopted a general test for all kinds of interferences once 
the interference has been established. In Beyeler, the ECtHR identified the three criteria (lawfulness, in 
the general interest and proportionality) with which any interference with a possession must comply. 
See: Beyeler v Italy (2002) App no. 33202/96, ECHR 2000-I 57 See also Schutte (2004), supra n 49. 
93 Iatridis, supra n 51, para.58. 
94 The ECtHR stated "...the rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is 
inherent in all the Articles of the Convention". Iatridis, supra n 51, para. 58. 
 
 169 
limits on the restitution of property of bona fide third parties generated legal 
uncertainty.95 
 
The ECtHR has a broad ("substantive") perception of law. This includes not only 
statutory laws, and the case law of national courts itself, but also lower-level 
regulations and even established practices,96 as the ECtHR stated in Kruslin: "… the 
Court has always understood the term 'law' in its ‘substantive’ sense, not its ‘formal’ 
one … it has included both enactments of lower rank than statutes and unwritten 
law”.97 This relatively loose requirement is different from the attitude of the Court of 
Justice, as the “law” in the jurisprudence of the latter seemed to be limited to statutory 
provision.98 
 
Step 4: In the Public or General Interest 
Once interference with property has been established, the ECtHR will then consider 
whether such interference is lawful, and the first step is to examine whether it is in the 
public or general interest.99 The ECtHR has emphasized that: "[i]n order to be 
justified, any interference with the right to property must serve a legitimate objective 
in the public, or general, interest."100  
Public or general interest, however, is not necessarily restricted to affairs that benefit 
the public. As long as the State's taking of property is in pursuit of legitimate social, 
                                                 
95 See: Todorova v Bulgaria (2012) App no. 40265/04, ECHR 883; Lithgow and Others v The United 
Kingdom (1986) App no. 9006/80; 9263/81, ECHR 8. 
96 Schutte (2004), supra n49. 
97 Kruslin v France (1990) Application No 11801/85, 12 EHRR 547. 
98 As observed by Advocate General Villalón in his Opinion in Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v 
SABAM [2011] E.C.R. I-11959, para. 37.  
99 According to the ECtHR, ‘general’ and ‘public’ are the same. See: Ploeger, H. D., D. A. Groetelaers, 
et al. (2005). "Planning and the Fundamental Right to Property." 
100 James, supra n 26. 
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economic or other policies, such an act can be deemed to be "in the public interest", 
even if the community at large has no direct use or enjoyment of the property taken. 
The ECtHR's consideration of the public or general interest can best be illustrated in 
James. In James, new legislation entitled long (over 21 years) leaseholders to buy the 
ownership of their house at less than the market value. In challenging the lawfulness 
of the legislation, the applicants contended that the transfer of property from one 
person to another could not be "in the public interest". The ECtHR refuted this 
argument and held that the compulsory transfer of property from one individual to 
another may constitute a legitimate aim in the public interest. It added that the taking 
of property pursuant to a policy calculated to enhance social justice within the 
community could properly be described as being in the public interest.101  
The ECtHR in James further pointed out that States have a wide "margin of 
appreciation" to implement social and economic policies, given the different cultural, 
historic and philosophical practices amongst them:  
"Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national 
authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate 
what is 'in the public interest'. Under the system of protection established by the 
Convention, it is thus for the national authorities to make the initial assessment 
both of the existence of a problem of public concern warranting measures of 
deprivation of property and of the remedial action to be taken … Here as in other 
fields to which the safeguards of the Convention extend, the national authorities 
accordingly enjoy a certain margin of appreciation ... unless that is manifestly 
without reasonable foundation."  




The ECtHR concluded that, in James, the belief of the UK legislature in the existence 
of a social injustice on the part of leaseholders could not be characterized as 
manifestly unreasonable.102 The doctrine of the margin of appreciation has been 
quoted and adopted frequently in subsequent cases.103  
With the establishment of the doctrine of margin of appreciation, the ECtHR generally 
respects the judgements of States (in their domestic legislature or administrative acts) 
about whether a measure is in the public or general interest. However, that is not to 
say that the ECtHR does not have a role to play in assessing whether a State's 
legislation or acts are of public or general interest; it is able to review whether the 
margin of appreciation has been exceeded. As the noted in Jahn, the ECtHR cannot 
abdicate its power of review and must therefore determine whether the requisite 
balance was maintained in a manner consonant with the applicant’s right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of his property, within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 
1. Indeed, in recent years, there are increasing numbers of cases in which States were 
found to have exceeded the margin.104  
Step 5: Fair Balance Test 
                                                 
102 The ECtHR further noted that the more important the social considerations, the wider the margin of 
appreciation. See: Herrmann v Germany (2007) App no. 9300/07 ECHR 26. 
103 For example, in Pressos, the ECtHR noted that under the ECHR system it is for the national 
authorities to make the initial assessment both of the existence of a problem of public concern 
warranting measures of deprivation of property, and of the remedial action to be taken, see Pressos 
supra n 22. In AGOSI, the ECtHR pointed out that the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with 
regard both to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the consequences of 
enforcement are justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in 
question. See: AGOSI v The United Kingdom (1986) App no. 9118/80, ECHR 13. In Zvolsk, the ECtHR 
pointed out that because of the State’s direct knowledge of the society and its needs, it is in principle 
better placed to appreciate what is “in the public interest”. It is thus for the State to make the initial 
assessment of the existence of a problem of public concern warranting measures of deprivation of 
property, see: Zvolský & Zvolská v The Czech Republic (2002) App no. 46129/99, ECHR 2002 I-X 
104 See: Sporrong supra n 69, Holy Monasteries v Greece (1995) App no 13092/87, 20 EHRR and 
Spacek v the Czech Republic (1999) App no.26449/95, ECHR 128. 
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It is not sufficient that interference is of public or general interest and meets a 
legitimate objective; it must also be proportionate,105 i.e. there must exist a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed by the State 
and the aim sought.106 In other words, a fair balance must be struck between the 
demands of the public or general interest of the Community and the protection of the 
individual’s property rights.107 In fact, this test is usually the core issue in most 
ECtHR property rights cases, as it has been noted above that the ECtHR generally 
respects the State’s assessment about public or general interests. 
 
The principle of proportionality or fair balance may be best explained in Sporrong, in 
which ECtHR stated  
 
" … the Court must determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands 
of the general interests of the community and the requirements of the protection of the 
individual’s fundamental rights … The search for this balance is inherent in the whole 
of the Convention and is also reflected in the structure of Article 1 ... Being combined 
in this way, the two series of measures created a situation which upset the fair balance 
which should be struck between the protection of the right to property and the 
requirement of the general interest: the Sporrong Estate and Mrs Lönnroth bore an 
individual and excessive burden which could have been rendered legitimate only if 
                                                 
105 However, in Velikovi, the ECtHR mixed the general interest and proportionality, saying the 
proportionality of interference must be decided with reference to: (i) whether or not the case clearly fell 
within the scope of the legitimate aims of the legislation at issue; and (ii) the hardship suffered by the 
applicants and the adequacy of the compensation actually obtained or that which could have been 
obtained. See: Velikovi and others v Bulgaria (2007) App. no 43278/98, 48 EHRR 27. 
106 As in Kopecký, the ECtHR reiterated: “[t]he application of the relevant provisions of the restitution 
laws by the national courts shows how the State assessed the competing interests. Even accepting that 
the State had a wide margin of appreciation in the case, the need to maintain a fair balance means that 
promotion of the general interest must not impose an excessive burden on a restitution claimant.” See: 
Kopecký v Slovakia (2004) App no.44912/98, ECHR 446. 
107 Iatridis, supra n 51. 
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they had had the possibility of seeking a reduction of the time-limits or of claiming 
compensation."108  
 
One of the main measures of proportionality held by the ECtHR is the weighing 
between the loss of the applicant and the compensation he receives. The ECtHR stated 
in James that: "[a]lthough Article 1 does not expressly require the payment of 
compensation for a taking of, or other interference with, property. But in the case of a 
taking (or deprivation) of property, compensation is generally implicitly required."109 
Again in Jahn, the ECtHR stated: "[c]ompensation terms under the relevant 
legislation are material to the assessment [of] whether the contested measure respects 
the requisite fair balance and, notably, whether it imposes a disproportionate burden 
on the applicants."110 
 
Although in Former King of Greece, the ECtHR has stated that in many cases of 
lawful expropriation, such as a distinct taking of land for road construction or other 
"public interest" purposes, only full compensation may be regarded as reasonably 
related to the value of the property,111 it should be noted that full compensation is not 
always granted under ECtHR case law,112 as suggested in James: "[l]egitimate 
objectives of 'public interest’, such as are pursued in measures of economic reform or 
                                                 
108 Sporrong supra n 69. 
109 James, supra n 70. 
110 Jahn et al. v Germany (2005) App no. 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01, ECHR 444.  
111 Former King of Greece and others v Greece (2000) App no 25701/94, ECHR 640. 
112 James, supra n 26.The standard employed by the ECtHR, therefore, was lower than the standard 
under general public international law under which an individual can be fully compensated. This 
general compensation rule employs the so called "Hull" formula , which requires compensation to be 
"prompt, adequate, effective" and the victim has to receive full compensation. See: Kirchner (2012) 
supra n 3. This issue has been disputed in Lithgow, where the applicant claimed that deprivation of 
property is subject to the conditions provided for “by the general principles of international law", and 
thus should be "adequate, prompt and effective". The ECtHR rejected this argument, saying this 
requirement only applies to non-nationals. The amount of compensation awarded, however, has 
increased in more recent cases, see: Lithgow, supra n 32. 
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measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for less than 
reimbursement of the full market value." However, a denial of compensation is per se 
not lawful. This principle was also illustrated in James, as the ECtHR stated:  
 
"the taking of property in the public interest without payment of compensation is 
treated as justifiable only in exceptional circumstances ... the protection of the right 
of property it affords would be largely illusory and ineffective in the absence of 
any equivalent principle. Clearly, compensation terms are material to the 
assessment [of] whether the contested legislation respects a fair balance between 
the various interests at stake and, notably, whether it does not impose a 
disproportionate burden on the applicants ... the taking of property without 
payment of an amount reasonably related to its value would normally constitute a 
disproportionate interference which could not be considered justifiable under 
Article 1."113  
 
In the slightly later case of Lithgow, the applicant's aircraft were nationalised by the 
State. While not contesting the nationalisation, the applicant claimed that the 
compensation they received was grossly inadequate and discriminatory. The ECtHR 
pointed out that while compensation standards may vary,114 compensation may not be 
denied per se – this would amount to a second violation of the right to property 
because compensation claims are also protected under Article 1. Only in very extreme 
                                                 
113 James, supra n 26. 
114 The ECtHR stated that the “margin of appreciation” doctrine does not only apply when considering 
whether nationalisation was in the public interest, but also to the choice of compensation terms: "the 
Court’s power of review in the present case is limited to ascertaining whether the decision regarding 
compensation fell outside the United Kingdom’s wide margin of appreciation; it will respect the 
legislature’s judgment in this connection unless that judgment was manifestly without reasonable 
foundation". Lithgow, supra n 85. 
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circumstances may compensation be denied in expropriation cases. Again in Pressos 
Compania Naviera, a collision of ships occurred in Belgian waters. The owners of the 
ships sued for damages but the compensation was later denied by new domestic 
legislation. The ECtHR reiterated that the denial of compensation is only justifiable in 
exceptional circumstances.115 
 
Not only should a compensation be granted in principle, but the proceedings should 
also be timely and not excessively lengthy. This rule should also be applied to 
administrative or judicial proceedings.116 The ECtHR further noted that there exists a 
strong but rebuttable presumption that excessively long proceedings will occasion 
non-pecuniary damage.117 Regarding the excessive length of judicial proceedings, the 
ECtHR has developed key criteria for verification of the effectiveness of a 
compensation claim in Wasserman:118 
• an action for compensation must be heard within a reasonable time; 
• the compensation must be paid promptly and generally no later than six months 
from the date on which the decision awarding compensation becomes enforceable; 
• the procedural rules governing an action for compensation must conform to the 
principle of fairness guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention; 
                                                 
115 For other examples see also: The Holy Monasteries, Former King of Greece and Zvolsky. However, 
in Jahn, after considering the uncertainty of the legal position of heirs and the grounds of social justice, 
the ECtHR held that the lack of any compensation did not upset the “fair balance”. 
116 In Akkus v Turkey, the ECtHR pointed out that the abnormally lengthy delays in the payment of 
compensation for expropriation lead to increased financial loss for the person whose land has been 
expropriated putting him in a position of uncertainty, especially when the monetary depreciation which 
occurs in certain States is taken into account…The same applies to abnormally lengthy delays in 
administrative or judicial proceedings in which such compensation is determined, especially when 
people whose land has been expropriated are obliged to resort to such proceedings in order to obtain 
the compensation to which they are entitled. See: Akkus v Turkey (2000)App no.19263/92, EHRR 365 
and the many subsequent cases against Turkey. 
117 See Scordino v Italy (2006) App No 36813/97 ECHR 2006-V and Wasserman v Russia (2008) App 




• the rules regarding legal costs must not place an excessive burden on litigants 
where their action is justified; and 
• the level of compensation must not be unreasonable in comparison with the 
awards made by the Court in similar cases.
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Chapter VII   
Legality and Constitutionality of Restrictions to Right to 
Property in Taiwan 
 
Preface 
This chapter discusses the property rights protection regime in Taiwan, and especially 
the criteria employed in constitutional review. In doing so, this chapter starts with a 
general overview of the right to property (1), including the constitutional provision 
(1.1) and an introduction to the concepts, content and scope of the right to property 
(1.2). The second section (2) contains a discussion about the constitutional review of 
the right to property in Taiwan, including a general discussion (2.1) and a specific 
discussion about a special situation, namely expropriation (2.2), which will play an 
important role later in this thesis. 
 
1. General View of Right to Property 
This section contains three subsections. As stated in Chapter Three, unlike the 
European Union which is a supranational organisation, Taiwan is an individual 
country with a codified constitution.1 The first subsection therefore begins with the 
Taiwanese constitutional provisions related to property rights protection. Because the 
wordings of these constitutional provisions are very concise in nature and their 
meanings need to be further interpreted, two main sources—the scholarly discussions 
and the Grand Justices' Official Interpretations of the constitution provisions--will be 
cited extensively, as both of them play important roles in the interpretion and 
formation of fundamental rights.   
                                                 




The second subsection then discusses the constitutionality tests that relate to property 
rights. The term "fundamental right(s)" is used interchangeably with "constitutional 
right(s)" and "right(s)" in this and the following chapters of this thesis, as not only are 
the latter two terms used in the Taiwanese Constitution, but such rights are concisely 
included in the Constitution.2 
 
1.1 Constitutional Provisions 
There are three articles in the Taiwanese Constitution that relate to the protection of 
property rights. The first article, Article 15, proclaims that property rights (phrased as 
"rights to property"), along with the rights to exist and rights to work, are 
constitutional rights and should be protected. 
Article 15: "The rights to existence, the rights to working, and the rights to property 
shall be guaranteed to the people".  
 
The second provision is Article 23. As mentioned earlier in Chapter Three, this article 
is a general provision about the legitimate restriction of constitutional rights. In other 
words, it states under which circumstances a legal measure may restrict fundamental 
rights. 
 
Article 23: "All the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding Article shall not 
                                                 
2 As stated in Article 22 of Taiwanese constitution: "All other freedoms and rights of the people that 
are not detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be guaranteed under the Constitution." 
Constitutional rights, at least Taiwanese constitutional rights, are not necessary fundamental rights as 
defined in the previous chapters. However, the differences between fundamental rights and 
constitutional rights are not the focus of this thesis and will not be discussed in this thesis. Further 
discussions on this issue, see: Zhao, H. (2013). "The Formal Rationality of the Constitutional Norms 
and Its Value in the Perspective of the Limited Models of the Fundamental Rights." Academia Sinica 
Law Journal 12.  
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be restricted by law except by such as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon 
the freedoms of other persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order or 
to advance public welfare". 
 
The third relevant article especially states that certain properties are subjects to the 
restrictions of the State. 
 
Article 145: "With respect to private wealth and privately-operated enterprises, the 
State shall restrict them by law if they are deemed detrimental to the balanced 
development of national wealth and people’s livelihoods. 
Cooperative enterprises shall receive encouragement and assistance from the State. 
Nationals’ productive enterprises and foreign trade shall receive encouragement, 
guidance and protection from the State". 
 
Two points should be noted regarding this third provision. First, the terms "people" 
and "nationals" used in these articles have the same meaning in the perspective of this 
thesis.3 Second, Article 145 is contained within Chapter XIII on "Fundamental 
National Policies". This chapter was drafted and enacted upon the social and 
economic background of the 1940s and many articles have yet to be amended. Such 
articles are generally deemed out of date and therefore should be regarded mere as 
guidance rather than applicable clauses.4 
 
                                                 
3 The differences occur in cases such as when foreigners stay in Taiwan's territory. In this case, 
foreigners can still enjoy fundamental or constitutional rights, but do not have the rights to receive 
education and social welfares. In Taiwanese Constitution, there is another term “citizen” who are 
nationals that are capable of participating in politics and serving as civil servants.    
4 Wu, G. (2005). "The Socila Movement and Constitution Interpretations." The Theory and Practice of 
Constitution Interpretations 1-7. 
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1.2 Concepts, Content and Scope of Right to Property 
As Article 15 of Taiwanese Constitution is concisely worded and the true meaning of 
its wording is not comprehensible without further interpretation, Taiwanese legal 
scholars have strived to fill in the concepts of property rights. The most common 
approach that the scholars adopted was introducing the relevant constitutional theories 
from Germany.5 
 
With the consideration of German theories, the property rights under the Constitution 
can be first construed as two concepts. The first concept is that the State has the 
responsibility to establish a regulatory framework in order to protect property rights. 
Such framework has a "covering effect" over all legislation and regulations. In other 
words, not only should the civil legislation be included in such framework, but the 
effect of such framework should also penetrate into the design of public legislation.6 
In other words, the legislator should offer the necessary operating system of property 
rights protection via legislative techniques in both material and procedural legislation. 
This aspect is called the institutional guarantee (Institutionsgarantie) of property 
rights.7  
 
The institutional guarantee was first introduced by the Official Interpretation No.386, 
according to which the most important content of these is its private-beneficial nature 
(Privatnützigkeit). The private-beneficial nature means that properties themselves are 
                                                 
5 See for examples: Su, Y.-C. (1996). "The Protection of Property Rights and Judicial Review"; Lee, 
H.-t. (2004). The Protection of Property Rights and the Compensation to Expropriation ; Tsai, W.-i. 
(2006). The Concept of Property Rights Protection and its Dogmatic Structure, Cheng Kung Law 
Review. 
6 Yang , S.-l. (1992). "The Protection of Property Rights and Public Expropriation." Socioeconomic 
Law and Institution Review (9): 259-278; Gee, K.-C. (2001). "The Protection of Property Rights--A 





for private citizens to own and utilise.8 The legislators should keep in mind that the 
point of the existence of property rights is this private-serving nature when they are 
forming the concepts and the scope of protection of property rights.9 In other words, 
although the legislators are expected to form the private property system, such 
formation shall not intrude upon the core content of the said system.10 
 
The second concept of property rights emphasises on their defensive nature, and 
therefore can be construed as an individual guarantee in contrast with the previous 
aspect. The classical central idea of this aspect was that each individual can use, make 
profits from, and dispose of his own property without State interference. The holders 
of property rights therefore enjoy a subjective public right (Subjektiv-öffentliches 
Recht) against the use of State power to effect any any deprivation of and restriction 
upon legally acquired properties.11 This concept, however, was later adjusted at the 
end of 19th century with the rise of Collectivism and the idea of social solidarity.12 
The ideas of social function were then introduced to the once absolute individual 
property rights. The right to property was therefore considered a right with obligations 
and the employment of such right is subject to certain restrictions, e.g., the pursuit of 
public interests.13 This process of individual-base property rights evolving to 
social-base property rights has been defined as the socialisation of property rights.14  
 
The revised, or rather compromised property right, therefore is not an absolute right 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid; Su (1996) supra n 5. 
11 Chen, H.-M. (1999). Basic Theories of Constitutional Fundamental Rights Angle Publishing: 304. 
12 Yang (1992), supra n 114; Tsai, W.-Y. (2001). The Legal Foundation of Social State, Tseng-Dien: 48. 
Zhuang, Z.-F. (2005). The Research Of Constitutional Property Rights, National Taiwan University: 10. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Yang (1992), supra n 6: 264; Lee (2004), supra n 5. 
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and should not be regarded as a sheer prohibition of the restriction of employment or 
the deprivation of properties; rather, it is a right that property-holders can rely on in 
order to resist the "illegal" entrenchment from State legislation or administrative acts. 
Taiwanese scholars further interpret that the protection of property rights therefore 
can be construed as a two-stage protection: In principle it is a guarantee of the 
established and existing status of ownership (Bestandsschutz),15 and only when the 
conditions of legal restrictions are met (such as a legal expropriation) would such a 
guarantee be transformed into the guarantee of value (Wertsgarantie), i.e., the 
compensation of the value of the said properties.16 This is actually an enlargement of 
the concept of traditional property rights, from the original rights on objects, to the 
monetary value of such rights.17 
 
After figuring out the constitutional meaning, Taiwanese scholars' next step 
proceeded to identify the content and scope of property rights, i.e., which rights 
should be included as property rights, or more simply, what should be regarded as 
"property". Some Taiwanese scholars have called such content "private property 
rights", in contrast with the previous concepts being "constitutional property rights", 
as such content can be reflected into private laws.18 Scholars further explain such 
content as "[t]he rights that citizens enjoy upon their properties under which they can 
use, make profits and dispose the said properties and not to be illegally encroached 
upon by State power"19 or "All rights and objects that legally and on the owners' 
                                                 
15 Lee, C.-L. (1999). "Guarantee of the Established and Existing Status and the Guarantee of Values of 
Property rights." Taiwan Law Journal(4): 101; Lee(2001) supra n 6: 248. 
16 Ibid Lee (1999):102; Lee (2001):249. 
17 Chen, H.-M. (2002). Explanation of the Constitution of R.O.C., ShanMin Publishing. 
18 Zhuang (2005) supra n 12; Tsai (2006) supra n 5. 
19 Lee (2001) supra n 6. 
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subjective perception that are with pecuniary values."20 Generally, scholars hold an 
open attitude about the identification of "property" and admit a wide range of rights 
and legal interests. Enumerated below are rights and legal interests that are confirmed 
or agreed by scholarly discussions21 to be included as property rights: 
(a) Ownership rights and other rights in rem and quasi rights in rem;22 
(b) Creditors' rights; 
(c) Intangible property; 
(d) Monetary property; and 
(e) Freedom of usage 
 
Similarly, the Grand Justices have recognised a wide range of property rights. In their 
Official Interpretations, the Grand Justices have accepted that the following rights 
should be protected as property rights: ownership rights;23 quasi rights in rem;24 
intangible properties;25 creditor's rights;26 claims of statute of limitations;27 
pecuniary claims under administrative laws;28 and collective properties.29 
 
2. Constitutionality Review of Right to Property 
2.1 General Standard 
As stated above, the modern perception is that property rights are not absolute, but 
                                                 
20 Chen (2002) supra n 17. 
21 See for examples: Su (1996), supra n 5; Chen (1999) supra n 11; Lee (2001) supra n 6; Tsai (2006) 
supra n 5. 
22 Quasi rights in rem refer to certain rights that have similar nature as rights in rem but cannot be 
regarded as the latter, such as fishery or mining rights in certain regions.  
23 Official Interpretations No.148, 336, 374, 400, 406, 440 and 444. 
24 Official Interpretation No.383. 
25 Official Interpretations No. 213 and 370. 
26 Official Interpretations No.37, 292, 335 and 386. 
27 Official Interpretation No.437. 
28 Official Interpretations No.187, 201, 246, 280, 285, 312, 316, 320, 389, 431, 434 and 457. 
29 Official Interpretation No.410. 
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bear their social functions, or rather social obligations, and the employment of 
property rights is therefore subject to certain restrictions or limitations. In other words, 
when the State applies its legislative power to form the content of property rights, as 
long as the core content of the said rights is not encroached upon by such legislation, 
they should be regarded as the scoping of property rights, and thus not be deemed 
unconstitutional.30 
 
When considering whether the legislative "scoping" of property rights is 
constitutional, Taiwanese scholars did not develop ad hoc constitutionality tests like 
they did for some other fundamental rights.31  
 
The constitutionality review, if, follows the traditional German approach, will 
therefore have two emphases: (1) in normative review, whether such restrictions meet 
the requirements of the principle of rule of law; and (2) in substantive review, whether 
such restrictions are excessive, which is the application of principle of 
proportionality,—the examination of the suitability, necessity and reasonableness of 
the said legislation, with the considerations of the intensity of review.32  
 
On the other hand, if the "trendier" United States three-pronged test is applied, the 
review of the said legislation, being economic legal measures, should apply the 
rational relationship test and will probably face only the mildest scrutiny as long as 
the said legislation is rationally related to its legal aims.33 
                                                 
30 Lee (2001) supra n 6: 248. 
31 Su (1996), supra n 5; Lee (2001) supra n 6; Chen (2002) supra n 17;  
32 Chen (2002) supra n 17; Liao, Y.-H. (2008). "Unpredictable or an Inherent Order? The 






2.2 Special Situation: Expropriation 
2.2.1 Concept of Expropriation 
While as mentioned above, it is well agreed amongst Taiwanese constitutional 
scholars that the content of property rights includes rights such as the peaceful 
enjoyment, ownership, and the freedom of employment without State control as 
defined in the European legal framework, but unlike the latter where these types of 
rights have been clearly distinguished, the judicial practices and scholarly discussions 
in Taiwan seldom accentuate the conditions and effects of these different rights, and 
rather emphasise heavily the expropriation of property, especially of land. These can 
been seen by their endeavour in proposing different legal bases and special conditions 
for expropriation in contrast to intervene upon regular property rights (see discussion 
below). 
 
The constitutionality of one of the main piece of expropriation legislation, i.e., the 
Land Expropriation Act, and of its application by administrative departments, has 
yielded many scholarly discussions. 
 
As discussed in (1.2), the Taiwanese Constitution is not against the legislative 
restrictions of property rights, but rather will see whether such restrictions are 
excessive (or "exceeding the endurable limit" in Taiwanese scholars' terminology). 
When such restrictions are deemed legitimate but excessive, the damage that the 
property owners bear becomes a special sacrifice (Sonderopfer, see discussion below) 
and relevant compensation should be granted.34 Taiwanese scholars have greatly 
                                                 
34 Lee (2001) supra n 6: 260. 
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stressed that the compensation is the condition of expropriation, and have described 
the relationship of expropriation and compensation as a "lip-and-teeth condition" or 
"synthetic condition".35 
 
Compensation for expropriation has been described as the "constitutional condition of 
property rights protection", "the protection of basic living conditions of the 
expropriatee", and "the condition of the fulfilment of expropriation."36 There have 
been several theories quoted by Taiwanese scholars in discussing the rationale of 
compensation for expropriation:37 
(a) Benevolence theory: the supporters of this theory think that because the State 
power and public interest is a priority, the restrictive legal measures are 
legitimate and the property rights-holders cannot claims for damages thereafter. 
The compensation in this regard is just benevolence from the state as an 
"ethical obligation." The amount of the compensation is a matter of the State's 
discretion and cannot be challenged; 
(b) Vested right theory: this theory originated from the vested right (Vollrecht) 
doctrine in natural law. While property rights are considered vested rights 
under this doctrine and should be respected, in exceptional situations they 
should give way to State power and to fulfil a public interest. However, the 
absence of due compensation will undermine the vested right doctrine and 
such compensation should therefore be granted in exchange for the vested 
right; 
(c) Special sacrifice theory: under this theory, when property rights are 
                                                 
35 See the concurring opinion to Official Interpretation No.579 by Grand Justices Hsieh, Z-C. 
36 Lee (2001) supra n 6; Wu, G. (2004). The Explanation and Application of Constitution. 
37 The detailed introduction to these theories, see: Lee (1999) supra n 15; Lee (2001) supra n 6 and 
Zhuang (2005) supra n 12. 
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encroached by the State power by means of legislative restrictions for the 
overall good of the public, and such restrictions exceed the scope of social 
obligations, the rights-holders bear a heavier burden than others and such a 
situation constitutes a violation of the principle of equity. From the 
rights-holders' perspective, the damage caused by the State power should be 
regarded as a special sacrifice, and such sacrifice should be redressed by being 
shared by the public, e.g., by means of taxation, as the public is benefited at 
the cost of the sacrifice of the few, which should be regarded as unfair or 
inqeuitable under the principle of equity;;38  
(d) Subjective theory: under this theory, the difference between the burdens 
imposed by the social obligations of property rights and the legislative 
restrictions that required compensation lies in the intention of the legislator. If 
the legislator's intention is to form the content and scope of the property rights, 
the burdens imposed by such legislation should be regarded as the social 
obligations of the property rights; otherwise the burdens or damage imposed 
by these legislations should be compensated;  
(e) Social function theory: as stated above, property rights are not absolute under 
this theory, but rather have their social functions. The enjoyment and 
employment of property rights are part of the social responsibilities, and it is 
also the reason why they should be protected and compensation should be 
granted when the said rights are infringed, as failure to protect such rights will 
impede the fulfilment of the social obligations; 
(f) Reasonable expectation theory: this theory holds that whether compensation 
should be granted depends upon the severity of the legislative restrictions. If 
                                                 
38 See Official Interpretations No.400, No.440, No.670. 
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they are not severe and society expects that the right-holders should bear such 
burden, they should be regarded as the social obligations of property rights. 
On the contrary, compensation should be granted where the legislative 
restrictions are severe and one cannot expect right-holders to bear such 
burdens.     
 
Among the above theories, the special sacrifice theory is adopted by the German 
Federal Courts when assessing whether compensation should be granted. In other 
words, a comparison should be made between the damage or sacrifice borne by the 
property rights-holders and others. If such damage or sacrifice is apparently unfair and 
lacking in reasonableness (Zumutbarkeit), it should be regarded as expropriation and 
due compensation should be granted; on the other hand, were such damage or 
sacrifice not apparently unfair and unreasonable, they should be regarded as the social 
obligations of the property rights, and State compensation should not be granted.39  
 
In Taiwan, the term "special sacrifice" was first cited by the Grand Justices in Official 
Interpretation No.336, and repeatedly appeared in later Interpretations. In the 
reasoning of Official Interpretation No.400, the Grand Justices held:  
 
"The purpose of Article 15 of the Constitution, which provides that the people's 
property right shall be protected, is to guarantee each individual the freedom to 
exercise his/her rights to use, profit and dispose for the duration of the property, 
and to prevent the infringements from public power and other parties upon his/her 
freedoms, so that he/she may develop his/her personality and maintain his/her 
                                                 
39 Yang (1992), supra n 6; Lee (2001) supra n 6. 
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dignity. However, individuals' freedom to exercise their property rights should be 
restrained by their social or ecological responsibilities according to the law. Those 
individuals whose property rights have been restrained due to the abovementioned 
responsibilities and have been particularly sacrificed for public benefits shall have 
the right to be fairly compensated."  
 
In the reasoning of Official Interpretation No.440, the Grand Justices reiterated the 
holding in No.400 and stated:  
 
"It has been provided in Article 15 of the Constitution that the people's rights of 
property shall be protected. When state organizations legally exercise their public 
power and incidentally cause harm to people's property, and this harm goes beyond 
the normal degree of tolerance the victim as a socially responsible person should 
display and becomes a special sacrifice to him/her, the state shall compensate 
him/her fairly."40 
 
2.2.2 Conditions of Expropriation 
As discussed earlier in this sub-section, there are two different perspectives with 
regard to the scope of expropriation. The first view is that the expropriation is limited 
to the deprivations only. The proponents of this view hold that the conditions and 
effects of legislative restrictions to other kinds of interferences with property rights 
should apply the analogy of the "pure" expropriation. The second view is that 
expropriation refers to any kind of property rights interferences as long as such 
interferences are excessive and constitute special sacrifice. In either case, it is 
                                                 
40 Lee (2001), supra n 12; Tsai (2001) supra n 6 and Zhuang (2005) supra n 12. 
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essential to look into the conditions of expropriation. 
 
The consensus among Taiwanese scholars is that the following conditions should be 
met for an expropriation to be held constitutional: 
(a) the expropriation should be provided for by law (the principle of rule of law); 
(b) the expropriation should have more than a legitimate aim; 
(c) the expropriation should be for public interest; 
(d) the expropriation measures should be proportional to their legal aims, or be 
imposed via the least harmful method available (principle of proportionality); 
and 
(e) there should be supplementary measures, i.e., compensation provisions about 
the compensation to the expropriation. 
 
While some of these conditions are not any different from, or even overlap with, 
constitutionality tests for general property right regulation, there are some particular 
concerns about (a), and (b) and (e) are the special conditions of expropriation. These 
conditions will be further discussed in the later analysis chapter (Chapter Eleven). 
 
It should be noted that in practice one of the main issues for an expropriation to be 
legitimate, or constitutional, is that the administrative departments usually treat the 
grant of compensation as the only condition of expropriation. In other words, 
Taiwanese administrative departments hold that as long as due compensation is 
granted, it is constitutional to carry out the expropriation. Such a view should be 
regarded as a misunderstanding of the constitutionality conditions and is therefore 
severely criticized by scholars, as the grant of compensation should be on the ground 
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that the expropriation is legitimately carried out, i.e., the expropriation should have 
passed all these review criteria.41 
 
3. Summary drawn from Chapters Six and Seven--A Comparison of Legality 
and Constitutionality of restrictions to the Right to Property in the European 
Union and Taiwan 
From the previous two chapters, it is possible to make certain observations. First, it is 
agreed in the two targeted jurisdictions that the right to property, as an economic right, 
is not absolute, but should be viewed in the light of the social function of property. 
Therefore, a light-touch approach to the review of the constitutionality and legality of 
the regulatory measure is adopted in both jurisdictions. 
 
Second, compared to the situation in the European Union, Taiwanese jurisprudence 
and scholarly discussions place considerable emphasis on the definition of 
expropriation and its effect. The result is that under the Taiwanese constitutional 
framework, a legal interference will more readily be found to be an expropriation, at 
least compared to Germany (whence Taiwan adopted most of its constitutional 
theories), as long as a special sacrifice—a burden exceeding its social functions—is 
recognised. Once an expropriation is confirmed, due compensation should follow. 
This is the so-called "lip-teeth" condition. In the European Union, it is more difficult 
for a legal interference to be recognised as an expropriation, but once it is, a timely 
and due amount of compensation is also emphasised in the European legal framework. 
 
                                                 
41 See for examples: Chen, A.-E. (1998) "The Evolution of Property Rights in Official Interpretations." 




Third, as discussed in Chapters Two and Three, telecoms forced access mechanisms 
include a series of obligations. Many of these obligations can be construed as the 
control of use (such as the forced opening of local loops and the obligations of 
facilities co-location) and even deprivation of property (such as ownership separation), 
and have to be deemed as interferences with property rights in both jurisdictions. 
These interferences, however, should be viewed in the light of the social function of 
the property. It is therefore interesting to see whether the properties at issue—the 
telecoms facilities that have a public service nature—will be required to bear an even 
more intensive form of State intervention due to their social function.  
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Chapter VIII   
Legality and Constitutionality of Restrictions upon Freedom 




As discussed earlier, in order to examine the legality and constitutionality of telecoms 
forced access mechanisms, it is necessary to identify which fundamental rights and 
freedoms of telcos are affected by these mechanisms, thus rendering such mechanisms 
potentially subject to a relevant constitutionality review. The first section of this 
chapter therefore discusses the freedom to conduct a business in the European Union. 
The freedom to conduct a business as guaranteed by Article 16 of the CFR is derived 
from the case law of the Court of Justice,1 which itself was inspired by the national 
laws of some of the Member States, but initially as a general principle instead of an 
individual right. Hence, the first part of this section (1) is about the historical 
development and concept of the freedom to conduct a business: how did freedom to 
conduct a business originate in European law (1.1), and how is it being protected, i.e., 
does it enjoy the same status of protection as other typical rights such as the right to 
property (1.2), as both are economic rights targeted by this thesis? Then, what kinds 
of freedoms are included in the freedom to conduct a business (1.3)?   
 
As the main aim of recognizing the freedom to conduct a business is to safeguard the 
right of each person in the EU to pursue a business without being subject to either 
discrimination or disproportionate restrictions,2 the next part focuses on the 
                                                 
1 Case C-59/83, SA Biovilac NV v European Economic Community [1984] E.C.R. 4057, para. 21. 
2 See, for instance, Case C-230/78, Eridania v Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry [1979] E.C.R. 
2749, paras. 20–22; Case C-240/83, Procureur de la République v Association de défense des brûleurs 
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restrictions upon freedom to conduct a business (2): the nature of the review of the 
legality of restrictions upon that freedom (2.1) and the restrictions recognised as be 
legitimate in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (2.2).   
 
1. History and Concept of Freedom to Conduct a Business in the European 
Union 
1.1 History of Freedom to Conduct a Business 
1.1.1 Case Law of the Court of Justice 
The freedom to conduct a business has a long history in European Union law. It was 
first seen as a corollary to the fundamental right to property, but gradually gained a 
separate existence.3 In a number of early Court of Justice cases, such as the 
aforementioned Nold,4 the concept of the said freedom, such as the right freely to 
choose and practise a trade or profession, was recognised. In Sukkerfabriken Nykøbing 
Limiteret,5 the Court of Justice noted another concept: the freedom to make a contract. 
In the beginning, however, the freedom to conduct a business was usually seen as a 
corollary to the fundamental right to property, at least by the Court of Justice. Indeed, 
as mentioned in Chapter Six, a major concept of property rights, according to the 
much-cited ECtHR case law of the Court of Justice, is that there should be no 
unlawful interference in the peaceful enjoyment of the said property. Understandably, 
there will be some overlap between the scope of property rights and the freedom to 
conduct a business. Indeed, in Eridania,6 the Court of Justice asserted that the 
                                                                                                                                            
d'huiles usagées (ADBHU) [1985], E.C.R 531, paras. 9-13; Case C-200/96, Metronome Musik v Music 
Point Hokamp [1998] E.C.R. I-1953, para. 21.   
3 See: Opinion of Advocate General Villalón, Case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure 
[2013] OJ C 260/6, para. 48. 
4 Case C-4/73, Nold v Commission [1974] E.C.R. 491.para. 14. See also Chapter Four of this thesis. 
5 Case C-151/78, Sukkerfabriken Nykøbing v Ministry of Agriculture [1979] E.C.R. 1, para. 19. 
6 Case C-230/78, Eridania v Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry [1979] E.C.R. 2749, para. 22. 
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limitations on quotas laid down by Community rules were related to the maintenance 
of market advantage, and thus were an issue of property rights protection. Again, in 
Finsider,7 the Court of Justice asserted that the limitations were imposed on 
production quotas for certain products did not constitute expropriation without any 
compensation. It was not until the 1980s that the freedom to conduct a business 
started to gain some status as a general principle in the European Union, distinct from 
property rights, in cases such as Hauer8 and Schrader.9 Over the years, the Court of 
Justice has come to recognise inter alia the right to engage in economic or 
commercial activity10 and the freedom to trade.11 
  
Like other fundamental rights and freedoms, the Court of Justice does not regard the 
freedom to conduct a business as absolute; rather, it has to be read in light of its social 
function.12 This attitude has been followed in subsequent cases, despite different 
terms having been set out in Court of Justice case law. These terms include a "right to 




"freedom to pursue an occupation"15 or a "professional 
activity"16. It has been noted that these terms are different in name only;17 they do not 
affect the substance of the right. 
 
                                                 
7 Case T-26/90, Finsider v Commission [1992] E.C.R. II 1789. 
8 Case C-44/79, Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] E.C.R. 3727. 
9 Case C-265/87, Schrader v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] E.C.R. 2237. 
10 Nold [1974] E.C.R. 491. 
11 Case C-240/83, Procureur de la République v Association de défense des brûleurs d'huiles usagées 
(ADBHU) [1985], E.C.R 531. 
12 Case C-4/73, Nold v Commission [1974] E.C.R. 491, para. 14. 
13 Case C-161/97, Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems v Commion [1999] E.C.R. I-2057. 
14 ADBHU [1985] E.C.R. 531. 
15 Case C-177/90, Kuehn v Landwirtschaftkammer [1992] E.C.R. I-35. 
16 Case C-44/79, Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] E.C.R. 3727. 
17 See Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl, joined Cases C-184/02 & C-223/02, Spain & Finland 
v Parliament & Council [2004] E.C.R. I-7789, para. 18. 
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1.1.2 ECHR and ECtHR Case Law 
Despite the ECHR having enteredinto force early in 1953, as an early fundamental 
rights document in Europe, there were no ECHR articles stipulating the freedom to 
conduct a business. This may be due to the fact that the ECHR was drafted primarily 
in consideration of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations 
and in accordance with the common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedoms 
and rule of law of European countries; and at the time of its drafting, political rights 
and rights closely related to individuals were its major concern.18 Hence, protection 
of the freedom to conduct a business does not fall within the fundamental rights 
enumerated in the ECHR. The ECtHR further confirms this by adopting a strict 
attitude toward the absence of any provision concerning the freedom to conduct a 
business, which cannot be amended by extrapolating the right to property. As in 
Marckx v Belgium, the ECtHR held that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR only 
applies to existing possessions and does not guarantee the right to acquire 
possessions.19   
 
That is not to say, however, that the freedom to conduct a business has never appeared 
in ECtHR case law; the ECtHR has recognised elements of the right in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), particularly those deriving from the freedom 
to enjoy the right to property (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR)20 and those 
related to freedom of expression (Article 10 of the ECHR, freedom of commercial 
expression),21 as the ECtHR has used Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR – on 
                                                 
18 See: Preamble to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
para. 2. 
19 Marckx v Belgium (1979) App. no.6833/74, 2 EHRR 330, para. 50. 
20 Smith Kline and French Laboratories v the Netherlands (1990) App. no. 12633/87, 66 ECHR. 
21 Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v Austria (No. 3), (2006) App no. 39069/97 42 EHRR 28; Casado 
Coca v Spain (1994) App. no. 15450/89 18 EFRR 1; Barthold v Germany (1985) App No 8734/79, 7 
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the protection of private property – as the basis for inferring principles protecting the 
right to economic initiative.22 Also, it has been argued that the freedom to conduct a 
business serves as an evaluation scale for interference in the legality of fundamental 
rights and freedoms in the ECHR. For example, in Informationverein Lentia, the 
ECtHR expressed its concern that national regulations that seriously curtail the 
freedom to conduct business might not comply with the guarantee of freedom of 
expression in Article 10 of the ECHR.23 In the recent case of Ahmet Yildirim, the 
ECtHR cited the Court of Justice case Scarlet Extended24 when considering whether a 
fair balance had been struck between the right to intellectual property and the freedom 
to conduct business, the right to the protection of personal data and the freedom to 
receive or impart information when imposing obligations on Internet service 
providers.25 
 
1.2 The Nature of Freedom to Conduct a Business 
1.2.1 A General Principle or Human Right? 
The freedom to conduct a business, as protected in Article 16 CFR, has a long 
relationship with the freedom to pursue an occupation and the right to property, now 
protected in Articles 15 and 17 CFR, respectively. In particular, the Court of Justice 
has recognised that the freedom to conduct a business is a corollary of the right to 
property;26 both form general principles of EU law and are subject to limitations in 
                                                                                                                                            
EHRR 383.. See also: Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal (2007) App. no 73049/01, 44 EHRR 42, para. 
72. 
22 See Mock, W. B., G. Demuro, et al. (2010). Human Rights in Europe, Durham.; L. Rossi, L. S. 
(2008) "How fundamental are fundamental principles? Primacy and fundamental rights after Lisbon." 
Yearbook of European Law 27(1): 65. 
23 Informationverein Lentia v Austria (1994) App. no. 37093/97 17 EHRR 93. 
24 Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs [2011] E.C.R. I-11959 
25 Ahmet Yildirim v Turkey (2013) App. no. 3111/10 ECHR 3003. 
26 Case C-59/83 SA Biovilac NV v European Economic Community (1984) E.C.R. 4057, para. 21. 
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the EU and national legislation deemed to be in the interest of the EU.27   
 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and CFR, these general principles of the 
European Union are no longer exclusively guiding norms to ensure the protection of 
fundamental rights within the Union;28 other sources, such as the ECHR and 
constitutional traditions common to Member States that aim to protect fundamental 
rights, also constitute general principles of the Union.29 This leads to a degree of legal 
uncertainty regarding the scope of application of fundamental rights protection in the 
European Union.30 One of the concerns of this uncertainty is whether the freedom to 
conduct a business should be understood as more of a subjective right that is 
individually justiciable in contrast to a general principle.  
 
This issue is closely related to the nature of the freedom to conduct a business. Indeed, 
the seventh recital of the Preamble to the CFR seems problematic. It refers to the 
Charter as a collection of "rights, freedoms and principles". This suggests that not 
everything in the Charter can be viewed as a fundamental right or freedom. Thus, the 
freedom to conduct a business may well be a general principle or social right. Despite 
being termed a "freedom", one major concern with the freedom to conduct a business 
being a fundamental right or freedom is the lack of clarity in the text of Article 16 of 
the CFR.31 Groussot et al. adopted the same analogy in their discussions of 
Association Médiation Sociale, where the Court of Justice considered another social 
                                                 
27 Case C-44/79, Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] E.C.R. 3727. and Case C-265/87, Schrader v 
Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] E.C.R. 2237. 
28 See Groussot, X., L. Pech, et al. (2011). "The Scope of Application of Fundamental Rights on 
Member States' Action: In Search of Certainty in EU Adjudication." Available at SSRN 1936473. 
29 Article 6(3) TEU. 
30 Groussot, X., L. Pech, et al. (2011). "The Scope of Application of Fundamental Rights on Member 
States' Action: In Search of Certainty in EU Adjudication." 
31 See Oliver, P. (2013). "What Purpose Does Article 16 of the Charter Serve?” General Principles of 
EU La and European Private Law, Kluwer: 293. 
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right, the right to information as stipulated in Article 27 of CFR, and compared it with 
the provisions in Article 21 ("non-discrimination").32 They then concluded that the 
freedom to conduct a business in Article 16, in the absence of national law to 
implement it, was not specific enough to be a right.33 Even if Article 16 should be 
deemed a "principle" in the sense of Article 52(5) of the Charter, it should be 
considered and viewed as a "principle" having justiciability, even if only to a limited 
extent.34  
 
Here, however, from the close relationship of the freedom to conduct a business with 
the right to property, the freedom to contract and the freedom to exercise an economic 
activity,35 it may be concluded that although Article 16 of the CFR bears the 
"prodromal signs" of a "principle" in the sense of Article 52(5) of the Charter (by 
making references to national laws and practices),36 it is more akin to a fundamental 
right. This stance is upheld by the Court of Justice for, as it states in Alemo: "…the 
interpretation of Article 3 of Directive 2001/23 must in any event comply with Article 
16 of the Charter, laying down the freedom to conduct a business … That 
                                                 
32 Case C-176/12, Association de mediation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT [2014] OJ C 
85/3, cited from Oliver, P(2013) above. 
33 Groussot, X., G. T. Petursson, et al. (2014). "Weak Right, Strong Court-The Freedom to Conduct 
Business and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights." Lund University Legal Research Paper Series 
(01): 6. 
34 See Lenaerts, K. (2012). "Exploring the limits of the EU charter of fundamental rights." European 
Constitutional Law Review 8(03): 375. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See also: In Spain and Finland, the Court of Justice considered the legality of a Union Directive 
aiming to regulate the organization of the working time of persons performing road-transport activities.
 
The two Member States argued that those rules could not be extended to self-employed persons, as that 
would have constituted a violation of the right to private initiative and the right to the freedom to 
pursue an economic activity. The Court ruled, however, that these rights are general principles of EU 
law and must be read in light of their social function. Same conclusion: Usai, A. (2013). "The Freedom 
to Conduct a Business in the EU, Its Limitations and Its Role in the European Legal Order: A New 
Engine for Deeper and Stronger Economic, Social, and Political Integration, The." German LJ 14: 1867, 
as the author asserted that the right to economic initiative may be applied both against the EU and 
against Member States, not only when implementing Union law, but also whenever the genuine 
substance of a EU citizen’s rights is undercut.  
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fundamental right covers, inter alia, freedom of contract, as is apparent from the 
explanations provided as guidance to the interpretation of the Charter" (emphasis 
added).37 
 
1.2.2 Freedom to Conduct a Business as a Lesser Right? 
As discussed above, the freedom to conduct a business is more of a fundamental right 
and freedom in its nature than a general principle, but a concern that is raised is how 
that right should be exercised. To be specific, does the freedom to conduct a business 
enjoy a lesser level of protection than other fundamental rights, even lesser than the 
right to property, i.e. does it enjoy unfettered exercise in the absence of restraint or 
control over an action, or is it like a principle that can only be exercised to the degree 
that it is implemented by law? 
 
Lord Goldsmith, who was the UK government’s representative in drafting the CFR, 
made a clear distinction between individually justiciable civil and political rights and 
social and economic rights.38 In his opinion, freedom to conduct a business, together 
with economic freedoms to seek employment and to property as social and economic 
rights, first took the form of principles which were implemented differently in the 
national laws and practices of the Member States.39 These principles only gave rise to 
rights to the extent that they are implemented by national law or, in areas where there 
was such competence, by Community (now EU) law. He then remarked, that such 
modern social and economic rights are "usually not justiciable individually in the 
                                                 
37 Case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure [2013] OJ C 260/6, para. 32. 
38 P. Goldsmith (2001). "A charter of rights, freedoms and principles", Common Market Law Review 
38(5): 1201-1216. 
39 Ibid, 1212. 
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same ways as other rights but instead "inform policy-making by the legislator";40 they 
are recognized and given effect to in different ways in the Member States whose 
competence this primarily is. Indeed, as observed by Oliver, before the entry into 
force of the CFR, claims based on what is now Article 16 were almost never 
successful, except in Scarlet Extended.41 The reason for this low success rate is to be 
found in the fact that the right is closely related to the right to property,42 and also due 
to the broad exceptions that the ECtHR accepts as justifications for its limitation 
under the ECHR. In fact, cases regarding to the freedom to conduct a business are 
often resolved on the basis of other grounds, such as equality, legitimate expectations 
or other fundamental freedoms.43 
 
After the entry into force of the CFR, there are disputes whether the restrictions 
recognised in historic case law should be sustained (see discussions below at (3),44 
but this issue remains, again due to the unique wording of Article 16, especially 
compared to that of right to property as protected in Article 17. Commentators, such 
as Peers et al, observed that in the text of Article 16 the freedom to conduct a business 
being a freedom to be exercised "in accordance with Union law and national law and 
practices" raises an assumption that its exercise is more limited, by contrast to rights 
to work and property, despite the further comment that it requires the Court of Justice 
to make clear whether the freedom to conduct a business should be understood as a 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Groussot, X., G. T. Petursson, et al. (2014). "Weak Right, Strong Court-The Freedom to Conduct 
Business and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights." Lund University Legal Research Paper Series 
(01): 5. 
42 Micklitz, H.-W. (2005). The politics of judicial co-operation in the EU: Sunday trading, equal 
treatment and good faith, Cambridge University Press: 101-102. 
43 Oliver, P. (2013). “What Purpose Does Article 16 of the Charter Serve?” General Principles of EU 
La and European Private Law, Kluwer: 293. 
44 Peers, S., T. Hervey, et al. (2014). The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a Commentary, 
Bloomsbury Publishing: 459. 
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lesser right than the right to property or strengthened protection be granted as a 
subjective right.45 
 
To conclude, freedom to conduct a business, unlike individually justiciable civil rights, 
is more of a modern social and economic right in nature, and thus should allow for a 
wider range of intervention, as confirmed in Sky Österreich:  
 
"… on the basis of that case-law and in the light of the wording of Article 16 of the 
Charter, which differs from the wording of the other fundamental freedoms laid 
down in Title II thereof, yet is similar to that of certain provisions of Title IV of the 
Charter, the freedom to conduct a business may be subject to a broad range of 
interventions on the part of public authorities which may limit the exercise of 
economic activity in the public interest."46  
 
This non-absolute nature, as observed by Advocate General Villalón in Alemo-Herron, 
is often used in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in contrast to other 
fundamental rights,47 such as privacy,48 health49 and intellectual property rights,50 
as in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.  
 
                                                 
45 Ibid, 444. 
46 Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Rundfunk [2013] OJ C 269/25.  
47 Opinion of Advocate General Villalón, Case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure [2013] 
OJ C 260/6. 
48 Case C-1/11, Interseroh Scrap and Metal Trading GmbH v Sonderabfall-Management-Gesellschaft 
Rheinland-Pfalz mbH (SAM) [2012] OJ C 151/8., para. 44; Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v 
Société belge des auteurs [2011] E.C.R. I-11959, para. 50; and Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging 
van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV [2012] OJ C 98/6, para. 48. 
49 Case C-544/10 Deutsches Weintor v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [2012] OJ C 331/3, para. 55. 
50 Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs [2011] E.C.R. I-11959, para. 50, and 
Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v 
Netlog NV [2012] OJ C 98/6, para. 48. 
 
 203 
1.3 Content of Freedom to Conduct a Business 
The Official Explanations of the CFR, besides specifying the sources of freedom to 
conduct a business, also make it clear that this freedom includes three categories: the 
freedom to pursue an economic or commercial activity; the freedom to make contracts; 
and the principle of free competition,51 with the first two rights finding expression in 
Court of Justice case law52 and the third right being based on the wording of Treaties 
(ex Article 4(1) EC) and Article 119 TFEU:  
 
"This Article is based on Court of Justice case-law which has recognised freedom 
to exercise an economic or commercial activity (see judgments of 14 May 1974, 
Case 4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491, paragraph 14 of the grounds, and of 27 
September 1979, Case 230-78 SpA Eridiana and others [1979] ECR 2749, 
paragraphs 20 and 31 of the grounds) and freedom of contract (see inter alia 
Sukkerfabriken Nykøbing judgment, Case 151/78 [1979] ECR 1, paragraph 19 of 
the grounds, and judgment of 5 October 1999, C-240/97 Spain v Commission 
[1999] ECR I-6571, paragraph 99 of the grounds) and Article 119(1) and (3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which recognises free 
competition. Of course, this right is to be exercised with respect for Union law and 
national legislation. It may be subject to the limitations provided for in Article 52(1) 
of the Charter".53 
                                                 
51 See: Opinion of Advocate General Villalón, Case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure 
[2013] OJ C 260/6. See also Opinion of Advocate General Mazák, Case C-544/10 Deutsches Weintor v 
Land Rheinland-Pfalz [2012] OJ C 331/3, and Opinions of Advocate General Geelhoed, Case C-210/03, 
Swedish Match UK Ltd v Secretary of State for Health [2004] E.C.R. I-11893. 
52 See, for example, Case C-4/73, Nold v Commission [1974] E.C.R. 491; Opinion of Advocate 
General Kokott, Case C-441/07 P, Commission v Alrosa Company Ltd. [2010] E.C.R. I-5949, para. 225; 
Opinion of Advocate General Villalón, Case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure [2013] OJ 
C 260/6, para. 54. 





However, as the Advocate General pointed out in Alemo-Herron, despite the fact that 
the freedom to conduct a business derives from these three sources, to date case-law 
has not, in fact, provided a full and useful definition of this freedom. The judgments 
in which the Court has had occasion to rule in this area have gone no further than 
either referring to the right to property or simply citing the provisions of Article 16 of 
the Charter. However, this does not mean that the basic elements of the right cannot 
be inferred and, in this, the sources referred to in the explanations of Article 16 of the 
Charter are of considerable assistance. In effect, the freedom to conduct a business, as 
stated in that article, acts to protect economic initiative and economic activity, 
obviously within limits but nevertheless ensuring that there are certain minimum 
conditions for economic activity in the internal market. Thus, the freedom to conduct 
a business acts as a limit on the actions of the Union in its legislative and executive 
role, as well as on the actions of Member States in their application of European 
Union law.54 
 
Via the analysis of the three categories stated in the Official Explanation we can 
conclude the freedom to conduct a business would include any legitimate form of 
profit-making activity.55 It also seems to encompass the full "life-cycle" of such 
activities,56 for instance from setting up a company57, through the operation of the 
                                                                                                                                            
April 2016). 
54 Supra n 50. 
55 See: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2015) "Freedom to Conduct a Business: 




57 Article 15 (2) of the Charter includes “the right of establishment” but relates specifically to EU 
citizens doing so “in any Member State”. A “freedom of establishment”, as an EU common market 
principle, is also explicit in Article 49 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, See: Case 
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business, including the protection for the established market position,58 the protection 
of commercial of secrecy,59 the freedom to choose with whom to do business,60 the 
freedom to determine the price of a service,61 to insolvency or closing a business.62  
 
2. Restrictions upon Freedom to Conduct a Business in the European Union 
2.1 Legality Review of Restrictions upon Freedom to Conduct a Business 
The Court of Justice has consistently held that fundamental rights are not absolute but 
must be considered in relation to their social function.63 Restrictions, therefore, may 
be imposed but should be legitimate, provided that they correspond to objectives of 
general interest pursued by the EU and do not constitute, with regard to the aim 
pursued, disproportionate and intolerable interference or impair the very substance of 
such rights.64 
 
The analysis of the legality of restrictions on the freedom to conduct a business is, in 
                                                                                                                                            
C-244/11, European Commission v Hellenic Republic [2012] OJ C 9/15.   
58 See for example: Case C-280/93, Germany v Council [1994] E.C.R. I-4973. 
59 See for example: Case C-1/11, Interseroh Scrap and Metal Trading GmbH v 
Sonderabfall-Management-Gesellschaft Rheinland-Pfalz mbH (SAM) [2012] OJ C 151/8. 
60 Joined Cases C-90/90 & C-91/90, Neu and others v Secrétaire d’État à l’Agriculture et à la 
Viticulture [1991] E.C.R. I-3617, para. 13. 
61 Case C-437/04, Commission v Belgium, [2007] E.C.R. I-2513, para. 51, and Case C-213/10, F-TEX 
SIA v Lietuvos-Anglijos UAB, Jadecloud-Vilma, [2012] OJ C165/3, para. 45. 
62 See Recommendation 2014/135/EU OJ L 74/65: Article 16 of the Charter insofar as " (19) Court 
confirmation of a restructuring plan is necessary to ensure that the reduction of the rights of creditors is 
proportionate to the benefits of the restructuring and that creditors have access to an effective remedy, 
in full compliance with the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property as enshrined in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The court should therefore reject a plan where it 
is likely that the attempted restructuring reduces the rights of dissenting creditors below what they 
could reasonably expect to receive in the absence of a restructuring of the debtor's business. " 
63 See for examples: Case C-5/88, Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] 
E.C.R. 2609; Case C-44/94, R v Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food, [1995] E.C.R. I-3115; 
Case C-200/96, Metronome Musik v Music Point Hokamp [1998] E.C.R. I-1953 and Joined Cases 
C-184/02 & C-223/02, Spain & Finland v Parliament & Council [2004] E.C.R. I-7789. 
64 See Article 52 of CFR and the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. See also 




the view of this thesis, best demonstrated in the aforementioned Sky Österreich case,65 
despite the order of the analytical steps taken being unconventional. In this case, the 
regulatory measure challenged is the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
(AVMSD),66 which in its Article 15 states that a broadcaster that is transmitting an 
event of great interest to the public, using an exclusive right to do so, must allow other 
broadcasters to use short extracts, of their own choice, from its signal. 
 
Sky Österreich had acquired the exclusive right to broadcast Europa League matches 
in the 2009–10 to 2011–12 seasons on Austrian territory with a considerable monetary 
bid. On the other hand, Österreichischer Rundfunk, a public broadcaster, sought to 
acquire short extracts to broadcast but could not reach an agreement with Sky 
Österreich regarding the price. The Austria Court thought that implementation of the 
regulatory measure in question might be contrary to the fundamental right to conduct 
a business and the right to property, and took it to the Court of Justice. Interestingly, 
the Court of Justice decided that the right to property was not applicable in this case, 
as broadcasters who have acquired an exclusive broadcasting right cannot rely on an 
"established legal position", which is essential to the right to property. 
 
In dealing with the freedom to conduct a business, the Court of Justice considered the 
following questions: 
(1) does the challenged regulatory measure affect the core content of the freedom 
to conduct a business; 
                                                 
65 Case C-283/11, Sky Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Rundfunk [2013] OJ C 269/25. 
66 Directive 2007/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 11 Dec. 2007, O.J. 2007, L 
332/27 (Audiovisual Media Service Directive). (The provisions were renumbered by the codifying 




(2) does this provision have a legitimate aim; 
(3) is it appropriate for this aim; 
(4) could a less restrictive measure achieve the objective as effectively; and 
(5) does the provision strike a fair balance between the objective and the harm 
caused to the freedom to conduct a business? 
 
The Court found that Article 15(6) AVMSD does not affect the core content of the 
freedom to conduct a business, as that provision does not prevent a business activity 
from being carried out by the holder of exclusive broadcasting rights. In addition, it 
does not prevent the holder of those rights from making use of them by broadcasting 
the event in question itself for consideration, or by granting that right to another 
broadcaster on a contractual basis for consideration, or to any other economic 
operator.67 
 
The Court also found that the provision in question had a legitimate aim. The 
safeguarding of the fundamental freedom to receive information, guaranteed under 
Article 11(1) of the Charter, and the promotion of the pluralism of the media in the 
production and programming of information in the European Union, protected under 
Article 11(2) of the Charter, are of great interest to the public.68 
 
The provision was also found to be appropriate to its aims, as it puts any broadcaster 
in a position to be able to broadcast short news reports and thus inform the general 
public of events of great interest to it, but which are marketed on an exclusive basis, 
                                                 
67 Case C-283/11, Sky Österreich v Österreichischer Rundfunk [2013] OJ C 269/25, para. 49. 
68 Ibid, paras. 51–52. 
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by guaranteeing those broadcasters access to those events.69 
 
The Court found that less restrictive measures did exist, such as requiring 
compensation for holders of exclusive broadcasting rights in addition to costs directly 
incurred in providing access to the signal, but such measures would not achieve the 
objective pursued as effectively as they would deter or even prevent certain 
broadcasters from requesting access for the purpose of broadcasting short news 
reports and thus considerably restrict the access of the general public to the 
information.70 
 
Finally, the Court held that where several rights and fundamental freedoms protected 
by the European Union legal order are at issue, the assessment of the possible 
disproportionate nature of a provision of European Union law must be carried out 
with a view to reconciling the requirements of the protection of those different rights 
and freedoms and striking a fair balance between them.71 The Court then considered 
the economic impact and the conditions laid down, such as the maximum length of the 
short extracts and identifying the source, and the reasonableness of costs, and found 
that a fair balance had been struck in this case. 
 
2.2 Restrictions Recognised in the European Courts' Jurisprudence 
Before the entry into force of the CFR, it was observed that the reach of the economic 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and the vital restrictions and interferences 
between economic and social orders were clearly contained, limited by the legitimate 
                                                 
69 Ibid, para. 53. 
70 Ibid, para. 55. 
71 Ibid, para. 60. 
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social aims of Member States, especially regarding the regulation of industries of 
public significance.72 With the entry into force of the CFR, and the enhanced status 
afforded by the freedom to conduct a business, an issue that surfaced is whether the 
restrictions recognised in European Court case law, especially whether they still 
correspond to an objective pursued by the Union, should be sustained. With regard to 
this issue, as Article 52 (1) of the CFR reproduces the settled case law of the Court 
and accepts that limitations may be imposed on the exercise of rights and freedoms 
recognised by the CFR, on condition that: those limitations are provided for in law, 
respect the essence of the rights and freedoms in question, are subject to the principle 
of proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet the objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.73 
 
The European Courts' jurisprudence has found legitimate a wide range of restrictions 
that have been imposed on the freedom to conduct a business to be legitimate, such as 
restrictions to ensure the public's safety74 and health75 in the context of the fight 
against terrorism,76 sanctions in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, the objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy and improvements to road 
safety, but often in relation to fundamental freedoms such as the free movement of 
goods and services.77 More particularly, when establishing the competition rules 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market, the European Union has adopted 
                                                 
72 Peers, S., T. Hervey, et al. (2014). The EU Charter of fundamental rights: a commentary, 
Bloomsbury Publishing: 459. 
73 Ibid. 
74 See, for example: joined Cases C-184/02 & C-223/02, Spain & Finland v Parliament & Council 
[2004] E.C.R. I-7789.   
75 See, for example: Case C-376/98, Germany v Parliament [2000] E.C.R. I-8419. 
76 See, for example joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council of the 
European Union and EC Commission [2008] E.C.R .I–6351. 
77 See: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, (2015) "Freedom to Conduct a Business: 
Exploring the Dimensions of a Fundamental Right." 
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many rules that are claimed to limit business activity by their very nature.78 They do 
so notably by requiring the prior authorization of mergers, prohibiting the abuse of a 
dominant position and prohibiting agreements that restrict competition where their 
positive effects do not outweigh this negative effect. Hence, to safeguard the 
fundamental freedom to conduct a business, it is essential that relevant competition 
law as well as its application by the authorities charged with its implementation is 
subject to effective judicial control, to ensure that restrictions are proportionate and do 
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the aim: a free and competitive internal 
market.79 
 
The scope of the freedom to establish and conduct a business is also determined by 
the fact that the Charter contains other fundamental rights and values that, in practice, 
often need to be balanced with the freedom to conduct a business. Besides the rights 
of workers, this is also the case with respect to freedom of expression,80 intellectual 
property rights81 and consumer protection.82 In such cases, the Court of Justice has to 
weigh competing fundamental rights and strike a fair balance, taking into account the 
specific circumstances of a given case.
                                                 
78 See for example, Case T-41/96, Bayer v Commission [2000] E.C.R. II-3383, para. 180.   
79 See for example, Case C-320/03, Commission v Austria [2005] E.C.R. I-9871. See also Drexl, J., W. 
Kerber, et al. (2011). Competition policy and the economic approach: foundations and limitations, 
Edward Elgar Publishing.   
80 See Case C-283/11, Sky Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Rundfunk [2013] OJ C 269/25, paras. 
30–68 (in this case the CJEU concluded that limitations on the obligation aiming to safeguard the 
fundamental freedom to receive information and the freedom and pluralism of the media guaranteed by 
Article 11 of the Charter on the freedom to conduct a business are justified and in line with the 
principle of proportionality).  
81 See for example: Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs [2011] E.C.R. 
I-11959.  
82 Case C-12/11, Denise McDonagh v Ryanair [2013] OJ C 86/2. In this case, Ryanair argued that its 
obligation to provide care to passengers whose flights have been cancelled due to extraordinary 
circumstances (such as the closure of airspace due to the eruption of the volcano) disproportionately 
interferes with its right under Article 16 of the CFR. This argument was not upheld by the Court. In 
another case: Case C-281/09, European Commission v Kingdom of Spain [2011] E.C.R. I-11811, the 
Court balanced the freedom to conduct a business and respect for their editorial independence of the 
broadcaster and consumers’ interest against excessive advertising.  
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Chapter IX   
Legality and Constitutionality of Restrictions upon Freedom 
to Conduct a Business in Taiwan 
 
Preface 
As discussed in Chapter Six, to examine the constitutionality of telecoms forced 
access mechanisms, it is necessary to identify which fundamental rights and freedoms 
of telcos are affected by these mechanisms and thus should be subject to a relevant 
constitutionality review. This chapter discusses the freedom to conduct a business in 
Taiwan, and more importantly the legality under the Constitution of restrictions on the 
freedom to conduct a business. In doing so, this chapter starts with an introduction to 
the concepts and content of the freedom to conduct a business in Taiwan (1), and goes 
on to discuss the scope for constitutional review of restrictions on the freedom to 
conduct a business (2), including constitutional review criteria (2.1) and a selection of 
Official Interpretations of the freedom to conduct a business (2.2). The end of this 
chapter in section (3) will compare the different systems employed to review the 
legality of review systems of restrictions on the freedom to conduct a business in 
Taiwan and in the European Union, pulling together observations from this and the 
previous chapters.   
 
1. The Concepts and Content of Freedom to conduct a Business 
1.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the Taiwanese Constitution’s provisions are very broad 
in their meaning and concise in their language. Many fundamental rights and 
freedoms are not stipulated in the articles of the Constitution and have to be inferred 
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by analogy with existing provisions or through the inclusive protection in Article 22 
of the Constitution.1  
 
While not stipulated in constitutional provisions, the freedom to conduct a business 
has long been recognised as a constitutional freedom,2 and it is widely agreed that 
such a freedom originates from an analogy with the right to work3 and the right to 
property, both protected in Article 15 of the Constitution.4 This view is sustained by 
the later Official Interpretation No. 514, as a Grand Justice pointed out: "[t]he people's 
freedom to run a business is protected as the right to work and the right to property 
under Article 15 of the Constitution."5 It should be noted, however, that Taiwanese 
commentators seem to recognise that the freedom to conduct a business has a closer 
relationship with the right to work than the right to property. The importance of this 
view for the present discussion is that the constitutional review criteria adopted should 
therefore be similar to those for the right to work.6 This issue will be discussed 
further later in this section (2.1). 
 
1.2 The Concept of Freedom to Conduct a Business 
                                                 
1 Article 22 of Constitution reads: "All other freedoms and rights of the people that are not detrimental 
to social order or public welfare shall be guaranteed under the Constitution." 
2 See: Lee, H.-T. (1990). "Comments on the Judicial Review of Business Operating Permit and 
Restricitons on Freedom to Conduct a Business."; Chen, H.-m. (1995). The Explanational Notes of the 
Constitution of R.O.C., Hsin-min Chen; Lee, H.-T. (1998). The Family Tree of Right to Work; Huang, 
Y. (2000). "The Meaning and Evolution of Right to Work" The Law Monthly 51(10): 34-55.  
3 The right to work is sometimes comprehended as a "freedom of occupation" in scholarly discussions; 
this is especially true when Grand Justices and scholars are discussing constitutional review criteria, 
see discussion below in 2.1. 
4 Article 15 of the Constitution reads: "The right of existence, the right of work, and the right to 
property shall be guaranteed to the people."    
5 No. 514 Official Interpretation.  
6 Tsai, T.-J. (2006). "The Protection and Limitation of Freedom to Conduct a Business." National 
Taiwan University Law Journal 35(3): 277-321; Lee, C.-L. (2008). "The Thought of Equality in 
Economic Regulations and Comments on the Freedom to Conduct a Business in Official 
Interpretations"; Hsu, C.-h. (2010). "The Constitutionality Review of Occupational Regulation: A 
Commentary to No.649 Official Interpretation ". 
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Although one of the major sources of the freedom to conduct a business originated 
from the right to work, to date, when compared to the many Official Interpretations of 
the right to work,7 there are relatively few Official Interpretations directly related to 
the freedom to conduct a business.8 It is therefore left to scholars and commentators 
to define the meaning and content of the freedom to conduct a business. Most 
Taiwanese scholars and commentators adopt the rationale of German scholars towards 
Article 12 of the German Basic Law to comprehend the right to work and the freedom 
to conduct a business;9 and, according to them, the freedom to conduct a business 
means that the activities of conducting a business should be free from improper 
interference from the State.10 The objectives of such activities should be 
profit-oriented and the relevant activities should be constant and repeating in nature, 
and through the medium of certain properties.11    
 
1.3 The Content of Freedom to Conduct a Business 
It has been pointed out that, unlike the right to work, which comprises individual 
intentions and behaviours, the freedom to conduct a business usually includes many 
elements, such as people, matters (business activities themselves) and objects (land, 
                                                 
7 The Official Interpretations regarding to right to work, include No.404, No.411, No.453, No.462, No. 
491, No.494, No.510, No.514, No. 538, No.545, No. 547, No.584 and No.702.  
8 The only Official Interpretation directly related to the freedom to conduct a business is No.514, see 
discussion below in (2.2). 
9 Article 12 of German Basic Law reads (translated):  
"(1) All Germans shall have the right freely to choose their occupation or profession, their place of 
work and their place of training. The practice of an occupation or profession may be regulated by or 
pursuant to a law. 
(2) No person may be required to perform work of a particular kind except within the framework of 
a traditional duty of community service that applies generally and equally to all. 
(3) Forced labour may be imposed only on persons deprived of their liberty by the judgment of a 
court." 
10 Huang, Y. (2000). "The Meaning and Evolution of Right to Work " The Law Monthly 51(10): 48; 
Dong, B. and J.-p. Fa (2003). New Commentary on Constitution; Tsai, T.-J. (2006). "The Protection 





buildings or the media of business activities) and thus is subject to multi-dimensional 
regulations. These regulated people, matters and objects are in principle under the 
protection of the freedom to conduct a business.12 Thus, according to scholars and 
commentators, the content of the freedom to conduct a business includes: 
a. the freedom to enter and exit an economic market (the starting, stopping and 
maintenance of a business); 
b. the freedom to be active in an economic market; and 
c. the right to request the State to maintain effective competition in the market so 
that all market players enjoy a fair and reasonable competitive status.13 
 
2. Constitutionality Review of Regulatory Measures 
2.1 Constitutionality Review Criteria 
The freedom to conduct a business is a fundamental right and any legislative or 
administrative regulatory measure restricting that right should be subject to a 
constitutional review. The Grand Justices and scholars have not developed an ad hoc 
constitutional review system for the freedom to conduct a business; therefore, any 
review should follow general criteria: a normative review (rule of law) and a 
substantive review. The key issue, however, is what the intensity of such a review 
should be.14 As protection of the freedom to conduct a business originates from the 
right to work and the right to property, the consensus among Taiwanese scholars and 
commentators is that the intensity of constitutional review of regulatory measures 
                                                 
12 Tsai, T.-J. (2006). "The Protection and Limitation of Freedom to Conduct a Business." National 
Taiwan University Law Journal 35(3): 290. 
13 Huang, Y. (2000). "The Meaning and Evolution of Right to Work " The Law Monthly 51(10): 48; 
Tsai, T.-J. (2006). "The Protection and Limitation of Freedom to Conduct a Business." National 
Taiwan University Law Journal 35(3): 293; Hsu, C.-h. (2010). "The Constitutionality Review of 
Occupational Regulation: A Commentary to No.649 Official Interpretation". 
14 For a discussion about constitutional review intensity, see Chapter Four.   
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restricting the freedom to conduct a business should be the same as that for the right 
to work.15 
 
With regard to constitutional review criteria for restrictions upon the right to work, the 
Grand Justices and scholars usually comprehend such a right as "freedom of 
occupation", and so they introduced the "three-stage theory" (Dreistufentheorie), 
which derives from the Apotheken urteil case in the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany,16 to decide restrictions on the freedom of occupation into three 
categories:17 
a. restrictions on the freedom to engage in an occupation; 
b. subjective restrictions on the freedom to choose an occupation; and 
c. objective restrictions on the freedom to choose an occupation. 
 
With regard to the freedom to engage in an occupation, there are no restrictions on 
setting the conditions or eligibility for engaging in an occupation, only on the manner 
in which engagement is restricted. According to the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany, such a restriction is legitimate as long as a reasonable assessment of the 
public interest has been made and the restriction is fit for purpose (Zweckmäßig). The 
intensity of such review, according to Taiwanese scholars, should be a Rational 
Relationship Test.18 However, for the latter two categories – the subjective and 
objective restrictions on the freedom to choose an occupation – the restriction will 
                                                 
15 Lee, H.-T. (1990). "Comments on the Judicial Review of Business Operating Permit and 
Restricitons on Freedom to Conduct a Business"; Tsai, T.-J. (2006). "The Protection and Limitation of 
Freedom to Conduct a Business." National Taiwan University Law Journal 35(3): 292; Hsu, C.-h. 
(2010). "The Constitutionality Review of Occupational Regulation: A Commentary to No.649 Official 
Interpretation".     
16 BVerfGE7377 ff. 
17 The Official Interpretations that applied the three stage theory include No.510, No.584, No.637, 
No.649 and No.655. 
18 See the concurring opinion to No.584 Official Interpretation by Grand Justices Hsu, T.-L. 
 
 216 
only be legitimate when it aims to protect a particularly significant public interest 
(besonders wichtige Gemeinschaftsgut) and such restriction should be inevitable 
(unumgänglich). In subjective restrictions on the freedom to choose an occupation, 
engaging in such an occupation requires eligibility, and such eligibility is subjective, 
i.e. one can work to achieve it. The restriction of such freedom, according to the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, should meet the principle of proportionality. 
Such intensity, as understood by Taiwanese scholars, equates to an Intermediate 
Scrutiny Test. As for objective restrictions on the freedom to choose an occupation, 
engaging in such an occupation requires eligibility, and such eligibility cannot be 
gained via endeavour. A restriction on this freedom is only legitimate when 
compelling public interests are very likely (höchstwahrscheinlich) to be infringed and 
such a restriction absolutely necessary.19 In Taiwanese scholars’ eyes, such intensity 
equates to a Strict Scrutiny Test.20   
 
Following this rationale, Taiwanese scholars and commentators have held that 
restrictions on the freedom to conduct a business should be categorised into: 
restrictions on the freedom to engage in the freedom to conduct a business, subjective 
restrictions of freedom to conduct a business and objective restrictions on the freedom 
to conduct a business. While confusing in terms of language, the scholarly discussions 
end here and do not raise any examples of what constitutes these restrictions. It 
therefore leaves much speculation: 
(1) what is the freedom to engage in the freedom to conduct a business? 
                                                 
19 BVerfGE 7, 405. 
20 Tsai, T.-J. (2006). "The Protection and Limitation of Freedom to Conduct a Business." National 
Taiwan University Law Journal 35(3): 292; Lee, C.-L. (2008). "The Thought of Equality in Economic 
Regulations and Comments on the Freedom to Conduct a Business in Official Interpretations"; Hsu, 




(2) As discussed above, unlike restrictions on the freedom to engage in an occupation, 
restrictions on the freedom to choose an occupation involve the eligibility to 
engage in an occupation, and thus incur the requirement of a significant public 
interest and the inevitability of such restriction. The same can hardly be said of the 
distinction between subjective and objective restrictions on the freedom to 
conduct a business and the so-called "freedom to engage in the freedom to 
conduct a business." 
(3) It is difficult to draw a clear line between the object of the first category of 
restrictions on the right to work, the freedom to engage in an occupation, and the 
freedom to conduct a business. Is it necessary or more sensible further to 
distinguish the restrictions on the freedom to conduct a business into three 
categories and to apply different review intensities than directly to adopt a 
Rational Relationship Test?   
 
Of particular importance to the discussion later in this chapter,21 this thesis holds that 
restrictions on the freedom to conduct a business, as a derivative of the right to work, 
are a kind of economic fundamental right and freedom.22 Such economic fundamental 
rights and freedoms, except for some special considerations (such as the eligibility to 
engage in an occupation, as discussed above), should be subject to a low intensity of 
constitutional review, such as the American Rational Relationship Test or German 
Tenability Control. This stance will be used in Chapter Eleven.    
 
2.2 Official Interpretations concerning the Freedom to Conduct a Business  
                                                 
21 See discussion in Chapter Eleven. 




While the Grand Justices do not always give clear instructions about constitutional 
review criteria, it is essential to look at their Official Interpretations, especially to see 
how the principle of proportionality is applied in real cases. However, as discussed 
earlier in this section, only one Official Interpretation has been directly made of the 
freedom to conduct a business. In Official Interpretation No. 514, the challenged 
regulatory measure was the Arcade Games Business Guidance and Regulation Act 
(now annulled), in which the arcade-game operators should not allow children and 
juveniles under 18 years of age to enter (Article 13(12)), and violators will have their 
permission to operate their business revoked (Article 17(13)). 
 
In their reasoning, the Grand Justices first recognised the freedom to conduct a 
business, by saying:  
 
"The people's freedom to run a business is protected as the right to work and the 
property right under Article 15 of the Constitution. Based on the constitutional 
protection of the right to work, people are free to choose to engage in a certain 
business as their profession. Therefore, people are free to start or end a business 
and determine the office hours, location, customers, and manner of the business. 
Moreover, based on the constitutional protection of the property right, people are 
free to operate a business. For example, people are free to determine the 
manufacture, transaction and disposition of the goods produced by their business."  
 
They went on to say: "According to Article 23 of the Constitution, the content 
regarding the requirements for business permission, the obligations a business should 
obey, and the sanctions imposed for violation of said obligations, as mentioned above, 
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should be regulated under legislative law. If a restriction on a business is authorized 
under legislative law and orders are issued as supplemental regulations, the purpose, 
content, and scope of the authorization should be concrete and definite." 
 
In the present case, the Grand Justices held that Article 13(12) of the Act, besides 
being an obligation on game arcade operators to manage their business, was also "a 
restriction on the people's freedom to choose their customers, which is part of the 
freedom to choose one's profession" and its legal effect on the revocation of 
permission to operate a business is "related to the constitutional protection of the 
people's right to work and property right. Therefore, the regulation governing 
revocation of the permission should be regulated or authorized under legislative law." 
This case was, however, decided on its formality instead of substance, as the Grand 
Justices found that the regulation was necessary for certain purposes, but was issued 
when "relevant law and systems were not fully developed", and "[s]ince the relevant 
issues are regulated under legislative law, the agency in charge should no longer apply 
the order issued without the authorization given by legislative law."23  
 
3. Summary—A Comparison of the Legality and Constitutionality of 
restrictions upon the Freedom to Conduct a Business in the European Union 
and Taiwan 
This and the previous chapter have discussed the legality and constitutionality of 
restrictions on the freedom to conduct a business in the European Union and Taiwan, 
with special attention paid to the review criteria of legality and constitutionality. 
Three main observations can be made with regard to the differences between these 
                                                 
23 Official Interpretation No.514, The Republic of China Constitutional Court Reporter: 





First, it has been heavily debated in the European Union whether the nature of the 
freedom to conduct a business is a general principle or an individually enforceable 
right. In other words, the freedom to conduct a business does not clearly enjoy the 
same status of protection as other rights related to work within the European legal 
framework, such as the freedom of movement for workers. The reason for this is 
possibly because of the close relationship between the freedom to conduct a business 
and the right to property, and therefore should be treated as such. Also, it is not settled 
whether the freedom to conduct a business enjoys the same protection as other rights, 
including the right to property, i.e. should it have to bear wider interference than the 
right to property? On the other hand, the freedom to conduct a business has almost 
never been denied as a constitutional right in Taiwan. Taiwanese scholarly 
discussions emphasise, however, its relationship with the right to work, i.e. the 
freedom to conduct a business originated from the right to work, and many of the 
discussions are an analogue of the latter. One of these features is the emphasis on 
subjective and objective restrictions. This is consistent with examples found in the 
national laws of Member States of the European Union24 but rarely discussed in the 
Union context; this may be due to the differences between a nation and a 
supra-national organisation. 
 
Second, while the reviews in these two jurisdictions follow the same main theme of 
the application of the principle of proportionality, the discussions in Taiwan focus 
mostly on the intensity of review applicable to different types of restrictions, while in 
                                                 
24 See: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2015) "Freedom to Conduct a Business: 
Exploring the Dimensions of a Fundamental Right": 34. 
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the European Courts' jurisprudence much effort is paid to the question of legitimate 
grounds, i.e. what objectives of general interest can be used to restrict the freedom to 
conduct a business, and with respect to what other fundamental rights and freedoms 
can the freedom to conduct a business be used as a counterweight? 
 
Finally, since telecoms forced access mechanisms, as discussed in Chapters Two and 
Three, include a series of obligations such as the control of interconnection fees, the 
requirement of facilities co-location, and the restriction on entering or not entering a 
contract, we can conclude that the telco's freedom to conduct a business will be 






Analysis (1): The European Union 
 
Preface 
This chapter analyses the legality of telecoms forced access mechanisms in the 
European Union. To this end, the discussion in this chapter will apply the 
legality/lawfulness criteria in the jurisprudence of European Courts, to examine the 
three main telecoms forced access mechanisms identified earlier in this thesis 
(Chapter Two), with special consideration given to whether these mechanisms 
excessively restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms, and especially economic 
rights, of the telecoms companies, or telcos, upon which these regulatory mechanisms 
are imposed. 
 
This chapter starts with a discussion of the conditions for judicial review of telecoms 
forced access mechanisms (1). First, I discuss the nature of telecoms forced access 
mechanisms (1.1), and how they are implemented in the European Union (1.2). I then 
discuss an important feature of the underlying economic policy and public interest 
nature of telecoms forced access mechanisms which hinders the application of a 
legality test, i.e. the discretion of the European institutions (1.3). The second section 
of this chapter considers the application of the proportionality test to telecoms forced 
access mechanisms in order to examine their legality (2). This chapter ends with a 
brief conclusion (3). The findings in this chapter will be further analysed, together 
with those reached in next chapter, in Chapter Twelve.   
 
1. Telecoms Forced Access Mechanisms in the European Union 
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1.1 The Nature of Telecoms Forced Access Mechanisms 
Telecoms forced access mechanisms, as specified in Chapters Two and Three, are 
regulatory measures within the telecoms regulatory framework that are designed to 
achieve better access to telecoms networks for other telecoms companies and citizens. 
The telecoms regulatory framework is generally regarded as a form of sector-specific 
(industry) regulation.1 There are several significant differences between 
sector-specific regulation and traditional competition law: e.g. sector-specific 
regulation tends to apply ex-ante to ensure the development of a competitive market 
in the industry, while competition law emphasises ex-post intervention. While this 
thesis has no intention of dealing with these differences, it is important to note that, as 
has been specified in Chapters One Chapter Two, many economic theories, especially 
competition law theories, play important roles in shaping sector-specific regulation, 
not to mention that the prevailing trend of telecoms regulation is moving from 
sector-specific regulation towards competition regulation.2 In this regard, there is no 
doubt that telecoms regulation has an economic policy nature. An example which will 
play an important role later in this chapter is the essential facility doctrine, which is 
derived from economic theories and plays an important role in competition law, but 
has also been adopted frequently in telecoms regulation, such as telecoms forced 
access mechanisms.  
 
On the other hand, telecoms regulation also has the function of offering a public 
service; in other words, the maximization of economic benefits is not always the only 
                                                 
1 See for example: Larouche, P. (2000). Competition law and regulation in European 
telecommunications, Hart Publishing: 442; Geradin, D. and M. Kerf (2003). Controlling market power 
in telecommunications: antitrust vs sector-specific regulation, Oxford University Press. 
2 See, in this regard, Freund, N. and E.-O. Ruhle (2011). "The evolution from sector-specific regulation 




policy goal pursued. Sometimes, telecoms regulatory measures are required to give 
way and consider benefiting all citizens in order to fulfil the concept of a guarantor 
State (Gewährleistungsstaat). The universal service--i.e. the provision of a defined 
minimum set of services to all end-users at an affordable price3--is a legal obligation 
imposed on telcos regardless of the actual costs of providing such services, and is a 
good example of this function. Telecoms forced access mechanisms similarly pursue 
public service goals (see the discussion later in this chapter). In this regard, there is no 
denying that telecoms forced access mechanisms do, by their nature, exist to promote 
public or social interests as well as economic ones. 
 
1.2 Implementing Instruments 
The main legal instruments that formulate the structure and lay down the conditions 
for telecoms forced access mechanisms take the form of regulations and directives. 
These include the Regulation on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop, the Framework 
Directive and the Access Directive. The Commission Recommendation 2000/417/EC 
of 25 May 2000 on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop, while not binding, also 
plays an important role in formulating the regulatory framework for local-loop 
unbundling.4 The many decisions made by the Council and the Commission are 
mostly supplementary to the said regulations and directives, and concern individual 
cases. In this regard, and for the purposes of the discussion in this thesis, this chapter 
focuses on the legality of telecoms forced access legal instruments of a general nature.  
 
1.3 The Relationship between Judicial Review and Legislative Discretion 
1.3.1 Legislative Discretion in the Jurisprudence of European Courts 
                                                 
3 See Recital (4) in the Preamble to the Universal Service Directive. 
4 See discussions in Chapter Two. 
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When considering the legality of telecoms forced access mechanisms, i.e. whether 
they excessively curtail the fundamental rights of telcos, it should be noted that the 
European Courts do not usually move directly to applying a proportionality test to 
review the said mechanisms. Instead, they tend to respect the decisions made by the 
relevant institutions and it is well recognised in the jurisprudence of the European 
Courts that the Union institutions enjoy discretionary power to enact legislation, 
especially in fields that require expertise and consideration of the public interest. As 
noted in Emesa Sugar, where a sugar company sought to challenge a newly adopted 
decision (Decision 97/803/EC) and be treated equally, the Court pointed out: "[t]he 
Court's review must be limited, in particular if the Council has to reconcile divergent 
interests and thus select options within the context of the policy choices which are its 
own responsibility."5 Similarly, in Arnold André, where the Court dealt with the 
lawfulness of a Community Directive (Directive 89/622/EC) that was implemented by 
a Member State to prohibit oral-use tobacco, "the Community legislature must be 
allowed a broad discretion in an area … which entails political, economic and social 
choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. 
Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if 
the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the 
competent institution is seeking to pursue."6 In Germany v Council, where certain 
Member States that produced bananas were concerned that agricultural workers living 
in economically less-favoured regions should be able to dispose of produce of vital 
importance for them, the Court of Justice held that:  
                                                 
5 Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Aruba [2000] E.C.R. I-675, paras. 90 and 91. 
6 C-434/02 Arnold André v Landrat des Kreises Herford [2004] E.C.R. I-11825. See also, to this effect: 
Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council [1996] E.C.R. I-5755, para 58; Case C-233/94 Germany v 
Parliament and Council [1997] E.C.R. I-2405, paras. 55 and 56; Case C-157/96 National Farmers 




"the lawfulness of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the 
measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the 
competent institution is seeking to pursue. More specifically, where the 
Community legislature is obliged, in connection with the adoption of rules, to 
assess their future effects, which cannot be accurately foreseen, its assessment is 
open to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the 
information available to it at the time of the adoption of the rules in question."7  
 
The Court's review is therefore limited in these circumstances, in particular if, in 
establishing a common organization for a market, the Council has to reconcile 
divergent interests and thus select options within the context of policy choices which 
are its own responsibility.8  
 
In short, in cases that involve political and social interests or complex economic 
assessments, the European Courts generally recognise that Union Institutions enjoy 
discretionary power in terms of adopting relevant regulatory measures or making 
economic assessments, unless such adoptions or assessments, at the time when Union 
institutions are making decisions, are manifestly erroneous or inappropriate.  
 
1.3.2 Rationale of (Legislative) Discretion 
Discretion has been defined as the competence of an institution to decide a certain 
issue with the highest authority. The competence of other institutions has to be 
                                                 
7 Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] E.C.R. I-4973. See also Case C-331/88 Fedesa and Others 




recognized and respected by the courts when they exercise their power of judicial 
review. In other words, there is no discretion for a deciding institution if a controlling 
court with higher authority is allowed to decide the same case.9 As mentioned in the 
cases noted above, discretion is generally granted in cases that involve political, 
economic and social choices where institutions have to make complex assessments. 
Fritzsche (2010) further distinguishes four categories where discretion is likely to 
arise: weighing of interests and policies, expert knowledge and expert committees, the 
appraisal of complex economic matters and complex value judgements, but 
understandably the distinctions between these four categories are not always clear and 
they sometimes overlap.10 Telecoms forced access mechanisms, for example, can 
involve all four categories.   
 
Discretion is one aspect of the institutional balance11 which the Court of Justice 
considers to be a legal principle laid down in the Treaty;12 as the Court noted in 
Meroni, when referring to "the balance of powers which is characteristic of the 
institutional structure of the Community".13 The European Courts have also 
repeatedly held that they form part of this institutional balance.14 There is no exact 
source from which the Courts derive this institutional balance. Some have argued that 
                                                 
9 Fritzsche, A. (2010). "Discretion, scope of judicial review and institutional balance in European 
Law." Common Market Law Review 47(2): 363 
10 Ibid: 368. 
11 It is consented that discretion and the separation of powers are linked at the EU level, see for 
example Schermers, H. G. and D. F. Waelbroeck (2001). Judicial protection in the European Union, 
Kluwer Law International: 886 
12 See Case C-138/79, SA Roquette Frères v Council [1980] E.C.R. 3333, para. 33: "the institutional 
balance intended by the Treaty” and Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council [1990] E.C.R. 
I-2041, para. 26:“the institutional balance laid down in the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities". 
13 Case C-9/56, Meroni v High Authority [1957] E.C.R. 133. 
14 See for example Case C-415/85, Commission v Ireland [1988] E.C.R. 3097, paras. 8–9 in which the 
Court held that due to the balance of powers established by the Treaty, it could not decide whether such 
an action is brought for proper motives. 
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discretion, according to Article 7(1) EC (now contained in Art. 13(2) TEU) which 
states that: "[e]ach institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon 
it by this Treaty", is the basic rule,15 while others regard it as a general principle of 
Community law rooted in the doctrine of the separation of powers, as recognised by 
the constitutions of Member States,16 despite the Union’s institutional structure not 
being quite the same as the separate legislative, executive and judicial powers of 
Member States. For example, the Commission has legislative,17 administrative,18 
executive19 and judicial powers.20  
 
1.3.3 Manifest Error 
As discussed above, the European Courts have reiterated that the discretionary powers 
of other Union institutes should be respected, and the lawfulness of measures adopted 
by Union institutions can be challenged only if the assessments made by Union 
institutions are manifestly erroneous, or the measures adopted are manifestly 
inappropriate regarding achieving the objectives intended, as such errors fall within 
the scope of Article 263(2) of the TFEU as an "infringement of the Treaty or any rule 
of law relating to its application".21 It is therefore crucial to know how much latitude 
there is, or what may constitute a manifest error.  
 
                                                 
15 E.g. Hilf, Die Organisationsstruktur der Europaischen Gemeinschaften: rechtliche 
Gestaltungsmoglichkeiten und Grenzen (Springer, Berlin u.a., 1982), cited from Fritzsche (2010), 
supra n 9: 384. 
16 Bernhardt, Verfassungsprinzipie – Verfassungsgerichtsfunktionen – Verfassungsprozessrechtim 
EWG-Vertrag (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1987) cited from Fritzsche (2010), supra n 9: 385. 
See also Case C-159/96 Republic v Commission [1998] E.C.R. I-7379, para. 72: "a general rule of 
law". 
17 Article 17(2) TEU. 
18 Article 17(1) TEU. 
19 Craig, P. and G. de Búrca (2015). EU law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford University Press: 37 
20 Article 17(1) TEU and Article 258TFEU 
21 Fritzsche (2010), supra n 9: 398 
 
 230 
According to Legal (2000), discretion lies within the freedom of choice afforded by 
the economic methodology to be applied and in the global determination reached on 
the basis of this methodology; the latter applies as long as it is not contradicted by 
facts and not obviously contrary to accepted methods of economic reasoning.22 Thus, 
the adoption of a methodology that is contradicted by facts or which is obviously 
contrary to accepted methods of economic reasoning should be regarded as manifestly 
erroneous. The former President of the Court of First Instance, Vesterdorf, gave a 
further explanation that the role of the General Court is to check whether the 
Commission has "clearly overlooked, underestimated, or exaggerated the relevant 
economic data, drawn unconvincing, in the sense of implausible, direct inferences 
from primary material facts or adopted an erroneous approach to assessing the 
material facts", and in the absence of such errors, the Court should uphold a 
decision.23   
 
A more innovative and rather aggressive approach to analyzing what constitutes a 
manifest error has been taken. In Tetra Laval, one of the grounds for appeal 
concerned the scope and nature of the judicial review carried out by the Court of First 
Instance in the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano. Advocate General Tizzano also 
proposed his own standard after examining a Court of Justice case, Kali and Salz.24 
First, he distinguished the Courts’ tasks into finding out facts and making complex 
economic assessments; regarding the former, "the issue is to verify objectively and 
materially the accuracy of certain facts and the correctness of the conclusions drawn 
                                                 
22 See Legal, H. (2006). Standards of proof and standards of judicial review in EU competition law. 
Annual Proceedings-Forham Corporate Law Institute, Kluwer Academic Publishers: 115. 
23 See: Vesterdorf, B. (2005). "Judicial Review in EC competition law: Reflections on the role of the 
Community Courts in the EC system of competition law enforcement." CPI Journal 1: 32. 
24 Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, France and Others v Commission [1998] E.C.R. I-1375. 
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in order to establish whether certain known facts make it possible to prove the 
existence of other facts to be ascertained".25 As for complex economic assessments, 
he admitted that "review by the Community judicature is necessarily more limited, 
since the latter has to respect the broad discretion inherent in that kind of assessment 
and may not substitute its own point of view for that of the body which is 
institutionally responsible for making those assessments",26 but the Courts can still 
review:  
 
"whether the Commission undertook a thorough and painstaking investigation, and 
in particular whether it carefully inquired into and took sufficiently into 
consideration all the relevant factors; and whether the various passages in the 
reasoning developed by the Commission in order to arrive at its conclusions in 
respect of the compatibility or otherwise of a concentration with the common 
market satisfy requirements of logic, coherence and appropriateness".27  
 
It should be noted that, in the same case, the Court of Justice, on the other hand, 
engaged in rather conservative and traditional reasoning, stating:  
 
"Whilst the Court recognises that the Commission has a margin of discretion with 
regard to economic matters, that does not mean that the Community Courts must 
refrain from reviewing the Commission's interpretation of information of an economic 
nature. Not only must the Community Courts, inter alia, establish whether the 
evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that 
                                                 
25 See Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] 
E.C.R. I-987, para. 86. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid, para. 88.  
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evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to 
assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions 
drawn from it."28  
 
The opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, while being very detailed in its reasoning, 
has been criticised as far-reaching29 and going somehow against the Courts' 
traditionally conservative attitude. From the discussion above, we can conclude that, 
generally, a manifest error has been made when a Union Institution has: 
a) adopted a methodology that is contradicted by the facts or obviously contrary to 
accepted methods of economic reasoning; or 
b) clearly overlooked, underestimated or exaggerated relevant economic data, drawn 
unconvincing, in the sense of implausible, direct inferences from primary material 
facts or adopted an erroneous approach to assessing material facts. 
 
1.3.4 Legislative Discretion in Cases Involving Fundamental Rights 
As discussed above, it is generally recognized in Court of Justice jurisprudence that 
the Union legislature must be allowed broad discretion in an area which involves 
complex political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called on 
to undertake complex assessments. Only if a measure adopted in this field is 
manifestly inappropriate in relation to an objective which competent institutions are 
seeking to pursue can the lawfulness of such a measure be affected. It should, 
however, be noted that, in some recent cases with regard to the protection of 
fundamental rights, especially the right to privacy, the Court of Justice started to 
increase the intensity of its scrutiny. Amongst these cases, one of the most notable is 
                                                 
28 Ibid, para. 39. 
29 Fritzsche (2010), supra n 9: 400. 
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Digital Rights Ireland, in which the Court of Justice introduced the rationale of 
ECtHR case law, and held that if an important fundamental right is involved, even in 
expert knowledge areas, the said discretionary power should be more limited.30 While 
it is not rare for the Court of Justice to "borrow" a rationale from the ECtHR in human 
rights cases, it is the first time it has clearly applied the analogy of the latter to limit 
the scope of legislative discretion and engaged in a substantive proportionality review. 
This innovative case is therefore worth further in-depth analysis.  
 
The Union legislation challenged was Directive 2006/24/EC, which requires 
telephone communication service providers to retain traffic and location data relating 
to them for a period specified by law in order to prevent, detect, investigate and 
prosecute crimes and safeguard the security of the State. Particular issues were 
whether the Directive was compatible with: the right of citizens to move and reside 
freely within the territories of Member States as laid down in Article 21 TFEU; the 
right to privacy as laid down in Article 7 CFR and Article 8 ECHR; the right to 
freedom of expression as laid down in Article 11 CFR and Article 10 ECHR; and the 
right to good administration as laid down in Article 41 CFR.31  
 
In this regard, the Court of Justice first reviewed settled case law and explained that 
the principle of proportionality requires that the acts of EU institutions are appropriate 
for attaining legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do not 
                                                 
30 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications, Marine 
and Natural Resources [2014] OJ C 175/6. 
31 Ibid, para. 18. 
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exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve those 
objectives.32  
 
Unlike settled case law that respects the Union's legislative discretion, however, the 
Court of Justice in Digital Rights Ireland used an analogy with the ECtHR case of 
Marper in which the ECtHR stated:  
 
"A margin of appreciation must be left to the competent national authorities in this 
assessment. The breadth of this margin varies and depends on a number of factors, 
including the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the 
individual, the nature of the interference and the object pursued by the interference. 
The margin will tend to be narrower where the right at stake is crucial to the 
individual's effective enjoyment of intimate or key rights … Where a particularly 
important facet of an individual's existence or identity is at stake, the margin 
allowed to the State will be restricted… ."33  
 
The Court of Justice therefore stated that where interference with fundamental rights 
is an issue, the extent of the EU legislature's discretion may prove to be limited, 
depending on a number of factors, including, in particular: the area concerned; the 
nature of the right at issue guaranteed by the CFR; the nature and seriousness of the 
interference; and the object pursued by the interference.34 The Court of Justice further 
specified that, in view of the important role played by the protection of personal data 
in light of the fundamental right to respect private life and the extent and seriousness 
                                                 
32 Ibid, para. 46. 
33 Marper v the United Kingdom (2008), App no. 30562/04, 30566/04, ECHR 1581. 
34 Supra n 30: 47. 
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of the interference with that right caused by Directive 2006/24, the EU legislature's 
discretion is reduced, with the result that any review of that discretion should be 
strict.35 
 
The Court of Justice then applied a proportionality test and found that the retention of 
such data may be considered to be appropriate for attaining an objective pursued by the 
Directive.36 However, the Court of Justice went on to examine the safeguards put in 
place to restrict interference with the right of privacy and the protection of personal data. 
It again drew an analogy with other ECtHR cases37 and emphasised that the EU 
legislation in question must lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope and 
application of the measure in question, and impose minimum safeguards so that persons 
whose data have been retained have sufficient guarantees to protect their personal data 
effectively against the risk of abuse and any unlawful access to and use of those data.38  
 
After a careful examination, the Court of Justice pointed out that Directive 2006/24 
entailed wide-ranging and particularly serious interference with those fundamental 
rights within the legal order of the EU, but without such interference being precisely 
circumscribed by provisions to ensure that it is actually limited to what is strictly 
necessary. Moreover, as for concerns about the rules relating to the security and 
protection of data retained by network providers, it held that Directive 2006/24 did not 
provide sufficient safeguards, as required by Article 8 of the Charter, to ensure effective 
protection of data retained against the risk of abuse and any unlawful access to and use 
                                                 
35 Supra n 30: 48. 
36 Supra n 30: 49. 
37 Liberty and Others v the United Kingdom (2008) App no. 58243/00, 28 ECHR 16; Rotaru v Romania 
(2000) App no. 28341/95, ECHR 2000-V. 
38 Supra n 30: 54. 
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of that data. The Court of Justice concluded that, in this case, Directive 2006/24 failed 
to lay down clear and precise rules governing the extent of the interference with the 
fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. 
Similarly, in Google Spain,39 where the Court of Justice dealt with whether the 
processing of personal data by Internet search engines derogated the privacy and 
personal data-protection regime in the European Union, most notably Articles 7 and 8 
of the CFR and Directive 95/46/EC,40 despite being a case involving technology and 
special industry, the Court of Justice engaged in a thorough investigation of possible 
fundamental rights infringements.  
 
The Court of Justice pointed out the potential seriousness of interference with 
fundamental rights, which cannot be justified merely by the economic interest which 
the operator of such an engine has, there are also the effects of the removal of links 
from the list of results on the legitimate interests of Internet users potentially 
interested in having access to that information, and so a fair balance should be sought. 
The Court of Justice further stated that the balance in specific cases may depend on 
the nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s 
private life and on the interest of the public in having that information, which may 
vary according to the role played by the data subject in public life.41  
 
Another case that shows the increasing intensity of the scrutiny of fundamental rights 
                                                 
39 Case C-131/12, Google Spain v AEPD [2014] OJ C 165/11. 
40 Council Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 OJ L 281/31. 
41 Google Spain, supra n 39, para. 81. 
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by the Court of Justice is Schrems.42 In this case, a social network (Facebook) user in 
Ireland contested his personal data being transferred to Facebook Ireland’s parent 
company in the United States, which he contended does not provide protection of 
personal data equivalent to that in the European regime, also as in Articles 7 and 8 of 
the CFR and Directive 95/46/EC. Specifically, he contested whether the validity of a 
Commission Decision43 under which this personal-data transfer is practised is 
legitimate. 
 
Drawing on the spirit of more intense scrutiny of the protection of privacy and 
personal date from Digital Rights Ireland, the Court of Justice engaged in a careful 
examination of whether the Decision at issue derogates Articles 7 and 8 of the CFR. 
As such, the Court of Justice found that the Decision does not contain any limit on 
such interference, nor does it refer to the existence of any effective legal protection 
against interference of that kind44; further, the Decision denies the national 
supervisory authorities the powers that derive from Directive 95/46/EC, whereby a 
person, in bringing a claim under that provision, may put forward matters calling into 
question what a Commission decision has found.45 The Court of Justice thus found 
the Decision at issue does not render sufficient guarantees to protect personal data 
effectively against the risk of unlawful access, use and abuse.  
 
Similarly, in the aforementioned Sky Österreich, while recognising a broad 
intervention should be borne to freedom to conduct a business, the Court of Justice 
                                                 
42 Case C-362/14, Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, [2015] OJ C 398/5. 
43 Commission Decision No. 2000/520/EC, [2000] OJ L 215/7. 
44 Schrems, supra n 42, para. 88. 
45 Ibid, para. 102. 
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still engaged a detailed substantive review.46 
 
These cases, led by Digital Rights Ireland, have made way for an intense judicial 
review of cases involving fundamental rights, which no doubt conforms to the trend 
of fundamental rights protection in the European Union, but at the same time they also 
raise several questions. First, these cases specifically concern the important role 
played by the protection of personal data in light of the fundamental right to respect 
for private life. It leads to speculation as to whether the Court of Justice attaches more 
importance to the protection of private life than to other fundamental rights, such as 
the economic rights targeted by this thesis. Since these cases are just the inception of 
the application of an intensive, or at least a substantive, review of cases in 
sector-specific or specialised industries, it will be intriguing to see the development of 
the Court’s attitude in future cases.  
  
Second, cases like Digital Rights Ireland drew an analogy with Marper, which is 
concerned with the margin of appreciation of authorities in Member States when 
implementing Union policies. This margin of appreciation, while similar to the 
character of discretion, has a different legal source from the latter. The term "margin 
of discretion" finds its EU origins in Article 33(1) of the ECSC Treaty:  
 
"[t]he Court of Justice may not ... examine the evaluation of the situation, resulting 
from economic facts or circumstances, in the light of which the Commission took 
its decisions or made its recommendations, save where the Commission is alleged 
to have misused its powers or to have manifestly failed to observe the provisions of 
                                                 
46 See discussions in Chapter Six. 
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this Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application".  
 
The ECtHR uses the concept of this term to determine whether a Member State of the 
ECHR has breached the Convention.47 Caution, therefore, should be taken in direct 
application of the analogy, of one case to another. 
 
Lastly, if we apply the analogy with Marper and consider the nature of the right at 
issue, the nature and seriousness of the interference and the object pursued by the 
interference, it is similar to the general practice of the Court of Justice's application of 
a proportionality test. In other words, via such an analogy, the Court's limited review 
will turn into a fuller one, and legislative discretion is similar to being abandoned. Is 
this really the intention of the Court of Justice? 
 
2. The Legality of Telecoms Forced Access Mechanism in the European Union 
In this section, I will discuss the legality of telecoms forced access mechanisms in the 
European Union. It has been noted that the proportionality of the restriction on the 
right to property and the freedom to conduct a business must be verified in the light of 
the wide margin of discretion conferred on the Union legislature,48 and the Courts 
generally respect the decisions of the legislative departments without engaging in a 
substantive review. The latest cases such as Digital Rights Ireland, however, has 
indicated that when important fundamental rights are involved, a full or classical 
proportionality test is not just possible but necessary. In other words, cases that used 
to be "beyond" the Courts' scrutiny may now and in the future be subject to a full 
                                                 
47 See discussions in Chapter Six. 
48 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Case C-283/11, Sky Österreich v Österreichischer Rundfunk 





Here, this thesis will apply the classic full review, while the legislative discretion 
mentioned above will be temporarily "ignored", for several reasons: 
(1) first, these telecoms forced access mechanisms have seldom been subject to 
substantive review. If in the future the European Courts' jurisprudence follows 
the rationale of Digital Rights Ireland, the analysis conducted in this research 
can serve as a reference; and 
(2) from a practical perspective, before cases were brought to the Court, the Court 
has no way to "filter" cases involving important fundamental rights from those 
that do not, before really investigating the case. In other words, the decision of 
whether a light-touch approach should be adopted is actually formulated at the 
same time as when the Court is reviewing the case. The methodology proposed 
here is actually not much different from the Court's actual review process. 
 
In the first part (3.1), the fundamental rights and freedoms of the telcos that will be 
affected by the imposition of telecoms forced access mechanisms will be identified. 
As noted in the previous chapter, however, fundamental rights and freedoms are not 
absolute but should be considered along with their social function and balanced with 
other fundamental rights and interests; in the second part (3.2), a proportionality test 
will be applied, along with consideration of other fundamental rights and interests in 




It should be noted that, the Court of Justice sometimes applies a "simplified" 
proportionality test in its jurisprudence,49 such as the narration requiring that "acts of 
the EU institutions be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by 
the legislation at issue and do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and 
necessary in order to achieve those objectives",50 and sometimes only one criterion 
for a proportionality test is taken into consideration. In this thesis, however, a classical 
proportionality test will be applied, i.e. whether the regulatory measure has legitimate 
aims, whether the requirements of suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto 
sensu are met, and whether the regulatory measure respects the essence of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms that will be used to examine the legality of these 
telecoms forced access mechanisms.  
 
In addition, the ECHR provisions and the ECtHR case law will also be considered, 
due to respect given thereto in the CFR. Since the Treaty of Lisbon took effect on 1 
December 2009, the European Union has been expected to sign the ECHR.51 This 
would mean that not only are Union institutions subject to external monitoring of their 
compliance with fundamental rights, and cases against the Union directly or indirectly 
concerned with Community law can be brought to the ECtHR,52 but the Court of 
Justice is also bound by judicial precedents in ECtHR case law.53 In this regard, the 
                                                 
49 As noted by Peers et al. (2014) the elements of proportionality test are difficult to separate in 
practice, and the case law often makes no clear attempt to separate them. See: Peers, S., T. Hervey, et al. 
(2014). The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a commentary, Bloomsbury Publishing: 1480. 
50 See for example joined Cases C-581/10 and C-629/10 Nelson and Others [2012) OJ C 399/3; Case 
C-283/11, Sky Österreich v Österreichischer Rundfunk [2013] OJ C 269/25, para. 29. 
51 Article 6(2) TEU: The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined 
in the Treaties. 
52 Juncker, J.-C. (2006) "A Sole Ambition for the European Continent". 
53 It should however be noted that, in December 2014, the Court of Justice issued a negative opinion 
on the European Union's accession to the ECHR, see Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice. See Peers et 
al. (2014) supra n 49: 1456. 
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reasoning of the ECtHR will be taken into consideration where appropriate in this 
chapter, and an example of the national practice of a Member State for each of the 
telecoms forced access mechanisms will be discussed in this chapter (see Sections 
3.2.1.2, 3.2.2.2 and 3.2.3.2), not just for this purpose but also to avoid the discussion 
being too abstract.54   
 
2.1 Fundamental Rights and Freedoms Involved 
2.1.1 Interconnection 
As specified in Chapter Two, interconnection refers to the physical (traditional public 
switched telephone networks, PSTNs) and logical (Internet) linkage of the public 
communications networks of two or more telcos in order to enable the customers of 
these different telcos to communicate with each other, or to access services provided 
by other telcos. While the telcos still retain ownership of the said networks, and 
remain free to dispose of them or put them to other uses which are not prohibited, they 
are obliged to let such networks be linked to other telcos. Their rights to use such 
networks, as protected under Article 17(1) CFR and Article 1(2) of the First Protocol 
to the ECHR – control over the use of property – are therefore affected, as the concept 
of control of the use of property is understood to mean a measure which, whilst not 
entailing transfer of ownership, seeks to "limit or control" the use of property.55  
 
Likewise, as interconnection imposes a burden on telcos' freedom to exercise 
commercial activities, i.e. to use their own networks freely without interference, this 
                                                 
54 The Court of Justice can, at the request of courts or tribunals of the Member States, give preliminary 
rulings on the interpretation of Union law or the validity of acts adopted by the institutions (Article 19 
(3) b), while the ECtHR has expressed its concerns that it must in proceedings originating in an 
individual application, confine its attention, as far as possible, to the concrete case. See: Ashingdane v 
United Kingdom (1985) App no. 8225/78, 7 EHRR 528, para. 59. 
55 See Sporrong & Lönnroth v Sweden (1982) App no. 7151/75; 7152/75, ECHR 5. para. 44.  
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mechanism should be regarded as a limitation on telcos' freedom to conduct their 
business, as those telcos can no longer freely decide with which bodies they may wish 
to enter into an agreement.56   
 
2.1.2 Local Loop Unbundling 
As for local-loop unbundling, as noted in Chapter Two, there are three types of 
local-loop unbundling within the EU's telecoms regulatory. These different types of 
local-loop unbundling involve different uses of the networks and facilities in the local 
loops. In full unbundling, for example, metallic cable pairs are leased to another telco 
for their exclusive use. The lessee (competing telco) has full control of the said 
networks and is in a direct relationship with the customers for the telecoms services 
provided by those networks. In line-sharing, while the local loop is used by both the 
incumbent telco and the competing telco, the competing telco is actually using the 
high frequency spectrum of the metallic cables that is available via XDSL technology 
(see below Figure 10.1). And as for sub-loop unbundling, the competing telco puts its 
own device into the incumbent’s street cabinet and connects it to their own backhaul 
network. 
 
                                                 




(Figures 10.1 The layered model of telecommunications and information service provision. Source: 
Vogelsang, I. and B. M. Mitchell (1997). Telecommunications Competition: The Last Ten Miles, MIT 
Press (MA): 11. Here the high frequency spectrum is the at the second layer from the bottom) 
 
In either type of local-loop unbundling, the incumbent telco is required to bear a 
burden attached to its property. This burden can either be shared use of the metallic 
cables (full unbundling), allowing the high frequency spectrum available on its 
metallic cables to be used by others (line-sharing) or accepting the co-location of 
another telco's device in its own facility (sub-loop unbundling). While these 
obligations make it more difficult for the incumbent to use, sell, donate and otherwise 
deal with its property, it is still entitled and able to do so and thus this does not 
constitute a deprivation of property;57 however, such obligations apparently amount 
to control over the use of property as understood in Article 1(2) of the First Protocol 
                                                 
57 See: Sporrong, supra n 55, para. 62. 
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to the ECHR and the use of property as understood in Article 17(1) of the CFR. 
Similar to the situation with interconnection, local-loop unbundling does constitute 
interference with the incumbent telco's freedom to conduct its business, as the free use 
of its local loop network is a right inherent in the carrying on of its economic or 
commercial activities.58  
 
2.1.3 Separation 
As discussed in Chapter Two, in economic theory, there can be several different 
models of separation, from the least intense accounting separation, through 
intermediate functional separation, to the most demanding type, ownership 
separation.59 These different models may involve different fundamental rights and 
freedoms. Accounting separation, for example, requires telcos to separate their 
accounting systems in order to satisfy transparency requirements and further facilitate 
other regulatory measures, such as price control and interconnection, which require 
cost-oriented pricing. As accounting separation affects telcos' freedom to engage in 
commercial activities, it is in essence a limitation on their freedom to conduct their 
business. However, this regulatory measure does not require any network facility or 
asset to be accessed by others, and thus it is not a telecoms forced access measure of a 
type that this thesis intends to target.  
 
Other separation models, such as functional separation and ownership separation, are, 
on the other hand, typical telecoms forced access mechanisms, and they may affect 
telcos' right to property and freedom to conduct their business. Functional separation, 
as discussed in Chapter Two, refers to the separation of the access network department 
                                                 
58 Case C-230/78, Eridania v Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry [1979] E.C.R. 2749, para. 20. 
59 See discussions in Chapters Two and Three. 
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of a telco—usually the incumbent telco—into an independent unit, so that these 
access networks may be equally accessed by the incumbent and competing telcos. At 
the same time, the application of functional separation is usually accompanied by a 
series of supplementary arrangements, such as transparency of information and 
costs,60 and the setting up of a Chinese wall,61 i.e. an information barrier within an 
organization that is erected in order to prevent the exchange or communication of 
information. While the ownership of access networks is not changed, the incumbent 
telco is obliged to accept limits on the use of said property: e.g. networks should be 
made into independent units equally accessed by other telcos. At the same time, while 
blocking the communication of information between the network department and 
other departments does not really affect the use of the networks, it can be regarded as 
interference in the peaceful enjoyment of the said property. In this regard, functional 
separation restricts the incumbent telco's right to property (Article 17(1) of the CFR 
and Article 1(1) and (2) of the First Protocol to the ECHR). It should also be noted 
that, as functional separation can come with different arrangements for network 
access, if such arrangements are so intensive as to affect the incumbent telco’s rights 
to use or even sell their property, they can be considered to be a deprivation of 
possessions, and then such functional separation arrangements should be regarded as 
de facto expropriation (Article 1(1) of the First Protocol to the ECHR).62 At the same 
time, without doubt, such intense interference with the use of property that plays an 
important role in a telco's operation of its business, i.e. providing telecoms services, 
will also constitute interference with the telco's freedom to engage in commercial 
                                                 
60 See for example (the functional separation of British Telecom), Ofcom. "Final statements on the 
Strategic Review of Telecommunications, and undertakings in lieu of a reference under the Enterprise 
Act 2002. 
61 Ibid. 





The much more intrusive ownership separation, as the name suggests, requires more 
than an independent unit within the incumbent telco, as a further step is needed: i.e. 
splitting up networks by changing their ownership away from only the incumbent 
telco. There can be different arrangements for splitting networks. Two of the most 
common arrangements are: 
  
(1) establishing a separate company to operate on its own as a network company. 
There are two kinds of further arrangements for this: a separate network 
department may be made into:  
a) a company owning the local access network and providing wholesale access 
to service providers; or  
b) another company providing retail services;63 and  
 
(2) being expropriated by the government and subsumed into a public network 
department or company.64  
 
In either case, there is no doubt that ownership separation constitutes a prima facie 
deprivation of property. Likewise, such intense interference with the use of telecoms 
networks that play an important role in the incumbent telco's operation of its business 
will also constitute interference with the telco's freedom to engage in commercial 
                                                 
63 See: "BEREC Guidance on Functional Separation - Annex I, Functional Separation in Practice: EU 
Experiences." Available at: http://berec.europa.eu/files/documents/bor_10_44Rev1b.pdf: 5(accessed 
April 2016). 




activity.   
 
2.2  Analysis of Telecoms Forced Access Mechanisms 
The European Courts generally apply a proportionality test to examine the legality of 
a Union regulatory measure,65 and this is also true when a case concerns fundamental 
rights.66 As discussed in Chapter Four, it has been reiterated in the jurisprudence of 
the European Courts that fundamental rights and freedoms are not absolute but should 
be considered in relation to their social function67 and balanced with other rights and 
the public interest recognised by the European Union,68 including the objectives 
mentioned in Article 3 TEU and other interests protected by specific provisions of the 
Treaties, such as Article 4(1) TEU and Articles 35 (3), 36 and 346 of the TFEU.69 
Accordingly, the fundamental rights and freedoms concerned play an important role in 
the European courts' application of a proportionality test when considering whether a 
balance has been struck between the public or social interests that a regulatory 
measure aims to achieve and the fundamental rights and freedoms that the said 
regulatory measure restricts. In other words, for a legislative restriction of 
fundamental rights and freedoms to be legal, a regulatory measure should have 
legitimate aims, be suitable for and necessary to achieve its objectives, and be 
proportionate to the objectives to fulfil the requirement of a proportionality test, and it 
                                                 
65 Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (Protocol No. 2 
annexed to the TEU) and Article 5(4) of that Treaty. 
66 Article 52(1) CFR: "Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they 
are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others." 
67 Case C-5/88 Wachauf v Germany [1989] E.C.R. 2609, Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik v Music 
Point Hokamp [1998] E.C.R. I-1953, para. 21 and Joined Cases C-184/02 and C-223/02, Spain and 
Finland v European Parliament and Council [2004] E.C.R. I-1789, para. 52. 
68 Article 52 (1) CFR. 
69 Peers et al. (2014) supra n 49: 1455. 
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should also respect the essence of fundamental rights and freedoms.70 It should be 
noted that while a classic proportionality test involves a four-step analysis--legitimate 
aims, suitability (appropriateness), necessity and proportionality stricto sensu71--in 
reality these four steps are often not clearly distinguished under Court of Justice 
jurisprudence. In some cases, the Court of Justice applies a "simplified" principle of 
proportionality by stating the principle that "measures implemented by acts of the 
European Union are appropriate for attaining the objective pursued and do not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve it",72 "measures adopted by Community 
institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to 
attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question"73 or that the 
said measure is "appropriate and necessary as regards its intended objective".74 For 
the purpose of discussion, however, this chapter will apply a classic four-step analysis. 
 
The principle of proportionality is also respected by ECtHR case law. When a 
regulatory measure concerns the right to property, one of the main targets of this 
thesis, while the reasoning may not be the exactly the same, as specified in Chapter 
Six, the ECtHR also emphsises that it should observe the principle of proportionality. 
As noted in James: "[n]ot only must a measure depriving a person of his property 
pursue, on the facts as well as in principle, a legitimate aim ‘in the public interest', but 
there must also be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
                                                 
70 Supra n 68. 
71 Barak, A. (2012). Proportionality: constitutional rights and their limitations, Cambridge University 
Press. 
72 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker and Schecke v Land Hessen [2010) E.C.R.-I 11063, paras. 
72 – 86. 
73 Case C-189/01 and Case C-189/01, Jippes and Others v Minister van Landbouw [2001] E.C.R. 
I-5689, para. 81. 
74 Sky Österreich supra n 50, paras. 45–66. 
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employed and the aim sought to be realized."75 Also, in Ashingdane, the ECtHR 
states that "… a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) if it 
does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved".76 




2.2.1.1 Proportionality Test 
A. Legitimate Aims 
The first criterion for an interconnection to be legitimate is that it should have 
legitimate aims or policy objectives. According to Article 52(1) CFR, the objective of 
a regulatory measure is legitimate if it serves the public good or the protection of 
rights and freedoms of other persons.77 The legitimate aims and policy objectives of 
interconnection are best explained in the preamble to Council Directive 97/33/EC (the 
Interconnection Directive), which states that ensuring the "interconnection of public 
networks and, in the future competitive environment, interconnection between 
different national and Community operators" is to "promote Community-wide 
telecommunications services" (Recital 1) and, at the same time, "a general framework 
for interconnection to public telecommunications networks and publicly available 
telecommunications services, irrespective of the supporting technologies employed, is 
needed in order to provide end-to-end interoperability of services for Community 
users" (Recital 2). These policy objectives are in line with the provisions in Article 
                                                 
75 James v United Kingdom (1986) App no.8793/79, ECHR 2, para. 50. 
76 Ashingdane v United Kingdom  (1985) App no.8225/78, ECHR 8, para. 57. 
77 Joined Cases C-184/02 and C-223/02, Spain and Finland v Parliament and Council [2004] E.C.R. 
I-7789, para. 53.  
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100a of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC, now 
Article 114 (1) TFEU), in that the Council should adopt measures approximating the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
which have as their object the establishing and functioning of the internal market and 
ensuring the free movement of services as stipulated in Article 8a TEEC78 (now 
Article 21(1) TFEU), and thus should be regarded as legitimate.   
 
B. Suitability (appropriateness) 
Suitability, plainly put, means that a regulatory measure at issue fits the purpose that 
the said measure was designed to fulfil. The requirement is that the regulatory 
measure can realise or advance the underlying purpose of the legislation, and the use 
of such a regulatory measure would rationally lead to the realisation of the 
legislation’s purpose.79 
 
There are several considerations regarding the suitability of a regulatory measure. 
First, the measure chosen does not have to be the only one capable of realising the 
legislation’s objectives,80 and there may be cases where several means are used, and 
all are considered as having a rational connection to the objectives.81 Second, there is 
no requirement for the regulatory measure chosen fully to realise its objectives; a 
partial realisation will meet this requirement.82 It also does not matter whether other 
more proper means exist – this should rather be considered in relation to the latter 
necessity criterion. Third, the examination of suitability should be continuous: i.e. this 
                                                 
78 For reference, see the preamble to the Open Network Directive. 
79 Barak (2012) supra n 71: 303. 
80 Emiliou, N. (1996). The principle of proportionality in European law: a comparative study, Kluwer 
Law Intl: 28. 




requirement must be met both during the enactment of legislation and during judicial 
review.83 
 
In the present case, the policy objectives of interconnection, as discussed above, are to 
promote EU-wide telecoms services by ensuring the interconnection of telecoms 
networks, and to provide end-to-end interoperability of services for EU users. Indeed, 
in examining the provisions for interconnection in the Open Network Directive and 
the Interconnection Directive, while interconnection, together with the obligations 
imposed (such as the obligation to negotiate84 and the harmonisation of technical 
interfaces and/or service features)85 it may not be the only measure to achieve the 
objectives and may or may not fully realise them, there can be no doubt about that the 
objectives are those of which it is aiming. This criterion therefore should be regarded 
as met.   
 
C. Necessity 
Necessity, as a sub-discipline of the principle of proportionality, means the least 
restrictive means. To meet the requirement of necessity, the legislator has to choose 
the least restrictive amongst all the regulatory measures that are suitable for achieving 
its policy objectives. As noted in Fedesa, the criterion of necessity means that where 
there is a choice between several appropriate measures to achieve the aim pursued, it 
must be the least onerous and disadvantageous one.86 Also, in Volker & Schecke, the 
Court of Justice noted that Union Institutions should consider whether their objectives 
could be met by a method involving less interference with fundamental rights, and the 
                                                 
83 Ibid: 312. 
84 Article 4 Interconnection Directive. 
85 Recital (2) in Annex II to the Open Network Directive. 
86 Case C-331/88, R v MAFF ex parte Fedesa [1990] E.C.R. I-4023. See also: Jippes, supra n 73. 
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requirement of necessity is not satisfied if it is possible to envisage measures which 
affect fundamental rights less adversely yet still contribute effectively to the 
objectives of the regulatory measure in question.87 It should be noted that 
effectiveness is to be considered at the same time as the extent of onerousness. The 
Court of Justice does not prefer a less onerous measure if that measure would not have 
achieved the intended objective as effectively.88   
 
Barak (2012) cites Pulido (2007) and proposes two elements to be included in a 
necessity test. The first is the existence of hypothetical alternative measures that can 
advance the objectives of the regulatory measure as well as, or better than, the 
measure adopted. The second is that hypothetical alternative measures limit the 
fundamental rights and freedoms less than the regulatory measure at issue. There is no 
necessity in the regulatory measure at issue if these two requirements are satisfied.89 
Compared to the other criteria for a proportionality test which are inherently rather 
abstract in their nature--"have legitimate aims", "fit for purpose" (suitability), 
"proportionate" (proportionality stricto sensu, see discussion below) and "respecting 
the essence of the rights--the requirement of necessity allows the least leeway for the 
regulatory measure adopted. The criterion of necessity, like suitability, should be met 
both during the time of enactment of legislation and during judicial review.90 
 
In the case of interconnection, in order to achieve the policy objectives – to promote 
EU-wide telecoms services and provide end-to-end interoperability of services for EU 
users – it is not just a matter of choosing the most direct and least disadvantageous 
                                                 
87 Schecke, supra n 72, paras. 72-86. 
88 Sky Österreich supra n 50, paras. 55, 57. 
89 Barak (2012) supra n 71: 323. 
90 Ibid, p.331. 
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means; on most, if not all, occasions it may be the only way to adopt interconnection, 
i.e. there is no more direct way to include the networks and users of small telecoms 
into the market other than simply to interconnect such networks to the main networks, 
and so it is difficult to envisage a lighter-touch and more economical measure. This 
criterion is thus met. 
 
D. Proportionality Stricto Sensu  
This criterion is probably the most important sub-discipline of the principle of 
proportionality91 and is therefore worthy of in-depth analysis. According to 
proportionality stricto sensu, the "benefits" of the measure at issue must outweigh its 
"costs";92 therefore, in order to justify a limitation on fundamental rights and 
freedoms, a proper relation should exist between the benefits gained by fulfilling the 
policy objectives and the harm caused to the said fundamental rights and freedoms 
from achieving the policy objectives. The test requires a balancing of the benefits 
gained by the public and the harm caused to the fundamental rights through the use of 
the means selected by the legislation to obtain the proper purpose.93 In other words, 
even if a regulatory measure is fit for purpose and is the least onerous as per the 
requirement for suitability and necessity, the harm caused by the restriction of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms should still be proportionate to the gain achieved in 
implementing such a restriction if it is to be legitimate. A good example is presented 
by Grimm (2007). Assume that a law allows the police to shoot a person (even if such 
shooting would lead to that person’s death) if it is the only way to prevent that person 
from harming another’s property. This regulatory measure is designed to protect 
                                                 
91 Ibid., p.340. 
92 See Tridimas, T. (2006). The general principles of EU law. Chapter 3. 
93 Barak (2012) supra n 71: 340. 
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private property, and therefore its policy objective is proper. The regulatory measure 
adopted by the legislator is rational, since it advances the proper purpose. According 
to the provision's own words, it can only be triggered when no other means exists to 
protect the property without taking a human life, and thus the necessity test is fulfilled 
as well. This provision should, however, still be regarded as unlawful as the protection 
of private property cannot justify the taking of a human life.94 Thus, the implication 
of this criterion is that the greater the degree of detriment to fundamental rights and 
freedoms, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the public interest on 
which the legislator relies.95 It should also be noted that the result of the assessment 
of proportionality stricto sensu can affect the second criterion of necessity, as the 
legislator may be required to adopt a measure that is less restrictive, even if this would 
lead to a lower level of protection for its policy objectives.96 
 
The requirement of proportionality stricto sensu is also enshrined in ECtHR case law, 
usually in the form of the ECtHR’s "fair balance" test.97 According to the ECtHR, fair 
balance means that there must be a reasonable relationship between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be realized.98 
 
A classic example of the ECtHR's analysis of proportionality stricto sensu was 
Hutten-Czapska. In this case, to address the issue of the shortage of flats after the 
communist regime, Poland enacted new legislation (Ustawa o najmie lokali 
                                                 
94 Grimm, D. (2007). "Proportionality in Canadian and German constitutional jurisprudence." 
University of Toronto Law Journal 57(2): 383-397. 
95 Alexy, R. (2003). "On balancing and subsumption. A structural comparison." Ratio Juris 16(4): 436. 
96 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Case C-434/04 Ahokainen and Leppik [2006] E.C.R. 
I-9171, para. 26. 
97 See for example: Austinet al v United Kingdom (2012) App nos. 39692/09, 40713/09, 41008/09, 
ECHR 459, para. 72. 
98 Jahn et al. v Germany (2005) App no. 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01, ECHR 444, para. 38. 
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mieszkalnych i dodatkach mieszkaniowych, The Lease of Dwellings and Housing 
Allowances Act of 2 July 1994), to restrict increases in rents payable by tenants and 
the right to terminate their tenancies. The applicant alleged that such a measure 
amounted to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. In its reasoning, 
the ECtHR held:  
 
"Not only must an interference with the right of property pursue, on the facts as 
well as in principle, a 'legitimate aim' in the 'general interest, but there must also be 
a reasonable relation of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realized by any measures applied by the State, including measures 
designed to control the use of the individual's property. That requirement is 
expressed by the notion of a 'fair balance' that must be struck between the demands 
of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of 
the individual's fundamental rights."99 
 
And the Court continued, stating:  
 
"the Polish State, which inherited from the communist regime the acute shortage of 
flats available for lease at an affordable level of rent, had to balance the 
exceptionally difficult and socially sensitive issues involved in reconciling the 
conflicting interests of landlords and tenants. It had, on the one hand, to secure the 
protection of the right to property of the former and, on the other, to respect the 
social rights of the latter, often vulnerable individuals. Nevertheless, the legitimate 
interests of the Community in such situations call for a fair distribution of the 
                                                 
99 Hutten-Czapska v Poland (2005) App no.35014/97, ECHR 119 para. 167. 
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social and financial burden involved in the transformation and reform of the 
country's housing supply. This burden cannot, as in the present case, be placed on 
one particular social group, however important the interests of the other group or 
the community as a whole."100 
 
The ECtHR, in its ruling, did not just provide a clear explanation of the process of the 
Court's assessment, but also clarified two possible misunderstandings during it. First, 
when balancing policy objectives and a restrictive regulatory measure, the public 
interest – as a policy objective, especially regarding vulnerable individuals – does not 
necessarily outweigh the fundamental rights and freedoms infringed. Second, in the 
balancing of benefits and costs, the number of members in the parties is not the 
Court's first consideration: the interests of a larger group do not necessarily outweigh 
those of a smaller group; it is just one of the elements of the assessment. The Court 
has to consider all the benefits and costs, including the nature of the conflicting 
interests and the intensity of the interference.101  
 
In the present case, when considering all the benefits brought about by implementing 
interconnection, besides the promotion of Community-wide telecoms services and the 
provision of end-to-end interoperability of services for Community users as discussed 
above, another benefit brought about by the implementing of interconnection is the 
enhancing of access to services of general economic interest (Article 36 CFR). Article 
36 CFR, together with Articles 14 and 106 of the TFEU, states that the European 
Union recognises and respects access to services of general economic interest in order 
                                                 
100 Ibid, para. 225. 
101 See for reference: Opinion of Advocate General in Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v Deutscher 
Bundestag [2015] OJ C 279/12, para. 186. 
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to promote the social and territorial cohesion of the European Union. While Article 36 
CFR does not give a clear definition of "services of general economic interest", it has 
been pointed out that the deliberate omission of such a definition means that it is 
regarded as a dynamic and evolutionary concept, especially as technology 
develops.102 This issue can be further explored by referring to the Commission's 
Green Paper on Services of General Interest, which states: "The range of services that 
can be provided on a given market is subject to technological, economic and societal 
change and has evolved over time … Given that the distinction is not static in time … 
it would neither be feasible nor desirable to provide a definitive a priori list of all 
services of general interest that are to be considered non-economic."103 This open and 
indefinite stance is upheld in the Commission's following White Paper, as it states:  
"In its Green Paper, the Commission has already stated that the Treaty provides the 
Community with a whole range of means to ensure that users have access to 
high-quality and affordable services of general interest in the European Union. 
Nevertheless, it is primarily for the relevant national, regional and local authorities to 
define, organise, finance and monitor services of general interest",104 and again, in its 
Annex, it states: "The term «services of general economic interest» is used in Articles 
16 and 86(2) of the Treaty. It is not defined in the Treaty or in secondary legislation. 
However, in Community practice there is broad agreement that the term refers to 
services of an economic nature which the Member States or the Community subject to 
specific public service obligations by virtue of a general interest criterion. The 
concept of services of general economic interest thus covers in particular certain 
services provided by the big network industries such as transport, postal services, 
                                                 
102 Peers et al. (2014) supra n 49: 979. 
103 European Commission, Green Paper on Services of General Interest, COM (2003) 270, point 45. 




energy and communications. However, the term also extends to any other economic 
activity subject to public service obligations."105 In other words, services of general 
economic interest are an open concept which is subject to the latest developments in 
culture, economics and technology. It is understandable that the Court of Justice held 
that the national authorities are in the best position to define them.106 Given that 
interconnection aims to ensure the provision of end-to-end interoperability of 
Community-wide telecoms services, the telecoms services facilitated by the provision 
of interconnection can be regarded as services of general economic interest.107 
 
It has been proposed that, in accordance with its nature of universal service 
obligations: ancillary restraints and – to the extent that this is constituted separately – 
a funding regime, a three-step approach should be used to define a service of general 
economic interest and the universal obligations that form its core:  
 
First, universal-service obligations should be defined: this means deciding which 
consumer rights are deemed to exist (or to be necessary) with regard to a particular 
service. 
 
Second an analysis is necessary of which of these consumer rights, as a result of 
market failure, would not be adequately provided for in a market setting. This might 
therefore require the imposition of universal-service obligations, and determination of 
what the precise content of these obligations would be. 
                                                 
105 Ibid, Annex 1. 
106 See Case C-202/88, French v Commission [1991] E.C.R. I-1223, para. 12; and Case C-157/94 
Commission v Netherlands [1997] E.C.R. I-5699, para. 39-40. 




The answer to the latter point can be determined based on the following questions: 
(1) What would be a proportionate remedy for the market failure concerned? Is it, 
for example, necessary to impose obligations on all undertakings in the market or 
should one or more operators with specific obligations be designated? Again, when 
looking at remedies, solutions that allow competition to work should be considered 
the first choice. 
(2) Do the undertakings concerned need an exemption from certain Treaty 
obligations in order to perform their task to the required standard? 
 
The third question is the need for ancillary restraints. Should the undertakings 
concerned receive any rights and/or obligations in excess of the scope of the 
universal-service and/or other public-service obligations themselves?108 
 
When implementing interconnection in terms of offering this "service of general 
economic interest", one interesting point to be raised is the status of the competing 
telcos. Sometimes, other providers of such services are in a relatively weak position, 
as they are small or medium size entities (SMEs). As these services are indispensable 
to all and the offering of such services by the SMEs relies on services firstly offered 
by the incumbent or the dominant market players, it has been noted that certain 
national consumer protection laws have taken these considerations insight concerning 
the weaker position of SMEs as grounds for extending the protection of consumer law 
to cover SMEs as well as traditional consumers.109 This broad view is in line with the 
earlier analysis of the relationship between the incumbent telco and its competitors, 
                                                 
108 See: Sauter, W. (2007) "Services of General Economic Interest and Universal Service in EU Law" 
TILEC, Tilburg. 
109 As pointed out in Johnston, A. (2016) "Searching for the EU Consumer in Services of General 
Economic Interest" in Leczykiewicz, D. and S. Weatherill Eds. (2016) The Images of the Consumer in 
EU Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford. 
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e.g., in telecoms forced access, the competing telcos are at times the incumbent's 
wholesale customers, and the incumbent bears the relevant obligations, such as the 
obligation to conclude an agreement and the transparency of cost and information 
(e.g., the information of the point of interconnection, POI). 
 
Another important benefit brought about by the implementing of interconnection that 
is related to the access to services of general economic interest referred to above is 
that interconnection plays an import role in the functioning of communications 
amongst consumers. This feature distinguishes telecoms interconnection from other 
network industries that also have a ubiquitous service nature, such as the energy 
industry, in that communications serve as a medium for expression and receiving 
information. The freedoms of expression and to receive information are general 
principles of EU law110 and are among the fundamental rights guaranteed by the legal 
order of the Union.111 As Article 10 of CFR states: "Everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression.[1] The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected. 
[2] " At the same time, they are also guaranteed in Article 10 of the ECHR.112 It is 
worth noting that the freedom to receive information and media pluralism are also 
closely related to another general objective: to facilitate the emergence of a single 
European information space.113 
 
It is easy to imagine that compared with the traditional telecoms service era, 
                                                 
110 Case C-260/89, ERT v DEP [1991] E.C.R. I-2925, para. 45. 
111 Case C-250/06, United Pan-Europe Communications Belgium v Belgian [2007] E.C.R. I-11135, 
para. 41. 
112 Article 10 of the ECHR includes not only the right to communicate but also to receive information; 
see Observer and Guardian v the United Kingdom (1991) App no.13585/88, ECHR 49, para. 59; 
Guerra v Italy (1998) App no.14967/89, 57DR81, para. 53. Opinion of Advocate General Bot. in Sky 
Österreich supra n 50, para. 43. 
113 Sky Österreich supra n 50, para. 43. 
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interconnection, which does not just allow other telcos to access telecoms networks 
but also enables customers of other telcos to jointly use telecoms services, has become 
more important with the thriving of the Internet. Thus, when considering all the 
benefits of the proportionality stricto sensu of interconnection, besides promoting 
competition, the ensuring of freedom of expression for consumers, and even citizens 
at large, must be included. It is interesting, however, to discuss, besides the freedom 
of expression, whether consumers or citizens at large have any direct right over this 
medium, i.e. a right to communicate or more specifically a right to access the Internet, 
as opposed to the telcos’ property rights and freedom to conduct their businesses in 
consideration of the proportionality stricto sensu of interconnection. 
 
Without a clear definition in the EU human rights framework and other international 
human documents114 about the right to communicate and the right to access the 
Internet, it is worth taking a look at the EU telecoms regulatory framework. As Lucchi 
(2011) notes, it has been an arm-wrestling situation in the legislative process between 
the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament.115 An amendment 
was planned to be included in the Framework Directive, which requires national 
regulatory authorities to protect the interests of EU citizens, in particular: "[A]pplying 
the principle that no restriction may be imposed on the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of end-users, without a prior ruling by the judicial authorities, notably in 
accordance with Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union on freedom of expression and information, save when public security is 
                                                 
114 Hamelink, C.J. and J.Hoffmann (2008). "The State of the Right to Communicate" Global Media 
Journal 7(1): 7. 
115 Lucchi, N. (2011). "Access to Network Services and Protection of Constitutional Rights: 
Recognising the Essential Role of Internet Access for the Freedom of Expression" Cardozo Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 19 (3):657.   
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threatened in which case the ruling may be subsequent." This provision, however, was 
later replaced by a much tamer one: "Measures taken by Member States regarding 
end-users' access to or use of services and applications through electronic 
communications networks shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
natural persons, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and general principles of Community 
law." 
 
Two observations can be made about this process. First, as stated in the provisions of 
the earlier draft amendment and the later amendment, there is no doubt that the 
freedom of expression is included in the said fundamental rights and freedoms, but the 
same cannot surely be said about the right to access the Internet itself. Second, 
whether such fundamental rights and freedoms include a right to access the Internet or 
not, the new provision shows that the exercise of such fundamental rights and 
freedoms has been much limited and is not unfettered as in the earlier provision. 
 
This second stance is sustained by the European courts and many national courts of 
Member States. The most common cases in the jurisprudence of the European courts 
about the right to access the Internet are about online intellectual property 
infringement issues. In combating online infringements of intellectual property rights, 
Member States usually adopt a series of measures, such as requiring Internet service 
providers (ISPs) to install a monitoring or filtering system to block online activities 
that are liable to infringe intellectual property rights, or a three-strikes procedure, i.e. 
three warnings (usually from ISPs by email) are sent before a formal judicial 
complaint is filed. In the aforementioned Scarlet Extended, for example, the national 
 
 264 
court in Belgium issued an order to require an ISP to install a monitoring system to 
block all online activities liable to infringe intellectual property rights. In its ruling, 
the Court of Justice held that the injunction with such a cover-all nature did not 
respect the requirement that a fair balance be struck between the right to intellectual 
property on the one hand, and the freedom to conduct a business, the right to the 
protection of personal data and the freedom to receive or impart information on the 
other.116  
 
Similarly, in an ECtHR case, Ahmet Yildirim, a website owner in Turkey had his 
website hosted by Google. He was later unable to access his own website since, for a 
crime investigation, a Turkish criminal court had ordered the national telecoms 
regulatory authority (TIB) to block all access to Google. The ECtHR cited Scarlet 
Extended and held that such a practice amounted to a violation of the freedom of 
expression in Article 10 of the ECHR; mainly based on that, the TIB was empowered 
with too extensive power without limitation.117 
 
Despite not being specified in their rulings, it seems, from the above cases, that the 
European Courts have implied the existence of a right to access the Internet, as the 
Courts rejected a general or broad scrutiny of denial of access to the Internet.  
 
It should be noted that, in a similar French constitutional decision118 with regard to 
whether the national regulatory authority was vested a broad power by national 
legislation, i.e. HADOPI II, to tackle online intellectual property infringements, the 
                                                 
116 Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs [2011] E.C.R. I-11959, para. 53. 
117 Ahmet Yildirim v Turkey (2013) App no. 3111/10 ECHR 3003. 
118 Conseil constitutionnel Decision No. 2009- 580DC of 10 June 2009, cited from Lucchi (2011), 
supra n 115. 
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highest constitutional French authority, the Conseil constitutionnel, concluded that 
although Internet access cannot be considered a fundamental right in itself, the right to 
communication – which enjoys a particular status as a protected right – certainly 
deserves strengthened protection with respect to Internet access.119 
 
Even when recognising that the right to communicate is a fundamental right, a 
question that promptly follows is whether this "right" can be used by consumers or 
citizens against telcos. For example, were telcos to fail to offer adequate Internet 
access or even other media for communications, are consumers in eligible to claim 
their right to communicate has been infringed by the said telcos? It has been argued 
that as human rights are meant to be a form of protection against state authorities, this 
may seem to contradict the concept of a "right" to communicate, since it implies 
certain standards to which private entities would have to adhere. For example, this 
right implies access to both infrastructure and content.120 However, it is not rare in 
European courts or within the ECtHR’s jurisprudence for a fundamental right to be 
used against a private party, as in some cases interference with or restrictions of 
fundamental rights do not come from states but from another private party. States, 
however, usually have a positive obligation to prevent such interference by or 
restrictions from another party. In Von Hannover, where the ECtHR decided between 
the protection of an applicant of contemporary society "par excellence" and the 
tabloid press's freedom of expression, the ECtHR held that states have an obligation to 
adopt measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the 
relations of individuals amongst themselves.121 In the current case, however, the right 
                                                 
119 Ibid, para.12. 
120 Hamelink and Hoffmann (2008) supra n 114: 13. 
121 Von Hannover v Germany, (2004) App no. 59320/00, ECHR 2004-VI, para. 57. 
 
 266 
to communicate involves not only the private telcos' negative undertaking not to 
restrict such rights but also positive conduct to supply telecoms services. This is not 
similar enough to cases such as Von Hannover and thus the right to communicate 
should not be stretched as such. However, in light of the above, in the assessment of 
proportionality stricto sensu, as stated earlier, in balancing all costs, the court has to 
consider all the benefits, not just rights. Therefore, even if the right to communicate is 
not recognised as such, it still plays an important role in the court's scrutiny. 
 
Even if, on the other hand, the right to communicate is not recognised as a 
fundamental right, the imposition of interconnection can, nonetheless, positively 
affect the freedom of expression of citizens. This is especially true when considering 
the current development of the Internet, as technological innovations in information 
and communications technology have created new opportunities for individuals to 
disseminate information to a mass audience and have had an important impact on the 
participation and contribution of citizens in decision-making processes.122 Indeed, as 
noted in an ECtHR case involving Times Newspapers, the Court of Human Rights 
states that: "In light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast 
amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public's 
access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information in general."123 
 
It should be further noted, however, that although the imposition of interconnection, 
as stated above, is closely related to access to services of general economic interest, 
and plays an important role in the supplying of ubiquitous telecoms services, the 
                                                 
122 See: Council of the European Union, (2014) EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of 
Expression Online and Offline, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting.  
123 Times Newspapers Ltd v the United Kingdom (2009) App nos. 3002/03 and 23676/03, ECHR 27. 
See also the aforementioned Ahmet Yıldırım. 
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guaranteeing of freedom of expression and a "right" to communicate and access the 
Internet is not the main task of interconnection; but it is important in the domain of 
universal service. To clarify further, the main function of interconnection is to ensure 
connectivity among telcos, so that smaller telcos or late market entrants can share the 
network effect and thus compete with dominant ones. At the same time, this may also 
benefit citizens – who already enjoy telecoms services – by connecting to one another. 
Service of general economic interest, or more specifically universal service, on the 
other hand, aims to provide services to those who cannot otherwise be served, 
especially in situations of market failure or geographical difficulties. This can be seen 
in the great differences between the recitals of the Access Directive and the Universal 
Service Directive.124 In fact, the sheer distinction between these two Directives 
explains that, at least in the field of telecoms, interconnection and universal service 
serve different functions.125 
 
Lastly, regarding the benefits of, interconnection the ensuring of telecoms 
interconnection and limitations on, managing or even the denial of access to the 
Internet, especially concerning certain networks, content and digital flows, such as the 
practices in the cases cited above, also relate to the issue of Net neutrality, though the 
latter is in fact more closely related to the transmission of digital data on telecoms 
networks – i.e. transit, which is beyond the remit of this thesis. New regulation on Net 
neutrality has recently been introduced into the EU telecoms regulatory framework, 
shortly before the completion of this thesis, and its effects must stand the test of time. 
That said, interconnection or forced access in general may still affect and be affected 
                                                 
124 See the discussion in Chapter Two. 
125 As opposed to the situation in energy-industry regulation, where the universal-service obligation is 
included in major Directives, such as Parliament and Council Directive 2009/72/EC concerning 




by Net neutrality, as can be observed from the following aspects: (i) As stated by 
BEREC, remedies to promote effective competition, such as the forced-access 
mechanisms targeted in this thesis, are fundamental in the Net neutrality context, as 
BEREC has recognised that telcos/ ISPs may have an incentive to discriminate 
competitors' equivalent services.126 (ii) The management of digital flows is not 
always commerce-oriented, but due rather to the physical limitations and capacity 
(bandwidth) of telecoms networks. It is essential that national regulators promote or 
offer enough incentives for investment in new networks by imposing forced access 
mechanisms in a sophisticated way.  
 
The weighing of the benefits and costs of interconnection, i.e. striking a balance 
between access to services of general economic interest, the right to communicate, 
freedom of expression and the telcos' property rights, as well as the freedom to 
conduct a business have been best demonstrated in the aforementioned Scarlet 
Extended.127 In its reasoning, the Court of Justice first recognised the importance of 
property rights protection, but reinstated that such rights are not inviolable and 
absolute.128 The Court then recalled its case law, such as Promusicae, and stated that 
the protection of the fundamental right to property must be balanced against the 
protection of other fundamental rights,129 and it stressed that national authorities and 
courts must strike a fair balance between the protection of property rights and 
protection of the fundamental rights of individuals who are affected by such 
measures.130 Therefore, a general restriction that has no time limit, such as the 
                                                 
126 See the BEREC Work Programme 2011, available at: 
http://berec.europa.eu/files/text/bor_10_43_1.pdf. (accessed April 2016). 
127 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, Case C-70/10 [2011] E.C.R. I-11959. 
128 Ibid, para. 43. 
129 Ibid, para. 44. 
130 Ibid, para. 45. 
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filtering system in this case, while at the same time constituting a serious infringement 
of the freedom of the ISP concerned to conduct its business, may affect the rights of 
future and unspecified citizens. 
  
The imposition of interconnection as discussed above has the benefit of promoting 
access to services of general economic interest and the rights to communicate and 
have freedom of expression. On the other hand, it does have the following 
disadvantages. First, while interconnection as discussed above can be deemed to be a 
service of general economic interest and of a public-service nature, it imposes a 
restriction on competition to the benefit of undertakings charged with SGEI, to the 
extent necessary to perform their public service tasks. This does not mean the public 
interest (as provided by a service of general economic interest) and market freedom 
are necessarily in conflict, as opening up services to competition frequently leads to 
lower prices and a greater range of choices for consumers; however, this binary 
system complicates efforts to introduce competition, either gradually or partially,131 
hence caution should be exercised. It has therefore been suggested that it appears to be 
consistent with the EU-law principle of proportionality to limit the application of the 
service of general economic interest concept to those cases where it is clear, in 
advance, to enable the undertaking(s) charged with a service of general economic 
interest to provide those services that could not otherwise be provided to the requisite 
standard. Where this is not the case, reserving particular services to specific 
undertakings would simply not be necessary – and should therefore fail the 
proportionality standard that is explicitly included in Article 106(2) TFEU.132 In other 
words, the principle of proportionality, among other benefits and costs, should be 
                                                 
131 Sauter (2007), supra n 108: 2. 
132 Sauter (2007), supra n 108: 16. 
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applied when examining the aforementioned three-step approach to a service of 
general economic interest. 
 
Another cost or disadvantage that should be considered is the imposition of 
interconnection restrict the telcos' use of their own property. Such restrictions, 
however, are relatively less burdensome on telcos' right to property, since besides the 
interconnection obligation, the said telcos are still free to dispose of their networks or 
put them to other uses which are not prohibited. This is especially true considering the 
following two features of interconnection: First, under the current European telecoms 
regulatory framework, only telcos enjoying significant market power have an 
obligation of interconnection (telcos without SMP status, on the other hand, should 
arrange interconnection via negotiation).133 This does somehow add weight to the 
public interest regarding fair competition and the restrictions requested on telcos' 
rights. Another feature is that interconnection fees should be cost-oriented; in other 
words, such fees should be calculated based on the costs incurred in the process of 
interconnection. As discussed in Chapter Two, the fees and costs of interconnection 
play an important role in interconnection agreements. Cost-oriented interconnection 
pricing does not just protect telcos that seek to interconnect, it also protects those 
telcos so that they will not suffer any economic loss by being required to fulfil 
interconnection obligations. 
 
It should be further noted here that the costs incurred in the process of interconnection 
should be construed as including a reasonable profit for the provider of the 
                                                 
133 See Article 8 Access Directive.  
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interconnection service. In T-Mobile Czech and Vodafone Czech,134 where the Court 
of Justice decided whether the "loss" or "net cost" in the Universal Service 
Directive135 includes a reasonable profit for the provider of a universal service, the 
Court of Justice held that according to the second paragraph of Part A of Annex IV to 
the Universal Service Directive, the net cost is to be calculated as the difference 
between the net cost to a designated undertaking operating with the universal service 
obligations and operating without the universal service obligations. For the purposes 
of that calculation, the cost of loans or equity capital must be taken into account 
where the designated undertaking has had to rely on capital in order to make the 
investment needed to provide a universal service;136 although the Directive at issue 
does not contain any express reference to the possibility of including the cost of 
equity capital or "reasonable profit" in the calculation of the net cost borne by the 
undertaking providing a universal service, a teleological interpretation of that 
directive nevertheless does permit the conclusion to be drawn that such items may be 
included.137 In addition, despite not being a binding rule, the Commission's 
Communication on the application of European Union State aid rules to compensation 
granted for the provision of services of general economic interest138 and Article 5(5) 
of Decision 2012/21139 give guidance on how to evaluate a "reasonable profit", which 
is defined as the rate of return on capital. Much like the universal service, one of the 
major policy aims of interconnection, as analysed above, is to provide ubiquitous 
telecoms services to the consumer, and so the same approach of calculation indicated 
                                                 
134 Case C-508/14, Český telekomunikační úřad v T-Mobile Czech Republic and Vodafone Czech 
Republic, [2015] OJ C 389/11. 
135 Recital 18, Articles 12 and 13 of the Universal Service Directive. 
136 T-Mobile Czech and Vodafone Czech, supra n 134, para. 34. 
137 Ibid, para. 36. 
138 Commission Communication on the application of European Union State aid rules to compensation 
granted for the provision of services of general economic interest, 2012 OJ C 8/4. 
139 Commission Decision No.2012/21/EU, 2011 OJ L 7/3. 
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above should apply by way of analogy. 
 
It should be noted, however, that the Court of Justice in Scarlet Extended seems to 
suggest that restrictions on or interference in the rights of an unspecified group of 
people may require more important justification. In the case of interconnection, this 
may play an important role in the court’s scrutiny, especially due to the fact that many 
consumers may be affected.140 However, as stated earlier, in Hutten-Czapska, the 
ECtHR held that the public interest, especially regarding vulnerable individuals, does 
not necessarily outweigh the fundamental rights and freedoms infringed, and thus a 
balance should be sought on a case-by-case basis.141 
 
From the discussion above, we can conclude that the harm and costs brought about by 
implementing interconnection do not outweigh the benefits it seeks. Thus the criterion 
of proportionality stricto sensu should be deemed to be met.  
 
E. Respecting the Essence  
For a Union regulatory measure that may affect fundamental rights and freedoms to 
be legitimate, it should not only ensure proportionality but also respect the essence or 
substance of the said rights and freedoms.142 However, the Court of Justice rarely 
directly defines what constitutes excessive interference with the essence of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. This is partly because this requirement is difficult to 
separate from the principle of proportionality,143 and partly because the different 
natures of fundamental rights and freedoms make it difficult to apply a general rule in 
                                                 
140 See for reference, Conseil constitutionnel Decision No. 2009- 580DC, supra n 118 para.16. 
141 Hutten-Czapska v Poland (2005) supra n.99. 
142 Article 51(1) CFR. 
143 Peers et al. (2014) supra n 49:1480. 
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every case. Some examples of the jurisprudence of European Courts can, however, 
still be drawn on in reference to this issue. For instance, Advocate General Kokott 
cited ECtHR case law in her Opinion in Schindler Holding, including Mamidakis144 
and Buffalo,145 extremely large fines may impose an excessive burden on the right to 
property in that they have a de facto expropriatory character, and thus impair the very 
substance of the fundamental right to respect for property.146 In Alemo-Herron, where 
the Court of Justice dealt with national legislation obliging the transferees of 
employment contracts to take on board subsequent changes in those contracts which 
were negotiated collectively, the Court held that the deprivation of rights to participate 
in a collective bargaining body and negotiate conditions of working seriously reduced 
the freedom to conduct a business – of which contractual freedom forms a part– to the 
point that such a limitation is liable adversely to affect the very essence of the 
freedom to conduct a business.147 
 
But with regard to the freedom to conduct a business, as discussed in Chapter Eight, 
the Court of Justice seems to suggest that it may be subject to a broader range of 
interventions by Union Institutions, other than fundamental rights and freedoms,148 
i.e. regulatory intervention is less likely to affect the essence of the freedom to 
conduct a business. 
 
In the present case, the telcos' right to property and the freedom to conduct a business 
are only marginally affected by the imposition of interconnection, as the mechanism 
                                                 
144 Mamidakis v Greece (2007) App no.35533/04, § 44, 11 January 2007. 
145 Buffalo S.r.l. en liquidation v Italy (2003) App no. 38746/97. 
146 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Cases C-501/11 P Schindler v Commission [2013] OJ C 
260/7, para. 213. 
147 Case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure [2013] OJ C 260/6, para.s 34–5. 
148 Sky Österreich supra n 50 paras. 45–66. 
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merely requires the telcos to comply with obligations such as revealing the interface 
and costing information, or setting the interconnection tariff arbitrarily, and does not 
constitute an excessive burden on, or severely restrict telcos from exercising their 
right to property and freedom to conduct their businesses.      
 
2.2.1.2 Example of National Practice in the Member State 
TDC v Teleklagenævnet149 
A. Facts and Legislation 
In this case, TDC, a telco with SMP status, challenged a decision taken by 
Teleklagenævnet, the Danish national telecoms regulatory authority (NRA), in 
accordance with national legislation, i.e. Law No. 780 of 28 June 2007 on competition 
and consumer matters in the telecommunications market (Lov om konkurrence – og 
forbrugerforhold på telemarkedet). The national legislation and the decision were 
adopted to implement the interconnection obligation in Article 8(1) of the Access 
Directive. Specifically, they require the relevant telcos to set up new infrastructure so 
that the applicant telcos' cable networks can access the requested telcos' fibre-optic 
networks. TDC asserted that the concept of "access" in the Access Directive does not 
cover the installation of such infrastructure, and such an obligation involves a 
considerable financial burden and therefore does not observe the principle of 
proportionality set out in Article 8(1) of the Access Directive.150 Teleklagenævnet, 
however, stated that a fibre-optic network, unlike other networks (copper, coaxial), is 
not connected directly to the end-user at the time of its initial installation, and the 
obligation to install drop cables does not constitute an obligation to establish new 
infrastructure, but rather a technical adaptation to the existing fibre-optic network. It 
                                                 
149 Case C-556/12, TDC v Teleklagenævnet [2014] OJ C 282/7. 
150 Ibid, para. 22. 
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also stated that the size of the initial investment by the owner of the installation was 
taken into account in the assessment of the proportionality of the measures envisaged 
when it imposed the said obligation.151 
 
B. Court's Ruling 
The Court of Justice first identified that the objectives of the national regulation were 
those enumerated in Article 1(1) of the Access Directive, whose aim was to establish 
"a regulatory framework … that will result in sustainable competition, [the] 
interoperability of electronic communications services and consumer benefits".152 
 
The Court went on to cite TeliaSonera Finland153 and identified that Teleklagenævnet, 
being the NRA, is entitled to assume responsibility for ensuring adequate access and 
interconnection, the interoperability of services154 and imposing obligations on SMP 
telcos to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, specific network elements 
and associated facilities on a case-by-case basis, in the light of objectives set out in 
Article 8 of the Framework Directive.155 With that in mind, the Court did not apply 
the margin of appreciation doctrine but went on to examine the substance of the 
decision instead. 
 
The Court then reiterated the principle of proportionality by stating that the 
obligations in Article 8 of the Access Directive imposed by NRAs must be based on 
the nature of the problem identified and be proportionate and justified in light of the 
                                                 
151 Ibid, para. 23. 
152 Ibid, para. 38. 
153 Case C-192/08 TeliaSonera v iMEZ [2009] E.C.R. I-10717, para. 58. 
154 TDC supra n 149, para. 41. 
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objectives set out in Article 8(1) of the Framework Directive.
156
 To assess the 
proportionality of interconnection, the Court stated that it should take into account: 
the technical and economic viability of using or installing competing facilities, in light 
of the rate of market development, and the nature and type of interconnection and/or 
access involved; the feasibility of providing the access proposed for the purpose of 
assessing the proportionality of the obligations imposed on operators with significant 
market power in a specific market; and the need to safeguard competition in the long 




In this particular case, the Court paid special attention to the following two points. 
First, regarding the competitive situation in the market, the Court pointed out that 
because of the particular way in which TDC's fibre optic network was constructed, 
this gave it a definite competitive advantage in the acquisition of new customers in the 
retail market. Thus the installation of new infrastructure was an essential condition for 
telcos competing with TDC to be able to acquire customers, by enabling them to offer 
services distributed by means of the fibre-optic network under conditions of equal 
competition with TDC.158 Second, the Court also considered the first mover 
advantage/ disadvantage159 by stating that while Article 13(1) of the Access Directive 
provides that NRAs may impose obligations relating to cost recovery and price 
controls on undertakings with significant market power, in order to encourage 
investment by telcos (including in next-generation networks,), NRAs have to take into 
account the investment made by the telcos and allow them a reasonable rate of return 
                                                 
156 Ibid, para. 44. 
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159 See discussion in Chapter Two. 
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on their capital employed, taking into account any risks specific to a particular 
investment project.160 
 
2.2.2 Local Loop Unbundling 
2.2.2.1 Proportionality Test 
B. Legitimate Aims 
As discussed above, an objective of a regulatory measure is legitimate if it serves the 
public good or the protection of rights and freedoms of other persons. The objectives 
of local-loop unbundling, besides those shared with interconnection as discussed 
above, can also be seen in the Framework Directive, as it states that the objectives of 
the Directive are to promote competition in the provision of electronic 
communications networks, electronic communications services and associated 
facilities and services,161 to help the development of the internal market,162 and 
promote the interests of citizens of the European Union.163 To be specific, local-loop 
unbundling aims to enhance competition in the local-loop market, ensure economic 
efficiency and bring the maximum benefit to users.164 These policy objectives are 
again in line with the provisions in Article 100a of the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community (TEEC, now Article 114(1) TFEU), whereby the 
Council should adopt measures that approximate provisions laid down by law, and 
regulations or administrative actions in Member States which have as their object the 
establishing and functioning of the internal market, and the ensuring of free 
movement of services as stipulated in Article 8a TEEC (now Article 21(1) TFEU), and 
                                                 
160 TDC supra n 149, para. 51.  
161 Article 8(2) Framework Directive.   
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163 Article 8(4) Framework Directive. 
164 Recital (2) in the preamble to local-loop unbundling Regulation. 
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thus should be regarded as legitimate. 
 
C. Suitability (appropriateness) 
The criterion of suitability, as discussed above, requires a regulatory measure to 
realise or advance the underlying purpose of legislation, and the use of such a 
regulatory measure would rationally lead to the realisation of the legislation's purpose. 
In the present case, while the unbundling of local loops into elements to be leased to 
competing telcos may not be the only way to achieve the policy objectives stated 
above, there is no denying that this mechanism does help to achieve this and thus is fit 
for the purpose the said measure was designed to fulfil; thus, the requirement of 
suitability is met. 
 
D. Necessity 
To satisfy the requirement of necessity, the regulatory measure adopted has to be the 
least restrictive amongst all the regulatory measures that are suitable for the stated 
policy objectives. In the present case, local-loop unbundling, which once seemed 
critical and necessary to address the competition issue in local-loop markets, is now 
facing the effects brought about by rapidly developing telecoms technologies, as there 
are now many vehicles that can provide the functions served by traditional local loops. 
Cable-television operators, for example, can use the cables that extend into their 
customers' premises to provide high-speed broadband services.165 Similarly, new 
technologies, such as satellite, can also offer high-speed wireless Internet access. And 
the latest developments in 3G and 4G services also overwhelmingly change the 
                                                 
165 For example, the cable internet services offered by Virgin Media UK can reach the highest speed of 
200Mbps, exceeding those provided by the incumbent BT. See:  
http://store.virginmedia.com/broadband/compare-broadband/index.html (accessed April 2016), and 
https://www.productsandservices.bt.com/products/broadband-packages (accessed April 2016). 
 
 279 
telecoms ecology by being able to offer high-speed wireless Internet access; hence, 
fixed-line networks in telco premises are no longer the only option to connect to the 
Internet. While it has been noted in Union legislation that these alternative 
infrastructures do not generally offer the same functionality or ubiquity,166 it is 
possible that, in practice, in some Member States where telecoms markets are highly 
developed, these new technologies are viable in terms of replacing traditional local 
loops in the very near future. In that case, there will exist alternatives to applying 
local-loop unbundling and those alternatives might impose less burden on the owners 
of local loops and their use. 
 
E. Proportionality Stricto Sensu 
Under the requirement of proportionality stricto sensu, in order for a regulatory 
measure that limits fundamental rights and freedoms to be justified, a proper relation 
should exist between all the benefits gained by achieving the policy objectives and the 
consequent harm caused to the said fundamental rights and freedoms. As for the 
necessity of local-loop unbundling, while it helps to achieve policy objectives as 
discussed above, some economists have showed their concern over the general 
application of this mechanism. Haussman and Sidak (1999), for example, stressed that 
local-loop unbundling should be mandatory only if a certain number of conditions 
were fulfilled.167 Doyle (2000) also categorised service areas and objected to 
                                                 
166 See: Recital (6) in the preamble to local-loop unbundling Regulation and Recital (8) of the 
preamble to Recommendation 2000/417/EC. 
167 In particular, these conditions include: (a) it is technically feasible to provide to the network 
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that is a monopolist in the supply of a telecommunications service to end users for the relevant 
geographic market; and (d) the network services supplier can exercise market power in the provision of 
telecommunications services to end users in the relevant geographic market by restricting access to the 
network. See: Hausman, J. A. and J. G. Sidak (1999). "A consumer-welfare approach to the mandatory 
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imposing local-loop unbundling in densely populated urban areas, as competition 
between infrastructure providers was emerging.168 Therefore, when weighing the 
benefits of imposing local-loop unbundling and the limitations on the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the affected telcos, the latter seem to dominate. Doyle further 
noted that "[w]hile policy makers have championed ULL as a way to promote 
competition at the local level in telecommunications, applying mandated ULL across 
the whole of a country may be inappropriate and socially damaging."169 
 
Another important issue that should be taken into consideration when weighing the 
benefits and harms of imposing local-loop unbundling is that it may reduce the 
incentive to adopt new technologies and invest in and deploy new infrastructure. Here, 
we take the current well-developing fibre-optic networks in the local-loop section as 
an example. Depending on the extent to which fibre-optic networks extend into 
end-users' premises, there are several different kinds of fibre-optic access. In 
ascending order, these are from Fibre to the Node (FTTN, meaning fibre-optic 
networks stretching to a street cabinet), Fibre to the Curb (FTTC, similar to FTTN, 
but fibre-optic networks stretch even closer to end-users' premises), Fibre to the 
Premises/Building (FTTP or FTTB) and Fibre to the Home (FTTH). Since fibre-optic 
networks offer high transmission speeds and better quality than traditional metallic 
(copper) networks, fibre optics that stretch further offer better quality networks; 
however, the difficulties in deploying such networks increase in the same order (see 
Fig 10.2 below). 
                                                                                                                                            
unbundling of telecommunications networks." Yale Law Journal: 417-505. 









Here, if we impose local-loop unbundling, the incumbent telco will no longer delay or 
even deny access to competing telcos, so better competition is achieved in the market 
and competing telcos can use existing copper networks to provide their services; 
however, such services will be limited, and telcos will find it difficult to catch up with 
the rapid development of telecoms services and applications that require higher 
transmission speeds with better and more stable characteristics. 
 
That said, as aforementioned, considering the great difficulty and cost of deploying 
their own substitute local loops, allowing competing telcos to access existing local 
loops may well eliminate the incentive for them to do so. The customers therefore do 
not benefit as they end up having to use existing and somewhat dated networks, as 
there are no other alternatives. This issue is of particular importance in some Member 
States where telecoms markets are highly developed and competing or alternative 
infrastructures are efficient.170 Thus, in practice, it is difficult to determine whether 
                                                 
170 Bohlin, E., S. Lindmark, et al. (2005). "Sweden's Telecom Liberalization and Local Loop 
Unbundling: Moving from Consensus to Enforcement", Paper presented at the 16th European Regional 
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the main policy goals of local-loop unbundling really outweigh the disadvantages that 
it may bring. 
 
F. Respect the Essence 
As discussed above, while the Court of Justice rarely demonstrates what constitutes 
interference with, or the essence of fundamental rights and freedoms, it has indicated 
that the freedom to conduct a business may tolerate a broader range of interference 
and thus its essence is less likely to be encroached upon; at the same time, the right to 
property is not respected when the guarantee of property is deprived of its substance, 
but this is not so when affected only marginally or when only the modalities of its 
exercise are regulated.171 In the present case, requested telcos are required to 
unbundle the elements of their local loop networks and allow them to be leased by 
other telcos upon request. Their enjoyment of the right to property in the said local 
loops and the freedom to conduct their businesses are not excessively restricted; hence 
this requirement is met.   
 
2.2.2.2 Example of National Practice in the Member State 
Commission v Germany172 
A. Facts and Legislation 
One of the most notable cases in the jurisprudence of European Courts with regard to 
local-loop unbundling is Commission v Germany, in which the Court of Justice 
considered the balance between the adoption of new technologies in the local loop 
markets, the roles and responsibilities of NRAs and the national legislation of 
                                                                                                                                            
Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS), Porto, 4-6 September. 
171 Case C-59/83, Biovilac v EEC [1984] E.C.R. 4057, para. 22; Case C-177/90, Kühn [1992] E.C.R. 
I-35, para. 17. 
172 Case C-424/07 Commission v Germany [2009] E.C.R. I-11431. 
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Member States. While not specified in the case, Germany aimed to incentivise the 
incumbent telco, Deutsche Telekom, to invest in high-speed VDSL networks in local 
loops by introducing an amendment to German telecoms law 
(Telekommunikationsgesetz, BGBl. 2004 I, p. 1190, TKG) in accordance with recital 
15 in the preamble to the Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 
(Commission Recommendation),173 point 32 of the Commission's guidelines for 
market analysis and assessment of significant market power under the Community 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services ("the 
guidelines"),174 and recital 27 in the preamble to the Framework Directive that new 
and emerging markets, in which market power may be found to exist because of 
"first-mover" advantages, should not in principle be subject to ex ante regulation. 
Thus, the new TKG states that new markets shall not, in principle, be subject to 
regulation within the meaning of Part 2 of the TKG submitted by Bundesnetzagentur, 
the German regulatory authority in the telecoms sector (NRA). The Commission 
regarded such legislation as a restriction on Bundesnetzagentur's discretion as laid 
down by Article 15(3) of the Framework Directive, and hence it brought a case 
against Germany to the Court of Justice. 
 
B. Court's Ruling 
The Court of Justice first cited Arcor175 and stated that, in carrying out regulatory 
functions, NRAs have broad discretion to be able to determine the need to regulate a 
                                                 
173 Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service markets within 
the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 
2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communication networks and services, OJ L 114/45. 
174 Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under 
the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ C 
165/6. 
175 Case C-55/06 Arcor v Germany [2008] E.C.R. I-2931, para. 153. 
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market according to each situation on a case-by-case basis.176 The Court emphasised 
that the Framework Directive confers upon NRAs, instead of national legislatures, the 
task of determining the need to regulate markets.177   
 
The Court then started to dispute Germany's assertion that new markets shall not be 
subject to regulation as this is a principle laid down in Union legislation. First, the 
Court held that recital 27 in the preamble to the Framework Directive merely states 
that guidelines will address the issue of new markets where, de facto, the market 
leader is likely to have a substantial market share but should not be subjected to 
inappropriate obligations. Thus, that recital envisages that the regulation of new 
markets must take account of the specific characteristics of those markets. Such 
provisions cannot be understood as laying down a general principle for non-regulation 
of those markets.178 
 
The Court also held that point 32 of the guidelines merely repeats the content of 
recital 27 in the preamble to the Framework Directive by prohibiting the imposition of 
inappropriate ex ante obligations. Therefore, the guidelines do not lay down a general 
rule of non-regulation of new markets either. That finding is also confirmed by the 
wording of the last two sentences of point 32 of the guidelines, which state that 
foreclosure of emerging markets by the leading undertaking should be prevented and 
that NRAs should ensure that they can fully justify any form of early ex ante 
intervention.179 
 
                                                 
176 Commission v Germany, supra n 172, para. 61. 
177 Ibid, para. 74. 
178 Ibid, para. 69. 
179 Ibid, para. 70. 
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Similarly, recital 15 in the preamble to the Commission Recommendation only 
envisages the non-regulation of new markets where, having regard to first-mover 
advantages, there are undertakings with significant market power. Therefore, that 
provision does not mean that new and emerging markets should not in principle be 
subject to ex ante regulation, but rather there should be verification by an NRA on a 
case-by-case basis of the necessary conditions for a finding that a new market does 
require regulation.180 
 
The Court concluded that by laying down a legal provision, according to which, as a 
general rule, the regulation of new markets by an NRA is excluded, the new provision 
of the TKG encroached on powers conferred on the NRA under the EU regulatory 
framework, thus preventing it from adopting regulatory measures appropriate to each 
particular case. The German legislature cannot alter a decision of the EU legislature 
and cannot, as a general rule, exempt new markets from regulation.181 
 
2.2.3 Separation 
2.2.3.1 Applicability of Article 345 TFEU? 
As discussed in Chapter Six 1, Article 345 TFEU provides that: "The Treaties shall in 
no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property 
ownership." Given the meaning of the wording of this provision, the consensus is that 
this article only concerns the systems of property ownership of undertakings, but not 
the contents of ownership nor objects of rights of ownership. In other words, Article 
345 is not to exclude the application of the Treaties to question of State or private 
ownership at all, but rather to emphasise how, according to the Treaties, these powers 
                                                 
180 Ibid, para. 72. 
181 Ibid, para. 75. 
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might belong to the Member States, but not as far as the excise of those powers is 
concerned.182 This view is supported by the Court of Justice, as the Court stated in 
Fearon: 
 
"[t]hat conclusion cannot be accepted. By virtue of Article 54 (3) (e) of the Treaty, 
the restrictions on the acquisition and use by a national of one Member State of 
land and buildings situated in another Member State are among those which are to 
be abolished with a view to the realization of freedom of establishment. Similarly, 
the Council's "Programme Général po Jr la Suppression des Restrictions à la 
Liberté d'Établissement" [General Programme for the Abolition of Restrictions on 
the Freedom of Establishment] of 18 December 1961 (Journal Officiel 1962, p. 36) 
lists, among the restrictions on freedom of establishment to be abolished, 
provisions or practices which provide for less favourable rules for nationals of 
another Member State in regard to compulsory acquisition. 
 
Consequently, although Article 222 of the Treaty does not call in question the Member 
States' right to establish a system of compulsory acquisition by public bodies, such a 
system remains subject to the fundamental rule of non-discrimination which underlies 
the chapter of the Treaty relating to the right of establishment."183 
 
Also, in Commission v Portugal, the Court held that: 
"[h]owever, those concerns cannot entitle Member States to plead their own 
systems of property ownership, referred to in Article 222 of the Treaty, by way of 
justification for obstacles, resulting from privileges attaching to their position as 
                                                 
182 See, Ramaekers, E. (2013) European Union Property Law, Intersentia nv, Mortsel: 121. 
183 Case C-182/83, Fearon [1984] E.C.R. 3677, paras. 6-7. 
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shareholder in a privatised undertaking, to the exercise of the freedoms provided 
for by the Treaty. As is apparent from the Court's case-law (Konle, cited above, 
paragraph 38), that article does not have the effect of exempting the Member 
States' systems of property ownership from the fundamental rules of the Treaty."184 
 
Therefore, European telecoms forced access mechanisms, while they may constitute 
interference or derogation of the content of property rights under the domestic legal 
order, generally do not fall within the domain of Article 345 TFEU. 
 
It should however be noted that, in the case of structural separation, as will be 
discussed in Chapter Ten, If the Union legislator finds that even functional separation 
is insufficient to achieve its legal aims and considers structural separation, there can 
be two possible arrangements or models: the establishment of a separate network 
company or the splitting up of networks expropriated by the State and made into 
public network departments or companies. The latter models is actually a form of 
nationalisation, and therefore concerns the system of the ownership of the said 
undertaking—whether it is publicly or privately owned—and thus Article 345 TFEU 
comes into consideration.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Six 1, whether or not the undertakings are owned publicly or 
privately are precluded from the scope of application of the Treaties. It has therefore 
been commented that this Article embeds the principle of neutrality.185  However, 
under the case law of the Court of Justice, the rules of the Internal Market remain 
applicable with regard to the exercise, by the Member States, of their competence to 
                                                 
184 Case C-367/98, Commission v Portugal [2002] E.C.R. I-4731, para. 48. 
185 Ramaekers, supra n182: 127. 
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nationalise. It has therefore been described as an existence v exercise dichotomy: the 
Treaties are neutral to existence, i.e, the question of nationalisation itself, but do 
interfere in the way in which the nationalisation take place.186 For example, an 
expropriation or nationalisation of telecoms networks by a Member States is allowed 
under the rules of Treaties, but the implementation of nationalisation must be in 
conformity with the Treaties, such as the four freedoms and particularly competition 
law.187 This discussion, therefore, leads to another issue: while the new 
publicly-owned telecoms network company may benefit the public interest by 
facilitating service of general economic interest, as discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, other 
telcos, which are private companies, could therefore be put at a disadvantage and have 
their fundamental rights and freedoms violated, such as freedom of competition and 
the right to equal treatment, as the new publicly-owned telecoms network company 
attains a near monopoly status in the network-access market. To avoid this, the 
operation of the new publicly-owned telecoms network company should be restricted 
to the wholesale network business and exclude the retail telecoms service. At the same 
time, some supplementary measures, such as a reasonable rate of return, should be 
adopted to ensure that sufficient incentives are in place for the new publicly-owned 
telecoms network company to provide such wholesale network services.188 
 
2.2.3.2 Proportionality Test 
A. Legitimate Aims 
Similarly to local-loop unbundling, the policy objective of separation exists mainly to 
                                                 
186 Ibid. A somehow different opinion seems to be held by Pielow and Ehlers, as they suggested the 
Community legislator is not allowed to prescribe privatisation or nationalisations, see, Pielow, J. and 
E.Ehlers, “Ownership Unbundling and constitutional conflict: a Typical German Debate?” European 
Review of Energy Markets 2 (3): 14. 
187 Ramaekers, supra n 182: 127. 
188 See, for reference, the discussion about functional separation in Chapter Two (2.2). 
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boost competition in the local-loop market. This policy objective is again in line with 
the Union objectives of establishing and functioning of the internal market, and 
ensuring the free movement of services, and thus should be regarded as legitimate. 
 
B. Suitability (appropriateness) 
The criterion of suitability requires that a regulatory measure can realise or advance 
the underlying purpose of the relevant legislation, and that the use of such a regulatory 
measure would rationally lead to the realisation of the legislation's purpose. In the 
present case, either functional separation or ownership separation will help to advance 
the policy objectives; thus, this requirement is met.   
 
C. Necessity 
The same rationale of assessing the necessity of local-loop unbundling can be used to 
assess the necessity of functional separation, and even ownership separation. As 
discussed above, by making the access network department independent, these 
separation models aim to ensure the provision of fully equivalent access to products to 
all downstream telcos. With the developments in technology, traditional access 
networks (especially copper networks) are no longer indispensable for providing 
telecoms services, as alternatives do exist. In other words, at least in Member States 
where the telecoms industry is highly developed, it may become an issue whether it is 
justifiable to impose separation, as splitting access networks may not be the least 
onerous and disadvantageous regulatory measure available. However, as stated in 
Article 13a of the Access Directive, before imposing separation, such as functional 
separation, the NRAs have a series of conditions or obligations to meet, such as they 
should submit to the Commission the evidence that the appropriate obligations 
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imposed under Articles 9 to 13 have failed to achieve effective competition and that 
there are important and persistent competition problems and/or market failures 
identified in relation to the wholesale provision of certain access product markets,189 
and more importantly have a reasoned assessment that there is no or little prospect of 
effective and sustainable infrastructure-based competition within a reasonable 
time-frame. In other words, the NRAs first have to establish that it is necessary to 
impose functional separation before they really do. Due to this legislative design, we 
can assume that this requirement is met.190  
 
D. Proportionality Stricto Sensu 
Proportionality stricto sensu considers the balance between the benefits gained and 
the harms caused by imposing a regulatory measure. This requirement, as pointed out 
in Sky Österreich, means that European Union law must be carried out with a view to 
reconciling the requirements of the protection of those different rights and freedoms 
and striking a fair balance between them. The Court in Sky Österreich then considered 
the economic impact, the conditions laid down, such as the maximum length of the 
short clips, identifying the source, and the reasonableness of costs. Thus, we know 
that what needs to be considered is not fixed, but subject to the characteristics of the 
regulatory measure at issue. 
 
The biggest benefit brought by separation is the promotion of competition in the 
access market; it does not just protect the competing telcos' right to compete, but more 
importantly the consensus is that consumers are therefore benefited by having more 
choices, better quality of internet products and services with lower prices. The NRA 
                                                 
189 Article 13 a (2) (a) of Access Directive. 
190 For the details of these obligations of NRAs, see Annex I. 
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can also save its regulatory costs in monitoring the situation in the access market. 
 
On the other hand, besides the severe interference with telcos' property rights and 
freedom to conduct a business, it has been observed that separation has some 
drawbacks. 
a. The costs of separation are very high. For example, it has been estimated that the 
costs for Telstra, the incumbent telco in Australia, will be up to AUD1 billion 
upfront and up to AUD100 million a year for six years if Australia uses the BT 
separation model.191 Such costs are caused by the re-organisation of the company, 
the increased personnel costs and the separation of the current shared functions 
between its departments. With the establishment of a public access unit or even 
company, such costs will eventually be borne by consumers.192 
b. Separation cannot reflect the need of telecoms market. As a long-term and 
irreversible regulatory measure, separation aims to target a monopoly on a 
on-going basis. This contradicts to the global trend of reducing regulation in the 
telecoms market. Especially, with the rapid-development of telecoms technology, 
the relevant regulations should be reviewed every now and then and revised where 
necessary.193  
c. Separation does not necessarily reduce the costs of regulation. As observed from 
the experience of BT's separation in the UK, the NRA Ofcom still has to regulate 
                                                 
191 See for reference: "Worst case regulation to cost Telstra $1.6 billion", available at: 
http://www.crn.com.au/(S(tgobyy55fuhxqpvfjefki445))/News/153004,worst-case-regulation-to-cost-tel
stra-16-billion.aspx#ixzz3sr8csrJK (accessed April 2016); a different but comparably high estimation, 
see: "Functional separation could cost $1.2b: Telstra Chairman", available at: 
http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/324948/functional_separation_could_cost_1_2b_telstra_chair
man/ (accessed April 2016). 
192 See, Lin, P.-L. L. Y.-H. (2011). The Research of Telecoms Regulation--A Special Note to Functional 
Separation, Taiwan Institute of Economic Research. 
193 See for example: Recital (26) in the preamble of Access directive: "Given the pace of technological 
and market developments, the implementation of this Directive should be reviewed within three years 
of its date of application to determine if it is meeting its objectives." 
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the tariffs, service quality and investment management.194 Therefore, separation 
does not necessary reduce regulatory costs, but the ongoing need for regulation 
can increase the overall costs of separation.195 In addition, it is possible that 
NRAs may impose regulatory measures as supplementary obligations under 
separation.  
 
With all of that being said, as discussed above, Article 13a (2) Access Directive 
enumerates a series of conditions that NRAs have to meet when they intend to impose 
functional separation, such as: with the evidence that the appropriate obligations 
imposed under Articles 9 to 13 have failed to achieve effective competition and that 
there are important and persistent competition problems and/or market failures 
identified in relation to the wholesale provision of certain access product markets; 
offering a reasoned assessment that there is no or little prospect of effective and 
sustainable infrastructure-based competition within a reasonable time-frame; and 
engaging in the analyses of expected impact and of the reasons justifying that this 
obligation would be the most efficient means to enforce remedies aimed at addressing 
the competition problems/markets failures identified.196 This evidence, the 
assessment and analyses should also be submitted for review by the Commission. In 
other words, the modalities and conditions of imposing separation are not arbitrary, 
but have been carefully defined in the Union measure. These modalities and 
conditions also ensure that the drawbacks above have been considered and the 
imposition of functional separation is proven to be the most reasonable choice. Taking 
                                                 
194 See also: Article 13a (5) of Access Directive. 
195 In this regard, as the separation cannot achieve this policy object, this issue should also be 
examined in the suitability criterion. However, as the examination of suitability is usually not strict, and 
reducing the regulatory costs is just one of the policy objects, with this mechanism is suitable for other 
policy objects, this criteria should still be deemed met. 
196 Article 13a (2) of Access Directive. 
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into consideration all of these conditions discussed above, the Union legislature was 
lawfully entitled to impose the limitations on the right to property and freedom to 
conduct a business, as the protection of these different rights and benefits and a fair 
balance between them has been reconciled. 
 
E. Respect the Essence  
As discussed above, according to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, the essence 
of the right to property is disrespected when a guarantee of property is deprived of its 
substance, but not if the said right is only marginally affected or when only modalities 
of its excises are regulated. In the present case, however, functional separation 
requires the incumbent telco to make its access network department into an 
independent unit, which constitutes severe control over the use of the said property. At 
the same time, the obligations that accompany functional separation--such as 
transparency in information and costs, the setting up of a Chinese wall and the 
obligatory equal treatment of all downstream telcos--severely restrict the incumbent 
telco's participation in commercial activities, and thus severely affect its freedom to 
conduct its business. As discussed in Chapter Two, functional separation includes a 
series of arrangements, and it is possible that, in some cases, these arrangements will 
restrict the incumbent telco's right to property so intensively that functional separation, 
while not qualifying as formal expropriation but entailing similarly negative 
consequences for the incumbent telco's property, will be considered a deprivation of 
possession and constitute de facto expropriation as proposed in ECtHR case law.197  
 
However, as discussed in Chapter Six, the Court of Justice seldom, if ever, defines 
                                                 
197 Sporrong, supra n 55, para. 63 and Gianni v Italy (2006) App no. 35941/03, para. 81. 
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what kinds of interferences undermine the essence of rights, especially the right to 
property. Expropriation, as a deprivation of possessions, is the most severe 
interference in the right to property, but cases involving expropriation are not always 
overturned by the Courts, especially by this requirement. One may reasonably assume 
that the more severe interference to property rights is the imposition of major 
expropriation without any compensation or where the compensation is apparently too 
low and far from proportionate. This area requires further exploration in the case law 
of the European courts. 
 
2.2.3.3 Example of National Practice in the Member State? 
After searching the database, there appear to be no cases regarding telecoms 
functional separation or ownership separation that have been submitted for review by 
European courts. It is admitted that, this is partly because functional separation was 
only introduced into the European telecoms regulatory framework in 2007, but mostly 
because, in reality, the implementation of functional separation, instead of being 
imposed by NRAs or national legislation, requires the cooperation and compliance of 
incumbent telcos.198 
 
That said, while considering the complexity and special technologies involved in 
telecoms networks, it is worthwhile investigating separation cases in other network 
industries for comparison. This is especially true in energy industries, such as 
electricity and natural gas, as there is relatively abundant EU legislation regarding the 
                                                 
198 See the discussions in Chapter Two, see also Minister for Broadband, Communications and the 
Digital Economy, "Telecommunications (Acceptance of Undertaking about Structural 
Separation—Matters) Instrument 2011" and Ofcom, "Final statements on the Strategic Review of 
Telecommunications, and undertakings in lieu of a reference under the Enterprise Act 2002", available 
at: http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/752417/statement/statement.pdf (accessed 
April 2016): 57–105. 
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separation of networks in such industries199 and, of special importance to this thesis, 
fundamental rights issues with regard to separation in such industries prompt much 
more debate.200  
 
One of the most notable separation cases in the energy industry is Essent.201 This case 
concerns the compatibility with European Union law of national legislation202 
concerning the following prohibitions: the prohibition of the sale to private investors 
of shares held in the electricity and gas distribution system operators active in the 
Netherlands ("the prohibition of privatization"); the prohibition of any ownership or 
control links between, on the one hand, companies which are members of the same 
group as an operator of such distribution systems and, on the other, companies which 
are members of the same group as an undertaking which generates/ produces, supplies 
or trades in electricity or gas in the Netherlands ("the group prohibition") ; lastly, the 
prohibition of engagement by such an operator and by the group of which it is a 
member in transactions or activities which may adversely affect the operation of the 
system concerned ("the prohibition of activity which may adversely affect the system 
                                                 
199 Parliament and Council Directive 2009/72/EC concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market 
in Electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, 2009 OJ L 211/55 and Directive 2009/73/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning Common Rules for the Internal 
Market in Natural Gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, 2009 OJ L 211/94. 
200 See for example, Brunekreeft, G. and E. Ehlers (2005). "Does Ownership Unbundling of the 
Distribution Networks Distort the Development of Distributed Generation?" Annual Reports Tilburg 
Law and Economics Center; Brunekreeft, G. and E. Ehlers (2006); "Ownership Unbundling of 
Electricity Networks and Distributed Generation", Competition and Regulation in Network Industries 1: 
63 and Pielow, J.-C. and E. Ehlers (2008). "Ownership unbundling and constitutional conflict: a typical 
German debate?" European Review of Energy Markets 2 (3). 
201 Case C-105/12, Nederlanden v Essent [2013] OJ C 367/8. 
202 Wet houdende regels met betrekking tot de productie, het transport en de levering van elektriciteit , 
Elektriciteitswet 1998 (The Law regulating the production, supply and transmission of electricity, the 
1998 Law on electricity), Wet houdende regels omtrent het transport en de levering van gas (Gaswet) 
of 22 June 2000, Staatsblad 2000 No 305; "the Law on gas" (The Law regulating the transmission and 
supply of gas, "the Law on gas") and the decree: Besluit, houdende regels omtrent het verlenen van 
instemming met wijzigingen ten aanzien van rechten op aandelen in een netbeheerder als bedoeld in de 
Elektriciteitswet 1998 en in de Gaswet (the Decree establishing the rules relating to permitting changes 
in rights attaching to shareholdings in a system operator subject to the 1998 Law on electricity and to 





The State of the Netherlands, as the defendant, asserted that the prohibition of 
privatisation constitutes a body of rules governing the system of property ownership 
within the meaning of Article 345 TFEU, and is therefore not prejudiced by the 
Treaties. The effect of that prohibition is, first, that shares held in a system operator 
active in the Netherlands cannot be the subject of private investment and, secondly, 
that the rules of the TFEU relating to the free movement of capital and freedom of 
establishment are not applicable. Alternatively, the State of the Netherlands 
maintained that the group prohibition and the prohibition of activities which may 
adversely affect system operation do not impede either the free movement of capital 
or freedom of establishment or, at the least, that a restriction on those freedoms is 
justified by overriding reasons in the public interest.204 
 
In its ruling, the Court of Justice first pointed out that, in the Court’s case law, the 
Treaties do not preclude, as a general rule, either the nationalisation of undertakings 
or their privatisation,205 and Member States may legitimately pursue an objective of 
establishing or maintaining a body of rules relating to the public ownership of certain 
undertakings.206 
 
The Court of Justice further noted that the objective of the prohibition of privatization 
is to maintain a body of rules relating to public ownership in respect of those 
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operators, and it therefore falls within the scope of Article 345 TFEU.207 Article 345 
TFEU, however, does not mean that rules governing the systems of property 
ownership current in Member States are not subject to the fundamental rules of the 
TFEU, especially the free movement of capital, as in Article 63(1) TFEU,208 and must 
be examined in light of that article, as must the group prohibition and indeed the 
prohibition of activities which may adversely affect system operation.209 
 
The Court of Justice considered the prohibition on the acquiring of shares and the 
three kinds of prohibition at issue, and it determined that they all constitute 
restrictions on the free movement of capital within the meaning of Article 63 
TFEU.210  
 
The Court of Justice referred to its case law, such as Commission v Spain211 and 
Commission v Poland212, and stated that the free movement of capital may be limited 
by national legislation only if it is justified by one of the reasons mentioned in Article 
65 TFEU or by overriding reasons in the public interest within the meaning of the 
Court’s case law.213 According to settled case law, grounds of a purely economic 
nature cannot constitute overriding reasons in the public interest justifying a 
restriction on a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaties;214 however, national 
legislation may constitute a justified restriction on a fundamental freedom when it is 
dictated by reasons of an economic nature in the pursuit of an objective in the public 
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The objective of undistorted competition in those markets is also pursued by the FEU 
Treaty, the preamble to which underlines the need for concerted action in order to 
guarantee, inter alia, fair competition, the ultimate aim of that action being to protect 
consumers. According to the Court’s settled case law, consumer protection constitutes 
an overriding reason in the public interest;216 at the same time, the objective of 
guaranteeing adequate investment in the electricity and gas distribution systems is 
designed to ensure, inter alia, security of energy supply, an objective which the Court 
has also recognised as being an overriding reason in the public interest.217 
 
Consequently, the objectives referred to by the referring court may, in principle, as 
overriding reasons in the public interest, justify the identified restrictions on 
fundamental freedoms.218 However, it is also necessary that the restrictions at issue 
are appropriate to the objectives pursued and do not go beyond what is necessary to 
attain those objectives, which is for the referring court to determine.219 
 
While not very similar to the situation in the telecoms industry, Essent does, in a way, 
reveal a key difference between the telecoms industry and other network industries 
such as electricity and gas (henceforth the energy industry). The first point to be noted 
is that to say that the telecoms and energy industries are at different stages of 
                                                 
215 Ibid, para. 52. 
216 The Court of Justice cited Case C-260/04, Commission v Italy [2007] E.C.R. I-7083, para. 27; Case 
C-393/05, Commission v Austria [2007] E.C.R. I-10195, para. 52; and Case C-458/08, Commission v 
Portugal [2010] E.C.R. I-11599, para. 89. 
217 The Court of Justice cited Case C-72/83 Campus Oil and Others,[1984] E.C.R. 2727, paras 34 and 
35; Case C-503/99 Commission v Belgium [2002] E.C.R. I-4809, para 46; and Case C-174/04, 
Commission v Italy, para. 40. 
218 Essent, supra n 201, para. 66. 
219 Ibid, para. 67. 
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liberalisation is not as accurate as to say they are on different tracks towards 
liberalisation. At first glance, separation (or unbundling) in the energy industry seems 
to be well ahead of that in the telecoms industry, as the so-called three-way options 
for the unbundling of the generation and transmission systems of the energy industry, 
namely ownership unbundling, independent system operators and independent 
transmission operators were introduced in the Third Energy Package and with much 
more enforcing power than the functional separation in the telecoms industry. 
However, privatisation is implemented very thoroughly in the telecoms industry, with 
the telecoms industries in almost all Member States having already been privatised, 
whilst privatisation of the energy industry is still struggling, as can be seen in this 
case. 
 
A second observation to be made is that, compared to the telecoms industry, the 
Commission cares more about stabilisation of the offerings of the energy service than 
privatising the industry, and therefore the energy industry in many Member States 
remains publicly owned. It is little wonder that the emphasis on the compatibility of 
national legislation in Member States and EU law usually concerns national measures 
for stabilising the offerings of the energy services and national legislation concerning 
limitations on privatisation, as seen in this case. On the other hand, as the telecoms 
industry in Member States is now largely privatised, its once public-service nature 
becomes a burden on private entities, and as such fundamental rights issues may arise, 
as this thesis intends to discuss. 
 
3. Conclusion 
In the European Union, telecom forced access mechanisms are generally subject to 
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broader interventions, or, in other words, they find it easier to pass the legality review. 
This is due to two reasons: first, they affect essentially economic rights. While 
fundamental rights are not absolute and their exercise is limited to their social 
functions, economic rights, unlike civil or political rights, generally can be expected 
to bear more burdens. Second, telecoms forced access mechanisms are part of 
telecoms regulations, which constitutes sector-specific regulation. The Courts 
generally recognise that legislative departments enjoy a wide discretionary power 
with sector-specific regulations when engaging in assessment, making decisions and 
choosing the relevant regulatory measures. 
 
The facts that the rights involved are somehow "lesser" rights and there is wider 
discretion of choosing regulatory measures do not necessarily mean that telecoms 
forced access mechanisms are not subject to substantive judicial review. As pointed 
out in Digital Rights Ireland, if, taking into consideration the nature of the rights, the 
nature and seriousness of the interference and the objective pursued by the 
interference, it is possible to for the Court to engage in a substantive review of a 
sector-specific regulatory measure. Also in Sky Österreich, while the Court recognised 
that the fundamental freedom at issue, i.e. the freedom to conduct a business, may be 
subject to a broad range of interventions, it subsequently engaged in a detailed 
substantive review. If we take the Digital Rights Ireland reasoning, the key issues here 
become whether the nature or the importance of the rights affected by telecoms forced 
access mechanisms and the nature and seriousness of the interference caused by 
imposing of telecoms forced access mechanisms are comparable to those in Digital 




In the view of this thesis, separation is the only contender comparable to the situation 
in Digital Rights Ireland. Although in the three mechanisms the fundamental rights 
affected are the same, the impairment of separation upon those rights is much stronger 
than interconnection and local-loop unbundling. Such a strong interference with the 
right to property and freedom to conduct a business does justify the lifting of the limit 
upon a substantive judicial review. However, as discussed above, even where a 







Analysis (2): Taiwan 
 
Preface 
This chapter analyses the legality of telecoms forced access mechanisms in Taiwan. 
As in the previous chapter, the discussion in this chapter explores the scope for 
judicial review in this field and applies the legality/constitutionality assessment 
criteria used in Taiwan to examine the three central telecoms forced access 
mechanisms identified in Chapters Two and Three, with special consideration given to 
whether these mechanisms excessively restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the telcos upon which these regulatory mechanisms are imposed. To avoid duplication 
of the discussion of the European Union, the same content discussed in Chapter Ten 
will be referred to here.  
 
As specified in Chapter Five, under the legal framework of Taiwan, reviewing the 
constitutionality or legality of a regulatory measure, especially with regard to possible 
infringements of property rights or the freedom to conduct a business as the main 
focus in this thesis, follows a normative review – the requirement of the rule of law – 
and a substantive review – the application of the principle of proportionality – with 
different intensities of judicial review depending upon the different characteristics of 
the fundamental rights involved. At the same time, just as with the situation in the 
European Union, the legislature in Taiwan also enjoys some discretion (see discussion 
below), and this is especially true with regard to expert or sector-specific legislation. 




The next section discusses the relationship between telecoms forced access 
mechanisms and legislative discretion. It starts by defining the nature of telecoms 
forced access mechanisms (section 1.1), and how these mechanisms are implemented 
in Taiwan (section 1.2).  
 
The following section discusses the criteria for the review of the constitutionality of a 
regulatory measure in Taiwan (section 2). It starts with a review of the traditional 
criteria for review of the constitutionality in Taiwan, namely a proportionality test 
with consideration of the intensity of review – a combination of the German and 
American approaches (section 2.1), the latest developments of such a review system 
(section 2.2) and how economic rights fit into this system (section 2.3). The last 
section of this chapter applies the review criteria examined above to the 
constitutionality of telecoms forced access mechanisms (3).  
 
1. Telecoms Forced Access Mechanisms in Taiwan 
1.1 The Nature of Telecoms Forced Access Mechanisms 
Under the legal framework in Taiwan, telecoms forced access mechanisms are 
regulatory measures within the telecoms regulatory framework that attempt to ensure 
better access to telecoms networks for other telecoms companies and citizens. Thus, 
they are regarded as a form of sector-specific (industry) regulation. But at the same 
time they also have the character of competition law and are generally categorised as 
economic law or part of economic policy.1 
  
                                                 
1 See for example: FTC (2015 (last updated)). "The Explanatory Notes of the Fair Trade Commission 




On the other hand, telecoms forced access mechanisms, as part of telecoms regulation, 
also have the function of offering a public service, where the maximization of 
economic effect is not always the only policy objective of concern, as there should 
also be considerations of the wider benefits to all citizens. This feature is best 
demonstrated in Article 1 of the Taiwanese Telecommunications Act: "This Act is 
enacted to ensure the sound development of telecommunications, promote the public 
welfare, safeguard the security of communications and protect the rights and interests 
of users. Matters not provided herein shall be subject to the provisions of other 
applicable laws."2 
 
The economic law nature of telecoms forced access mechanisms raises two concerns. 
First, the targeted industries or markets are subject to rapid change. To be regulated 
more efficiently, therefore the legislator usually leaves some flexibility in the 
provisions for the administrative institutions to make assessments and decisions. As 
noted by the Supreme Administrative Court:  
 
"The character of economic law and regulation often evolves along with changes in 
society and the economic situation. Different behaviours constantly surface over 
time, and it is inappropriate precisely to regulate such behaviours by laws and 
regulations. This is why provisions with indefinite legal concepts exist in economic 
law."3  
 
Indeed, there are numerous examples of these "indefinite legal concepts" in the 
                                                 
2 Article 1 Taiwanese Telecommunications Act. 
3 2006 No.93 Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court. 
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telecoms regulatory regime, such as "industrially applicable",4 "relevant market",5 
"no competition",6 "effective competition in the telecommunications market",7 
"abuse of DMP (dominant market player) status"8 and "not technically feasible".9 
This raises concerns about legal certainty, i.e. will the ambiguity in these provisions 
contravene the requirements of the rule of law? More specifically and of more 
importance to the discussions in this thesis: can regulatory measures that are 
significantly lacking in clarity and predictability be used to restrict fundamental rights 
and freedoms? This issue will be further discussed in the later sections of this chapter. 
 
The second concern is that, similar to discussions on European law, as a modern 
democratic State with a constitutional design and separation of powers, the legislative 
and administrative institutions in Taiwan enjoy a certain degree of discretion. This is 
especially true in the field of economic law and policy as the decisions made by 
relevant institutions are generally respected by the judicial department. Under the 
concept of a constitutional state, all statutes and regulations should be subject to 
review of their constitutionality. Thus, the interaction between 
legislative/administrative discretion and review of the constitutionality of a measure 
or, more specifically, how intensely telecoms forced access mechanisms should be 
reviewed, has become an issue.  
 
1.2 Implementing Instruments 
                                                 
4 See Article 22 Patent Act. 
5 See Article 5 Fair Trade Act. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See Article 20-1 Telecommunications Act. 
8 See Article 26-1 Telecommunications Act. 




The three telecoms forced access mechanisms are regulated by different legal 
instruments, and their supplementary obligations are sometimes imposed in a 
scatter-gun fashion across statutes, regulations and administrative orders. 
Interconnection, for example, has its principles laid out in the Telecommunications 
Act,10 with most of the supplementary obligations found in the Regulations 
Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications Enterprises,11 
which is delegated legislation. Similarly, in local-loop unbundling, the principles are 
laid out in the Telecommunications Act,12 while many obligations, such as tariff 
control, are also then set out in the Regulations Governing Networks Interconnection 
among Telecommunications Enterprises.13 As for separation, functional and 
ownership separation were first included in a draft amendment to the 
Telecommunications Act (2010)14 but, in a later version of the draft, the provisions 
about ownership separation were removed and the article was moved to Article 25. 
Even today, the proposal amendment remains only a draft and has never been adopted. 
It should however be noted that, according to this draft amendment, there are no 
details about the relevant obligations to be implemented, such as separation in the 
Telecommunications Act itself; it would be left to the regulator to draft and enact the 
relevant regulations.  
 
                                                 
10 Article 16 Telecommunications Act. 
11 See, for example: Article 4 (principles of interconnection), Article 7(principles for setting points of 
interconnection) and Article 11 (the arrangements of equipment configuration and maintenance, 
location and associated costs of interconnection) of Regulations Governing Network Interconnection 
among Telecommunications Enterprises. 
12 Article 31 Telecommunications Act. 
13 See, for example Article 18(2) Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among 
Telecommunications Enterprises. 
14 Draft amendment to Article 22 of the Telecommunications Act (2010) states: "If relevant effective 
competition is not achieved within a certain period that the amendment is in force, the regulator may 
impose on the dominant carrier in a fixed network telecommunications market a requirement to 
implement a structural split, functional separation or other necessary mechanisms that essentially 
promote effective competition (temporary translation)." 
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The definition of delegated regulation and its relationship to statutes and 
administrative orders within the Taiwanese legal framework requires an in-depth 
discussion about the constitutional design and balancing between legislative and 
administrative powers, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.15 To summarise, 
while delegated regulation is enacted by administrative institutions and is essentially 
an administrative act, because of its general nature and because the entitlement of 
administrative institutions to enact such regulation is framed by statutory delegation, 
it should be subject to similar judicial review, along with statutes.16 
 
2. Telecoms Forced Access and Review of Constitutionality 
2.1 Review of the Criteria for Constitutionality Review 
2.1.1 Principle of Proportionality and the German and American approaches 
As discussed in Chapter Five (2.4), the review of the constitutionality of regulatory 
measures that may affect fundamental rights and freedoms—usually inclusively called 
fundamental rights in Taiwan—is pursued in a two-step examination process. The first 
step is a normative review to see whether the challenged regulation meets the 
requirements of the rule of law. The second step—substantive review--on the other 
hand, differs in approach depending on the backgrounds of the Grand Justices. The 
traditional German approach is basically the application of the principle of 
proportionality with the consideration of the intensity of the review reflecting the 
nature of the different fundamental rights involved. This German intensity of judicial 
control system contains three categories: 
(1) in Evidence Control, the Constitutional Court (henceforth the Court) only reviews 
                                                 
15 For more detailed discussions, see: Hsu, T.-L. (1995). "The Commentary of Rule of Law". Law and 
State Powers, Angle Publish: 195-.Wu, G. (2015). "Delegated Legislation". The Theories and Practices 
of Administrative Law, SanMin Publish. 
16 See the dissenting opinion to No.137 Official Interpretation by Grand Justice Wang, Z.-Z..   
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whether there exist apparent errors in the challenged legislation;  
(2) in Tenability Control, the Court reviews whether the decisions made by legislators 
are reasonable or tenable; and 
(3) in Intensive Content Control, the Court has to review whether the legislator’s 
assessments or predictions are highly accurate or reliable, and where there exist 
reasonable doubts about such accuracy or reliability, the challenged legislation 
should be deemed unconstitutional (see discussions in Chapter Five (2.4.2.)). 
 
The American approach, on the other hand, also contains three categories:  
(1) the Rational Relationship Test requires that the policy objective pursued should be 
a legitimate governmental interest, and there should exist a rational relationship 
between the policy objective and the measure adopted;  
(2) the Intermediate Scrutiny Test requires that the policy objectives should pursue an 
important governmental interest, and there should exist a substantial relationship 
between the policy objective and the measure adopted; and 
(3) the Strict Scrutiny Test requires that the policy objective should pursue a 
compelling governmental interest, and the measure adopted should be narrowly 
tailored to the policy objective (see discussions in Chapter Five (2.4.2.)) 
 
 
2.1.2 Categorisation of Official Interpretations 
Because of the different backgrounds of the Grand Justices, the two approaches above 
are often used interchangeably in Official Interpretations. However, observation of 
Official Interpretations leads to the conclusion that there exists a sort of rules for how 
the Grand Justices apply those approaches when they are dealing with different 
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subject matters or fundamental rights: 
a. if the challenged regulatory measure involves both fundamental rights and 
decision-making in formulating sector-specific regulations, the approach 
adopted is usually that of German Tenability Control;17 
b. if the challenged regulatory measure involves fundamental rights and complex 
policy decisions, such as the assignment of resources, environmental 
protection or economic structures, the approach adopted is usually German 
Tenability Control or an American Rational Relationship Test;18  
c. if it is about issuing emergency decrees and supplementary measures, the 
approach adopted is usually an American Rational Relationship Test;19 
d. if the challenged regulatory measure is not related to the core content of 
fundamental rights (Kerngehalt der Grundrechten), the approach adopted is 
usually an American Rational Relationship Test;20 
e. if the challenged regulatory measure is related to the core content of 
fundamental rights, the approach adopted is usually German Intensive Content 
Control or an American Strict Scrutiny Test;21 and 
f. if the challenged regulatory measure involves the deprivation of personal 
freedoms and the right to life, the approach adopted is usually German 
Intensive Content Control or an American Strict Scrutiny Test.22 
                                                 
17 See the dissenting opinion to No.389 Official Interpretation by Grand Justices Su, J.-h. and Dai, 
T.-h.; the concurring opinion to No.532 Official Interpretation by Grand Justice Su, J.-h.. 
18See the concurring opinion to No.472 Official Interpretation by Grand Justice Su, J.-h.; the 
concurring opinion to No.472 Official Interpretation by Grand Justice Hsu, T.-L; the dissenting opinion 
to No.579 Official Interpretation by Grand Justice Hsu, T.-L.; the partial concurring opinion and partial 
dissenting opinion to No.580 Official Interpretation by Grand Justice Lin, T.-Y.. 
19 See the concurring opinion to No.571 Official Interpretation by Grand Justice Lin, T.-Y.. 
20 See the concurring opinion to No.569 Official Interpretation by Grand Justice Lin, T.-Y.. 
21See the partial dissenting opinion to No.490 Official Interpretation by Grand Justice Wang, H.-H.; the 
concurring opinion to No.573 Official Interpretation by Grand Justice Wang, H.-H.; the dissenting 
opinion to No.596 Official Interpretation by Grand Justices Hsu, T.-L. and Hsu, Y.H. 
22 See the partial concurring opinion and partial dissenting opinion to Official Interpretation No.588 by 




It can therefore be concluded that, from the Grand Justices’ point of view, German 
Tenability Control is consistent with an American Rational Relationship Test, as stated 
by Grand Justice Hsu: "[e]conomic fundamental rights are subject to loose judicial 
review in the United States and intermediate judicial review in Germany."23 On the 
other hand, German Intensive Content Control is treated as equivalent to an American 
Strict Scrutiny Test.24  
 
2.2 Latest Developments in the Criteria for Constitutionality Review  
Even in lightly-reviewed areas there is, however, a possibility that the restriction of 
fundamental rights is so intense that it constitutes an infringement of the core content 
of the said fundamental rights.25 The criteria for judicial review proposed above 
should thus not be deemed to be a strict set of rules. Therefore, it has been suggested 
when reviewing the constitutionality of a regulatory measure that not only the subject 
matter but also the extent of fundamental rights restriction should be taken into 
consideration.26 Chen (2000) further suggests that the "sliding-scale approach" used 
                                                                                                                                            
opinion to Official Interpretation No.594 by Grand Justice Hsu, Y.H.. 
23 See the concurring opinion to Official Interpretation No.584 by Grand Justices Hsu, T.-L.. 
24 This common attitude can be seen in the partial concurring opinion and partial dissenting opinion to 
Official Interpretation No.588 by Grand Justices Hsu, T.-L., Wang, H.-H., Liao, I.-N., Lin, T.-Y. and 
Hsu, Y.H as despite the different legal backgrounds, the Grand Justices agreed that strict criteria should 
be applied in reviewing personal freedom. 
25 See the dissenting opinion to No.596 Official Interpretation by Grand Justices Hsu, T.-L. and Hsu, 
Y.H.. In this case, the issue is that the Labor Standards Act did not provide that the right to claim 
retirement pensions shall not be attached, transferred or secured as that in the Public Functionaries 
Retirement Act. Grand Justices Hsu and Hsu held that while the designing of retirement pension system 
involves the management of national resources and economic and social structure, and is in principle 
not subject to strict review; however, the retirement pension is also related to the right of survival of the 
civil servants in their retire life, and this a light-touch approach is not suitable.   
26 It has been observed that the prevailing trend of review of the constitutionality in international 
practices is to apply different reviewing intensities toward different subject matters, and the 
development of review of the constitutionality in Taiwan is coherent to this trend. See: Huang, Z. 
(2000). "Legislative Discretion and Judicial Review--Focused on the Reviewing Criteria " The 
Constitutional Review 26(2): 156-185, and "The development of Review of the constitutionality 
Criteria in Official Interpretations (1996-2011): The Adoption and Localisation of the Principle of 
Proportionality." National Taiwan University Law Review 42(2): 215-258. 
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in the United States should be introduced into the Taiwanese review of 
constitutionality system in order to make a multi-dimensional assessment of the 
fundamental rights involved, the intensity of interference and the subject matters to 
decide which criteria should be applied.27  
 
2.3 Review of the constitutionality Criteria of Economic Rights in Official 
Interpretations 
Similar to the situation in the European Union, the Grand Justices hold that 
socio-economic rights – especially property rights – are not absolute but may entail 
social obligations. Thus, if a regulatory measure does not impose an excessive burden, 
such a measure should not be deemed an infringement of property rights.28 The same 
can be said about the freedom to conduct a business, which derives from property 
rights and the right to work (see discussion in Chapter Nine). Thus a regulatory 
measure involving socio-economic rights is deemed easiest to pass a review of the 
constitutionality.29 Indeed, as discussed above, sector-specific regulations or 
legislation involving economic rights are usually reviewed according to German 
Tenability Control or an American Rational Relationship Test.30 Such a stance taken 
by the Grand Justices is coherent with the broad extent of legislative discretion 
concerning sector-specific regulations.   
 
An exception to the situation above is the expropriation of property, for which the 
                                                 
27 Chen, Y.-J. (2005). "The Study of the Review of the constitutionalitying Criteria by Grand Justices 
and A Commentary on No.584 Official Interpretation " Studies in the Humanities and Social Science(3): 
112. 
28 See for reference: No.564 and 577 Official Interpretations. 
29 Chou, P.-C. (2009). "The Principle of Proportionality--The Reference of Applications in the 
European Court of Human Rights." National Taipei University: 112. 
30 German Tenability Control is actually the least intense substantial reviewing criteria, as Evident 
Control applies when there are significant errors in the challenged legislation and is in essence a 
normative reviewing criterion.   
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Grand Justices generally adopt the strict approach to review of constitutionality,31 as 
the Grand Justices have paid special attention in developing the conditions that should 
be met in the case of expropriation. In other words, an expropriation is only 
constitutional when the following conditions are met:32 
(a) The expropriation should be provided for by law (the principle of rule of law); 
(b) The expropriation should have more than a legitimate aim; 
(c) The expropriation should be for the public interest; 
(d) There should be supplementary measures, i.e., compensation provisions about 
the compensation to the expropriation; and 
(e) The expropriation measures should be proportionate to their legal aims 
(principle of proportionality). 
 
3. Legality of Telecoms Forced Access Mechanisms in Taiwan 
3.1 Fundamental Rights and Freedoms Involved 
3.1.1 Interconnection 
As discussed in Chapters Two and Ten, interconnection refers to the physical and 
logical linkage of the public communications networks of two or more telcos in order 
to enable the customers of these different telcos to communicate with each other, or to 
access services provided by other telcos. The telcos still retain ownership of the said 
networks, and remain free to dispose of them or put them to other uses which are not 
prohibited; however, they are obliged to let such networks be linked to other telcos. 
Their rights to use such networks, as part of property rights (see discussion in Chapter 
                                                 
31 Liao, Y.-H. (2008). "Unpredictable or an Inherent Order? The Review of the constitutionality 
Criteria Proposed by Current Grand Justices" Academia Sinica Law Journal 2: 220. 
32 See discussions in Chapter Seven (2.2.2). See also for reference: Chou, P.-C. (2009). "The Principle 
of Proportionality--The Reference of Applications in the European Court of Human Rights." National 
Taipei University: 112. 
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Seven), are therefore affected. Likewise, their freedom to conduct a business, as part 
of the right to work and the right to property as stipulated in Article 15 of the 
Constitution,33 is also restricted, as interconnection imposes a burden on telcos’ 
freedom to exercise commercial activities, i.e. telcos can no longer freely decide with 
which bodies they wish to enter into an agreement. 
 
3.1.2 Local-loop Unbundling 
As discussed in Chapter Three (2.3), there are four types of local-loop unbundling 
under the telecoms regulatory framework in Taiwan since, besides full unbundling, 
line-sharing and sub-loop unbundling in the European Union, bitstream access is also 
a type of local-loop unbundling implemented in Taiwan.34 Similar to the situation in 
the European Union, as discussed in Chapter Ten, in either type of local-loop 
unbundling, the incumbent telco is required to bear a burden attached to its property. 
This burden can be the shared use of metallic cables (full unbundling), allowing the 
high-frequency spectrum available on its metallic cables to be used by others 
(line-sharing), or allowing the co-location of another telco's device in its own facility 
(sub-loop unbundling). In bitstream access, while other telcos do not directly connect 
to the metallic cables of the local loop, it requires the incumbent telco to offer a 
wholesale-like bitstream service to other telcos via its local loop. While these burdens 
make it more difficult for the incumbent to exercise its property rights, it is still 
entitled and able to do so. Thus, local-loop unbundling does not constitute a 
deprivation of property, but merely interference with the use of property. 
 
                                                 
33 Article 15 of Constitution reads: "The right of existence, the right of work, and the right of property 
shall be guaranteed to the people." 
34 See discussions in Chapters Two and Three. 
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Likewise, local-loop unbundling also constitutes interference with the incumbent 
telco's freedom to conduct its business, as the incumbent’s rights to carry on economic 
or commercial activities are restricted: e.g. in being required to unbundle its local loop, 
it is no longer free to use its local-loop network. 
 
3.1.3 Separation 
The incumbent telco's property rights and freedom to conduct a business will be 
affected when separation is imposed. Functional separation, as discussed earlier, 
requires the access network department of the incumbent telco to be made into an 
independent unit so that its networks can be equally accessed by the incumbent itself 
and its competitors. This obligation and the many supplementary arrangements 
significantly limit the incumbent telco's use of its access networks, and thus constitute 
a restriction of its property rights. It should be noted that the concept of de facto 
expropriation is not recognised in the Taiwanese constitutionality jurisprudence as it is 
in the ECtHR. Therefore, even when functional separation arrangements severely 
restrict the incumbent telco's right to use the said property, as long as the ownership 
remains the same, it will not regarded as expropriation which, as discussed above, 
requires the appreciation of much more intense criteria for review in Taiwan. At the 
same time, such an intense restriction on the use of property that plays an important 
role in a telco's operation of its business, i.e. providing telecoms services, thus also 
constitutes interference with the telco's freedom to conduct its business. 
 
Ownership separation, on the other hand, proposes to split up access networks from 
the incumbent telco. As discussed in Chapter Ten, there can be two possible 
arrangements after such a split: the establishment of a separate network company or 
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the split-up networks being expropriated by the State and made into a public network 
department or company. In either case, ownership separation constitutes a deprivation 
of property; likewise, such intense interference with the use of telecoms networks that 
play an important role in the incumbent telco's operation of its business will also 
constitute interference with the telco's freedom to engage in commercial activity. 
 
3.2 Analysis of Telecoms Forced Access Mechanisms 
A review of constitutionality in Taiwan, as discussed above, is the combination of a 
normative review (rule of law) and a substantive review, with a selection of the 
German or American approach. With regard to substantive review, a different 
approach is taken for the discussion in this section for that in Chapter Ten (analysis of 
the European Union). This is because although we can at first ignore legislative 
discretion and consider a "classic" proportionality analysis as in the European Union, 
in scholarly discussions in Taiwan, the constitutionality review of a regulatory 
measure should be considered together with the nature of the measure, and the criteria 
of the review then follow. For example, if the challenged legislation is economic 
legislation, the reviewing intensity will be the German Tenability Control or the 
American Rational Relationship Test, and the Court has to review whether the 
decision made by the legislators is supportable or tenable, or whether there exists a 
rational relationship between the policy objective and the measure adopted.  
 
It should be noted, however, that in many cases, although the Court adopts the 
German approach and mentions the three-step proportionality test, in reality only a 
proportionality stricto sensu test is applied by the Court with due reviewing intensity; 
other criteria, even when taken into consideration, are usually treated with a 
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light-tough approach. An example of such a criterion is the policy objective of the 
challenged regulatory measure, which under the Taiwanese constitutionality 
jurisprudence is usually included when reviewing the first criterion – suitability; this 
is generally reviewed with low intensity, as Grand Justice Hsu pointed out in her 
concurring opinion of Official Interpretation No.594:  
 
"…the basic attitude for Grand Justices in reviewing the intensity of a 
constitutional review is that policy objectives of challenged regulations are 
reviewed with low intensity, while the effects of the challenged regulations are 
reviewed, depending on the different fundamental rights involved, with a different 
intensity."35 This is perhaps because of the logical difficulties in applying a 
reviewing intensity within each of the three criteria or steps of a proportionality 
test (see discussion below).  
 
It should also be remembered that a substantive review, i.e. the application of a 
proportionality test, is a gradual process; in other words, once a previous criterion has 
not been met, the challenged regulatory measure should be deemed unconstitutional 
and it is not necessary to proceed to an examination of the next criterion/criteria.36 
However, for the purposes of the discussion in this thesis, each criterion will be 
examined in this section.  
 
3.2.1 Interconnection 
(1) The Normative Review – Rule of Law 
                                                 
35 See the concurring opinion to No.594 Official Interpretation by Grand Justice Hsu, Y. H.. 
36 Li, H. H. (1999). Review of the constitutionality--A Commentary, Angle Publishing; Wu, G. (2015). 
"Delegated Legislation". The Theories and Practices of Administrative Law, SanMin Publish. 
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The first stage when reviewing the constitutionality of a measure is, as noted above, a 
normative review – the principle of the rule of law. With regard to this, Official 
Interpretation No.443 has established a graded statutory reserve system, as it states:  
 
"The determination of which freedom or right shall be regulated by law or by rules 
authorized by the law shall depend on regulated intensity. Reasonable deviation is 
allowed considering the party to be regulated, the content of the regulation, or the 
limitations to be made on the interests or freedom. For instance, depriving people's 
lives or limiting their physical freedom shall be in compliance with the principle of 
definitiveness of crime and punishment and stipulated by law; limitations 
concerning people's other freedoms shall also be stipulated by law, in the case 
where there is authorization by the law to the administrative institutions to make 
supplemental rules about detailed and technical matters, the authorization shall be 
specific and precise." 
 
In other words, the requirement of the rule of law should reflect the importance of the 
rights and the nature of the restrictions. Limitations to fundamental rights and 
freedoms are generally required to be stipulated by law, and only the detailed and 
technical supplemental rules can be delegated to administrative institutions, but such 
delegation, or authorization, should be specific and precise.  
 
The legal basis of interconnection derives from the Telecommunications Act as well 
as the Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among Telecommunications 
Enterprises, which is statutorily delegated legislation. Under the rationale of Official 
Interpretation No.443, although imposing interconnection involves the telco's 
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fundamental rights, it is not unconstitutional to have these detailed and technical 
matters regulated in delegated legislation, as long as the authorization is specific and 
precise. 
 
In the present case, the obligations, conditions, timing and fees are detailed and 
technical matters, and the delegating statutory provision—Article 16 (9) 
Telecommunications Act—reads:  
 
"The DGT37 shall enact governing rules with respect to network interconnection, 
tariff calculation, negotiation, mandatory terms within interconnection agreements, 
arbitration procedures , and matters requiring compliance related thereto, between 
or among Type I telecommunications enterprises and other telecommunications 
enterprises."  
 
This provision is precise and specific, thus this requirement should be deemed to be 
met.  
 
(2) Substantive Review 
A. The German Approach 
Interconnection, as discussed above, should be defined as a regulatory measure of 
economic law. Therefore, the intensity of constitutionality review, or the intensity of 
the application of the principle of proportionality, is the German Tenability Control. In 
other words, the Court has to review whether the legislator's decision regarding 
interconnection is supportable.  
                                                 
37 It should be noted that because of the error in the enacting process of the amendment, the regulator 




a. Suitability (appropriateness) 
In the present case, the policy objectives of interconnection are to eliminate disputes 
caused by unfair interconnection, to promote nation-wide telecoms services by 
ensuring the interconnection of telecoms networks, and to provide end-to-end 
interoperability of services to protect the rights of consumers.38 While 
interconnection may not be the only measure to achieve these objectives, this measure 
reasonably facilitates such goals. Thus this criterion should be regarded as met. 
 
b. Necessity 
Like the situation in the European Union, the requirement of necessity is by definition 
a strict criterion; thus, there exists an inherent conflict when the Court chooses a 
light-touch or even intermediate approach such as German Tenability Control to 
review this requirement. It is logically difficult to envisage engaging in a light-touch 
review of whether the measure adopted is the least restrictive; in other words, it is 
questionable how the Court accepts such broad legislative decision in choosing the 
least onerous measure. Unfortunately, this issue has not been emphasized in 
constitutionality jurisprudence and scholarly discussions in Taiwan. In the present 
case, however, just like the situation in the European Union, interconnection is the 
most direct and sometimes the only way to achieve the policy objectives – such as 
promoting nation-wide telecoms services and providing end-to-end interoperability of 
services to protect the rights of consumers. This criterion should therefore be deemed 
met. 
 
                                                 
38 See, for reference: the recital of 2002 draft bill of Regulations Governing Network Interconnection 
among Telecommunications Enterprises. 
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c. Proportionality Stricto Sensu 
The criterion of proportionality stricto sensu is where, at least in the view of this 
thesis, the intensity of review really comes into play. Although it has indeed been 
reiterated by Taiwanese scholars that the intensity of a review is not another aspect of 
a reviewing system other than a proportionality test--it is more of a supplementary 
system that penetrates each of the three sub-disciplines of a proportionality test--there 
is no denying that the reviewing intensity is used mainly to examine proportionality 
stricto sensu: i.e., is the regulatory measure at issue proportionate to the policy 
objectives? In the present case, it is to see whether the legislative decision to require 
interconnection is proportionate to the policy objectives, and is tenable or supportable. 
As stated above, the policy objectives of interconnection are to promote telecoms 
services and ensure the end-to-end interoperability of services to protect the rights of 
consumers. Besides, as discussed in Chapter Ten, interconnection involves providing 
a service of general economic interest. This service of general economic interest or 
service of general interest nature of telecoms is usually known as a type of public 
service obligation in Taiwan, and it is frequently quoted in Taiwanese telecoms 
legislative acts as well as in scholarly discussions. In fact, such public service 
obligations cannot find their source in Taiwanese constitutional provisions,39 only via 
the explications of scholars.  
 
The discussion of telecoms' public service obligation in Taiwan should start with the 
evolution of the role of the state. In the past, providing services like telecoms, 
including the construction of relevant infrastructure, was regarded as being an 
                                                 
39 The only seemly related provision in Taiwanese Constitution is Article 144, which reads: "Public 
utilities and other enterprises of a monopolistic nature shall, in principle, be under public operation. In 
cases permitted by law, they may be operated by private citizens". 
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obligation of the state. In addition, in order to guarantee all citizens could enjoy such 
services, it was acceptable for them to be provided in the form of a public monopoly. 
This situation began to change with the trend towards liberalisation, and competition 
and market rules have become guiding principles for the supply of telecoms services. 
While the state is no longer the provider of such services, it should be noted that it is 
not exempt from all responsibilities, it has turned into the supervisor or regulator of 
relevant market.40 In other words, the role of the state has changed from a productive 
state (Leistungstaat) to a guarantor state (Gewährleistungsstaat), hence it should 
design a relevant system to ensure that the public interest can be protected via the 
operation of the market. Therefore, a guarantor state does not abandon all obligations 
with respect to public services, it just withdraws from the task of implementation 
solely so that this can be done more flexibly, diversely and efficiently. In this regard, 
especially with its close relationship to a universal service, the imposition of 
interconnection on private telcos can be deemed as the implementation of a public 
service. 
 
On the other hand, imposing interconnection does not constitute a severe infringement 
of a telco's use of its property and the right to operate its business, it merely requires it 
to offer a suitable interface, and not to arbitrarily hinder interconnection, such as 
charging excessive interconnection fees or delaying the process; it can be concluded 
that there exists reasonableness in the relationship between policy objectives and so 
this adopted regulatory measure is supportable.  
 
                                                 
40 C.Franzius, "Der Gewahrleistungsstaat"– Ein neues Leitbild fur den sich wandelnder Staat,Der 
Staat,42-4/2003,S.499, cited from: On the Universal Service of Telecommunications in the Guarantee 
State, Chia-Yang Lin, National Taipei University, 2009. 
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B. The American Approach 
Being a form of economic legislation, if we adopt the American approach, 
interconnection should be subject to the Rational Relationship Test, i.e., whether it has 
legitimate aims, and whether imposing such a regulatory measure would rationally 
lead to the realisation of the legislation’s policy objective.  
 
As discussed above, the aims, or policy objectives of interconnection are to ensure the 
end-to-end interoperability of services to protect the rights of consumers, and thus 
should be deemed legitimate. In addition, the implementation of interconnection 
undoubtedly relates to the realisation of such policy objectives. Thus, interconnection 
can pass the constitutionality review. 
 
The case of interconnection in Taiwan is even more meaningful for another reason. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, unlike the situation in the European Union, 
interconnection also includes Internet interconnection (transit), and especially charges 
for transit.41 While there have been arguments about to whether it is better to regulate 
transit in the regulatory framework or leave it to negotiations between telcos,42 
considering this "extra" policy objective, the oligopoly situation in Taiwan's telecoms 
and Internet markets and the constant abuse of dominant-market player-status 
practices of the major telcos (such as charging excessive transit fees to their 
competitors in the Internet market) no matter whether assessed under German or 
American approach, it is even more reasonable to impose interconnection in Taiwan.  
                                                 
41 See, for example: Article 13 and 20 of Regulations Governing Network Interconnection among 
Telecommunications Enterprises. 
42 See the opinions submitted to NCC. (2013). "The Hearing of Internet Interconnection Regulation 
Enactment"; Lien, Y.-N. (2011). "Analyses of the Regulation and Technique of IP Internet 
Interconnection IP"; Lai, I.-C. (2012). "The Net Neutrality Doctrine--The Possibility of Regulating 




3.2.2 Local-loop Unbundling 
(1) Normative Review 
As with interconnection, the main provisions of local-loop unbundling are stipulated 
in the Telecommunications Act, with very detailed obligations then established in 
delegated legislation such as the Regulations for the Administration of Fixed Network 
Telecommunications Business. Other obligations, such as tariff control, are contained 
in the Regulations Governing Networks Interconnection among Telecommunications 
Enterprises. Under the same rationale in interconnection, this requirement should be 
deemed met. 
 
(2) Substantive Review  
A. The German Approach 
a. Suitability (appropriateness) 
In the present case, the policy objectives of local-loop unbundling are to eliminate 
unfair competition and discrimination in the downstream market and grant access to 
the network market, and consequently to benefit the consumers as they will have more 
choices, better products and lower prices when they are using internet services. The 
obligation to unbundle local-loop networks into elements to be easily leased by 
competitors does help to achieve these policy objectives. 
 
b. Necessity 
As discussed above (3.2.1 (2) b), there exists an inherent conflict between the 
requirement of necessity and the review criteria applied to economic legislation—the 
Tenability Control. If we ignore such conflict and engage in a classic necessity 
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discussion here, like the situation in the European Union, local-loop unbundling, 
which once seemed critical and necessary to address the competition issue in 
local-loop markets, is now facing the effects brought about by rapidly developing 
telecoms technologies, such as satellite and 3G/4G services which serve the same 
function as traditional local loops. This situation is especially apparent in Taiwan. 
Besides traditional telecoms networks, Taiwan has a relatively high CATV penetration 
rate; in 2014, the total number of subscriptions to CATV in Taiwan included 4.99 
million households and had a penetration rate of 59.9 per cent.43 While this 
penetration rate is not as high as traditional telephone metallic networks, which can be 
used to provide traditional Internet (narrowband) and modified to provide broadband 
services,44 the cable networks used in CATV can be used to provide broadband 
services as good as the broadband services provided by modified traditional metallic 
networks.45 Thus, unlike the situation in the European Union, where alternative 
infrastructure does not generally offer the same functionality or ubiquity,46 internet 
services provided via cable in Taiwan serve as a strong competing technology to the 
traditional local loop.             
 
In this regard, while local-loop unbundling may be argued to be the least onerous 
method to achieve the policy objective of promoting competition in the access 
network market, it may not be so for its ultimate policy objectives—benefiting the 
consumers--since consumers have many choices available that are arguably as 
                                                 
43 See discussions in Chapter Three and Communications Statistics published by NCC, available at: 
http://www.ncc.gov.tw/chinese/files/14081/1979_32567_140813_1.xls (accessed April 2016). 
44 Such as the FTTx fibre optic networks discussed in Chapter Ten. 
45 For example, the highest transmission speed provided to general customers via cable in Taiwan is 
300M (download)/30M (upload), provided by competing telco KBRO, whilst the highest transmission 
speed provided to general customers via FTTx highest speed is 300M/100M, provided by the 
incumbent telco CHT. See, respectively: http://www.cable.48h.tw/Kbro/?kdc=&kdc2= and 
http://www.cht.com.tw/personal/hinet-internet-rate.html. 
46 See discussions in Chapter Ten. 
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effective, so that it will not be necessary to require the telco to open its local loop to 
be accessed by competitors. In other words, there exists a less onerous method than 
imposing interconnection—which is not to impose interconnection—where the 
consumers will not necessarily suffer from worse products or higher prices. Hence, 
the question has become: what are the policy objectives of a competition law, or 
regulatory measure with a competition law nature, such as the interconnection 
requirement in this case? It would certainly appear that both the promotion of 
consumer welfare and the protection of a playing field for competitors are key 
underlying policy objectives. There is no doubt that the competitors' rights to 
competition have to give way to consumer welfare where they contradict each other. 
Such a direct contradiction, however, does not exist in this case, but only the results of 
necessity are different after being examined by these two standards. Regarding this, 
this thesis proposes that the requirement of necessity may not be met under a typical 
proportionality test, as in fact there does exist a less onerous measure; however, if we 
use the light-touch approach that is used in reviewing economic legislation, such as 
the German Tenability Control in this case, imposing such a regulatory measure 
should be deemed supportable.  
 
c. Proportionality Stricto Sensu  
Under Tenability Control, the requirement of proportionality stricto sensu is to see 
whether the legislative decision that the regulatory measure adopted is proportionate 
to its policy objectives is supportable. In this case, the policy objectives are the 
promotion of competition in the access network, and the improvement in consumer 
welfare by being offered better internet services. These benefits or public interests 
outweigh the harms caused by the restrictions imposed upon the telco, even though 
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these restrictions are not as minor as those in the case of interconnection. Thus, this 
requirement should be deemed met. 
 
B. The American Approach 
To pass the American Rational Relationship Test, a regulatory measure should have a 
legitimate aim, and the adoption of that regulatory measure is rationally related to that 
legitimate aim. 
 
In the current case, LLU, as discussed above, does have legitimate aims, and the 
implementing of LLU is rationally related to those aims. In fact, as discussed in 




The review of the constitutionality of separation is different from the other two 
telecoms forced access mechanisms because of its severe restriction upon the telco's 
right to property. The restriction is so severe that separation should be regarded as an 
expropriation. As discussed in Chapter Six, there have been many theories about 
expropriation, and in the jurisprudence of constitutionality in the Official 
Interpretations and scholarly discussion consensus has been reached by focusing upon 
the special sacrifice (Sonderopfer) theory. Under this theory, the right to property has 
its social obligations and should bear a certain degree of restriction; but where a 
restriction that imposes burdens upon one that are much heavier than upon others so 
that such situation constitutes a violation of the principle of equity, such a restriction 
should be regarded as an expropriation, or a property right restriction that should be 
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compensated. In other words, unlike the jurisprudence of constitutionality and 
scholarly discussions in Germany, which limit the scope of expropriation to the 
deprivation of the ownership, the consensus in Taiwan is that as long as a restriction 
exceeds the social obligation of the right to property, such a restriction becomes an 
expropriation.47 
 
As such, after the consideration of the burdens of separation imposed upon the 
incumbent telco, such as the severe restrictions to exercise its right to property and 
other supplementary obligations, and when compared with other telcos, the said 
burdens constitute an excessive interference and thus violate the equality before the 
law. Therefore, separation should be deemed to be an expropriation under Taiwanese 
law. 
 
According to the discussion in (3.3) of this chapter and Chapter Seven (2.2.2), for an 
expropriation to be constitutional, the consensus of Taiwanese constitutional 
jurisprudence and scholarly discussions is that there are some special conditions to be 
met, by contrast with other interferences with property rights. These conditions are:  
(1) the expropriation should be provided for by law (the principle of rule of law); 
(2) the expropriation should have more than a legitimate aim.; 
(3) the expropriation should be for compelling or distinct public interest; 
(4) there should be supplementary measures, i.e., compensation provisions about 
the compensation to the expropriation; and 
(5) the expropriation measures should be proportionate to their legal aims, or be 
imposed via the least harmful method available (principle of proportionality). 
                                                 




These conditions are in fact an enhanced version of the proportionality test. Thus, the 
constitutionality of separation, as an expropriation, will be examined using these 
requirements: 
 
(1) Provided for by Law 
This requirement is the same as the normative review above—rule of law, but more 
specific and intensive. According to the theory of substantiality, as discussed in 
Chapter Five (2.4.1), the principle is that the more important the fundamental rights 
involved, or more severe the interference with fundamental rights, the higher the 
requirement of the rule of law, or statutory reserve, to be specific;48 for substantive 
matters, the restrictions or interference can only be provided for by law.49 In the case 
of separation, as it should be defined as an expropriation, the imposition can only be 
provided for by law. As stated in Official Interpretation No.440:  
 
"…if the harm caused to people’s property rights by state power exceeds the extant 
of social function, and constitutes a special sacrifice, a reasonable compensation 
should be granted…" 
 
"…since the owner of the land cannot freely use his own land, which constitutes a 
special sacrifice, the State should expropriate the land in accordance with the law 
and grant the compensation…"50(emphasis added). 
 
                                                 
48 Official Interpretation No.443.  
49 Official Interpretation No.614. 
50 It should be noted that the "official" translation of this particular Official Interpretation is incorrect 
and misleading. The provisions cited here is translated by author. 
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In the present case, the proposed separation provision in the drafted amendment to the 
current Telecommunications Act is in a single article (Article 25) and states: 
 
"To promote the substantial effective competition in the fixed network market, if a 
relevant effective competition cannot be achieved within a certain period of time 
after the amendment of this Act, the regulator may impose necessary measures 
such as structural or functional separation to the dominant operator in the fixed-line 
market. The dominant operator cannot evade or reject such obligations. 
The certain period of time, the assessment of relevant effective competition, the 
methods of implementing structural or functional separation and the obligations of 
the dominant operator in the first paragraph should be decided by the regulator." 
 
Since, in a case of expropriation, the provision should be provided for by law, such 
statutory delegation should not be deemed constitutional, not to mention compared to 
the less severe interconnection and local-loop unbundling, because such delegation is 
not sufficiently precise and specific.51 
 
(2) Requires More than a Legitimate Aim 
Similar to the jurisprudence of European Courts, sometimes the Grand Justices merely 
state one or some of the requirements of the principle of proportionality, such as a 
legitimate aim; in Official Interpretation No.409, the Grand Justices reaffirmed that 
the principle of proportionality is an objective-measure analysis. While confirming 
Article 108 of the Land Act and Article 48 of Urban Planning Law are to specify the 
                                                 
51 Compared to this, the Land Expropriation Act, which is of the same nature of expropriation, is far 
more detailed and precise. For example, with regard to the so-called zone expropriation, in Article 4, 
the implementation and delegation is clearly specified. See Annex II. 
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objectives of land expropriation,52 the Grand Justices went on to say: "[t]his does not 
mean that the State can arbitrarily expropriate land as long as it has declared a purpose 
and end use covered by these two articles" and should still meet other conditions, such 
as the measures specified in Article 49 of the Enforcement Act of Land Act.53 It has 
therefore been commented that Official Interpretation No.409 has clarified that a 
legitimate objective is not enough for a regulatory measure to be legitimate, and a 
legitimate aim does not grant leeway for arbitrary measures, by requiring 
administrative institutions to take into consideration both the objective pursued and 
the measure adopted.54 
 
This requirement is of special importance in judicial practice, as the administrative 
departments have a common misunderstanding that an expropriation is constitutional 
or legal as long as public interests are involved.55 Unfortunately, due to the vague 
legislative design in the drafted amendment of the separation provision, it is 
impossible to specify whether this condition will be met. 
  
(3) Only for the Pursuit of a Distinct Public Interest 
As in Official Interpretation No.580, where the Grand Justices dealt with legislation 
regarding the redistribution of land, the Grand Justices emphasised this condition by 
                                                 
52 Article 108 of Land Act reads: "The lessee shall not, even with the consent of the lessor, sublease the 
whole or part of the leased farm land to another person."; Article 48Urban Planning Law reads: "Land 
reserved for public service facilities shall be expropriated or purchased by the operators of such public 
services according to related laws. Land for other public facilities shall be acquired by the concerned 
government or township, town or county city office through the following approaches: 
1) Expropriation, 2) Zone expropriation, 3) Urban land readjustment." 
53 Article 49 of Enforcement Act of Land Act reads: "To the extent that the purpose of land 
expropriation is not impeded, land expropriation shall be undertaken in a manner that will cause the 
least loss to the locality and shall avoid choosing farmland whenever possible." 
54 Li, N.-T. (2006). The Content of Human Rights Protection. Case Study of Constitution Ⅲ SanMin 
Publishing: 29. 





"…the Statute, considering the special historical background and the distinct 
significance to the public interest attainable through reasonable distribution of 
agricultural resources, is not in conflict with the constitutional principle of reliance 
protection."56 (emphasis added) 
 
(4) The expropriation-compensation connecting doctrine 
As Grand Justice Hsieh pointed out in his opinion concurring with Official 
Interpretation No.579, this Interpretation, together with No.400 and No.425, specifies 
the need to observe the expropriation-compensation connecting doctrine; in other 
words, the expropriation is a State act of deprivation of property rights based on 
public need and interest and via legitimate procedures. The legislation for 
expropriation should meet the principle of necessity and should stipulate the grant of 
reasonable compensation within a reasonable period of time. In other words, where 
there is expropriation, there is compensation. The granting of compensation is 
indispensable to the expropriation of land, and this is called the 
expropriation-compensation connecting doctrine.57 
 
(5) An act of expropriation should be imposed via the least harmful method 
available 
This requirement of proportionality is stated in the Reasoning of Official 
Interpretation No.440: 
  
                                                 
56 See the reasoning of Official Interpretation No.580. 
57 See the concurring opinion to Official Interpretation No.579 by Grand Justice Hsieh, T.-C.. 
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"Indeed, for the necessity of improving the public interest, competent organizations 
may legally expropriate land which has been designated for road use in city 
planning. However, such decisions to expropriate or purchase have to be made 
after taking into account the severity of the harm caused thereby, such as whether it 
has interfered with original uses or created dangers. Accordingly, prior to 
exercising their powers to expropriate or purchase, competent organizations may 
legally use existing roads or reserved land in city planning to bury underground 
facilities for electricity distribution, water supply or sewage systems. However, 
under the principle of proportionality, this can only be done in the least harmful 
places and with the least harmful methods."58 
 
It should be noted that, due to the severe interference of separation, if we apply the 
original proportionality test, the reviewing criteria should be the German Intensive 
Content Control or the American Strict Scrutiny Test. In other words, the Court has to 
decide whether the legislator’s assessments or predictions about the appropriateness, 
necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu of imposing separation are substantially 
authentic or reliable (Intensive Content Control), or whether imposing separation is 
narrowly tailored to the policy objective pursued (Strict Scrutiny Test). Where there 
exist reasonable doubts about the authenticity or reliability of imposing separation, or 
the imposition of separation is not tailored to its policy objectives, the challenged 
legislation of separation should be deemed unconstitutional. 
 
The policy objective of either functional or ownership separation, like local-loop 
unbundling, is to eliminate unfair competition and discrimination in the downstream 
                                                 
58 Official Interpretation No.440. 
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access-network market. Following Grand Justice Hsu's light-touch policy-objectives 
reviewing approach, from a rational point of view, separating the access network to 
become an independent unit, to be established as a new access network company or 
even expropriated to be a department of government, can lead to the realisation of 
these policy objectives. 
 
Like local-loop unbundling, separation aims to eliminate unfair competition and 
discrimination in the downstream access-network market; where less intensive 
local-loop unbundling has proven to be effective in achieving such policy objectives, 
it is not necessary to impose either functional or ownership separation. In other words, 
it is only when local-loop unbundling fails to eliminate unfair competition and 
discrimination in the downstream access-network market that separation should be 
considered.59 
 
However, as discussed above (3.2.2), in the current telecoms climate, it is gradually 
becoming questionable as to whether it is necessary to impose local-loop unbundling 
as several alternative technologies now offer the same if not better functions than 
traditional access networks. In other words, there exist alternatives to applying 
local-loop unbundling that are less burdensome to the owners of local loops. The 
same can be said of separation. 
 
Lastly, with regard to proportionality stricto sensu, in Taiwan's case there have always 
been two contradicting opinions about whether a regulatory measure such as 
separation should be adopted or, to be more precise, whether there is a need to 
                                                 
59 See the Draft amendment to Article 22 of the Telecommunications Act (2010). 
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encourage the deployment of a new set of networks – especially access networks. An 
objecting opinion – understandably from competing telcos, but also supported by 
some scholars – is that to deploy access networks is virtually and legally difficult and 
costly;60 also, because Taiwan is a small island country, there is no need to deploy a 
duplicate set of access networks as that would be a waste of resources, and so existing 
networks – most if not all of which belong to the incumbent telco – should be opened 
to be used by competing telcos.61 On the other hand, supporting opinion, apparently 
from the incumbent but again also supported by some scholars, reckons that, first, 
because Taiwan is a small island country, it is more sensible, or at least much easier 
than in a larger country, to deploy a duplicate set of networks; secondly, encouraging 
the deployment of a duplicate set of access networks can promote infrastructure 
competition, which is in the long term more beneficial to citizens than service 
competition.62 
 
Such diverse points of view, of course, are because of the different stances held by 
different parties: the incumbent telco apparently hopes to maintain the integrity of the 
company and retain ownership of access networks so that it can relied on for 
providing broadband services; competing telcos, on the other hand, hope to avoid the 
cost of investing in a new set of networks as they do not know whether a reasonable 
                                                 
60 For example, the existing networks were deployed in the state-owned eras with the public force, 
while the newly deployed networks should consider the strengthened local regulations and the factual 
difficulties to deploy a new set of network into the existing premises. For a more detailed discussion, 
see discussions in Chapter Three and Liu, Y. (2004). The Integration and Convergence of 
Telecommunications, Media and Internet. Telecommunications. Y. Liu; Liu, C.-J. (2005). "Analysis of 
the Opening of Local Loop Unbundling." Socioeconomic Law and Institution Review: 109-147; Lien, 
Y.-N. (2013). "Introduction to Communication Networks for Practioner." 143-. 
61 See for example the opinions submitted to the hearing of Telecommunications Act amendments by 
Taiwan Mobile Fixed Network and Far EasTone Telecom, available at: 
http://www.ncc.gov.tw/chinese/files/12052/1760_24816_120525_1.pdf. 
62 See discussions in Chapter Ten. 
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return can be expected.63 Another significant case where such different stances lead 
to different points of view on the same thing is the recent practice in Australia of 
structurally separating (ownership separation) the access networks of the incumbent 
telco, Telstra, and constructing a new set of national networks.64 The incumbent telco 
in Taiwan would argue that the rationale held by the objecting opinion above--i.e. it is 
difficult to deploy a new set of national networks--is sensible, as even a large country 
like Australia chose to do so, and therefore the competing telcos should not use the 
difficulties of deployment as an excuse not to deploy their own new networks, 
especially considering Taiwan is a much smaller country. At the same time, however, 
the incumbent will have a hard time defending the argument that such separation is 
not practical since, in addition to the United Kingdom, Sweden and Italy, another 
country has now chosen to do so. 
 
Thus, in the present case, we can say that there still exist reasonable doubts about the 
proportionality stricto sensu of separation, i.e. whether imposing such severe 
interference with or restrictions upon the incumbent telco's property rights and 
freedom to conduct its business strikes a fair balance with the policy objectives it aims 
to achieve, i.e. to enable citizens to use more advanced telecoms services. From a 
strict perspective of review, it is also questionable whether the imposition of a 
separation mechanism would be narrowly tailored to its policy objectives. Thus, 
whether separation can pass an examination of this criterion is questionable. 
 
                                                 
63 See for reference: Liu, C.-J., et al. (2013). "The Conflict and Balancing of the Privatisation and 
Liberalisation of Telecommunications--The Case Study Of ChungHwa Telecom." 
64 See ACCC (2011). Assessment of Telstra's Structural Separation Undertaking and draft Migration 
Plan, available at 
https://www.accc.gov.au/regulated-infrastructure/communications/industry-reform/assessment-of-telstr
as-ssu-draft-migration-plan (accessed April 2016). 
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The constitutionality of the three telecoms forced access mechanisms in Taiwan can 
be construed as the chart below: 






Interconnection O (detailed and technical 
supplemental rules can 
be delegated to 
administrative 
institutions; are specific 
and precise) 
O (Tenability Control; 
the benefit and cost are 
proportionate and 
supportable) 
O (Rational Relationship 
Test; with legitimate 
aims and the measure 
rationally lead to the 
realisation the aims) 
Local loop 
unbundling 
O (detailed and technical 
supplemental rules can 
be delegated to 
administrative 
institutions; are specific 
and precise) 
? (Tenability Control;  
Necessity: a less 
onerous method may 
exist)  
O (Rational Relationship 
Test; with legitimate 
aims and the measure 
rationally lead to the 




X (statutory delegation 
is not allowed in 
expropriation) 
Special Substantive Review in Expropriation 
More than a legitimate aim: ? 
Compensation provisions: X 
Proportionality Test 
? (Intensive Content 
Control; Necessity: a 
less onerous method 
may exist; there exist 
reasonable doubts 
about the accuracy of 
the measure) 
? (Strict Scrutiny Test; 
whether the measure is 
narrowly tailored to its 
policy objectives is 
questionable) 
Chart 11.1: The constitutionality of the three telecoms forced access mechanisms in Taiwan.
                                                 







Chapter XII Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined the legality and constitutionality of telecoms forced access 
mechanisms in the European Union and Taiwan. It began with an introduction to 
telecoms forced access mechanisms (Chapters Two and Three) and to the fundamental 
rights protection regimes in these two jurisdictions (Chapters Four and Five). It 
proceeded to a discussion about the two fundamental rights and freedoms most likely 
to be restricted by telecoms forced access mechanisms – the right to property and 
freedom to conduct a business (Chapters Six to Nine). In-depth analyses of the 
legality and constitutionality of such restrictions in the European Union and Taiwan 
were then conducted in Chapters Ten and Eleven, respectively. The results and 
findings of the analyses are discussed in this chapter. 
 
Telecoms forced access mechanisms are found to restrict the right to property and the 
freedom to conduct a business of the telcos on which these mechanisms are imposed.1 
These rights are regarded as economic rights rather than classic civil or political rights 
in both the European Union and Taiwan, and, as pointed out in Sky Österreich, they 
are subject to a broad range of interventions via the legal framework of the European 
Union.2 This is similar to the situation in Taiwan, as different intensities are applied 
by the Grand Justices in their reviews of the constitutionality of regulatory measures 
that affect different fundamental rights;3 even when regarding the same fundamental 
rights and freedoms, the intensity of review will differ when different fundamental 
rights come into play, e.g. when considering freedom of speech, commercial speech is 
                                                 
1 See Chapters Six and Seven. 
2 See Chapter Seven. 
3 See Chapter Three. 
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subject to broader intervention than political speeches.4  
 
The jurisprudence of the European Courts recognises that Union institutions enjoy 
considerable judicial discretion when adopting regulatory measures, especially as 
regards sector-specific regulations and economic decisions; such regulatory measures 
will only be challenged where there exists a manifest error.5 Therefore, telecoms 
forced access mechanisms, being part of sector-specific regulations, will generally be 
upheld if ever they are brought before the Courts. Some recent cases such as Digital 
Rights Ireland, however, held that if an important fundamental right is involved, the 
discretion allowed should be limited.6 While this rationale does raise some issues, 
such as whether the marginal discretion in ECtHR case law can ever be analogous to 
the legislative discretion enjoyed by EU institutions, and whether such an analogy can 
be applied beyond other important fundamental rights, cases like Digital Rights 
Ireland did really open the way for a substantive review of sector-specific regulations, 
and it will be interesting to see whether the Court explores this field further in the 
future. 
 
The same legislative discretion is also recognised in Taiwan.7 One might even argue 
that the manifest error test corresponds to the German Evident Control approach 
adopted in Taiwan.8 However, to say that the constitutionality of sector-specific 
regulations is never challenged would be incorrect, although they are rarely brought 
before the Court. An examination of the 733 Official Interpretations made thus far 
                                                 
4 See Chen, H.-M. (2002). Explanation of the Constitution of R.O.C., ShanMin:163. 
5 See Chapter Eight. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See Chapter Nine. 
8 For the concept of the German judicial control system, see the discussion in Chapter Five. 
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does not reveal any cases that involve a substantive review of the constitutionality of a 
sector-specific regulatory measure. In fact, it is not just their constitutionality; 
regulations in the telecoms industry, either legislative or administrative, are rarely 
challenged in administrative or civil courts. As Shyr (2010) observes, no cases 
regarding interconnection have been brought before the Supreme Administrative 
Court, and only ten cases regarding interconnection have been brought before the high 
Administrative Court, among which perhaps only four were about substantive 
disputes, while the others concerned procedural issues.9 Such "obedience", as 
observed by the author, may be due to the complex politico-cultural structure of 
public service industries in Taiwan: e.g. the major shareholding in the incumbent telco, 
CHT, is held by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) and the 
latter has a strong influence on CHT's decision-making. There is also the historical 
relationship between the NCC and MOTC.10       
 
However, if we disregard this reluctance to seek judicial review in this area, it is 
possible that a substantive constitutionality review of telecoms forced access 
mechanisms can be conducted under the Taiwanese constitutional framework. The 
sliding-scale approach, from US case law, suggests that the traditional intensity of 
review is not unshakeable, as the intensity of review should be considered along with 
the types of fundamental rights restricted and the intensity and manner of 
interference.11 It is unknown to what extent this sliding-scale approach applies, i.e. 
whether it is applicable to sector-specific regulations in Taiwanese constitutional 
jurisprudence, and a ruling with regard to this issue by the Grand Justices would be 
                                                 
9 Shyr, H. (2010). "Objective-oriented Interconnection Regulations and Their Judicial Review", Law 
Monthly 61(6): 23–42. 
10 For a discussion of these situations, see Chapter Three. 





Thus, the first finding of this thesis is that, unlike the traditional belief that 
sector-specific regulation should be prevented from judicial review due to the 
legislative discretion, in theory it is not just possible but sometimes even necessary to 
review the legality and constitutionality of telecoms forced access mechanisms. To be 
specific, the criteria of intensity of legality or constitutionality review of a regulatory 
measure is not decided by the classification of the regulatory measure--e.g., whether it 
is a kind of sector-specific regulation--but should be by the nature of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms involved, and the intensity of the interference to such 
fundamental rights and freedoms: If the regulatory measure at issue severely interferes 
with or restricts fundamental rights and freedoms, such as telecoms separation 
discussed in this thesis, even though it is a kind of sector-specific regulation, and the 
fundamental rights affected are the "weaker" economic rights, such a regulatory 
measure should still be subject to a strict legality or constitutionality review. 
 
The analysis conducted in this thesis, with regard to the three telecoms forced access 
mechanisms identified, is based on the key assumption that a substantive judicial 
review is applicable. The first mechanism, interconnection, is found to be the least 
restrictive. Taking into account the policy objectives it aims to achieve, it is basically 
accepted that interconnection is not likely to be deemed illegitimate or 
unconstitutional.13 It should be noted that a major difference between the situation in 
                                                 
12 Due to the very limited numbers of the Official Interpretations made, the only Official Interpretation 
with regards to the telecoms industry was No.613 Official Interpretation which was not really about 
telecoms regulation, but the constitutionality of the constitution of the commissioners in the telecoms 
regulator the NCC. This Official Interpretation is available at: 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=613 (accessed April 2016). 
13 See discussions in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
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the European Union and Taiwan is that while Internet interconnections are not 
regulated in the European Union, they are included in interconnections in Taiwan. 
Caution, therefore, should be exerted when reviewing the relevant obligations 
imposed in order not to interfere with the freedoms of speech and information.14      
 
With regard to LLU, there are three types within the regulatory framework of the 
European Union and four types in Taiwan.15 This diversity of standards reflects the 
rapid development of access technology, which may play an important role in 
reviewing the legality and constitutionality of LLU. For example, in Taiwan, as a 
relatively advanced country in the telecoms field,16 there exist many substitutes in the 
market, not just for traditional access networks themselves, but also for the functions 
of access networks.17 The more effective substitutes exist, the less likely it is that 
LLU obligations, as a significant interference in the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the incumbent telco, will pass a proportionality test, especially the requirement of 
necessity.18    
 
Similar to LLU, separation aims to promote competition in the access network market. 
However, as it constitutes the most significant interference in the incumbent telco's 
fundamental rights and freedoms, understandably, it will be the most disputed. This 
did not stop one of the separation models – functional separation – being included in 
the 2007 European "Telecoms Package", and it has been implemented by European 
                                                 
14 See Chapter Nine. 
15 See Chapters Two and Three. 
16 See Chapter Three. 
17 For example, the currently prevailing 4G technology is not like cable networks, as a substitute for 
traditional access networks, but a technology that can be used on portable devices for the same 
Internet-connection function. 
18 See Chapters Eight and Nine. 
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Union Member States such as Sweden.19 The United Kingdom even implemented 
functional separation before the said Telecoms Package came into force. Despite the 
severe restriction upon the incumbent telco's right to property and freedom to conduct 
a business, as discussed in Chapter Ten, separation, or at least functional separation, is 
not found to be an illegal measure, mainly due to the many obligations imposed upon 
the NRAs' to ensure that the implemention of functional separation is the last resort to 
solve the competition problems in the access market and eventually benefit the 
consumers. In fact, there is much more than the legal scope to be considered when 
implementing separation, especially the public service nature of telecoms services and 
the welfare of many customers, rather than just the property of a company itself.20 
This is why it has been commented that the most important factor of implementing 
separation is the co-operation of the telco itself.21 However, as the same commentator 
pointed out, even in countries that adopt separation, such as the United Kingdom, it is 
still necessary to impose tariff control and to monitor the quality of services. 
Therefore, separation does not really reduce the cost of regulation. Moreover, it is not 
impossible for the regulator to impose some important elements of separation without 
imposing actual separation. In such cases, the imposition of separation will not be 
deemed necessary.22 
 
Unlike the situation in the European Union, neither functional nor ownership 
separation is included in the telecoms regulatory framework in Taiwan but merely in a 
                                                 
19 See Chapter Two. 
20 See for reference: ACCC (2011), Assessment of Telstra's Structural Separation Undertaking and 
draft Migration Plan. 
21 Liu, P. (2011). Research about Telecoms Separation, Taiwan Institute of Economic Research. 
22 For instance, the Italian telecoms regulator AGCOM has imposed the separation of information 
system between the network and retail departments of Telecom Italia. See: Telecom Italia, Meeting 
with BEREC The Italian Model of EoO: 6, available at: 
http://berec.europa.eu/files/workshop2014/20140429Presentations/9.%20Telecom%20Italia%20present
ation.pdf (accessed April 2016). 
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single article of a proposed draft amendment. This thesis can only rely on the 
conditions in economic theories and the common provisions in jurisdictions where 
separation has been proposed. It should be noted, however, that the current draft 
amendment of the Taiwanese functional separation provision may be problematic, as 
it does not meet the requirements of rule of law.  
 
Suppose that the requirement of normative review was found to be met, and a 
substantive review should be engaged. With regard to substantive review, being a 
sector-specific regulation, while severely interfering with fundamental rights, 
separation in Taiwanese constitutional jurisprudence would be subject to light-handed 
German Tenability Control or an American Rational Relationship Test if they were 
ever brought to the review of the Grand Justices.23 This is, however, contradiction 
with the fact that separation is an expropriation, and should entail a high intensity of 
review.24 A solution to this is the sliding-scale approach, under which the intensity of 
review of a regulatory measure is not dictated by the nature or categorisation of the 
regulatory measure at issue--e.g., whether they are sector-specific regulation or 
not--but instead by an overall consideration of the importance of the rights that are 
interfered with and the intensity of such interferences. In this regard, separation, being 
a severe interference with property rights and the freedom to conduct a business, 
should be subject to strict review. There should be solid evidence that imposing 
separation is directly related and necessary to the realisation of the policy objectives; 
there should be no lesser restrictions that can achieve the same result as effectively, 
and the measure adopted should not just strike a fair balance, but must be narrowly 
                                                 
23 See Chapter Nine. 
24 See Chapters Six and Nine. 
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tailored to its policy objective.25 
 
Thus, another conclusion can be drawn by comparing the constitutionality and legality 
of telecoms forced-access mechanisms in these two jurisdictions, especially as regards 
separation. Compared with the other two mechanisms, separation constitutes much 
more severe interference with the right to property and the freedom to conduct a 
business. The reason why assessments of constitutionality and legality may differ in 
these two jurisdictions is because of the different institutional designs of the regimes. 
The European Union is a supranational organization aiming to create a single market, 
and so uniform application of EU law is required. Therefore, there are three key 
features of the European legal system, namely doctrines of supremacy, the 
primarily-ruling reference system and direct effect. 
 
The doctrine of supremacy, or of primacy, was first introduced into the European legal 
system in the 1960s in Van Gend en Loos26 and Costa v ENEL27 in which the Court 
of Justice established that the Community Treaty created a new legal order that 
provided the Member States of the Community with only limited sovereign rights. In 
the later Simmenthal case,28 the Court of Justice stated that when a conflict arose 
between the national law of Member States and Community law, Community law was 
supreme and national law should not apply. Later, in the aforementioned Solange 1,29 
the Court of Justice stated that Community law was superior to all forms of national 
law, even including national constitutions. It was also in cases like Solange 1 that the 
                                                 
25 See Chapter Six. 
26 Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] E.C.R. 1. 
27 Case C-6/64, Costa v ENEL [1964] E.C.R. 585. 
28 Case C-92/78, Simmenthal v Commission [1978] E.C.R. 1129. 
29 Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr [1970] E.C.R. 1125. 
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Community started to become aware that some Member States' constitutional courts 
might refuse to recognise the supremacy of Community law if they found it 
inadequate to protect fundamental rights in their constitutions.30 
 
The doctrine of supremacy is also supported by the Treaties of the European Union, 
such as Article 1–6 TEU. It is also stated in Declaration 17 of the Treaty of Lisbon 
that Union Treaties have primacy over the national law of Member States. 
 
The preliminary ruling system was first adopted under Article 177 of the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. Now in Article 267 TFEU, the purpose of a preliminary ruling is to 
ensure the uniform application of European Union law in national courts. The Court 
of Justice can make preliminary rulings to interpret the Treaties of the Union, and to 
validate and interpret the acts of Union institutions; if a question which may include a 
conflict between national law and EU law is raised before a national court or tribunal 
of a member state, that court or tribunal shall request a preliminary reference from the 
Court. 
 
Another feature of the European Union's supranational nature is the direct effect of 
Union law. This doctrine has two kinds of meaning: the broad meaning (objective 
direct effect) is that the provisions of Union law have the capacity to be invoked 
before a domestic court; the narrower meaning (subjective direct effect), on the other 
hand, denotes that the provisions of Union law have the capacity to confer rights on 
individuals which can be enforced in national courts.31 The scope of the doctrine of 
                                                 
30 See, the discussion in Chapter Four 1.2. 
31 Craig, P. and G. de Búrca (2015). EU law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford: 182; Arnull, A. (2006) The European Union and its Court of Justice, Oxford University Press, 
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direct effect has expanded over time: in Van Gen en Loos,32 the Court of Justice held 
that directives had to meet some conditions in order to have direct effect, but in the 
later Van Colson33, directives did not need to meet any conditions because they were 
capable of indirect effect. 
 
It should also be noted that other "soft laws", such as Communications, Notices or 
Guidelines published by the European Commission, which set out how the 
Commission intends to perform its role in the application of Treaty provisions,34 
while not binding, may, nevertheless, have practical effects35 and, in essence, benefit 
the harmonisation of the European Union telecoms regulatory framework. A good 
example is the aforementioned Commission’s Recommendation on Relevant Product 
and Service Markets in which the Commission defined the markets that are subject to 
ex ante regulations.36 
 
Another feature of the EU being a union of Member States that is distinct from being 
a single country is the principle of conferral. According to this principle, all the EU 
competences are voluntarily conferred on it by the Member States. The EU has no 
competences by right, and thus any areas of policy not explicitly agreed in Treaties 
remain the domain of the Member States. This principle is stipulated in Articles 4 and 
5 TEU. A good example is the aforementioned Article 345 TFEU, which specifies that 
                                                                                                                                            
Oxford: 172; Bruno Witte, B. "Direct Effect, Primacy and the Nature of the Legal Order" in Craig, P. 
and G. de Búrca (eds) (2011), The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 339. 
32 Van Gend en Loos, supra n 26, para. 6. 
33 Case C-14/83, Von Colson v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] E.C.R. 1891, para. 28. 
34 For example, see the Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant 
market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services that aim to define a dominance position in Article 82 TEC (now Article 102 TFEU). 
35 F. Snyder, (1993) "Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community", EUI Working 
Papers. (Law) No. 93/5. 
36 See discussions in Chapter Two 2.2. 
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the Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the 
system of property ownership but the EU will only interfere in the way in which these 
rights are exercised. All these designs of legal system are different from those of 
Taiwan as a single country.   
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, Taiwan favours both the European Union and the 
United States as sources for regulatory policies and approaches; while, on the one 
hand, some policies from one jurisdiction can be used where there is shortage of 
examples applying those of the other, on the other hand it can be said there is no 
consistent system. Therefore, the choice of important policies usually becomes a 
cherry-picking process. As discussed in Chapter Three, the regulator NCC tends to be 
demanding and sometimes even dictatorial in regulating the market, especially to the 
incumbent.37 In addition, as the NCC is in fact responsible for drafting new telecoms 
bills,38 the policies that it chooses to adopt are usually the ones that facilitate its 
regulation of the market, or the ones that increase its regulatory power. One example 
for this is that the NCC turned a blind eye to the fact that in the United States the FCC 
declared in 2005 that facilities-based wireline broadband Internet access service is an 
information service instead of a communications service, and providers of such 
services are no longer required to offer access to Title II telcos, despite the high 
similarity of the legislative design, e.g., the categorisation of telcos.39 The 
introduction of functional separation into the draft Taiwanese amendment bill can be 
seen as a result of such regulatory philosophy. 
                                                 
37 See Chapter Three (3.1). 
38 See Chapter Five (2.5.1). 
39 See: FCC (2005), "Notice of Proposed Rule Making in the Matter of Appropriate Framework for 
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities", available at: 
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/2040.pdf (accessed April 2016). 
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Of course, that is not to say that it is a mistake for Taiwan to adopt functional 
separation from the European Union; however, such an adoption, as discussed in 
Chapters Three and Eleven, is coarse, as the drafted amendment provision is not 
detailed and specific enough. For example, it proposes many uncertain legal concepts, 
such as "substantial effective competition", "relevant effective competition" and "a 
certain period of time". However, the definitions of these uncertain legal concepts, 
together with the procedural requirements of the regulator, remain unspecified in the 
draft amendment bill. Instead, the draft amendment bill leaves a very broad and rather 
vague discretion to the regulator. While the other two types of telecoms forced access 
mechanisms are relatively less severe and may be regarded as detailed and technical 
matters, and can be regulated by the administrative department via statutory 
delegation,40 separation is a much intense interference with fundamental rights and 
should be regarded otherwise. Besides, while such legislative design may not meet the 
normative requirement, it also has an inherent constitutional risk that the NCC 
"grants" itself the right to regulate under the cover of statutory delegation. As 
discussed in Chapter Five (2.5.1), much sector-specific legislation, such as the 
Telecommunications Act, is in reality drafted by the relevant administrative institution, 
in this case the regulator NCC. The delegation of granting the right to restrict 
fundamental rights to the regulator in the drafted amendment, as commentators put it, 
is "giving the rights from one hand to another",41 and is in fact a crisis for the 
protection of fundamental rights. 
 
In addition, such arbitrary legislation may be especially harmful in Taiwan’s case. As 
                                                 
40 See the discussions about Official Interpretation 443 in Chapter Nine. 
41 Huang, M.-J. (2010). Research of Telecoms Regulations. 
 
 351 
discussed in Chapter Three (3.1), the telecoms market in Taiwan is special with many 
specific characteristics, such as the very advanced telecoms technology development, 
the reluctance to invest and the relatively high CATV penetration rate. It is therefore 
doubtful whether such a sloppy legislative design can pass the proportionality test, 
especially considering one of the biggest benefits of imposing functional separation is 
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Annex I  NRAs’ Obligations before Imposing Functional Separation  
(Article 13 s Access Directive) 
 
1.   Where the national regulatory authority concludes that the appropriate obligations 
imposed under Articles 9 to 13 have failed to achieve effective competition and that 
there are important and persisting competition problems and/or market failures 
identified in relation to the wholesale provision of certain access product markets, it 
may, as an exceptional measure, in accordance with the provisions of the second 
subparagraph of Article 8(3), impose an obligation on vertically integrated 
undertakings to place activities related to the wholesale provision of relevant access 
products in an independently operating business entity. 
That business entity shall supply access products and services to all undertakings, 
including to other business entities within the parent company, on the same timescales, 
terms and conditions, including those relating to price and service levels, and by 
means of the same systems and processes. 
2.   When a national regulatory authority intends to impose an obligation for 
functional separation, it shall submit a proposal to the Commission that includes: 
(a) evidence justifying the conclusions of the national regulatory authority as referred 
to in paragraph 1; 
(b) a reasoned assessment that there is no or little prospect of effective and 
sustainable infrastructure-based competition within a reasonable time-frame; 
(c) an analysis of the expected impact on the regulatory authority, on the undertaking, 
in particular on the workforce of the separated undertaking and on the electronic 
communications sector as a whole, and on incentives to invest in a sector as a 
whole, particularly with regard to the need to ensure social and territorial 
cohesion, and on other stakeholders including, in particular, the expected impact 
on competition and any potential entailing effects on consumers; 
(d) an analysis of the reasons justifying that this obligation would be the most 
efficient means to enforce remedies aimed at addressing the competition 
problems/markets failures identified. 
3.   The draft measure shall include the following elements: 
(a) the precise nature and level of separation, specifying in particular the legal status 
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of the separate business entity; 
(b) an identification of the assets of the separate business entity, and the products or 
services to be supplied by that entity; 
(c) the governance arrangements to ensure the independence of the staff employed by 
the separate business entity, and the corresponding incentive structure; 
(d) rules for ensuring compliance with the obligations; 
(e) rules for ensuring transparency of operational procedures, in particular towards 
other stakeholders; 
(f) a monitoring programme to ensure compliance, including the publication of an 
annual report. 
4.   Following the Commission's decision on the draft measure taken in accordance 
with Article 8(3), the national regulatory authority shall conduct a coordinated 
analysis of the different markets related to the access network in accordance with the 
procedure set out in Article 16 of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive). On 
the basis of its assessment, the national regulatory authority shall impose, maintain, 
amend or withdraw obligations, in accordance with Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive). 
5.   An undertaking on which functional separation has been imposed may be subject 
to any of the obligations identified in Articles 9 to13 in any specific market where it 
has been designated as having significant market power in accordance with Article 16 
of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), or any other obligations authorised 
by the Commission pursuant to Article 8(3).
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Annex II  Article 4 Land Expropriation Act: Zone Expropriation 
 
Zone expropriation may be carried out in case any of the following circumstances 
applies: 
1. Where all or part of a newly established urban area is to undergo development and 
construction. 
2. Where an old urban area is to undergo renewal to meet its needs for public safety, 
sanitation, transportation or promoting reasonable land use. 
3. Where an agricultural zone or protection zone of urban land is being changed to 
construction land or an industrial zone is being changed to residential zone. 
4. Where any non-urban land is to undergo development and construction. 
5. Where a rural community is to undergo renewal in order to improve its public 
infrastructure or improve public health, or coordinate with the agricultural 
development planning. 
6. Other circumstances where zone expropriation may be carried out according to law. 
Where the area of development referred to in Subparagraphs 1 to 3 of the preceding 
paragraph has been approved by the Central Competent Authority, zone expropriation 
may be carried out first, and the urban planning shall be promulgated and 
implemented within one year after the zone expropriation has been publicly 
announced without being subject to the restriction set forth in Article 52 of the Urban 
Planning Act. 
 
For a development project referred to in Subparagraph 5 of Paragraph 1 hereof, the 
land use applicant may, together with related authorities, propose the intended area of 
development, and submit a plan for the proposed undertaking that has been approved 
by its superior competent authority in charge of the relevant industry to the Central 
Competent Authority for approval, and proceed with the zone expropriation after the 
Central Competent Authority has granted its approval. After the required period for 
public announcement of zone expropriation has expired, the land use applicant shall 
complete the zone designation of non-urban land or change of land use zoning 
according to the land use plan. 
 
The development referred to in Subparagraph 4 or 6 of Paragraph 1 hereof shall be 
undertaken in accordance with Paragraph 2 hereof, provided it involves the creation, 
extension or change of an urban planning project. Otherwise, the development shall 
be undertaken in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph. 
Areas not adjoining each other may be merged together for the undertaking of zone 
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expropriation in accordance with the contents and scope of an urban planning project 
or the plan for the proposed undertaking, and the provisions of the preceding three 
paragraphs. 
 
Regulations governing the implementation of matters such as the survey and selection 
of zone expropriation area, formulation and approval of expropriation plan, 
acquisition of lands, compensation for relocation, construction works, allocation 
design, cadastration arrangement, settlement of rights, financial settlement and 
coordination between zone expropriation and urban planning, etc shall be prescribed 
by the Central Competent Authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
